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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the building up technological capabilities (TC) in developing
countries and the learning process for these TC in the context of Vietnam. There are 2 main sets
of research questions. The first is the interaction between learning process and its aim: the
accumulation of TC. The second set of research questions concerns the firm's interaction with
its external environment.
The study examines the learning process in 24 Vietnamese firms from two industries:
textile/garment and electronics. This learning process is a core activity for the creation of six
technological capabilities: production, investment, minor and major technical change, linkage
and marketing. The relationship between these TCs and several forms of learning (such as
learning-by-doing, learning-by-training, by-searching information or foreign connections) is
examined. The influences of macro-environment factors on the learning process, the reaction of
the firms to these influences and their impact on learning activity are also identified.
The study found that a pattern of TC accumulation has emerged, where production and minor
technical change are developed more and earlier than other forms of TC. There is a relationship
between certain learning mechanisms and TC: prior accumulation of experiences and foreign
connections are the most important learning mechanisms for the firms. The study suggests that
learning is a long and painstaking process that the firms need to go through in order to
accumulate their TC. The macro-economic policies and the supporting infrastructure are the
two most influential factors for learning and building up TC. In the context of Vietnam, the
characteristics of both a developing country and a transitional economy seem to create particular
difficulties for Vietnamese firms in learning their TC. The Vietnamese government so far has
little selective policy intervention, and at the same time, it has inherited some problems of the
planned economy, such as the overprotection of state owned enterprises. Besides the macro
policies and supporting system, the market factors in transition period have important influence
on learning TC of the firms.
The thesis elaborates some policy implications as conducive environment conditions for
learning to take place, such as balancing priorities to private and state owned enterprises, the
promotion of training, education and the R&D system. At the same time, the firms have to be
more active and conscious in devising their own strategies, in order to respond to the
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Technology, Technological Capability and Learning
The question of building up technological capabilities (TC) in developing countries has
been addressed by development studies as the technology dimension has become a more
visible and important issue. Economic theories based on traditional factors (labour and
capital) do not fully explain the phenomena of how developing countries emerge as new
actors in the international technological arena. Similarly, dependency theory fails to
explain why some developing countries can catch up quite successfully with the
industrialised world. For the development of advanced countries in general, and for the
rise of newly industrialised countries (NICs) in particular, the role of technological change
in economic development has been repeatedly confirmed. There is also much evidence
that the need to accumulate TC is crucial for almost all developing countries seeking to
achieve more technological and economic development. The original focus on technology
transfer and technical choice in technology studies of developing countries has shifted with
the recognition that TC acquisition is a pre-condition for successful technology transfer.
Moreover, not all developing countries have achieved success in the catching-up process,
like some NICs in Asia and Latin America; the issue of formulating TC is even more
pressing for late-comers. In academic discourse and in the policy-making process,
concerned actors are asking questions like: what is the technological capability required by
developing countries? what role do these capabilities play in the process of late
industrialisation of a poor country? and how can these capabilities be built up?
It is not by chance that the problems of technological capability are seen as pivotal.
The question of why some countries are able to create TC that helps them to achieve
positive economic performances while others are not, leads the discussion directly to the
specific localised nature of each country in the learning process. For each country, in their
specific given conditions, the path of development has evolved in a long and painful
process of accumulating experience and incremental change. Another question arises: in
the same given country, with similar macroeconomics and other political and social
conditions, why are some firms productive and quite competitive both locally and
internationally while others are not? Rephrasing the question, why are some firms able to
learn how to adopt, absorb, adapt and assimilate the processes of external technology,
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regardless of whether the source is foreign or local? There must be something crucial
happening 'behind the gate' of the firms.
These questions suggest important sets of research issues to be investigated in this
area. The first is learning process and its aim - the accumulation of TC. To understand the
determinants of TC accumulation for countries and firms, it is necessary to look at the
learning process and TC acquisition at the firm level with the firm as the main actor in this
process. The second set of research issues concerns the firm's interaction with its
environment. The acquisition of TC is influenced both by the macro level factors of the
environment in which firms operate, and by the specific actions of each firm in the form of
its strategic plans and behaviours and its whole learning attitude. This micro-macro
interactive process is thus a central question to be examined in this study of learning and
TC accumulation.
1.2 Vietnam's Context
As one of the poorest countries in the world, Vietnam has recently entered a rehabilitation
period after successive wars. Alongside the many radical changes in the international
political and economic situation, the country is also undergoing the process of transition
from being a centrally planned economy to a market economy. At this turning point in its
development, it seems clear that, among other things, technology could and should play a
very important role. Again, the questions facing researchers and policy makers in Vietnam
are how to build up the TC of the country and how to ensure that the local efforts of a
sector or firm contribute significantly to this TC.
As both a developing country and an economy in transition, Vietnam has
characteristics similar to both types of country. The combination of these different features
may create additional specific conditions for Vietnam's technological development.
Another important question, therefore, is how all these factors are related to the learning
process and TC accumulation in Vietnamese industrial firms. Examination of this will
surely contribute not only to our general understanding of knowledge on learning and TC
development in general, but also to a stock of knowledge on developing countries in
Southeast Asia, and of transitional economies in the Asian context.
This study seeks to identify the problems which Vietnamese firms have to face in
the process of building up their TC. Specifically, the study has focused on the learning
process of the firms as a core activity for the creation of technological capabilities. The
influences of macro-environmental factors on the learning process and the reaction of the
firms to these influences have also been examined. On the basis of this analysis, the study
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suggests some policy implications about conducive environment conditions for learning
and TC accumulation.
1.3 Aims and Outline
I had four aims in pursuing this study: first, to examine the development of TC in
Vietnamese industrial companies and to look at how the learning process is related to the
accumulation of TC; second, to understand the link between macro environment factors
and micro internal actions of firms in shaping learning and TC accumulation; third, to
address more specific issues relevant to Vietnam's context in comparative perspective with
other developing countries, or with transitional economies that may have similar features
of technological learning; and finally, to provide a background for elaborating some policy
implications and recommendations for those organisations within and outwith Vietnam
which are concerned with enhancing TC acquisition in similar settings.
The first part of this thesis covers the conceptual framework and research design of
the study. Chapter 2 deals with the concept of technological capabilities. Chapter 3
reviews literature on learning and its characteristics. Chapter 4 then presents the research
questions and methodologies adopted.
Part II provides the empirical material of this study, starting with Chapter 5 on the
industrial background. Chapter 6 addresses the issue of TC accumulation in the
Vietnamese firms, their sequence and patterns. The learning process used to acquire these
TCs is examined in Chapter 7: patterns, dynamics and the contribution of different learning
mechanisms to different TCs. Chapter 8 addresses questions about the reasons behind the
patterns of TC accumulation and learning: the influence of external macro factors and firm-
level micro factors on firms' learning activities. In Chapter 9, four firm case studies are
presented so as to illustrate in more depth the processes of learning and TC acquisition in
the context of firms as a whole.
Part III concludes the thesis: Chapter 10 analyses the findings of this study in
comparison to relevant literature, while Chapter 11 draws some conclusions and
implications for policy-making, from both firm and country perspectives. This final
chapter also suggests some issues for further research concerning TC accumulation and
learning in the context of both developing countries and transitional economies.
3
PART I
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN
As noted in the introductory chapter, research on technological capabilities has come into
focus through a shift in innovation studies in the context of developing countries. In this
part, I will review literature on TC-building which provides the definitions and different
typologies of TC. In addition, literature background on learning activities for the
accumulation of TC is provided. On the basis of this literature review - covering both
theoretical and empirical studies -1 then propose a research structure and method of study.
Chapter 2 will review the literature on TC, while Chapter 3 deals with learning issues. The
research design and methodology of the study are given in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: DEFINITIONS AND ISSUES
2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the concept of TC in the context of developing countries. Section 2.2
examines the importance of TC for the enrichment of developing countries. The main
definitions and typologies of TC are presented in section 2.3. In section 2.4, some current
research issues on the TC of developing countries are examined. The chapter finishes with a
discussion of the framework for studying TC. Some implications for designing the research
questions and methodology to be used in the study are also discussed. These implications
will serve as a basis for Chapter 4 where I will suggest a framework for the research, in
terms of the questions it poses, the conceptual steps it follows, and the methods it uses.
2.2 The Importance of TC: an Overview
It is not by chance that the study of TC has became relevant in development studies. In
economics studies, technology has been known as a source of growth, development and
wealth for rich nations. Technology is central to regional and economic change, job-creation
and job-destruction (Malecki, 1991). As a disturber of comparative advantage, it has
provided the principal source of change for firms, regions and nations (Chesnais, 1986).
However, the conventional approaches in economics studies (associated with Ballasa,
Kruger and others) tend to focus on prescriptions such as "get prices right" and to disregard
the peculiar nature and cost of technological learning (Lall, 1992). In the context of
developing countries, until the late 1970s, the agenda of development economics and
technology studies had mostly been shaped by neoclassical approaches which emphasised
the choice of appropriate technology and technology transfer (Enos, 1991; Fransman, 1985).
But the purchase of machinery or capital goods from industrial countries by firms does not
of itself contribute to economic development. There must be considerable efforts devoted to
learning the new technology, to developing the capability to produce machinery and design
capability (Chudnovsky, 1986; Enos & Park, 1988; Fransman, 1986b). As Lall (1987)
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noted, the efficient development of industry requires a broad range of TC which can be only
acquired by a long process of learning.
By the mid 1980s, the above mentioned agenda was questioned and the
shortcomings of the conventional concept was criticised in a search for new ways of
conceptualising technology studies (Rosenberg, 1976; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Bell &
Pavitt, 1992; Fransman, 1995). In this context, technological capabilities became a central
question (Fransman & King, 1984, Westphal et al, 1985). Although technology transfer is
still a relevant question, particularly in the initial stage of technological development, the
need to pay more attention to technological capability has come into the viewfinder of
technology studies (Fransman, 1986c & 1995) and as Clark (1985) observed, there has been
an explosion of literature on the subject of TC.
According to many studies, TC plays the critical role in sustaining the
competitiveness of nations and firms (Hewitt & Wield, 1996). It is the central and decisive
factor in creating competitive positions (Ernst & O'Connor, 1989), a key source of
competitive strength (Mytelka, 1993). Key TCs are needed for sustained growth, structural
transformation and continuous adjustment (UNCTAD, 1990). Especially in conditions of
accelerated globalisation of trade and investment, those firms and nations that fail to
accumulate their TC cannot maintain the growth, performance and rising knowledge-
intensity and change-intensity of industrial production (Dosi & Soete, 1991; Justman &
Teubal, 1995; Bell & Pavitt, 1993).
As a result, the concept of TC has come into consideration with increased focus on
the factors influencing the acquisition and assimilation of imported technologies, and
attempts to achieve progress through mastering, adapting and improving these technologies.
Moreover, the efforts of developing countries to introduce new elements in imported
technologies has become a decisive factor in their ability to catch up, to seek and sustain a
place in a global industry, to compete in the international market (Cooper, 1995).
The questions of TC creation have been dealt with in a number of empirical studies.
These studies comprise two main types: the large and comprehensive project sponsored by
different international organisations, which cover many countries and many industries at the
same time, and specific cases which cover certain country, industry and concrete companies
in particular. One large programme is the regional research programme on scientific and
technological development in Latin America, sponsored jointly by ECLA, EDB, IDRC and
UNDP during the 1970s. This programme undertook the studies on both theoretical and
empirical dimensions of technology generation in Latin American manufacturing industries
such as steel making, rayon production, cigarettes, cement and construction industries (Katz,
1987b). This programme covered the countries in Latin America which are most active in
technology development such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Another large
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programme has been research on the export of technology by NICs, sponsored by the World
Bank at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. This programme dealt
specifically with the export performances of technology (mostly in the capital goods sector)
of various NICs of Asia and Latin America like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil,
Mexico, Argentina, India, etc. (Lall, 1984). More current works include some regional-
based research on the production and technology networking of Japanese firms in Pacific
Asia (Baba & Hatashima, 1995), and the technological dynamism and export performance of
East and South East Asian economies (Ernst et al, 1997).
Next to these programmes, there are various country studies which have concentrated
on the technological development of specific countries in Asia such as India (Lall, 1982,
1984 & 1987; Desai, 1980 & 1984), South Korea (Westphal et al, 1981, 1984a, 1984b &
1985; Enos & Park, 1988; Jacobsson, 1993; Amsden, 1989), Taiwan (Fransman, 1986a;
Amsden, 1984; Jacobsson, 1990), Thailand (Bell et al, 1982), Hong Kong (Fransman,
1984b; Chen, 1984), Israel (Teubal et al, 1976 & 1986) and many others.
Studies on Latin American countries have been done by Katz et al (1987b), Teitel &
Sercovitch (1984), Teubal (1984), Dahlman (1984), Erber (1986), and Bell & Casiolato
(1993). In the meantime, Mytelka (1985 and 1992), Muller (1984), Langdon (1982 &
1984), Eisemon (1984), Collinson (1991) and Bennell (1984) have conducted research into
some African countries. More recently, there have been noteworthy case studies on Asian
NICs (Kim, 1990; Chen, 1990; Hobday, 1993, 1994, 1995a & 1995b; Ernst, 1995; Ernst et
al, 1997).
Another type of study has been conducted at the level of the firm, with more
diversified industrial and national backgrounds. Firm-level case studies may be used in
national studies or they may stand as independent studies of only one firm which identify
specific problems such as the study of Bell and Scott-Kemmis (1985a & 1985b) on Thai
firms, the case of Electric Arc (Ltd) in Jamaica by Girvan & Marcelle (1990), the case of a
Brazilian steel company (Barbosa & Vaidya, 1995), and a failure case of industrialisation in
a Ghanaian firm by Adei (1990).
The purpose of these studies is to look at the technological development of
developing countries in general, and/or of most NICs in particular. Different and specific
features of development have been considered: industrialisation (Amsden, 1989); the
acquisition of TC (its forms, content, etc.) (Katz, 1987b; Lall, 1987; Fransman, 1986a);
technological innovation and its contribution to economic performance as measured by
export activities (Lall, 1984; Teubal et al, 1986; Ernst et al, 1997); and the adoption and
diffusion of imported technology (Enos & Park, 1988).
Whatever their purpose, most of these empirical studies have provided evidence of
the importance of TC. The above mentioned country studies show that TC is an important
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factor for national economic development and industrialisation (Amsden, 1989); for
improving the performance of industries (Mytelka, 1985; Baba & Hatashima, 1995); for
maintaining export success (Ernst et al, 1997); and for competitiveness (Lall & Wignaraja,
1994; Hobday, 1993). The success of many NICs reveal the significance of their TC
(Hobday, 1995a). In contrast, Bell et al (1984) have shown that the majority of nascent
industries never achieve maturity in large measure because of a failure to build up adequate
TCs. A similar finding emerges from the study on Thai firms done by Bell & Scott-Kemmis
(1985a and 1985b) and on African firms provided by Adei (1990) and Mytelka (1992).
The need for firms and/or countries to develop their own TC in order to benefit from
technological knowledge has been highlighted by Katz (1987a) in his study on Latin
American countries, although these countries and firms have different ways of TC-building
and have enjoyed different degrees of success. In a study of industrialisation, Lall (1987)
has stressed that conscious technological efforts are needed to change a given technology, to
master it and to make it operative in a particular environment, and to apply technological
knowledge for the purpose of industrialisation. As Amsden (1989) points out in her study
on the industrialisation of South Korea, the credo of successful firms is to invest in in-house
technological capability. In the World Bank's study on the export of technology by NICs,
Lall (1984) noted the significance of TC for export activity. This argument has been
confirmed repeatedly in different cases drawn from the same study (Westphal et al, 1984a;
Chen, 1984; Teitel & Sercovich, 1984).
As can be seen here, there is no doubt that TC has become a central question in
economic and technology development studies. It is vital for developing countries' efforts to
develop nascent industries, to catch up, to industrialise and then further to export
technology. Only by creating TC can developing countries participate in international
technological activities. Those who do not acquire these capabilities have often been left
behind or have simply been out of the competition. A few successful cases, mostly in East
and Southeast Asian countries, and a lot more unsuccessful examples in the developing
world have confirmed this argument.
2.3 Definitions and Taxonomies of TC
Having seen the central importance of TC for developing countries, I will now examine
various definitions and taxonomies of TC. By the end of the 1980s, many studies
recognised the importance of TC for developing countries and suggested different definitions
of TC. These definitions are mostly related to the context of developing countries in their
effort to formulate a basis for technical change and economic growth.
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The most simplified definition of TC is the general ability to undertake a broad range
of technological tasks (Lall, 1987). Similarly, TC can be described as a set (or sub-set) of
abilities relating to: the understanding of specified technology-related tasks or actions; the
transforming of inputs into outputs; and the activities of buying, producing and selling
(Fransman, 1986c). Many other studies go further than this definition in giving more
detailed and concrete divisions of TC.
In looking at the experiences of South Korea in the acquisition of TC, Westphal et al
(1985) identified technological capability as the ability to make effective use of technical
knowledge. This inheres, they argue, not in the knowledge that is possessed but more in the
use of that knowledge and in the proficiency of its use in production, investment and
innovation. The focus of these capabilities, thus, is the application of knowledge. Westphal
et al (1985) classified these capabilities into three broad areas of functional application:
• production capability: this is the capability required to operate productive facilities;
proficiency in this capability is reflected in technical efficiency and the ability to adapt
operations to changing market circumstances; this capability includes elements like
production management and engineering, repair and maintenance of physical capital, and
also marketing.
• investment capability, this is the capability needed to expand capacity and establish new
productive facilities; the proficiency in this capability is reflected in project cost and the
ability to tailor project design to suit the special circumstances of the investment; this
capability includes elements like personnel training, pre-investment feasibility studies and
project execution.
• innovation capability, this is the capability required to develop technologies; its
proficiency is demonstrated in an ability to develop technologies which are less costly
and more effective; the main elements of this capability are search and R&D activities,
ranging from radical (major) new departures to incremental (minor) improvements in
existing technologies.
Lall (1987) also divides technological capabilities into more specific functions/tasks,
suggesting five elements which cover different technological functions:
• Pre-investment choice which includes initial analysis of project profitability, detailed
specification of the project, search for technology, purchase of technology and
engineering studies.
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• Project execution which includes basic process engineering, detailed engineering,
equipment specification, civil construction, mechanical erection, ancillary services,
project co-ordination and supervision.
• Plant operation which includes trouble-shooting and quality control.
• Technological improvements which include identifying and undertaking improvements.
• Transfer of technology to other enterprises.
In more updated studies, Lall (1990 & 1992) regrouped these capabilities into three
main functions: investment, production and linkage within the economy with three degrees
of complexity: basic, intermediary and advanced. These functions are used frequently in his
recent works on TC (Lall, 1993a, 1993b & 1994a). In investment capability, there are two
phases of pre-investment and project execution. In production capability there are three
types of function: process engineering, product engineering and industrial engineering which
covers plant operation and technological improvements. The function of technology transfer
is understood as part of the linkage capability.
Fransman (1984a), in his overview of TC in the Third World, suggests the following
categories of technological capability:
• the search for available alternative technologies and the selection of the most appropriate
technology;
• the mastering of the technology;
• the adaptation of the technology to suit specific production conditions;
• the, further development of the technology as a result of minor innovation;
• the institutionalised search formore important innovation with the development of R&D
facilities; and
• the conducting ofbasic research.
Similarly, technological capability is defined by Amsden & Kim (1986) as the ability,
embodied in people, to select the appropriate technology, to implement it, to operate the
production facilities, to adapt and improve those facilities, and to create new processes and
products. More briefly, Dahlman (1982) suggests that technological capability involves an
understanding of the principles underpinning what is brought in from outside, and an ability
to introduce modifications in order to get better results. Baranson and Roark (1985), in their
studies on international technology transfer processes, distinguish different kinds of transfer
imparting different capabilities:
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• operational capabilities which permit the recipient to make a product equivalent to that
produced by the technology supplier (though, in practice, the production efficiencies and
quality levels achieved may vary widely);
• duplicative capabilities which allow for the duplication of transferred technologies
leading to design and engineering know-how sufficient to reproduce an entire plant or
discrete components;
• innovative capabilities which go beyond duplication so as to alter transferred products,
processes and equipment designs in response to changing resources, requirements and
market demands.
In other studies of the role of training and the acquisition of technical knowledge,
Bell and Scott-Kemmis (1985b) divide what they call technological capacities into two main
categories:
• capacities for effectively using a technical system, which include:
- capacities to manufacture effectively so as to use a given technological system
effectively, to maintain realisable levels of product quality and production efficiency, to
carry out problem-solving activities and to liaise with suppliers;
- capacities to undertake marketing and user support effectively, e.g. to analyse the
market, to provide technical advice to the user, to provide after-sale, maintenance, and
problem-solving services.
• capacities for changing a technical system, which also include two levels of change:
- capacities for incremental technical change such as the capacity to design and
implement minor changes in products, processes, methods, and organisational systems,
to modify technology acquired from other sources, and to modify products for
specialised application and markets;
- capacities for major technical change so as to implement change in a firm's technical
system, to draw on new technologies from external sources and to generate significant
advances in technical knowledge.
Although these definitions adopt different terms and perspectives, they have much in
common in the sense that all describe different levels of complexity of technological effort
for the recipient (in technology transfer) or for the concerned actors. Also, all see these
complexities as increasing with the evolution of technological mastery: from the use of
existing technologies (in the broadest sense of use), to the change of existing technologies
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(through adaptation and assimilation) and, ultimately, to the creation of new technologies
(through technological design and R&D).
There are some notable features among the different taxonomies on TC discussed
above. These taxonomies have one thing in common: their divisions are all related to
abilities to undertake certain functions of the firm. It is not so easy to separate all these
taxonomies. It seems that they overlap and duplicate each other. For example, in order to
operate (or produce) successfully it is necessary to master and adapt, or, if one wants to
change, one should conduct research and innovate, etc. It seems reasonable to see this as
layers of functions, and as layers of abilities to conduct these functions. The point here is
that the function/action of firms is seen as the focus of all taxonomies on TC.
There is another point to address here. In their latest works on TC, Bell & Pavitt
(1993 & 1997) have distinguished production capacity and technological capability, because
the focus of these studies is the dynamism of industrialisation and the resources necessary to
generate and manage this dynamism. For them, production capacity incorporates the
resources used to produce industrial goods at given levels of efficiency and given input
combinations. At the same time, technological capabilities consist of the resources needed to
generate and manage technical change, including skills, knowledge and experience, and
industrial structures and linkages. These studies also differentiate technical change and
technological learning. While technical change encompasses the ways in which new
technology is incorporated into the production capacity, technological learning (or
technological accumulation) refers to any process by which the resources for generating and
managing technical change are increased or strengthened. These distinctions are presented in
Figure 2.1 (Bell & Pavitt, 1993).
At first sight, it seems that Bell & Pavitt's taxonomy might be contradictory to other
taxonomies of TC, because their TC concept only deals with technical change. However, if
we adopt the view that knowledge, skills and experience are the focus of TC accumulation
regardless of its purpose, TC can also include the knowledge, skills and experience used for
the production function. These labour skills (operational and managerial know-how and
experience) together with experience in arranging organisational methods and systems which
are part of the production capacity in Bell & Pavitt's (1993) taxonomy, therefore, are also
part of technological capability (see my underlining in Figure 2.1). This capability may be
called production capability in other taxonomies. For example, Westphal et al (1985), Lall
(1992, 1993a, 1993b and 1994a) or Baranson & Roark (1985) all include these elements in
production capability. In other taxonomies, Fransman (1984a) describes it within the
category of mastering technology, while Bell & Scot-Kemmis (1985b) give the categories of
using (manufacturing) technical systems. As a result, these old and new concepts of TC are
not contradictory, but merely different in focus. Depending on the purposes and emphases
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of the studies, there can be various names. But, in general, they all refer to knowledge,
skills, and experience as a core element of TC.
One notable feature is the increasingly recognised importance ofmarketing capability.
For instance, in earlier works on TC, Lall (1992) mentions this competence in TC taxonomy
only implicitly. The significance of market linkage is only mentioned in relation to linkage
capability. However, in more recent studies and more specific work on the garment industry
of Sri Lanka, Lall & Wignaraja (1994) emphasise marketing as one of the necessary
technological capabilities of the firms. For firms exporting from developing countries,
marketing in the sense of finding or attracting customers and persuading them to place orders
or buy products is almost inseparable in practice from building up the firm's supply
capabilities (Keesing & Lall, 1992).
2.4 Some Key Issues Emerging from Studies of TC
2.4.1 Uneven and Sequential Features of TC Development
Several issues emerge from existing studies of TC. One concerns the uneveness of TC
accumulation across firms in a single country and across different countries. Various TCs
are accumulated to different extents. Firms in Korea or Taiwan, for example, have
developed strong capabilities for generating continuous incremental change in technologies
initially acquired from industrialised countries, then for replicating technologies already
developed elsewhere, and eventually for developing more original innovations (Bell &
Pavitt, 1993). Chudnovsky (1986) has noted that in the case of Brazil, an important learning
process has taken place regarding manufacturing know-how and detailed design, while
design capability is still not developed and basic design is still mostly imported. The
findings of many studies on the software and computing industries (Ernst & O'Connor,
1993; Correa, 1995; Katz, 1987b) and the fashion garment industry (Mytelka, 1991; Lall &
Wignarajar, 1994) report that compared to production and minor technical change
capabilities, the investment and to a larger extent, the marketing capabilities of firms tend to
be weak. The study by Westphal et al (1985) specified that even in the case of Korea as a
NIC, production and investment capabilities were more developed than innovation
capability. This point has also been analysed by Fransman (1995) in his survey on firms
and national level competitiveness.
The uneveness of TC development points to the sequential feature of their
accumulation. Firms do not acquire their different TCs at once, but step by step. The above
mentioned increasing complexity of TC over the process of technological mastery implies
that the accumulation of TC cannot happen simultaneously for all kinds of TC. Rather, there
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is a tendency to start from lower and easier levels of TC (i.e., using technology) and to
progress to a higher and more complicated level (i.e., changing and creating technology).
This progress can occur in a sequence of TC acquisition, over time. This sequential aspect is
not new if one takes into account the notion of the path dependency of innovation (Metcalfe
& Boden, 1992) or the progressing of TC accumulation from simple to more complex
tasks/functions over time (Rosenberg, 1994). Thus, Lall (1993b) noted the attitude of
"getting into production" as the first stance taken by many firms in developing countries.
Empirical evidence given by Ernst (1994 & 1995) have illustrated that Korean electronics
firms (even large chaebol, like Samsung or LG Group) in their first period of learning TC,
tended to develop production competence first, such as the final assembly of mature and
proven imported product designs. On the basis of the development of production, these
firms can then further develop other capabilities. This is called reverse-sequence, which
starts with production capability as the foundation for developing other capabilities such as
investment and adaptive engineering (minor technical change). The Korean experience of
first beginning with production capability with other capabilities coming later is confirmed by
Kim (1990). Similarly, the case of other East Asian NICs suggest that firms in these
countries started with simple assembly of mature products and processes for their first
accumulation of production capability. Then, they moved "backward" along the path of a
traditional technology life-cycle through technological assimilation such as reverse
engineering (Hobday, 1993). Using the simple model of technological development on the
basis of NICs experiences, Hobday (1994 & 1995b) stated that TC accumulation in these
countries has gone through stages from basic production capability to minor incremental
process engineering capability, then to more innovative ones.
2.4.2 Firm-Specificity of TC Accumulation
A second important feature of TC accumulation seen clearly in the existing literature is firm-
specificity as specified by Teece et al (1990), Coombs et al (1992a) and many other authors
(Lall, 1990 & 1993b; Cooper, 1991). In most studies, the TC concept seems to imply the
abilities to use, change and create technologies as those abilities related to concrete activities
at the level of the firm.
Since most innovations are developed by firms, the abilities to select, adapt, use and
transfer technology necessarily have to be developed by the enterprise itself (Katz, 1984a;
Lundvall, 1992). This notion comes from the localisation of technological change (Atkinson
& Stiglitz, 1969) which specified that there is a specific point around which firms localise
their technological effort. The most important components of technology accumulation are
localised in firms (Bell & Pavitt, 1993). In theories of evolutionary economics (Nelson &
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Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Nelson, 1987), the firm is the central actor for several reasons:
firms do not operate on a common production function; technological knowledge is not
shared equally by firms; and the extent to which firms master transferred technologies varies
according to the skills, efforts and investment mobilised. Because of this, the enterprise-
level of technological effort is important (Lall, 1987 & 1992). As Bell & Pavitt (1992) put
it, the firm is the most important actor in accumulating technology because it learns from
developing and operating specific production systems.
Historical empirical studies show that much R&D, design and production
engineering emerge within firms (Amsden 1989; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). The firms'
difference is considered by some authors as axiomatic (Alic, 1995) and can be found in
various studies. One of them is on the Greek food industry (Tsekouras, 1995) where the
author found that individual managers of each firm played very important roles in
formulating their "core competencies" which, again, differ from firm to firm. Recent studies
by Hobday (1994) of export-led technology development in East Asian NICs such as
Singapore found that local firms have proved to be the main contributor to growth.
All these studies point to the importance of the firm in technological development.
However, the technological efforts of the firm are not separated from the environment in
which the firm functions. Therefore, the firm's interaction with factors in its surrounding
environment has emerged as another important set of issues in TC studies which I will
discuss in the next section.
2.4.3 Macro-Micro Links and External Environment Factors
It has been shown by many studies that the technological behaviour of firms is conditioned
by different forces including forces coming from outwith those firms (Katz et al, 1987a;
Lall, 1984). The firm and its technological activity are not isolated from the economic,
technological, political, institutional and socio-cultural context in which the firm operates.
Accordingly, these country-level (or macro-economic) factors play an important role in
shaping the TC of firms and the ways firms acquire their capabilities (UNCTAD, 1990; Lall,
1992).
Firms are strongly affected by the external environment factors or connections which
may act as incentives for or constraints on their technological activities (Metcalfe & de Liso,
1995). Lall (1987) categorises constraints as being internal (firm's nature), external
(infrastructure, raw material supply, etc.), and policy-induced (policy of the government,
other macro-economic mechanisms such as fiscal, labour, import-export policies and
regulations, etc.). These "contour factors" (Katz, 1987b) have very decisive influences on
the rate and nature of firms' technological efforts.
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Although authors emphasise different factors, in general they point to certain
common groups of factors which typically influence firms' activities. These consist of both
supply- and demand-side factors: macro-economic government policies, market factors or
structure, industrial supporting systems, physical and science and technology (S&T)
infrastructure (including academic research), functioning of legal, financial, marketing,
system of information and other institutions (Lall, 1993a & 1994b; Bell & Pavitt, 1993).
Many analyses have conceptualised the role of these factors in terms of the national
system of innovation or NSI (or as some call it, the national innovation system) and its
impact on the innovative capabilities of firms (Nelson, 1988; Freeman, 1987a & 1988;
Fransman, 1990 & 1991). Fransman (1995), for example, sees NSI as including the
influence that government exerts on the innovation process and the related accumulation of
competences, all those institutions and processes within the nation state and their interactions
which together influence technological innovation. Lundvall (1992) points to the elements of
NSI such as organisations, institutions and all parts of the economic structure and the
institutional set-up which affect learning as well as searching and exploring; these may
include the production system, the marketing system and the system of finance. Similarly,
Johnson (1992) emphasised the elements of both supply- and demand-side, such as
institutional infrastructure, R&D departments, universities and bridging mechanisms as
important for the innovation activity of firms. Andersen (1992) went even further pointing
out that factors such as national cultures and ideologies have an impact on firms'
technological efforts. More country studies on NSI in Scandinavia (Edquist & Lundvall,
1993), Japan (Fransman, 1991) or others (Nelson, 1993) point to the importance of this
complex external environment.
The main implication from this work is that it is impossible to separate a firm's
technological accumulation from its operating environment. Moreover, the accumulation of
TC does not depend on the impact of external factors on a passive firm but on the interaction
of firms with their environment, thus, on the way firms react or respond to these factors. To
reflect more explicitly this micro-macro link in technological activities, Molina (1992)
suggested the approach of socio-technical constituencies. According to this approach, the
generation of TC is a complex process in which technical and institutional actors' expertise,
visions, interests and cultural dispositions interact and blend in a context of evolving market
and political pressures. This approach puts technology at the centre of the analysis. Socio-
technical constituents may be defined as a dynamic ensemble of technical constituents
(expertise, tools, machines) and social constituents (people and their values, interest groups,
etc.), which interact and shape each other in the course of the creation, production and
diffusion of specific technologies (Molina, 1992).
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In this model, the firm's TCs are jointly shaped by micro-level factors (within the
firm) and macro-level factors concerning the sectoral or national context of the country; firms
are constituents of the larger whole. It is not the aim ofmy discussion to develop further the
approach of socio-technical constituencies but its implications are useful to my study: the
"micro" and the "macro" are not separate; they belong to a single reality. Therefore, the
study on technological capabilities of firms at the micro-level must be undertaken in the
context of interactions with, and influences of, external environment factors at the macro-
level.
The combination of micro and macro conditions shaping the accumulation of TC can
be found in many different case studies of various countries (Lall, 1982; Fransman, 1984a).
Based on the failure experiences of Thai firms in their effort for TC accumulation, Bell and
Scott-Kemmis (1985a) strongly emphasised some preconditions for this process to be
successful. They note that the basis for the cumulative internal learning process within a
firm is its existing knowledge resources, and that the conditions for locally-generated
technical change of an industry are competitive pressure, cost-reducing pressure,
opportunities in technology acquisition, etc. Importantly, the need for active and conscious
investment within the firm has also been specified (Cooper, 1991; Bell, 1984). Among the
conditions for effective accumulation of TC is the protection of accumulation efforts and the
role of the state in relation to that protection (Lall, 1982 & 1994b; Bell, 1984). The
experiences of Korea and Brazil show the importance of government in creating export
inducement or a favourable policy environment. Even in the case of liberalised economies
like Hong Kong, a certain degree of direct government intervention is still required
(Fransman, 1984b). Recent lessons from East Asian NICs suggest that external factors,
such as the education system, investment in training efforts (Korea, Taiwan) or the active
role of government policy in Singapore, are all vital for TC accumulation (Hobday, 1994;
Lall, 1994b). Thus, the interaction between activities at the micro level of the firms and
factors at macro level is undoubtedly a key issue to examine if one wants to understand the
technological behaviour of firms.
2.4.4 Cumulativeness of TC Acquisition
Throughout the literature survey, I have mentioned that TC accumulation is not a single
action, but a long-term and painstaking process. The technological competence of firms is
accumulated incrementally over time mostly through slow step-by-step development. The
cumulative nature of TC accumulation has been noted by Fransman (1985) in his survey of
literature relevant to technological development in developing countries. According to Bell &
Pavitt (1992), given the importance of specific knowledge, individuals and firms are not
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capable of learning simultaneously across diverse technological and organisational
dimensions. Instead, they tend to move along the particular trajectories by which past
activities shape present directions of technical change, and experience reinforces the existing
stock of knowledge and expertise.
The significance of incremental technological change has been highlighted in
literature on both the industrialised and developing countries (Bell & Pavitt, 1993 & 1997).
One of the first studies was the analysis of continuing cost reduction in Du Pont rayon plants
(Hollander, 1965). Imai (1986) gives evidence from the continuous improvement of
Japanese firms. In some other studies, the importance of cumulative incremental innovation
can be seen in the case of the steel industry of Brazil (Dahlman & Fonseca, 1987) or the
petrochemical industry of Korea (Enos and Park, 1988). In more recent surveys of
experiences in Taiwan or South Korea, Hobday (1993) confirms that firms' TC
accumulation is a gradual and incremental process. In the case of Singapore, for instance,
technology was accumulated through a gradual process, and not by leapfrogging (Hobday,
1994).
2.5 Framework for Studying TC
2.5.1 Three Dimensions of TC
Looking through the definitions and taxonomy of TC presented in Section 2.3, the most
integrated framework of TC study appears to be the model of TC analysis suggested by
Fransman (1986d). This framework suggested a useful approach in dealing with TC by
giving a three dimensional model: organisational practices (divided into operational and
change practices), environment conditions, and performance of firms.
The first dimension concerns operational and change practices which reflect the
activities of the firms for TC (called functional division) in different taxonomies. The second
dimension is environment conditions and shows the interactions between firms and their
surrounding environment, the micro/macro link. The third dimension, an evaluation of
economic and technological performance, reflects any success in TC acquisition.1 Going
further, Fransman suggested that the concept of mapping TC based on these three
dimensions should be the preferred direction for research on TC.
'interestingly, by invoking an analogy with biological evolution, Fransman (1986d) introduced the firm as
an social organism which acts/interacts with its external environment. He calls this a system "of the
organism and its environment, which combines both macroscopic and microscopic elements". This approach
is quite similar to the micro/macro view of socio-technical constituencies developed by Molina (1992).
18
It is necessary to say a bit more about the evaluation of performance. The indicators
of performance which reflect the successes (or failures) of TC acquisition by firms are very
complex. Usually, in various studies, different indicators are given of firms' performance as
the outcome of their efforts in TC acquisition. In order to evaluate performance as an
indication of TC acquisition, some studies use quantitative features in economic gains such
as productivity, profitability, reduction rate of cost of production (in general or per unit of
products), export performances, growth rate, etc. The evidence of TC studies reveal that
quantitative analysis of TC accumulation cannot always be provided, for different reasons
(lack of data on the firms, economic gains such as profitability are sometimes attributed to
causes other than the increasing of TC). Therefore, most studies use qualitative analysis
such as descriptions of how the firms have acquired their capabilities over time, what they do
before and after certain periods of time, and how firms improve their technological level and
sophistication. They analyse how firms gain new skills, knowledge and experiences in
order to do something new. The use of qualitative analysis, in combination with quantitative
data (where possible) is often the only approach available to studies of TC.
2.5.2 TC as Firm-Focus Activity
The focus and emphasis of studies on country, industry or firm level provide different
insights. As presented in Section 2.4.2, however, the firm is the main actor in the
technological development of industry and country. Therefore, it is only by looking at the
firm's experiences that studies of TC can understand in more detail exactly what is
happening in each case. Moreover, different firms have different backgrounds (historical
circumstances of establishment, managers' experiences and education, firm-specific practice,
etc). Without examining these specific features in detail, it is rather difficult to draw any
conclusions about TC accumulation and learning activities.
Although many theoretical and empirical studies have been done on country or
industry levels, specific firm have served as illustrations for the arguments at the macro level
of country studies. In certain conditions, firm experiences can be used to generalise for the
whole sector: where there are a sufficient number of cases, or where they are representative
enough, for example. As a result, there is no doubt that case studies which focus on the firm
level are quite the most appropriate way to study the acquisition of TC and learning.
For this reason, firms' capabilities in the forms of functional/organisational activities
are the focus of this study, while interactions of the firms with their macro-environments
(influences of environmental factors on changes of TC and reactions of firms to these
impacts), is another dimension of the research, as the Fransman's model has suggested. As
discussed above, for the third dimension of TC study, the performance of firms will be dealt
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with in a specific way: qualitatively rather than quantitatively. In addition, this study will not
measure performance per se, but will look at the influences on TC change with respect to
only some performances of the firms. In this sense, the performance indicators of firms are
to be examined to a much lesser extent than the other two dimensions.
2.5.3 Six Forms of TC
On the basis of the review of TC taxonomies in Section 2.3, another division of TC used by
UNCTAD in a study of some East and South East Asian countries (Ernst et al, 1997) seems
quite operationally useful. This taxonomy divides TC into six types of functions with
knowledge and skills positioned as the core elements that firms need in order to acquire,
assimilate, use, adapt, change and create technologies:
• Investment capability, the ability to undertake the functions of identification, preparation,
design, setting up and commissioning of new industrial projects, or the expansion and/or
modernisation of existing ones. This capability can have two sub-elements: pre-
investment and project implementation.
• Production capability: the ability to operate plants, where shop floor experiences and
learning-by-doing have an important role. This capability has elements like production
management, production engineering, repair and maintenance of physical capital.
• Minor technical change capability: the ability to adapt engineering and organisational
features, reverse engineering and analytical design, and system engineering.
• Marketing capability: the ability to deal with demand patterns, market trends, user needs
and skills so as to collect marketing intelligence.
• Linkage capability: the ability and organisational competence to transfer technologies at
three levels: within a firm, among firms, and between firms and their scientific and
technological infrastructure (network or system).
• Major technical change capability: the ability to create technologies which are new in
principle, design new features of products and processes (including new product ideas),
and the ability to deploy scientific knowledge in developing patentable ideas.
This taxonomy is quite similar to the others. It has a functional focus. The
capabilities include (or are almost the same as) those of other taxonomies (investment,
production/operation/use, minor change/adaptation, major change/innovation and linkage).
And it also divides capabilities into the various stages of technological development within
firms: starting from the pre-investment period up to diffusion and transfer activities.
Specifically, marketing capability is named, which in other taxonomies is included under the
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rubric of different capabilities: under the categories of production capability (Westphal et al,
1985; Lall, 1992), or capability to use a technical system (Bell & Scot-Kemmis, 1985b) so
as to undertake marketing and user support. In separating out marketing capability, Ernst et
al's classification acknowledges one more important aspect which is essential for successful
innovation activities of firms.
The distinction between minor and major technical change capabilities is also
noteworthy. In this taxonomy, although minor technical change can have quite significant
gains in terms of profits and economic growth for firms, in technical terms it is less
noticeable than major technical change which are a kind of breakthrough activity. This
second type of technical change tends to lead to new invention, using scientific principles to
create very new technologies (product ideas for patenting, etc.). The examples of these two
kinds of technical change can be seen more concretely in sections 6.2.3, 6.2.6, 6.3.3 and
6.3.6. One of the reasons this distinction is used is that in the context of developing
countries, the technical change activity tends to be closer to minor type rather than to radical
type of change which is out of reach of most firms from developing countries.
According to discussion in 2.3, linkage capability concerns the transfer of
technology. The new taxonomy includes the technology transfer not only among firms, but
also between firms and the whole industrial supporting system (R&D, training, etc.) as well
as among different divisions of firms. This means the linkage capability includes technology
transfer occuring not only from firms to other firms, but also from the whole S&T
infrastructure into the firms which is crucial for the firms' long term economic performance
and growth.
Comparing taxonomies, it can be said that Ernst et al's is an extended and updated
version of Bell & Pavitt's (1992 and 1993). Production capability in the former includes
those skills, knowledge and experience (and only these elements, equipment is not included
for instance) which are grouped within the production capacity classification of the latter. At
the same time, the distinction between production capacity and technological capability in the
latter approach, in fact reflects the difference the former taxonomy makes between TC in
production and TC in technical change. The reason that Bell & Pavitt (1993) did not include
marketing capability in their technological capability is that they are mainly concerned with
technical change as the focus of TC leading to production capacity. Nonetheless, for firms
to operate and sustain their operation, sales activity is an important element, in both local and
export markets. Particularly, with increasing interdependence and globalisation of economic
and technological development, contacts with markets ensure that firms have constant
feedback for their future innovation activities. These characteristics are certainly vital for the
'normal living' of the firms. It would be fair to say that by using this more detailed
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classification of TC by Ernst et al, it is easier to look at the evolution of TC and at the
changes over time of a firm's reaction to outside influences.
Taking all these factors into account, the use of a three dimensional model of TC with
the taxonomy of six specific TCs was considered to be a suitable approach for examining the
learning process for TC accumulation.
2.5.4 Groups of External Environment Factors
The process of TC acquisition through learning is subject to influences of macro
environmental factors as discussed in Section 2.4.3. These macro elements can be grouped
in the following categories:
• policies of the government. These can include macro economic conditions, policies on
financial, banking, monetary, labour, investment, trade and management issues. These
policies, as shown in the review of other literature, have a significant impact either on
creating a conducive environment for the operation of firms or on hindering their
technological efforts.
• market practices: These include structure, regulations and pressure. It is well known that
markets create the necessary competitive pressure for firms in their innovative activities.
The market-pull needed for technological development of firms is unavoidable if firms
want to upgrade their technological competence and sustain their performance.
• supporting system: This includes education, R&D, training, information, documentation
and all other industrial services such as consultancy, quality control, standardisation, etc.
In short this group of factors include all elements of the national system of innovation
surrounding the firm's activities which, as supply-side factors, can create a push for
technological innovation in the firm.
• other socio-cultural factors: These include cultural tradition, social context, specific
political and historical circumstances and advantages/disadvantages which have
influences on the process of TC accumulation by firms.
These categories are broadly divided to show different focuses. By examining their
influences on firms' activity and how firms interact with these influences by devising their
own responses, one can see how firms operate in their particular environment, and so
understand why they have developed their technological behaviour as they did.
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2.6 Conclusion
The review presented in this chapter has shown the importance of TC in the development of
developing countries. This issue has become more significant recently and, therefore, the
focus of my study on TC is an attempt to contribute to our understanding of this
phenomenon.
Three dimensions of TC should be taken into account: the functional/organisational
activities of the firm itself or which TCs are acquired; its behavioural relations with its
environment in shaping TC; and its performance as a reflection of its TC acquisition. This
general approach provides the framework for studying TC. Nonetheless, because TC
accumulation cannot always be understood through quantitative analysis, a qualitative
approach seems more suitable for this kind of research. This point especially concerns the
third dimension of this TC study where the performance of firms as they upgrade their TC is
represented through more descriptive analysis.
On the basis of the synthesis and extension of other already tested taxonomies of TC,
six types of TC were adopted for this study. This helps to address the issue of TC
accumulation at the firm level in more concrete terms. For the obvious reason of firm-
specificity in TC accumulation, the most appropriate approach of this study is the emphasis
on activity at the firm level. At the same time, firms are not isolated islands but constituent
elements of the larger environment. Therefore, four groups of environmental factors are
suggested as the external influences on firms' TC accumulation.
The discussion on TC accumulation associates itself with the concept of learning. In
Bell & Pavitt's (1993 & 1997) approach, learning is the process (or the means), through
which TCs are accumulated by firms. In order to understand how TCs are accumulated by
firms, it is necessary to examine learning process within the firms. The concept of learning,
its taxonomies and main characteristics, are addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LEARNING PROCESS AND THE CREATION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the concept of TC accumulation and its main features.
Among them, the cumulativeness and incrementalism of TC accumulation point to learning
activities as the means to achieve TC. To understand how TCs are accumulated, I will
examine in Section 3.2 the impact of incremental technical change on TC accumulation and
the role of the learning process. Then, the chapter explores the concept of learning in Section
3.3. Some key features of the learning process are given in Section 3.4. Section 3.5
provides a taxonomy of learning. Section 3.6 discusses factors influencing learning
activities. Section 3.7 examines some problems emerging from the literature as well as
discussing the framework for undertaking this study.
3.2 Incremental Change in TC Accumulation: the Role of
Learning
The cumulative nature of TC acquisition in developing countries is extremely important given
that most, if not all, major innovations or radical breakthroughs in science and technology
activities have taken place in industrialised countries. For many reasons, developing
countries cannot afford to pursue major innovation right at the beginning of their
industrialisation path. The most appropriate and affordable way to acquire TC is to rely on
incremental technical change and a gradual accumulation of knowledge, skill and experience.
However, the role of incremental technical change and of accumulative innovation has tended
to be neglected. Many authors have pointed out that, for some time, innovation studies have
been dominated by what Rosenberg (1976) calls the "Schumpeterian heritage", which tends
to see innovation only in terms of major change and radical breakthroughs (Lall, 1982).
Studies in this tradition tend to set up an analytical framework which does not recognise
minor change, but focuses instead on productivity improvements which stem from major
innovations. For example, Rosenberg writes:
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Schumpeter himself was quite explicit that his analysis was intended to apply only
to major innovations of a kind which involved significant shifts to an entirely new
production function (Rosenberg, 1976: 66).
For Schumpeter, the more important thing was to emphasise the discontinuous nature
of innovative activity; the cluster of innovations are at the heart of his business cycles.
Hence, the analysis of the diffusion of technology fails to focus upon continuous
technological and engineering alteration and adaptation, the cumulative effects of which
decisively influence the volume and the timing of product sales (Rosenberg, 1976).
Nevertheless, many authors of technology studies have recognised the importance of
the incremental nature of technical change. Hollander (1965) emphasises that the cumulative
effect of minor technical changes upon cost reduction are no less than the effect of major
technical changes. This point is similar to Enos' (1958) study of the rate of technical
progress, saying that the cost reduction achieved by later improvements through minor
innovations were greater than the cost reduction associated with their initial introduction. The
main point here is that the economic gains from major innovation may be at least equalled by
the gains from continuing improvements to the innovation during their diffusion and use
(Rosenberg, 1982 & 1976). The taxonomy of innovation given by Freeman (1987b) divides
innovations into three categories: incremental, radical innovation and technological revolution.
The incremental type of innovation is described as a "relatively smooth continuous progress
leading to steady improvements in the array of existing products and services and the way in
which they are produced".
The need to look closer at the internal nature of technological innovation, especially at
incremental change has been argued by Rosenberg (1982) in his book Inside the Black Box.
He emphasises that incremental technological improvements can contribute significantly to
economic results:
even small further technological improvements made after the innovation has
reached a threshold level may lead to rapid, large scale productivity consequences
(Rosenberg, 1982: 27).
Minor cumulative developments such as modification and improvement can occur
through the bandwagon effect (Mensch, 1975), which accompanies diffusion (Dosi, 1984).
There can be no doubt that incremental innovation is the most important type of technical
change in developing countries, at least in the first period of their technological development,
where social and economic conditions do not enable them to pursue more radical
technological innovation. As Fransman (1985 & 1986a) concludes, over time, incremental
technical change is usually of greater significance than radical frontier-shifting change.
Breakthrough technological innovation is often necessary to introduce qualitative change in
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the economy (such as new industries) and occurs mainly in highly industrialised countries
rather than developing ones, while far more significant quantitatively are incremental changes
which appear in all countries.
After the technology adoption phase, these incremental gains encompassing the
diffusion phase can be accumulated. Empirical studies of developing countries have
illustrated that their TCs have been gained mainly through incremental processes. The
evidence can be found in studies on the contribution of continuous improvement to
competitiveness in Japan (Imai, 1986), or the petrochemical industry of Korea (Enos & Park,
1988). Other studies include the steel industry in Brazil (Dahlman & Fonseca, 1987) or more
recent studies carried out by the World Bank on the cumulative nature of technical change
(Mody et al, 1991). In the process of technical change, minor innovations are accumulated
over time, not overnight.
The implication of this discussion points to the concept of learning which is an
important issue for firms creating TC. Unlike a machine or a piece of equipment which can
be bought, knowledge, skills and experience - as the core elements of TC - need to be learnt
step-by-step. As Coombs et al (1992b) argue, the learning process is the essential means to
acquire TC. It is an important instance of innovation (Mytelka, 1993) and is necessary for
building competence (Bessant et al, 1996). In order to create dynamic capabilities (Teece et
al, 1990) or to increase competitiveness (Chesnais, 1991), firms or countries need to learn,
again over time.
In many studies on the TC building of developing countries, authors have emphasised
the importance of technology transfer and of learning together (for adaptation, assimilation
and absorption of transferred technology) since the earliest period of industrialisation
(Rosenberg & Frischstak, 1985). Moreover, in the long run, the concept of learning
becomes the most important issue in the technology development of developing countries in
general. For instance, Solo (1975: 12) points out that:
transfer of technology is misleading, for it is not transferring but learning that is at
issue - the capacity of a society to learn and apply what it learns in order to
produce more with the same human and natural resources.
He goes further to assert that:
every society learns from or makes use of the learning of others. This learning
takes place through trade, training and travel...technological advance depends on
what those individuals who live and work in a particular society have learned,
including what they have learned about how to act upon what they know (Solo,
1975: 12).
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To illustrate this point, there are numerous empirical studies of developing countries.
In the case of Asian experiences, thanks to learning efforts, developing countries are able to
accumulate their TC as in the case of Korea (Kim, 1990; Westphal et al, 1984; Amsden &
Kim, 1986; Lee, Bae & Choi, 1988), other NICs (Hobday, 1993, 1995a & 1995b), and
India (Lall, 1987). Some case studies of the steel firm Acindar in Argentina (Maxwel, 1981),
and the SIDOR plant in Venezuela (Viana, 1984) have confirmed that learning effort can bring
technological mastery to these firms. Mytelka (1985) in her study on technology transfer to
firms in the textile industry in Africa confirms that effective technology transfer is essentially
a process of building TC through consciously engaging in learning-by-doing within firms.
Learning has become the common denominator for all countries which successfully
industrialise, such as Korea (Amsden, 1989), and the means by which they compete.
Bell et al's (1982) study of Thai firms shows that without learning, these firms cannot
become mature in technological terms (they remain in permanent infancy). In studies of
African countries and firms within them (such as in the Ivory Coast), Mytelka (1985 & 1992)
reports that no learning takes place and therefore little TC is gained. Similarly, in Tanzania's
textile industry, Mlawa (1983) gives evidence of a lack of learning and a shortfall of TC as a
result.
Having seen the importance of incremental technical change and its cumulativeness, I
have argued that learning has a significant role to play in the process of TC acquisition for
developing countries. As mentioned above, the issue of learning is important not only for
developing countries, but is also crucial in the industrialised world. However, it seems that
developing countries need to learn more. In the following sections, I present the concept of
learning, its key features and its taxonomy.
3.3 The Concept of Learning
As mentioned above, the concept of learning has not come 'ready made'. It has evolved out
of theoretical and empirical studies. According to neo-Schumpeterian tradition, technical
knowledge is tacit and highly specific to countries and firms and therefore its accumulation
can be best achieved by highly-localised learning (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1969). This notion of
localisation of technical change, which is based on learning, is also found by David (1975)
and Cooper (1991). One of the first uses of the learning concept comes from Arrow (1962)
where he introduces the model of learning-by-doing which argues that production costs
decline as productive experience increases. According to him, through the 'doing' (the
process of production which accumulates production experience), the cost of production is
reduced without capital investment as the productivity of workers increases. This core
concept regarding the possibility of accumulation of experience during the process of
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practising production and other related activities has been developed further by other authors.
Similar findings about the automatic effects of learning in the course of production emerge
from the study of labour productivity increases in the Horndal steel works (Lundberg, 1961),
the textile mills of Lowell (David, 1975), and the unit cost decrease in a US rayon plant
(Hollander, 1965). Arrow's idea is examined by other authors who introduce the concept of
a learning curve (Hirsch, 1963; Hirshleifer, 1962; Hartley, 1965; Enos, 1958). This
concept, first associated with a study of the aircraft industry (Wright, 1936), is related to the
observation that direct labour costs decrease as the cumulative number of airframes produced
rise. Sahal (1981) calls this concept a "progress function" and finds that a learning curve
happened in various industries from shipbuilding to petroleum refining.
The concept of learning-by-doing and of the learning curve, however, has some
problems. Although it is well accepted that learning-by-doing can be described as the
phenomenon which occurs when productivity is increased as result of production, it may
reflect the combined effects of many factors beyond the growing experience of workers, and
may also include changes and improvements within management, plant layout, blueprints,
etc. Thus, the concept fails to distinguish the process by which firms learn in production and
in technical change. Also this concept tends to consider that learning is automatic and that
firms do not have conscious efforts (investment, strategies, etc.) to foster learning.
Moreover, in the context of many developing countries, empirical evidence such as those of
Thai firms (Bell et al, 1982) indicates the reverse tendency: production efficiency decreased
over time and productivity increases are not automatic.
Among many studies dealing with this kind of problem, the works by Bell et al
(1982) and Bell (1984) seem the most distinctive. Attempting to conceptualise learning, Bell
et al (1982) distinguish two uses of the term 'learning': learning as the process by which -
through education, training or experience - an individual (or firm) accumulates particular sets
of skills and knowledge; and learning as the effect that is presumed to result from this
process. This second use of 'learning' implies changes in the performance of production
activities. It assumes that some kind of skill and knowledge accumulation process lies behind
the observed performance changes. Such changes are supposed to be the effect of 'learning',
in its first meaning, as having taken place. Bell (1984) argues that this identification of cause
and effect is "misleading" because falling unit costs (or rising productivity) with apparently
unchanged production facilities may have absolutely nothing to do with increasing skill and
knowledge. Therefore, learning as used in the second sense may occur without any learning
in the first sense having occurred. Bell only tries to deal with learning in the first sense: the
process of acquiring additional skill and knowledge by individuals, and through them, by
organisations. The second sense can be described as technical change and this needs to be
separated from learning. Thus, the more appropriate way of using the learning concept is in
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its first meaning, and it might be termed as technological accumulation (Bell & Pavitt, 1992
and 1993).
However, as Bell et al (1982) point out, even in the first sense of learning (as
process), there can be two slightly different meanings. The first is the process by which a
firm accumulates skills from any combination of education, training and experience, including
hiring expertise. The second sense refers more to that process of capability accumulation that
results from experience. Traditional use of learning-by-doing belongs to this second sense.
However, as mentioned elsewhere, learning-by-doing does not capture the full complexity of
TC accumulation. As a result, it is more reasonable for studies of learning to focus on the
accumulation of knowledge, skills and experience by different mechanisms of education and
training. In addition to learning-by-doing, other forms of much more active learning are
shown to be significant.
In addition to the learning-by-doing concept, the role of learning in the accumulation
of information flows and the generation of further knowledge for innovation in the
subsequent use of technology is also significant (Rosenberg, 1982). The information signals
as compulsive sequences are important for the solution of bottlenecks in technical change and
this information can be tackled by users to producers through learning-by-using.
The learning concept is widely used for two different strands of technology studies:
the accumulation of TC in the context of developing countries and the acquisition of
technological competence and competitiveness in business and management studies of
industrialised countries. In the context of developing countries, the study by Cooper (1991)
on the relevance of innovation studies for these countries has confirmed that the learning
concept can and should be used effectively in their conditions. In these countries, the
imitation (Cooper, 1995) and search (Fransman, 1985) activities which mainly aim at
accumulating TC are important factors related to learning. The experiences of these countries
show that firms and countries have to undertake these more active elements rather than just
relying on simple and passive learning-by-doing if they are to achieve sustainable
technological mastery. As can be seen here, the concept of learning has evolved from the
rather simple notion of learning-by-doing into what Lall (1994b) terms a "conscious and
purposive learning" activity.
Learning is also a major strand in management studies which are more geared to the
concept of organisational learning. In industrialised countries, in order to acquire and sustain
technological competence, as opposed to the notion of capability (Fransman, 1995),
organisations have to learn. The concept of the learning organisation (Argyris and Shon,
1978) - or as some call it, organisational learning (Duncan & Weiss, 1995; Batchelor &
Oxtoby, 1995; Arcangeli et al, 1995) - has come into focus. The whole process of
knowledge mobilisation, its generation through different sets of procedures and rules and its
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utilisation to achieve set targets of the organisation (and of individual persons within it) is the
main idea of the concept of the learning organisation.1 But the learning focus of this strand
differs from that of developing countries.
Having discussed different angles of the concept of learning, this section has pointed
to its suitability for studying accumulation of TC in developing countries. The key features of
learning process are discussed in the following section.
3.4 Key Features of the Learning Process
The literature presented on TC acquisition and learning examined the concept of learning. In
this section, I will discuss some other important features of the learning process which have
implications for this study.
3.4.1 Learning is not Costless and Automatic
As argued above, learning is a complex process involving many different types of activities.
In fact, learning does not come 'just so' as Arrow (1962) mentioned, but as a conscious,
systematic and frequent effort made by the concerned actors. The assumed automatism of
learning is criticised by many authors (Cooper, 1991; Westphal et al, 1981; Bell & Pavitt,
1992 and 1993). Empirical evidence in many studies has rejected the classical perception that
learning is a costless and automatic phenomenon (Enos & Park, 1988; Bell et al, 1982). It is
argued that the old concept of learning-by-doing contains nothing that leads to the idea that
firms might have explicit and active technology search strategies (Katz, 1987a). Indeed the
evidence for a 'reverse tendency' - that operating efficiency and labour productivity can
decrease rather than increase over time - illustrates that learning cannot be automatic (Ahmed,
1981; Bell & Hoffman, 1981; Bell et al, 1980; Girvan, 1983).
As Fransman (1986c) summarises, learning requires an expenditure of effort,
therefore it is a costly activity; learning does not accrue automatically as a function of output,
investment or time; and the gain from learning cannot be presumed. These assumptions are in
contrast to the old and classical concept of automatic learning-by-doing as used in economic
literature.
^or many studies, learning is a central issue in theories of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), firms'
behaviours (Dodgson, 1992), and its competitive and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 1990; Alic, 1995;
Fransman, 1995; Bessant et al, 1996). Although this strand of learning studies focuses on various themes
such as the knowledge base of firms (Arthur, 1988; Saviotti, 1992; Metcalfe and de Liso, 1995), institutional
learning (Lundvall, 1992; Johnson and Lundvall, 1992), the structure and competitive strategies of firms
(Coombs et al, 1992b; Chesnais, 1991; Boisot, 1995) and the core competence of firms (Prahalad and Hamel,
1990), most of these themes have firms (or organisations), learning activities and knowledge flows within
firms, and firms' interactions with their outside environments as the common elements.
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There are numerous theoretical and empirical studies available (Maxwell, 1981;
Fransman, 1985; Lall, 1987; Fransman & King, 1984; Bell & Pavitt, 1992 and 1993) whose
main implication is that, in order to achieve technological capability, firms need to make a
conscious effort to organise and invest in resources for learning.
3.4.2 Learning is Incrementally Cumulative and Dynamic
Another important characteristic of technological knowledge is the incremental cumulativeness
of its acquisition (Malerba, 1992). Nelson & Winter (1982), for instance, have identified the
cumulativeness and tacitness of knowledge as crucial features in learning. The accumulation
of technology is a continuous, long-term process which relies on feedback flows of
information (or learning) from within the industry and from users (Baark, 1991). Experience
and further knowledge can come through feedback and error correction which Alio (1995)
calls artful practice. These learning activities are not static phenomena. They involve myriad
improvements and changes (Boisot, 1995). For example, Lapid's work (1994) shows that
the development of a product moves over time from direct learning to learning-by-doing,
learning-by-using and then to cross-learning. A study by Lall & Wignaraja (1994) on how
Sri Lankan firms use the foreign connection mechanism also indicates the diversity in forms
of foreign involvement.
If knowledge is the main focus of the learning concept, it is necessary to mention
some general notions related to this issue. As I have reviewed, the accumulation of
knowledge, experience and skill is the core element of the process of learning. But, in many
instances, knowledge is tacit; it cannot be codified nor can it be embodied in a single person
or organisation (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). The tacitness of knowledge was noted quite early by
Polanyi (1966) and many other authors. Lall (1987) also emphasises the importance of tacit
or uncodified elements. These elements cannot be bought off-the-shelf in the form of capital
goods, nor through drawings or manuals. They are part of what constitutes skill, technical
knowledge, experience and organisational ability. Winter (1987), for example, considers
knowledge and competence as strategic assets and has introduced a taxonomy of knowledge
assets. In his taxonomy, knowledge can be conceptualised in terms of a series of dualisms
such as tacit/articulable, not-teachable/teachable, not-observable/observable, etc. This
distinction is also presented in studies of Teece (1981) and Saviotti (1992).
It is important to note that tacit knowledge which is often skill-based and acquired on-
the-job, makes a greater overall contribution to product development than does formal
knowledge, which is acquired through research literature and education (Senker, 1992;
Senker & Faulkner, 1992). More often than not, this kind of knowledge comprises specific
know-how techniques that are not encoded in text books and often cannot be written down or
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described, and which can only be learnt through practice. Despite the importance of this
specific tacit knowledge, however, Senker and Faulkner (1992) emphasise that technological
innovation demands the synthesis of both types of knowledge.
The main implication of this discussion is crucial for the concept of learning. Tacit
know-how - understood as an intangible asset - can be acquired by firms through a long-term
internal learning process and this partly explains why incremental cumulativeness is one of
key features of learning. The synthesis of both kinds of knowledge (tacit and codified)
suggests that there may be a need to combine different types of learning mechanisms for
effective learning (Teece et al, 1992; Bell & Casiolato, 1993; Cooper, 1995). Learning-by-
doing is more associated with the acquisition of tacit knowledge (Faulkner, 1993) and it can
be combined with other sources of learning such as reading literature; doing research;
receiving formal training and instruction (Alic, 1995; Spender & Di Bello, 1995); learning-
by-absorption (Dickson et al, 1995); or learning by foreign connection (Batchelor et al,
1995). This combined effect of learning - "integrated learning" as Bessant et al (1996) call it -
can bring much more significant comprehensiveness and complimentarity of learning than
reliance on just one or two types of learning. Lately, Lapid (1994 and 1995) has developed
the idea of multi-product-shared learning or cross-learning as the new way of combining
learning activities (see Section 3.5.3).
The tacitness of knowledge discussed above also contributes to the cumulativeness of
learning. Individuals and firms are not able to learn simultaneously across a wide variety of
technological and organisational dimensions (Bell & Pavitt, 1993). Because of its tacit
elements, knowledge has to be learnt through doing-based activities which take time
(Faulkner, 1993). The transfer of this tacit knowledge tends to be slower and more
expensive than the transfer of operating know-how (Scott-Kemmis & Bell, 1988). In
consequence, learning cannot take place overnight, but must be pursued as a long and
continuous process with many new layers of knowledge settling on top of those already in
existence. Clearly then, the learning process needs to be based on previously accumulated
knowledge and skill or, as Dosi (1995) says, "the more you learn, the easier it is to learn
more".
The evidence ofmany empirical studies show that firms, industries and countries need
time to accumulate their TC. For example, Bessant et al's (1996) study found that, in
implementing continuous improvements, people's participation in firms enables an
incremental development of technological competence to come into being. In other studies of
developing countries conducted by international organisations, the example of Bangladesh's
textile industry demonstrates that the process of technological mastery takes a very long time
to come to fruition (UNCTAD, 1990). Similar evidence from other studies of developing
countries can be found. For instance, Hobday (1994 & 1995b) finds that in East Asian
32
NICs, learning electronics technology is not done through leapfrogging but through a gradual
process.
Among the implications of the incremental cumulativeness of knowledge such as the
length of time firms need to learn and accumulate their TC, many authors have pointed out
that prior accumulation of knowledge and expertise is crucial (Rosenberg, 1982; Nelson &
Winter, 1982). Knowledge accumulated in the past contributes to present innovative
activities and to the direction of technological change in the future. Therefore, the
knowledge, skill and experience accumulated by personnel in firms elsewhere can be crucial
in determining what firms learn at a later stage (i.e., that they know what to learn and they
know how to learn it). This absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) to
recognise the value of new external information and to assimilate and apply it to commercial
ends is critical to its further learning and innovative capabilities. Partly through this ability to
recognise the value of new research directions, firms invest in basic research activity that can
help them better understand how and where to conduct research of a more applied nature
leading to potentially commercial products (Rosenberg, 1990).
At the same time, this previously accumulated knowledge of firms might have
negative effects as well, given that previous experiences can lock the firm's technological
learning into the past. As a result, some authors argue the need for learning-by-forgetting
(Johnson, 1992), by which is meant that firms have to change their past experience to accept
knowledge associated with a new pattern of operation. This can also be called unlearning of
old behaviours and reinforcing new patterns (Bessant et al, 1996). In any case, this
cumulativeness is intrinsic to knowledge acquisition and places the incremental process of
learning - especially of prior knowledge accumulation - in a privileged position. This
implication is significant for identifying prior accumulation (e.g., through choosing to recruit
new graduates or experienced personnel) as a distinct learning mechanism (see later in Section
3.5.4).
3.5 Taxonomy of Learning
The learning process can take different forms depending on various criteria. Lall (1982) and
Bell (1984) propose taxonomies of learning that are particularly appropriate for developing
countries.
3.5.1 Technical and Non-Technical Learning
According to Lall (1982), all progress in technology or in efficiency can be regarded as a
form of learning which takes time to be realised and involves the accumulation of experience.
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He distinguishes between learning which has technical and non-technical content. In
technical learning, he identifies three stages each with two sub-stages. The first stage,
learning within a given technology, refers to the import of technology by developing
countries (or its transfer from abroad). There are two sorts of learning which can contribute
to greater efficiency, neither of them requiring major modifications to the "embodied"
technology:
• simple "learning-by-doing" whereby workers become more efficient simply through
experience;
• "learning-by-adaptation", whereby small changes made by shop-floor technicians,
engineers and managers, to products or processes contribute to productivity. Activities
such as trouble-shooting, rearrangements of plants and adaptation of equipment refer to as
this kind of learning.
Learning the embodied technology is the second stage and occurs when some of the
machinery required is manufactured within the country, to reproduce or improve that
particular function within the technology. This stage has two sub-stages:
• "learning-by-imitation": local engineers replicate foreign designs and blueprints;
• "learning-by-design": for this stage engineers progress to understand the basic scientific
and engineering principles involved in order to be able to adapt, change and improve the
machinery.
Between these two stages, there are some small but quite important steps: putting
together imported components, doing some detailed engineering, then some basic design
work which involves knowledge of the exact qualities and specification of materials,
components, mechanical principles, requiring more experience, search and purposeful
technical work. At a later stage, it usually requires the creation of a separate R&D unit.
At the third stage, learning the entire technology or production system involves a
transition from the capability to produce similar machines to being able to produce the whole
technology in a functional plant with a variety of different kinds of machinery, each with its
own sub-technology, and overall design. The ability to train others in the know-how needed
to run the plant is also included in this stage. The first step of this stage is learning to provide
a turnkey plant embodying a given technology, the second is learning to innovate completely
new processes or products, which are major innovations and require basic R&D on the
frontier of particular technologies.
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Non-technical learning expresses the whole gamut of functions required for
successful commercial activity: organisational, managerial, financial, marketing and political.
Some of these functions can be learnt together with technical learning, and some are
independently learnt. The importance of non-technical learning has been stressed since the
failure of this learning may hold back or abort technical learning.
The taxonomy given by Lall can be mostly placed in the context of the production and
export of capital goods by developing countries. Hence, this taxonomy is closer to the
country level than the firm level perspective. This taxonomy, however, has identified a
framework for looking at learning phenomena in developing countries.
Another important aspect of the content of learning is the distinction between know-
how and know-why (Bell & Scott-Kemmis, 1985a; Lall, 1985). For example, Lall writes:
A certain amount of know-how accumulation is a necessary part of the production
process: the need to introduce new techniques into production make the inevitable
adaptation to local conditions, train workers, etc. But, the progression to deeper
technological capability such as design changes, basic design capability, new
product/process development requires investment in accumulating know-why
(Lall, 1985: 76).
Indeed, while know-how is a kind of practical knowledge and tends to be more useful
for doing and using technical and production systems, know-why (usually theoretical
knowledge) seems to be more appropriate for changing these systems. This feature of the
firm's knowledge has a major bearing on the substance and the depth of the learning process
(Bell & Scott-Kemmis, 1985a). The differences between these two types of knowledge can
be associated with other distinctions as seen in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.2 Functional (or Activities of) Learning
The taxonomy presented above shows the progress of learning from simple to more complex
forms. The taxonomy of learning introduced by Bell (1984) categorises learning by the
functions firms perform in order to learn. He divides learning into two kinds of process
whereby technological capacity is acquired. In addition to learning-by-doing where acquiring
skill and knowledge depends largely or entirely on experience, there is the acquisition of
increased skill and knowledge by different means: other mechanisms that do not rest on
experience accumulation. As a result, he distinguishes a number of types of learning, the first
two of which are doing-based (or experience-based) activities.
Through learning-by-operating, the flow of experience derives from the doing of
operational tasks, and is one kind of feedback mechanism. By implementing micro-
alterations to the way they carry out their own operating tasks, individuals in firms generate
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improved enterprise performance. This type of learning is passive, and almost automatic: it
will occur at some rate with the passage of time or with increasing cumulative output. It is
not a significant source of improved production performance over the longer term.
Learning-by-changing is generated not by operating existing plants, but by doing
various kinds of technical change activity. In the course of this learning, firms find solutions
to various technical problems which affect their performance and experience, through the
process of adaptation. The rate of learning-by-changing depends on the rate of experienced
"minor" changes and the rate of investment in major new units of capital-embodied
technology, combined with the degree of participation in these projects.
Learning-by-training in which formalised training is a source of technological capacity
and a kind of explicit investment in the acquisition of technological capability.
Learning-by-hiring by which skills and knowledge may be acquired through the
simple mechanism of hiring the people who embody those sources; the hiring of more or less
ready-made technological capacity.
Learning-by-searching involves looking for forms of disembodied knowledge and
information rather than being (i) already embodied in hireable human capital or (ii) transferred
by a reasonably explicit training process. This type of information very seldom just arrives.
It has to be actively searched out and acquired by firms. It requires the prior accumulation
and deployment of resources to make the search effort.
While the taxonomy of Lall (1982) is more purpose-oriented for the technological
progress of a country (or a firm) through stages, the one given by Bell is more firm-level and
action-oriented with the focus on the very specific core element of learning: accumulation of
skill, information and knowledge. However, these two kinds of taxonomy are not
alternatives, but complementary. Both are quite useful as methodological tools for research
on the learning process. In a similar vein, depending on the actions involved in the learning
process, other studies introduce forms of learning-by-using (Von Hippel, 1982; Rosenberg,
1982), learning-by-exporting (Teubal, 1984; Westphal et al, 1981), by licensing activity
(Erber, 1986), and by R&D (Rosenberg, 1982; Katz, 1985). The main element of these
categorisations is also the accumulation of knowledge, skill and experience through various
activities.
3.5.3 Other Distinctions
Whilst Lall's taxonomy answers the question of what to learn (i.e., the content of learning)
and Bell's looks at learning by various means, others have drawn distinctions which tend to
reflect different facets of how learning takes place.
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Formal and Informal Learning
The formality of learning is the main criterion of this distinction. Amsden and Kim (1986)
have divided organisation-wide learning into two overlapping but distinct forms of training:
science-based learning which is furthered in the classroom or laboratory, and art-based
learning which is gained through on-the-job experience. These may be called theoretical- and
empirical-based learning which provide know-why and know-how types of knowledge (see
Section 3.5.1) as mentioned by Lall (1985).
Another 'formal versus informal' aspect of learning relates to the network of learning.
Networks of relationship between different actors can have a great impact on TC building
within firms (Pyke et al, 1990; Nohria and Eccles, 1992); learning through flexible
organisation (Pedersen et al, 1994); collective learning of knowledge (Kogut et al, 1993;
Lundvall, 1993; Grabher, 1993); and networks of learning (Powell & Brantley, 1992). In
studies of the knitting industry in Modena, Italy (Lazerson, 1990) and of the electronics and
textile sectors in Korea (Myung Rae-cho, 1994), networking among personnel of various
firms and industrial supporting units was found to make an important contribution to
learning. In this networking, both formal and informal learning can take place, but informal
networking has an important role to play in specific conditions where formal learning cannot
function and more tacit understanding of knowledge is required.
Process and Product Learning
With regard to the purposes of learning, Teubal (1984) mentions two types of learning,
mostly in the context of the capital goods sector: simple or process learning and more
complicated product learning. Process learning enables the firm to produce existing
equipment at lower cost, to introduce relatively minor technological improvements or to more
fully exploit the markets currently served by the firm. In the meantime, product learning
enables the firm to shift to new, but technologically-related, types of equipment which are
more difficult to produce or require a design capability as well. This involves better
exploitation of the existing set of sub-markets or user segments related to its areas of
expertise. Among product learning, for different types of products, studies also distinguish
between single-product shared learning which combines learning-by-doing and learning-by-
using to develop a single product (Sahal, 1981; Altschuler et al, 1985) and multi-product
shared learning that incorporates all types of learning into a cross-learning pattern (Teubal et
al, 1976; Lapid, 1994) where experience and knowledge are accumulated through exchange
between teams both developing, separately but simultaneously, two or more products.
Rather similar to this distinction in terms of complexity of learning, Argyris & Schon
(1978) also note the difference between single-loop, double-loop and deutero learning.
Single-loop learning involves feedback into present decision-making to improve future
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decisions, double-loop learning concerns changing the whole basis of decision-making and a
total modification of the firm. Deutero learning, or "learning about learning", reviews the
whole process of learning in the firm.
Strategic and Tactical Learning
From another angle of strategies of firms, Dodgson (1992) suggests a distinction between
tactical and strategic learning with differences in time scale and complexity. While the former
aims at immediate problem-solving activities and has a shorter time scale, the latter involves
the firm developing managerial and scientific or technological skills for the long term future.
Focusing more on learning in the context of developing countries, Lall (1980)
distinguishes various levels of learning: an elementary level of simple learning-by-doing and
learning-by-adapting; an immediate level of learning-by-design and by improved design; and
a more advanced level of learning-by-setting-up complete production systems and by
innovation.
These additional distinctions, in fact, are not so different from each other, since some
notions in one categorisation are used in others, depending on the purposes and focus of the
studies. Most of the distinctions which focus on the formality, the aims and the time-scale of
learning in this section include more concrete functional learning (Section 3.5.2) and different
contents of learning (Section 3.5.1). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, in the next
section I propose an integrated approach for using learning mechanisms.
3.5.4 The Integrated Approach
The definitions and taxonomies of TC and learning seem to be quite similar. However, TCs
are the abilities to do some technological functions, while learning is the process and means
of acquiring these abilities. For example, in order to get production capability, which means
the ability to conduct different functions of production, the firm has to accumulate (or leam)
knowledge, skill and experience by different means - learning-by-Joing production, learning-
by-imitating production operations, leaming-by-adapting production facilities and so on.
As has been shown in previous sections, the two taxonomies given by Lall and Bell
seem the most detailed. Some categories of learning in one taxonomy have been included in
(or covered by) other taxonomies. However, it is not so easy to use these taxonomies exactly
as they stand. Take Lall's taxonomy, for example. It is necessary and reasonable to stress
the importance of both technical and non-technical capability acquisition. But it is not always
feasible to use this distinction in looking how they relate to the six forms of TC mentioned in
the last chapter (Section 2.5.3). For some TCs, such as investment or marketing, technical
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and non-technical learning are intertwined so closely that their separation is impossible (and
unhelpful).
Bell's taxonomy is easier to use for studying the firm, for several reasons. First, it is
easier to see activities of learning as learning mechanisms, by which firms accumulate their
knowledge, experience and skill. Second, by using a function-focus on learning
mechanisms, it becomes more feasible to collect the necessary data through interviews and
firm case studies because functional distinctions are usually easier to identify than other
categories such as the complexity, purposes or even contents of learning. Another reason is
related to the implications for both firms and policy-makers: by looking at concrete functional
activities as learning mechanisms, measures can be suggested to enhance each of these
mechanisms for TC accumulation.
In addition, besides the forms of learning by training, hiring or searching, there is
something more which constitutes the whole complex of learning action to get a technology, a
production system or a project to work normally. Interestingly, this is described by Fleck
(1991) as learning by "struggling to get it to work". He mentions that this kind of learning
refers to the implementation process, by which improvements and modifications have to be
made to the constituent components before the configuration can work as an integrated entity.
In a similar attempt to devise a learning taxonomy, Fleck (1994) suggests the following
learning types: learning-by-doing, learning-by-undoing (reverse engineering), learning-by-
using (incremental improvements made in the course of, or after, using a technology),
learning-by-trying, or by-struggling (improvements made before new configurations can be
implemented) and learning-by-learning (training programmes).
For the reasons mentioned above, I propose to use six categories of learning. This is
an extended version of Bell's taxonomy which integrates elements of other taxonomies.
The first is active learning-by-doing in its broadest sense, including incremental
improvements made before and after technology is implemented and used. In this sense, this
form of learning refers to all learning-by-doing, learning-by-operating/using, changing and
trying/adapting, etc. Examples of this kind of learning are also found in studies of learning
mechanisms presented in studies by Lapid (1994) and Von Hippel & Tyre (1995), where
problem identification and solution finding can be done through practical tests and checking.
This form of learning - called "learning by templating" by Von Hippel & Tyre (1995) as a
variant of trial and error problem solving - can also be described as a form of pattern
recognition. As a result of templating, problems are discovered in the course of doing. In a
study on Celltech, a biotechnology firm, Dodgson (1992) presented a similar use of various
kinds of mechanisms in the learning process of the firm. In the Celltech case, learning-by-
doing takes the form of learning by solving technical problems. To pursue this type of
learning, firms try to implement something, adjust the problems, change the configuration
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and learn from mistakes to improve certain targets after each test trial, etc. In short, it is much
more broader and active than just passive doing. Fleck's (1994) notion of learning-by-
struggling or trying fits into this active leaming-by-doing.
However, as established in Section 3.4, doing-based learning is not enough and firms
need to have more active learning forms for TC accumulation. Other active learning
mechanisms are required. First, learning by prior accumulation of knowledge, skills,
experience from recruitment is necessary. This way of learning helps firms to acquire
knowledge and experience through their personnel before they start working for the firm and
to increase firms' absorptive capacity for subsequent learning.
Learning by local training: on-the-job mode includes various training and supporting
activities which do not require workers to leave their jobs, and these are mostly offered on-
site. This also includes hiring experts to come in from outside to solve problems in firms and
to share their experience with the firms' personnel. This category is close to the in-house
training activities mentioned by others, and these activities are usually short-term and more
frequently informal than formal in style. As Enos (1991) notes, on-the-job training can offer
advantages over formal training (being quicker, more pragmatic and achievable with a
minimum of overhead) and its effects seems to be substantial. The ojf-the-job mode of local
learning refers to training courses whereby staff leave their job for some time to attend off-site
activities. This form of training usually tends to be more formal and long-term, and is offered
by outside organisations such as universities, vocational schools, training centres or other
companies. The study by Bell and Scott-Kemmis (1985a) shows the value of examining both
on-the-job and off-the-job training.
Learning by searching and collecting information (for instance, through
documentation) and by contacting consultants is quite an important mechanism, as is
networking. As an example of this way of learning, Robert (1973) mentions that the role of
local consultancy is crucial to the successful transfer of turnkey projects from an external
source for internal incorporation by the firm.
Last is learning through foreign connections: both for training on-the-job or off-the-
job, as well as for other technical assistance in searching out expertise and collecting
information, etc. The reason for adding one more learning type into this taxonomy lies in the
context of developing countries, where, in many cases, foreign connections are the most
important initial input to starting up a business, either through technology transfer or through
direct investment. In a broad sense, foreign connections may already be implicated in many
other mechanisms such as forms of training and information collection which are foreign-
related. However, in many cases, a firm's success or failure in using foreign connections for
acquiring TC can be so substantial (Lall & Wignaraja, 1994) that it remains necessary to
consider this mechanism separately from the other forms of learning.
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As can be seen here, the proposed taxonomy has a function-based focus, although it
includes other distinctions. It can involve both technical and non-technical contents, product
or process learning purposes and long-term strategic or short-term tactical learning
perspectives.
3.6 Factors Influencing Learning Activities
3.6.1 Sector- and Firm-Specificity of Learning
Technological innovation and learning vary depending on context. Changes that affect one
technology or one way of producing a good may have little effect on other technologies or
other modes of production. This specificity of technological development is termed the
localised nature of technological learning (Stiglitz, 1987; Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1969).
Because of this localisation and the context of each sector or each firm, learning is sector- and
firm-specific.
First, let us consider a sector-level perspective on technological learning. According
to Pavitt (1984), industrial sectors can be divided into four types depending on the ways
technological innovation takes place: (i) supplier-dominated, (ii) scale-intensive, (iii)
specialised-suppliers and (iv) science-based sectors. These types of sector have different
rates, sequences and evolution modes of TC building. Differences in the pattern of
innovation and technical change in various sectors, together with their various implications
for learning, are highlighted by other authors (Teubal et al, 1986; Lall, 1987).2 The scope of
learning in sophisticated industries is potentially greater than in conventional ones.
Innovation and learning can differ from industry to industry (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and
learning is the outcome of production in a given industry (Andersen, 1992).
Cimoli and Dosi (1988) have also tried to map the relationship between Pavitt's
classification and the main mechanisms of innovation, diffusion and learning. According to
them, learning patterns are quite different for different sectors.3 Forms of learning related to
the development and use of capital equipment are important, but more formal search/learning
2For example, Teubal et al. (1986) distinguish conventional and sophisticated industries as having
fundamental structural differences with implications for the nature of learning. Conventional industries only
use technologies, while sophisticated industries develop and diffuse these technologies.
3In supplier-dominated sectors, diffusion-through-learning is important, being both internal to the firms, via
production-based experience, and being industry-wide, via epidemic diffusion of information and skills. Both
supplier-dominated and specialised-supplier sectors are characterised by various forms of tacit and incremental
learning related to the use of equipment, possible improvements in the latter, development of engineering
skills in machine-building, adaptation of existing machines and final products to specific environment
conditions. In science-based sectors, an extensive search process (R&D effort) is the typical learning
mechanism. In the scale-intensive sectors, two types of learning are combined: more cumulative learning by
operating/using and more active learning-by-search.
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through R&D is highly complementary to informal learning and diffusion of technological
knowledge. As Bell & Pavitt (1993) suggest, the locus of technological learning differs
between sectors, ranging from production operation (quality control, production planning) in
supplier-dominated sectors, to exploitation of basic research for products and associated
process developments (R&D) in science-based sectors. Therefore, the use of certain elements
of each learning mechanism - such as absorptive capacity - also varies between industrial
sectors. For example, Preverez & Shohet (1995) report that the pharmaceutical sector is more
receptive to new research ideas than the energy sector which displays greater conservatism.
Similarly, firms in the pharmaceutical industry make more use of public sector research than
the parallel computer or advanced engineering ceramics industries do (Faulkner & Senker,
1994).
These differences in the nature of learning in sectors also imply different conditions
for learning to be successful (Cimoli & Dosi, 1988; Bell & Pavitt, 1993). In the supplier-
dominated and specialised-supplier sectors, great importance is attributed to the literacy and
skill levels of the workforce and the skills and technical competence of engineers and
designers in the mechanical and (increasingly) electronics fields. In scale-intensive sectors,
finding managers who are capable of efficiently running complex organisations is important.
In science-based sectors, the quality of higher education and research capabilities is most
significant.
Different learning patterns in different industries can also be seen from studies of
developing countries. For example, Lall (1993b) notes that in the experience of Asian
developing countries, the learning process varies greatly by industry between automobile
manufacturing and garments, for instance. According to him, the complexity, cost and risk
of TC investment rises with the sophistication of the technology and the level of technological
development reached. More concretely, constraints in the textile industry (like the cost of
building up a valuable level of TC) seem to be less than in other industries such as automobile
or other manufacturing.
In addition to the different features of innovation and learning in various sectors, one
characteristic pointed out by some studies is the inter-relatedness and complementary
interaction of different sectors in innovation (Rosenberg, 1982). As Erber (1986) shows
through Brazilian cases, reverse engineering of machinery by local producers is difficult to
perform in the absence of engineering services capabilities. Thus, the study of the learning
process should reflect the sector-specific nature of technological innovation.
In addition to sector-specific features, firm-specific features are no less important to
learning. As argued in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.5.2, the most active and important learning
activities for TC accumulation take place at the firm level by particular individuals or units
within the firms. Many authors suggest that a firm's knowledge is highly specific (Coombs
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et al, 1992b; Saviotti, 1992); that TC accumulation most importantly occurs within firms
(Enos, 1991); that most innovations are developed by firms (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989,
Amsden, 1989, Katz, 1987b); and that the organisation of learning within firms is important
and affects each firm's capabilities (Lundval, 1992). Pointing more specifically to the fact
that the learning process is necessarily firm-specific, Lall (1994b) emphasises that there is no
predictable learning curve up which all firms travel. Each firm has its own background
situation and historical circumstances that influence the patterns of TC accumulation and
learning. A study of Korean small firms reveals that predominant determinants of
technological innovation vary according to the types of organisation and managerial attitudes
toward innovation (Kim et al, 1993). As Bell & Pavitt (1993) underline, the localised nature
of firm-centred technological accumulation, and the firm as a human capital creator in the
process of learning, have great importance. Firm-specific features can become evident in the
form of managers' background (education, working experiences, etc.) (Enos, 1991), and in
the types of knowledge specific to particular firms (Bell & Pavitt, 1993). As a result, the
learning process which is experienced by firms and their managers and which is dependent on
these factors, is highly localised. Thus, the characteristics of a firm like its size, nature, type
of activities, production organisation (Katz, 1985) or its social relations (Fransman, 1986a)
are important in influencing the learning process.
The firm-specificity of TC accumulation and learning activities is well established.
We may conclude that the most important components of technological learning are centred in
firms, and hence, that it is necessary to use the firm-level as the framework for studying
learning mechanisms. This point has special significance for a country like Vietnam. As Bell
& Pavitt (1993, by citing Hanson & Pavitt, 1987) note, the failure to recognise the firm-
specific and localised nature of TC accumulation and learning has been one of shortcomings
of technological policy in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Soviet countries where
R&D and design functions were separated from production units, and similar shortcomings
characterise many developing countries. Firm-specificity implies the important role of firm-
initiated strategies and their interaction with the external environment as I will discuss in the
next section.
3.6,2 Macro-Level Factors and Micro-Level Responses
The impact ofmacro environmental factors on TC accumulation has already been discussed in
Section 2.3.4. Learning, as the process leading to the acquisition of TC, is necessarily
affected by these factors. Much of the literature addresses the conditions which must pertain
if learning is to be successful, and catalogues the reasons for failure. As argued both in
Chapter 2 and in the last section, learning is affected by and/or depends on the firm-specific
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efforts of managers and organisations (Fransman, 1986b), and firm-centred behaviours
(Katz, 1985; Mytelka, 1985). The rate and direction of technical search efforts (one form of
technical learning) of the firms in developing countries are affected by four major sets of
factors: (i) micro-economic determinants, (ii) the competitive climate, (iii) macro-economic
determinants, and (iv) new technical knowledge as international technological frontiers
expand (Katz, 1985).
The impact of macro determinants on learning in the firm is examined from different
angles in many studies. For instance, market and competitive factors can be important
external factors for the firm (Porter, 1990; Patel & Pavitt, 1992); as can the intervention of
government by macro policies (Nakaoka, 1987; Ozawa, 1980; Hobday, 1994 & 1995a; Lall,
1994b). So can the system of supporting institutions for specific industries (Pavitt & Patel,
1988; Laurence, 1980; Morita, 1992) or the whole national system of innovation (Lundvall,
1992). In a study on national systems of innovation (NSI), Dalum et al (1992) emphasise
both the macro-economic policies of the state and the industrial supporting system as essential
factors to promote learning. Besides the supply-side, there are also demand-side factors
which influence the stimuli for learning (Mytelka, 1985). The influence of both supply-side
and demand-side factors on learning processes is noted by Johnson (1992), and examined by
Lall (1993b and 1994a) in studies on the TC of firms as well as countries. In many
developing countries, macro factors such as market forces have an impact by creating
opportunities for learning-by-doing to occur. Besides, in the case of a successfully designed
policy by government, to create a complementary relationship between imported foreign
technology and learning-by-doing by local technologists, learning by reverse engineering
does take place (Cooper, 1973). Japan provides one example of this argument. These
factors come from many sources: changes in tastes, incomes, competition, availability of
inputs of foreign exchange, state procurement policies, etc. Furthermore, competition has an
important influence on learning by firms and suggests the notion of "learning-by-competing"
(Fransman, 1986a).
The debate on the role of the state and its intervention in creating competitive pressure
is not new in the literature, but it remains important to address here. Depending on
government policies, firms may face harsh competitive pressure in the external macro
environment or, alternatively, may be protected from this competition. The notion of
competition versus protection is reviewed in many studies (Fransman, 1985; Dalum et al,
1992; Bell & Pavitt, 1993). This debate has important implications for learning. For
example, Dalum et al (1992) challenge the Austrian argument suggesting that the market
mechanism is a very effective discovery process, the results of which cannot be improved by
policy-makers, and a position that nothing can be gained by regulations. Dalum et al (1992)
argue that there is no such thing as an unregulated market since a market is always embedded
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in sets of institutions. Furthermore, they emphasise the crucial role of government in
introducing incentive measures. The significance of government intervention, even in
conditions where market forces are dominant, is stressed by Bell & Casiolato (1993). In
other studies, Bell (1984) and Bell & Pavitt (1992) show the influence and role of
government policies in learning. Guererri & Tylecote (1995) mention the role of government
as financier of innovation, and even as the shaper of market patterns and forces. Enos (1991)
specifies five instruments of government action to support firms' technical competence. This
role of government can be catalytic in using technological infrastructure policy to create
capabilities (Justman & Teubal, 1995).
A similar debate occurs in the context of developing countries where the importance of
some degree of government intervention is often noted. Lall (1993b), based on Asian
evidence, notes the role of government in remedying market failures, providing information,
financial sources, skill formation, other technical services and infrastructure, etc. The role of
government in Singapore in exploiting information technology as a conscious strategy to
support industries (Wong, 1992) tells a similar story. The governments of Japan, Taiwan
and Korea have a crucial role to play in creating a facilitating environment for the growth of
firms (Fransman, 1995). Among the issues related to learning and TC accumulation is the
protection of production and its various effects and the role of the state in this (Lall, 1982 &
1994b; Bell, 1984). Even in the case of a most liberalised economy like Hong Kong, there is
a certain degree of direct government intervention (Fransman, 1984b). It is argued that
effective learning in developing countries requires some intervention involving preferential
financing and various measures of protection (Kim, 1980; Wade, 1990).4 Moreover,
intervention (for instance, by creating some protective measures through taxation and other
incentives) needs to be selective to support capability building in different developing
countries (Lall, 1993a).
Next to the macro policies of government, the learning process is becoming
increasingly dependent on factors like the training and education system, the networks of
R&D activities and other industrial services, which, in turn, require enormous investment and
effort both from the state and from individual firms. These factors are embedded in the
external environment in which the learning of firms takes place, and from which learning
activities at the firm level cannot be isolated (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Dosi, 1995).
4The anti-interventionist position is strongly criticised most clearly in Lall's (1994b) study on industrial
policy. He criticises the World Bank study on the East Asian miracle which failed to address the important
role of the government in tackling market failures. Similar points criticising anti-intervention arguments and
advocating a governmental role can be found in a range of studies of Dalum et al (1992), Amsden (1994) and
Ranis (1995).
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Besides external factors, learning by firms also depends on their internal action and on
the behaviour of their personnel. For example, the maximisation of learning potential
depends on firms' behaviour in defining exactly what technology is wanted; in identifying
potential suppliers and selecting the best; and in preparing negotiations and contracting the
core of technology while subcontracting peripheral technologies (Mytelka, 1985). An
important implication of firm-specificity mentioned above is the impact of firms' strategic
behaviours on learning activities such as on human resource development (Saviotti, 1992).
Having (or not having) different strategies for doing business, firms may have different needs
for learning and adopt different measures and behaviours to learn. Strategies for doing
business in general, and for learning and acquiring TC in particular, as the responses of firms
to external influences have another kind of impact on the learning process (Teece et al, 1990).
As a result, the interaction between macro factors and micro actions have jointly
shaped the learning of TC by firms (Cooper, 1995; Malecki, 1991). Coombs et al (1992a)
see the interactions of the constraining effects of the external environment, and the internal
actions of firms as complementary and not mutually exclusive. The macro-micro link
becomes a crucial determinant in examining the learning activities of firms. Empirical
evidence for this argument can be seen in many studies (Katz, 1987b; Mytelka, 1985). For
example, in the case of Celltech, Dodgson (1992) reports that learning is to serve the strategy
of firms and is influenced by both macro factors and internal strategies of the firm. Mytelka
(1985) in her study of African industries emphasises the role of firms' managers and their
actions as important in deciding which direction learning will follow.
The influence of macro environmental factors on learning and acquiring TC is
important in all economies. In the context of countries in transition from centrally-planned to
market economies, the role of the state discussed above has been actively debated (UNIDO,
1994; Balazs, 1995). The traditionally strong role of the government in a centrally-planned
economy is challenged by the transition to a market mechanism. However, the role of the
state in introducing intervention measures is emphasised as still vital for firms' activities in the
transitional period (McMillan, 1995). This role can be crucial in supporting the building up
of TC (Radosevic, 1993), in reorganising the national R&D system (Shaw, 1995; Zhang &
Reeve, 1995) and in influencing activities at firm level (Bell & Pavitt, 1993; Gourevitch et al,
1994; Gu, 1996). It is impossible to review all relevant studies on transitional economies
(and there is no need to do so in the scope of this thesis), but taking into account the fact that
Vietnam is the focus of my study, it is both a developing country and an economy in
transition, so this issue has specific significance. Therefore, I will come back to this topic
when discussing the specific context of Vietnam in the following chapters.
46
3.7 Reflection on Issues for Studying Learning
In the sections above, I have presented the concept of learning and discussed its key features.
A taxonomy for the purpose of this study is also suggested. The discussion has opened some
problems for studying learning, both in terms of the content and the methodology of the
study.
3.7.1 The Learning and TC Accumulation Relationship
The first problem observed from existing studies concerns the separation of learning and TC
accumulation activities. Although some authors specify that learning is the process of TC
accumulation (Bell & Pavitt, 1993), most studies indicate this relationship more implicitly.
The strand of management and business-related learning studies tends to deal with learning
activities only in firms of developed countries, and only for the purpose of improving
competitiveness. Although some of these studies are geared to the level of the firm and focus
rather explicitly on learning, they are not related to the context of developing countries. Very
concrete studies on learning-by-doing (Von Hippel & Tyre, 1995), learning-by-trying (Fleck,
1994), cross-learning (Lapid, 1994 & 1995), and learning the management of innovation
(Bessant et al, 1996) provide some examples. Firm case studies such as Celltech (Dodgson,
1992) or the Sony-Philips comparison (Collinson & Molina, 1995) have been conducted in
this vein. A shortage of sufficient detail also colours certain studies. For instance, in the
Celltech study, Dodgson (1992) uses learning mechanisms like off-the-job and on-the-job
training and collecting information through extensive collaboration with academia. Although
he calls these learning mechanisms by different names such as learning in R&D, or learning
from making, etc., the substance of learning mechanisms are the same. However, his
analysis of the use of these mechanisms is still too brief, and does not sufficiently consider
how these mechanisms came into being or were (re)organised in the learning process.
Another strand of studies deals with TC accumulation in the context of developing
countries, but this strand tends not to discuss learning mechanisms explicitly. The majority
of these studies discuss the accumulation of TC at the national level with little examination of
any concrete learning mechanisms used. The studies done by international organisations
(UNCTAD, 1990 & 1991) and on TC accumulation in general (Lall, 1992, 1993a, 1993b,
1994a and 1994b; Enos, 1991; Lee et al, 1988; Mytelka, 1993) are examples. Some country
studies on Korea (Ernst, 1995), other NICs (Hobday, 1993) or Singapore (Wong, 1992)
have the same TC focus at national level. Other studies examine learning activities a bit more
while discussing TC accumulation, such as studies of garment export in Sri Lanka (Lall &
47
Wignaraja, 1994), learning in the Indian context (Lall, 1987) or in African countries
(Mytelka, 1985 & 1992; Mlawa, 1983). But they are not explicit enough in addressing
learning's relation to TC. In the framework of other country or sector studies, authors tackle
the problems of accumulation of TC and therefore, relate themselves to issues about learning,
but they do not directly indicate the concrete forms of learning they encounter, nor do they
examine which forms of learning contribute to which kinds of TC.
As can be seen in both strands, there is not enough examination of the relationship
between different types of TC and the various forms of learning mechanism used to
accumulate these TCs. Assuming the six types of TC in Section 2.5.3 and the forms of
learning presented in Section 3.5.4, the role that each form of learning plays for each type of
TC may differ. In other words, the way each TC is acquired by learning might be different or
similar, depending on various factors internal and external to firms. It is useful to note that
Metcalfe & de Liso (1995) mention that different knowledge requires different learning
mechanisms. The significance of each mechanism depends upon its context of use for
acquiring particular TCs. However, it is difficult to find studies that address this relationship
in a comprehensive and systematic way, although some studies have moved in this direction.
For example, studies of cases in Asian countries such as Thailand (Bell & Scott-Kemmis,
1985a & 1985b) and NICs (Hobday, 1993, 1995a & 1995b) have examined some learning
mechanisms quite concretely. In the Latin American context, studies of learning in the firm
Embraer (Frischtack, 1994), the Argentine steel plant Acindar (Maxwell, 1981), and the
Venezuelan steel plant SIDOR (Viana, 1984) are noteworthy. Although these studies discuss
very well the learning activities in firms, it seems that the more specific discussion of the
learning-TC relationship remains to be done.
Even in studies which aim to relate the learning activities of firms to some TC
(Teubal, 1984; Hobday, 1995b), they do not go far enough behind the learning mechanisms
to see how firms use various ways of learning to accumulate their TC. They tend to describe
what has been learnt by the firms, but much less how it was done and through which
mechanisms. For example, Teubal (1984) in his study on learning in the export of
manufactured goods in Brazil finds that learning can be related to three groups of capabilities
such as manufacturing, design and others. He provides more examples of learning as spin¬
off in terms of performance, rather than in terms of mechanisms of knowledge accumulation.
Another example is Hobday's (1995b) study on learning electronics technological capability
by firms in NICs. When presenting the case of Anam Industrial (Korea), the author argues
that the firm learns from the foreign partner and has progressed from simple production to
more complex tasks without indicating in much detail how this was achieved step-by-step.
Moreover, in addition to the foreign connection, other learning mechanisms such as local
training are not examined. The author himself admits that there is still little known about the
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formal and informal methods by which late-comer firms train employees (Hobday,
1995b: 1187). Similar examples can be taken from other studies (see Lall, 1987). Thus,
there appears to be a need to look at the contribution of learning mechanisms to different TC
in greater detail, especially in the sense of knowledge accumulation. As existing studies now
stand, I would strongly agree with Bell's argument that there is too much emphasis on the
performance aspect of learning and too little on skill and knowledge accumulation.
Specifically, in many cases, it has been mentioned that thanks to learning, one or another TC
has been acquired successfully, but there is no indication of how exactly this happened; of
how knowledge, skill and experience are increased.
Another point to note is that most studies were done to establish why one or another
country, sector or firm succeeded in their effort at TC creation. Except for a few cases of
failure in Thai firms done by Bell and Scott-Kemmis (1985a & 1985b), Bell et al (1982) or in
a Ghanaian firm (Adei, 1990), there is little known about why so many firms in developing
countries could not do their learning and increase their technological skill, knowledge,
experience and expertise after so many years of being involved in the technology transfer and
development process. The examination of failure may provide very useful evidence on
learning activities and provide lessons for others.
One aspect of previous learning studies concerns the sector perspective of learning.
So far, not many studies have been done on sectors' similarities and differences in terms of
learning mechanisms and TC accumulation as a follow-up to the concept initiated by Pavitt
(1984) on sectoral innovation patterns. Moreover, studies on learning in developing
countries tend to concentrate on one sector (or one firm) and there is no possibility to look at
the sector perspective.
3.7.2 The Examination of Macro-Micro Interactions
Two issues emerge from this point. First is the lack of examination of the interaction between
macro environment factors and internal micro level factors on firms (structure, behaviours,
background, historical circumstances of establishment, etc.). Although most existing studies
recognise the importance of this interaction for TC accumulation and learning, not many of
them examine this issue in sufficient detail. This also influences their focus solely on TC
generation in general, and not on the concrete learning mechanisms used (Massaquois, 1995;
Enos, 1991; Lall, 1993b). Moreover, studies in this area tend to point out how macro
environment factors influence firms in their activities, but provide little data on how firms
react to those factors over time. This weakness has been recognised by authors in some
studies (Hobday, 1995b).
49
The second issue is related to the question of strategies of firms and their impact on
the learning process to accumulate TC. Although in the context of developed countries this
issue has been addressed vigorously, it is far less well explored in developing countries (Bell
& Pavitt, 1992). A more systematic examination of this issue could bring great value to our
understanding of a more balanced view of the interaction between macro and micro factors.
3.7.3 The Context of Developing and Transitional Economies: the Case of
Vietnam
As I have mentioned, an understanding of TC accumulation and learning in the context of
developing countries is in short supply, especially when it comes to learning activities at firm
level (Cooper, 1991; Hobday, 1995a). Most available studies are of the East Asian NICs of
Korea or Taiwan, with less on other countries in different parts of the world (see Bell &
Pavitt, 1993 for a comprehensive review). With regard to transitional economies, the
majority of studies are on economic reforms and restructuring whilst R&D activities,
technological accumulation are less well studied. A study of technological learning and TC
accumulation in the case of South East Asian countries such as Vietnam may contribute to
remedying this deficit in our knowledge. The experience of Vietnam (a developing country
and at the same time an economy in transition) can belong to both categories.
Up till now, and in general, studies of Vietnam are scarce and have been undertaken
by international organisations concerned with economic reform (World Bank, 1993; IMF,
1991; UNIDO,1991) or with politico-economic change (Beresford, 1989; Fforde & de
Vylder, 1989 and 1996; VoNhanTri, 1988; Gourevitch, 1994). Few studies have been done
on its technological and industrial development (UNIDO, 1989 & 1990) or its S&T activities
(APCCT, 1988; Vu Cao Dam, 1992; UNIDO/UNDP, 1994). Firm level studies on
technological learning and TC accumulation are virtually absent with the exception of a few
forthcoming studies (Tran Ngoc Ca & Le Dieu Anh, 1997).
One more reflection is that studies in other developing countries tend to consider the
technical side of learning more diligently than the non-technical side. But, in the conditions
of economies in transition like Vietnam which lacks market-oriented entrepreneurship and
other management skills, it seems that non-technical learning must play a great, if not greater,
role and this aspect should be addressed more explicitly. This emerging issue adds another
dimension to the purpose of this study.
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3.8 Conclusion
Studies of technological innovation show that incremental technical change and the
accumulation of TC play a very important role in innovation not only for developed countries
but also for the developing world. For poor and less developed countries, the accumulation
of TC on the basis of learning processes plays the decisive role in their industrialisation and
catching up process.
It has been shown that there are two senses of learning process mentioned in the
related literature which should be distinguished: the more conventional sense of the traditional
accumulation of skill, knowledge and information; and an extended sense of learning
concerning everything related to the progress in production performance (now extended to
export and research performances) of firms. An emphasis on the first sense of using the
learning concept is of great methodological significance for those who want to study this
issue further because it is the acquisition of knowledge, skills and information is the essence
of TC building of countries and firms and worth to be examined closely in greater details.
Learning, as it has been analysed by many studies, can have very different forms.
Sources of technical knowledge, skill and experience can be accumulated in different ways:
by learning-by-doing which is almost costless and automatic, and by more active learning
forms. The most simple form of knowledge, experience and skill accumulation through
learning-by-doing becomes increasingly less important in comparison with other forms of
learning. These forms of learning reveal the need for firms to make conscious efforts, incur
costs, and invest in long term processes to accumulate TCs. Even in the by-doing form of
learning, there is a need to make a more active 'trying' effort.
At the core of the learning process is knowledge (in its wider meaning, including
skill, experience and information) which accumulates incrementally, and is often tacit. In
addition, learning, like other features of innovation activities, is specific to the context of
different industrial sectors or firms.
Existing literature on innovation and development studies show that there is a lack of
examination of the relationship between learning and TC accumulation, especially among
studies done at firm level. At sector level, there is little known about the similarities and
differences between sectors in patterns of learning TC. Furthermore, experiences of failure
tend to be neglected.
Another issue needing to be examined further is the interaction between macro
environment factors and micro level factors of firms which have a combined effect on the
learning process of firms, particularly in developing countries. In addition, the specific
context of Vietnam as both a developing nation and a transitional economy can shed some
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light on this still infrequently investigated area of knowledge. Based on existing taxonomies
of learning, six forms of learning mechanisms are suggested to examine research questions
that I will discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
In the last two chapters, I presented the concepts of TC accumulation and learning. Some
problematic issues have emerged from the discourse on the study on learning and TC. This
chapter addresses the research questions and the methodology adopted for this study.
Section 4.2 raises the main objectives and research questions of the study. The research
design of the study is presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the methods of data
collection and analysis used for the study.
4.2 Objectives and Research Questions
4. 2.1 Overall Objectives of the Study
In Chapters 2 and 3, I discussed the theoretical literature on both innovation and
development studies in relation to TC accumulation and learning and gave an overview of
frameworks and empirical studies on these topics. The studies show that the issue of
learning is critical to the problems of TC accumulation. The learning issue has been
investigated by many, and the general conclusion is that learning is not costless and
automatic; it has many specific characteristics such as tacitness and cumulativeness, and it
takes time. Learning also has different features for different sectors and firms. Concerning
a taxonomy of learning, in addition to learning-by-doing, much more active learning is
required for firms to acquire their TC. At the same time, the overview in Section 3.7
identified some key questions that emerged in studies of TC and learning which require
further examination. The overall aim of this research is to address these questions by
looking at the experiences of firms in two Vietnamese industries: textile/garment and
electronics.
More concretely, there are several reasons for doing this study. The main one is
that, as mentioned in Section 3.7.1, learning activities and TC accumulation have not been
investigated sufficiently at the firm level. In particular, little is known in detail about the
relationship between concrete learning mechanisms and types of TC. A second reason is
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that the interaction between macro environmental factors and firm-level micro factors in
shaping TC accumulation and learning has not been examined much (see Section 3.7.2). A
third reason to do this study, as argued in Section 3.7.3, is the dearth of research work on
Vietnam, a developing country in transition from a planned to a market economy. Finally,
it is hoped that as well as contributing some insights to fill this knowledge gap, this
research will point to policy lessons both for Vietnamese policy-makers and firms wishing
to pursue learning efforts. These lessons may also have implication for other countries
with similar development or transitional conditions.
4.2.2 Framework of Study: Research Questions and Propositions
This study considers the three dimensions of TC suggested by Fransman: (i) the
functional/organisational activities of the firms; (ii) the interactions between the firms'
learning TC and their environment; and (iii) the firms' performances in accumulating TC.
The research examines the TC accumulation process in the practices of Vietnamese firms
focusing on the use of various learning mechanisms for TC creation, and the interaction of
firms' strategic behaviour and environmental factors in shaping their learning efforts. Six
TCs suggested in Chapter 2, and types of learning mechanisms proposed in Chapter 3, are
used for this examination. Within this framework, the study aims to answer the following
research questions:
What TCs existed or are being accumulated at the firms over time? Proposition (1),
associated with this research question, is that the patterns of TC accumulation (level,
sequence) are different across different contexts: sectors or firms. This well-accepted
argument is examined in the context of Vietnamese industrial firms.
The second question is how do firms accumulate their TCs by different learning
mechanisms? Specifically, the study looks at (i) how important and dynamic learning is in
TC accumulation, (ii) how different learning mechanisms individually and in combination
contribute to the accumulation of various TCs; and (iii) how learning patterns differ for
different backgrounds of firms and/or sectors.
Proposition (2), associated with this research question, suggests, in order to
accumulate different TCs, a firm needs to use different learning mechanisms in
combination. In general, the firm has to rely on much more active learning forms than
learning-by-doing to acquire their TCs. At the same time, different firms and sectors have
different patterns of learning. Again, this proposition is examined in relation to other
studies mentioned in Chapter 3, with more detail in the case of Vietnam.
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The third research question is why do firms have the modes ofTC accumulation and
learning they have? The purpose is to explain similarities and differences between firms in
their TC acquisition and learning patterns. In doing this, it seeks to answer more specific
questions: (i) what are the external environmental factors shaping firms' learning, and how
do they influence this process? (ii) how do firms interact with these external environment
factors and how does this interaction jointly shape their learning and TC accumulation
patterns?
There are two propositions underlying this research question. Proposition (3) is
that the macro environment can have different rates and ways of influencing specific firms,
depending on the firm's nature and characteristics and, as an outcome, different ways of
shaping how firms use learning for accumulation of TCs. Proposition (4) is that the plan of
actions and learning behaviour of managers of firms play an important role in the TC
accumulation process and can help to remedy some constraints created by the external
environment. This proposition suggests that only those firms having conscious strategies,
costly expenditure and long-term vision in their active learning efforts can acquire TC
relatively successfully: those who lack these elements will usually fail to do so, despite
passive learning-by-doing.
The hypotheses given above come as an outcome of discussions presented in
previous Chapters 2 and 3. Especially, the issues of learning and TC accumulation and
their external factors can be vividly seen in other discourse of technology and innovation
studies. In my study, the hypotheses are not tested in terms of statistical data, since it is
not feasible to do that kind of research solely on quantitative basis. But by combining
some quantitative data where it is available, with qualitative interpretation of case studies,
it is hoped that some conclusions can be drawn concerning these propositions. Thus, the
case study material, to a large extent play quite an important role in this qualitative
research.
The three mentioned research questions form the basis for examining the issues of
learning and TC accumulation discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Before turning to the
learning and TC relationship, it is necessary to look at the general landscape of TC in firms
and their status in accumulating TCs. Therefore, the role of the first research question is to
prepare the landscape for the second and third research questions.
4.3 Overall Research Design
The research was designed to be conducted in three stages, each using different methods
and sources. The first is based on a survey of the macro socio-economic context, using
general material available from existing literature and reference sources. The second and
55
largest stage uses interviews with firms in two industries, plus some observations and
firms' data (archive, reports, etc.) to examine the main questions concerning TC and
learning. Third, case studies of selected firms are used as illustration.
Thus, the general approach towards doing this study is something like a zooming-in
process. Initially, information on the country background is provided. Then, by
interviews, a picture of firms is presented as patterns for sectors and, on the basis of that,
specific cases are selected for the case studies. By the combined analyses of these data, I
hoped to link the process of formulation of TC and its surrounding environment through
the evolution of learning activities in the firms. There are possibilities for a certain level of
generalisation and this process, perhaps, can allow a reverse zooming (or zooming out):
concrete case experiences serve as evidence for formulating some conclusions about
general modes and patterns of learning at sector and country levels. Policy implications
are drawn as an outcome of these investigations.
Following the research questions mentioned in the previous section, this study
contains the following working blocks, each designed to examine a theme:
• to identify TC in the firms of two Vietnamese industries: textile/garment and
electronics;
• to examine what kind of learning mechanisms these firms used to accumulate their TC;
• to analyse the influence of external factors on the general activities of the firms and on
their learning processes in particular, then, the interactive responses of the firms to
these influences and their impact on different patterns of TC accumulation and learning
are examined.
The overall framework of the study focuses on two of the three dimensions of TC
discussed in Section 2.5.1: the functions of TC, and the impact of external environmental
factors on TC creation. The third dimension (performance) is dealt with only to a limited
extent and mostly in qualitative terms. More concretely, the typology of six TC types
provided in Section 2.5.3 (investment, production, minor and major technical change,
linkage and marketing) is used. Following the arguments made in Section 3.5.4
taxonomies of learning proposed by Lall and Bell are adjusted and grouped into an
integrated taxonomy comprising six learning mechanisms: learning-by-doing; prior
accumulation; on-the-job training; off-the-job training; using foreign connections; and
searching and gathering information. Further details on the TC and learning mechanisms
used in the study are given in the Appendices 4.1 and 4.3.
After the examining which of the six suggested forms of TC exist in firms, patterns
of TC accumulation are identified in terms of the extent of TC development and the
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sequence of accumulation. The details of how this examination was conducted and how
data was collected and interpreted are given in Section 4.4.
The next research question is examined by putting together two categories: the use
of learning mechanisms as the means to accumulate TC and the TC which resulted. The
interactions between learning mechanisms and types of TC are represented in the matrix
below. Along the horizontal axis are types of TC while the vertical columns represent
forms of learning mechanism. Symbols (+) or (-) express the contribution of particular
learning mechanisms to various kinds of TCs. For instance, (+) means the firm used this
learning mechanism for the corresponding TC and (-) means it did not use this mechanism.
By putting findings in this tabulate format, the study aims to identify the frequency of use
made of particular learning mechanisms by the firms for their various TCs. The trends of
learning mechanisms used in accumulating TC are the main findings of this section of the
examination.
Types of TC 1 2 3 4 5 6
Learning mechanisms
By doing -
By prior accumulation + - - + + +
By training + + --- +
By foreign contact etc. --- + + -
As indicated in Sections 2.5.4, 3.6.2 and 3.7.2, the influence of the external
environment are grouped into four main categories for the purposes of this study: (i)
government-related policy factors; (ii) market factors; (iii) factors supporting systems like
R&D, education and training, etc.; (iv) other socio-cultural factors. Details of these factors
are provided in Appendix 4.4. The influence of various environmental factors on different
modes of learning in the firms, such as incentives and constraints, is represented in the
table below.
Again, the study aims at identifying patterns of influence by external factors on
learning, by looking at the frequency of responses of firms to external stimuli. A (+)
means this group of factors has had an influence on a corresponding learning mechanism
and a (-) means that it did not influence the mechanism according to firms. The immediate
findings of this table reveal the firms' perspective on whether specific external factors tend
(or tend not) to affect specific internal learning mechanisms. The findings should have
significant implications from both firm and government perspectives in adjusting their
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actions so as to reduce the constraints on (or increase the likelihood of) deploying various
learning mechanisms.
Groups ofenvironmentalfactors 12 3 4
Learning mechanisms







By foreign contact etc. +
In the concluding part of the study, interpretation and analyses are provided to
answer research questions and propositions. In the next section, I give more details on
how the research design was implemented in practice.
4.4 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis
4.4.1 Methods Used in Other Studies: a Brief Review
In Chapters 2 and 3, I presented the issues and problems of other studies on TC
accumulation and learning in the context of developing countries. Concerning the methods
used in these studies, some observations can be made.
The studies mostly used interview methods. The interviewees were firm managers,
engineers, technicians and workers. Data of firms' archives and survey questionnaires
were also quite common. Analyses of cases were more frequently qualitative than
quantitative. The most used methods of analysis were qualitative description, anecdotal
stories with some quantitative illustration (where available). On-site observation was not
very popular among cases. More often, these studies tried to aggregate data and combine
methods. Due to these methods, indicators are more qualitative than quantitative. For
example, in respect of the acquisition of TC, there were more descriptions on how and
when a firm acquired TCs, and which capabilities it got, but none or few indicators to
measure quantitatively the growth of TC. Few quantitative indicators are available on the
most visible performances of firms as evidence for the acquisition of TC, such as increases
in productivity, improvements in the quality of products, rates of increase of skills of
labour forces, the localisation of technological activities, levels of workers education and
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experience (years of working) or export results, etc. The solution for that, in most cases, is
the combination of both kinds of analyses, with qualitative data as the focus and the
secondary use of quantitative complementarities when possible.
Among the different sectors chosen for these studies, many have a preference for
doing research on the capital goods sector. Although there are also some studies
undertaken on other sectors (like electronics in more recent studies), a comparison of
differences between these sectors in terms of TC and learning have not, on the whole, been
done.
Case studies tend to start by describing the historical development of firms. In this
description, the basic data of the firms are provided. Then, they describe different TCs
within the firms and how the firms tried to acquire these capabilities. The authors often
conclude the cases by offering a general observation of tendencies, general modes and
implications. As mentioned in Sections 2.5.2 and 3.7.1, a strand of studies on the learning
and TC of developing countries also tend to have a macro level focus (Lall, 1993, 1994a
and 1994b; Enos, 1991 are the most typical examples). On the other hand, many studies of
the management strand in the context of industrialised countries have very econometric
and quantitative approaches, using more graphs and economic modelling for studying
learning (Bala & Goyal, 1995; Creane, 1995; or Gruber, 1995 are examples of this mode of
analysis). Even some recent studies in developing countries follow this trend (Frishchtack,
1996). The applications of these approaches do not seem appropriate for examining in
more details the accumulation of skill, knowledge and experience over time as the focus of
a study on learning and TC. For instance, they do not break down learning into concrete
mechanisms. The methods used in this study have been more qualitative to examine
learning activity in a more detailed way.
4.4.2 Methods of Data Collection Used in this Study
As I mention in the research design, the study had three stages each using different
research techniques to examine propositions and research questions.
Stage 1: Survey ofMacro Socio-Economic Background
This part of the project served as an introductory background for the subsequent research
on companies. The method used was mainly bibliographical search, using material on the
general development of the Vietnamese economy and the technological development of
two industries - the textile/garment and electronics sectors. In addition, interviews with
some external organisations (ministries, research institutes, universities, schools,
associations, etc.) were conducted to map out the general context of the relevant industries.
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In this stage, the important milestones in Vietnamese development that have impacted on
TC accumulation in Vietnamese industries were identified, an overview of the two
industries was produced.
This stage of the research was important for drawing a general picture of Vietnam's
social and economic development, with the focus being on those factors which are having
an impact on the process of TC accumulation and learning in the targeted industries.
Specific industrial surveys provided more detailed sectoral background, covering features
of the two industries such as ownership, production capacity, technological level of
equipment, management issues, size and location of firms, R&D and training and
education activities. These factors are discussed to show how they might influence the
technological development of firms in these industries.
Stage 2: Survey ofInterviews and Questionnaires
I selected candidate study firms on the basis of several criteria. First, that the firms should
have pursued some technological accumulation activities with different levels of success.
Second, that these companies were usually known for some years by my contacts. These
contacts, initiated through other research projects, have helped to establish good
relationships with those firms, increasing my chances of gaining access to their data and to
their personnel for the purposes of interviewing. Twenty four firms in total were chosen
and approached (14 in the textile/garment industry and 10 in electronics)1 and interviews
were arranged with various people in these firms: directors, technical staff, personnel in the
financial, planning and sales divisions as well as shop-floor workers. For each firm,
interviews were repeated through several visits over a 5 to 7 month period. Each firm has
been interviewed at least twice, and not more than five times. A list of the firms, and the
number and date of interviews, are given in Appendix 4.5. Some firms have been studied
over a much longer period, thanks to prior access I had gained to their data through other
projects I have been involved in. I was thus able to observe some firms' development over
a period of almost 7-8 years.
Basic data on the firms selected for interview are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
These firms are mainly state-owned (11 in textile/garment and six in electronics). Five are
private companies (two in textile/garment and three in electronics), and the data set also
includes two joint ventures between Vietnamese and foreign partners, one in each sector.
The companies in the textile/garment industry are predominantly big employers (ranging
from 1,400 to 6,158 staff) with only a few smaller companies (90 to 600 staff). In
1Cases TGI 1 and E6 declined to be interviewed.
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electronics, almost all companies are small (less than 400 employees). The products of the
companies are very diversified. In textiles, they range from upstream products like
spinning, weaving to knitwear to more downstream products such as various types of
garment. Electronics companies produce both consumer electronics and smaller non-
consumer products (for various industrial and telecommunications uses). Computer
companies mostly concentrate around computer assembly and the production of some
related software products or services. Fourteen textile/garment companies have different
backgrounds of establishment and development. According to my scheme of periodisation
(see Chapter 5), five companies were founded before 1975. In the third period during the
1980s, three firms were set up. Three cases were established in South Vietnam during the
1960s and 1970s and were later transformed into SOEs after unification. By the end of the
1980s, three companies were set up. Seven electronic firms were created before the
reforms, when most private and joint venture firms were born with the liberalisation period
after the reforms.
To conduct the interviews, a check-list of questions was used (see Appendix 4.6)
which addressed the three main research questions about TCs, the learning-TC relationship
and the impact of macro-micro factors interaction on learning. These firm level interviews
are intended to give an inside-out perspective on the issues, i.e from the firms' point of
view.
In order to gain an outside-in perspective, and to supplement the bibliographical
material collected in Stage 1, an additional round of interviews was conducted with
relevant actors from organisations in the external 'environment'; these organisations include
ministries, government agencies, R&D units, universities and other education
organisations, that is, the whole supporting system for industrial development (concerned
with issues such as standardisation, quality control, consultancy, information services,
industrial association, etc.). The full list of these organisations, and the date and number of
interviews is available in Appendix 4.7. This round of interviews was mostly conducted
after the interviews with the firms so as to provide for some cross-checking of information
given by the firms relating to their collaborations. A second check-list of questions was
used for this group of respondents, and it can be found in Appendix 4.8. For some
organisations, my long-term relationship with them proved useful for conducting several
interviews and for using their own data sources (e.g., annual reports, reviews).
Stage 3: Company Cases
Based on the results of interviews, a few further in-depth case studies were conducted. By
pursuing this task, I was able to clarify more concretely what happened in these firms, and
how and why. The choice of firms was based on the available contacts with particular
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firms which allowed me to have greater access to their activities than others, and hence
ensured that a greater richness of material could be gathered from interviews and other
sources.
The firm case studies show in fine detail what happened in terms of their use of
learning mechanisms to accumulate different TCs; what kind of TCs they acquired; what
elements of the external environment most influenced their business; what kinds of
response they adopted; and how this came to influence their learning processes and their
TC accumulation. As a result, the case studies helped to clarify some issues more lucidly
than would have been possible by Stage 2 interviews alone. Moreover, this stage of the
study gave the sense of a 'whole firm' picture by linking all three research questions
together within the context of a few chosen firms. In this way, the study could more easily
show the interaction between the different sets of issues: TC, learning and micro-macro
interactions.
The case studies were done in different ways. First, direct interviews were
conducted which built upon Stage 2, by means of upgraded and expanded interviews with
relevant staff. In addition to the interviews, a study of the firms' archival material such as
documentation, reports and statistical data was carried out and proved helpful. In some
firms with which I have rather good contacts, I was able to do some on-site observation of
production lines, technology implementation, and of sales and marketing activities. For
this stage of study, questions similar to those given in the check-list for TC accumulation,
learning and external factors were used, although in finer detail and spending more time at
the firms.
4.4.3 Methods of Data Analysis and Interpretation Used in this Study
As I mention above, the first stage of study gives the general macro level background of
the country and of the chosen industries' development. Through this study, I have found
some strengths and weaknesses which may influence the learning activities and TC
accumulation of industrial firms. The form of the data is mainly a description of
tendencies. In addition, stage one data was analysed to produce descriptions of the
historical development of the industries; it is presented in Chapter 5.
For the second stage, using the check-list in Appendix 4.1,1 have tried to present
the data in tables showing the extent of TC accumulation (for each of the six TCs) in the 24
chosen firms. TC development in firms is divided roughly into three levels (strong, weak
and non-existent) judged by criteria of systematic regularity and autonomy of its own
personnel laid out in Appendix 4.2 in accordance with activities that the firms could
perform in the corresponding TCs. For example, a firm can have strongly developed TC if
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it is able to perform all technological tasks (functions) related to this corresponding TC by
its own staff on a regular basis. At the other extreme is non-existence of TC. The rest,
which did not fall into either of these levels, belong to the middle level of weak TC.
Because firms are working in different product areas using different kinds of technology,
the assessment of their TC accumulation was made in accordance with their specific areas.
Therefore, the division of TC accumulation into levels was useful in elucidating
differences in the extent of TC accumulation. The main purpose of this assessment is a
mapping of what kinds of TC are accumulated in firms. This mapping is used for the main
focus of the study which is to examine the learning mechanisms used for their TC
accumulation. By finding out the time at which firms became able to perform various
tasks, I was also able to establish the sequence of their TC accumulation which is presented
in figures 6.1 and 6.2.
Data on learning mechanisms concerned what learning mechanisms firms used, and
for gaining what kinds of knowledge, skill or experience. The uses made of learning
mechanisms are also presented in tabular format. For each TC, the number of firms using
one or another learning mechanism was counted against the existence (or not) of a TC in
these firms. Then, by linking the frequency of using learning mechanisms to the total
number of firms having the various types of TCs, I tried to see whether there was a
relationship between learning use and TC existence in the firms. Thus, the results of the
interviews are first presented as a description of activities, then converted into tabular
format for identifying and partially codifying emerging trends and patterns.
A similar method of data analysis was used for the next research question. The
interviews with firms yielded descriptions about the influence of macro factors on the
firms, together with their responses to those external influences. Then, by counting firms'
references to each of four groups of macro factors, the relation between these factors and
business activities and learning are recorded, in tables 8.1 and 8.2. To tease out details
which did not emerge sufficiently clearly from the previous steps, the firm case studies
provide more detailed descriptions of data.
Throughout this process of data analysis, whenever possible, my own interpretation
of the data is offered in combination with my existing knowledge accumulated from other
studies and surveys. This permits me to interpret the data of firms' interviews and case
studies in a more balanced way. There are mainly two levels of interpretation of the above
mentioned data. The first is the looking for explanation for emerging patterns of TC
acquisition, of using learning mechanisms to accumulate these TCs. To do so, I tried to
identify similarities and differences in these patterns and the reasons for these features.
However, some deviation from generally seen patterns demand more close scrutiny of the
material in the context of specific firms by doing case studies. Second level of
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interpretation is the considering how much the findings from these firms can tell about
wider trends or features. For example, the material of textile/garment (or electronics) firms
can be interpreted in the context of the whole industries. The differences in TC acquisition
and learning mechanisms in firms with different ownership can indicate the wider
phenomena of ownership tension in the Vietnamese conditions. Similarly, other issues are
examined for Vietnam context in general, the conditions of developing countries and the
features specific to transitional economies. Also, the material is interpreted in relation to
the learning activity of a firm in general. This level of analysis requires a reflection on the
wider research literature, both empirical studies from other countries and theoretical
background, which I presented in Chapter 10. By doing this analytical interpretation, I was
able to learn more about the techniques of presenting and comparing data, the
identification of tendencies and emerging features, and the reflection on issues of a wider
context.
4.5 Conclusion
The first part of this thesis has dealt with the theoretical background of studies on TC
accumulation (Chapter 2) and learning (Chapter 3). This chapter presents the design of the
research and the methods I used for the study. The study sought to examine TC
accumulation, the learning process leading to this accumulation and the relationship
between them in the case of 24 industrial Vietnamese firms. In addition, the joint impact
of external macro factors on firms and of their responses to these factors with respect to the
learning activity of the firms was another important research question. In order to conduct
this research, the dominant data collection method has been to conduct interviews with
personnel working in the textile/garment and electronics industries, supplemented by a
macro level survey and other firm-specific archival materials. The study involved a two-
way process: first focusing from macro material onto firm-specific material; then focusing
in reverse for a generalisation of the arguments.
Now, I move on to the next part of the thesis which presents the empirical material
of the study, using the methods and research framework outlined in this chapter.
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Table 4.1 Main characteristics of textile/garment companies
Date Own. Products, Empl.Turnover Export Main
of types of (USD) (%) export
estab. activities market









TG3 1984 state yarns
knitwear
TG4 1968 state poloshirts
fabrics
2,500 5.6 mln. 60





TG5 1987 state shirts 6,518 7 mln.
embroyd.
lingeries




TG7 1989 joint sewing
vent, threads
TG8 1991 privt. jackets
emboydered
garment
90 1.5 mln. 30
600 400,000 100
TG9 1990 privt. sportwear 3,500 5 mln.
jackets
coats







































TGI2 1960 state fabrics 1,400 1.4 mln 80
knitwear
TG13 1959 state knitwear 2,000 2.2 mln n.a
garment
TG14 1972 state garment 6,000 15.9 mln 98

















Table 4.2 Main characteristics of electronics firms
Date Own. Products, Empl.Turnover Export















E3 1989 privt. PCs
software
50 3 mln. 100
(before 1990)
FSU












55 2 mln. 100
(before 1990)
FSU
E7 1984 state industrial
electronics
services
100 21,800 0 No
E8 1986 privt speakers 200 1.2 mln 0






E10 1974 state consumer
electronics
TV, cassetes
12 mln. 0 No
Ell 1974 state consumer
electronics
TV,cassetes
450 17 mln. 0 No
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PART II
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF TWO VIETNAMESE INDUSTRIES
In the first part of this thesis, an overview of theoretical literature and empirical studies
provided a framework to guide this study, which suggested the basis of the research
questions and research design I adopted. Part II will present material from case studies in
two Vietnamese industries: textile/garment and electronics. Chapter 5 provides an overview
of the two industries. The detailed background of Vietnam's industrial development,
together with the milestones that are crucial for the TC accumulation process, can be seen in
Appendix 5.11. Chapter 6 looks at the patterns of TC creation in selected firms in these
industries. Chapter 7 examines the learning process: its patterns, dynamics, and its relations
to TC creation. Chapter 8 looks at the interaction between external factors and learning
activities in the firms. Chapter 9 presents case studies of four firms (two in the
textile/garment sector and two in the electronics sector) which elaborate the findings of the
preceding chapters in more detail. Thus, this part of the thesis follows the 'zooming-in'
process from national, through sectoral, to the micro level of the firms.
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CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT OF TWO INDUSTRIES: TEXTILE/GARMENT
AND ELECTRONICS
5.1 Introduction and Country Background
This chapter looks more closely at the development of the two industries studied:
textile/garment and electronics. The strengths and weaknesses of the industries are
presented in relation to the TC accumulation of firms in these sectors. This chapter is
written on the basis of each industry's data (published and unpublished archival material)
and interviews conducted with organisations relevant to the two industries.
The chapter begins with some brief background on Vietnam, in terms of the
important milestones of the development. Then, Section 5.2 introduces the textile/garment
industry by discussing important factors like ownership and size of the firms; export
activities; management structure; and the R&D, training and education infrastructure for
the industry. The chapter then moves on to discuss the same issues in relation to the
electronics industry in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes with a summary of the
conditions shaping both industries.
Vietnamese industrial development has evolved over four main periods: colonial
(pre-1945); war time (1946-1975); the pre-reform crisis (1976-1986); and reforms (post-
1986). The most characteristic feature of the first period is that the French contributed to
some industrial activities and some infrastructural establishment, but industrialisation was
negligible in terms of training local human resources. Being among the earliest industrial
activities, the textile sector acquired some industrial experience and technological skills.
In war time when the country was divided (after 1954), conditions in the South were more
favourable for technological development compared to the North. As a result, by 1975,
South Vietnam had accumulated a technological base of sorts, with different industrial,
commercial and managerial skills. For all their differences, North and South Vietnam both
faced unstable conditions for development between 1945-1975. Vietnam's development
was shaped by the very specific conditions and requirements of a war economy. The
instability was more economic than political. Inflation, budget deficits, trade deficits,
foreign debt, dependency on aid from big donors, difficulties related to frequent changes in
the economic conditions were characteristic features for both regions. The third period is
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characterised by the unification of the country and by economic crisis. By 1979-1981, the
economic system of Vietnam had come to possess features such as:
• a monopoly of the state sector over economic production. The private sector did not
exist or was destroyed (at least temporarily) by different socialist transformation
campaigns;
• all production and management decisions were handed down as plans from above as
from a command centre; enterprises did not have autonomy over their production and
business activities; implementation plans were more important than the other criteria of
production efficiency;
• economic policy gave priority to heavy industry;
• the monopoly of the state in foreign trade; reliance on the Soviet Union and Eastern
European markets only (or the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA);
isolation from other Western markets; no foreign direct investment;
• the inability of the banking system to lend to productive units on a commercial basis,
lending being restricted to fulfil lending plans designed by the state; high state budget
deficit; high rate of inflation.
After 1986, a renovation policy was introduced which included the following
important changes: structural change of investment priorities; decentralisation of the
economic management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); radical change and development
of the financial and banking system; and diversification and liberalisation of external
economic relations with Asia-Pacific and EU countries. Domestically, many enterprises
now possess the right to trade directly with foreign partners. For them, export-import
activities are now far less cumbersome than before, since rights include the freedom to
travel abroad and to forge contacts with foreign companies. In 1987, the new Foreign
Investment Law was passed together with a variety of detailed laws regulating technology
transfer into Vietnam from abroad; industrial property rights; and patenting.
Vietnamese industrial activity began in the French period (pre-1945) then
developed further during the second and third periods. But these periods were
characterised by very specific conditions which were not conducive to industry for
accumulating their TC. However, certain factors (positive measures adopted by the
government, foreign assistance, etc.) during these periods had brought industries some
level of technological expertise, production management knowledge, and skills that were
ripe for upgrading in the period after 1986.
Following reforms - most particularly, through the new 'open door' economic
policy - the fourth period has created new opportunities for industry to acquire new
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technological competence. In particular, the new possibilities for TC acquisition arose
with the liberalisation of the S&T infrastructure together with the relatively effective
education and training systems that have existed throughout the socialist construction
period. At the same time, the current period has brought new challenges: a deterioration of
education and training facilities; a lack of state subsidies for innovation activities (for
example, the research funding by the state budget which is no more available); altered
market conditions which make it tougher for industries to maintain their export
performance; and, a large but still disorganised domestic market. All these factors have a
strong impact on the development of TC in the industries studied here: the textile/garment
and electronics sectors to which I now turn.
5.2 The Textile/Garment Industry
5.2.1 The Periods of Development
The textile/garment industry had gone through four main periods of growth: limited initial
activities (pre-1945 under French rule); start-up and consolidation (1946-1975); expansion
(1976-1986) and export-oriented growth (post-1986). The textile industry began under the
French regime, but that early heritage is only now evident in a few nationalised spinning
plants in urban areas, and in some skills and experience of workers who were involved in
the textile industry. Most of this analysis, therefore, will deal with the last three periods.
The start-up and consolidation period took place between 1946-1975. After the end
of the first Indochina war in 1954, there were very few textile plants left in a good
condition. The biggest one, the Namdinh textile plant, which was used to produce cotton
thread yarn to supply artisan weavers (Fforde & Paine, 1987: 85), had been dismantled and
brought down to the South including the migration of its owner and its technical labour
force. Facilities set up by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) government before
1954 were small-scale and handicraft-oriented. By the beginning of the 1960s, a few
spinning, weaving and knitting plants were installed around the big cities. Textile
equipment and facilities were installed with aid from China, the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, and the equipment was of a 1950-1960s vintage. During the war (1965-
1973), these facilities were either evacuated to rural areas, or were severely damaged by
American bombing. In the South, the textile industry concentrated around the big cities, its
equipment was of the 1960s-1970s, and was imported from Japan, the US, Germany,
France, etc. The textile industry in both regions relied on imported material and spare
parts and mainly served the domestic market.
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As for garments, during the war period involving the French, some small
workshops were set up to serve the needs of the army in regions held by the DRV. In the
North, by 1956-1958, there were only two factories producing some hundred thousand
pieces of simple clothes for the domestic market and some for export. In the South, the
garment industry began in 1971 with six factories producing for the domestic and export
markets.
In the third period (1976-1986), industry was spurred by two stimuli to upgrade and
acquire new production facilities. First, modern spinning plants were purchased with loans
from France, Germany, Japan and Italy to produce cotton and polyester yarn. Second,
some of the large spinning, weaving and garment plants left in South Vietnam were
nationalised by transformation campaigns after 1975.
In the reform period after 1986, production was expanded further with a shift to
consumer goods and export programmes. In the conditions of a more open economy and
of more diversified linkages with foreign investment sources and markets, many
enterprises had initiated business relationships with foreign partners so as to expand their
production activities. In addition, those private entrepreneurs who had survived the
different transformation campaigns and were encouraged by multi-sectoral economic
reforms, started to use their own resources and personal links with foreigners to create new
production plants. The garment industry also witnessed a boom in the setting-up of new
plants and workshops, utilising both state and private funds, to produce for export.
Important milestones of textile/garment industry are provided in Figure 5.1. The macro
data of the industry is given in Appendices 5.1 to 5.7, most of which refers to the 1980s.
5.2.2 Ownership, Size and Location
Anti-private attitudes and priorities for large-scale industries were well known features of
the old DRV model of socialist construction (see Appendix 5.11). Although officially, up
till the reforms of 1986, there was no private sector in Vietnamese industrial activities,
private activities in textile and garment existed throughout the period of socialist
transformation, mainly in the form of small co-operative handicraft industries.
These co-operatives serve as a network of production units in implementing certain
orders from the state enterprises and in fulfilling their production plans in a domestic
subcontracting relationship. In the South, private companies in garment manufacture
mushroomed during the reform period of the industry's development, some of them
becoming quite large. As for the size of the firms, most SOEs are medium- to large-scale
(with some thousands of workers). Besides these, there are many medium- and small-scale
enterprises in the co-operative sector.
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The geographical locations of the textile and garment industry are largely
concentrated around Hanoi and HoChiMinh City (formerly Saigon) - the two big industrial
centres of the country. An educated labour force and an appropriate infrastructure are
more available in these areas.
5.2.3 Export Activities
Vietnam began to export textile and garment products in the 1960s. However, this kind of
activity was small-scale and on a trial basis. Before 1975, in the South, the textile industry
mostly served the domestic rather than the export market.
Serious exporting began in the mid 1970s, mostly to CMEA countries. Contracting
relationships with the former Soviet Union started in 1976: Soviet companies supplied
cotton and, in return, Vietnamese companies produced fabrics and garments for them. At
this time, the export activities of Vietnamese textile/garment companies were mostly based
on passive subcontracting relations with CMEA countries. Vietnam, in addition to being a
supplier of primary agriculture products and tropical natural resources, was a subcontractor
for these countries in simple products. These countries supplied Vietnam with equipment,
input material and bought back the output. There was no active role for Vietnamese
companies to develop technological expertise, or to improve the quality and design of
products. This passive mentality towards export made companies quite comfortable with
simple types of co-operation, poor quality and a limited range of products.
In 1986, Vietnam and the Soviet Union upgraded their relationship in a large
subcontracting garment programme. Soviet buyers supplied designs, patterns and
materials and received clothing products. The fee for subcontracting was paid in the form
of sewing machines and equipment as well as with other goods. Thanks to this
programme, Vietnam received 5,600 new Soviet-made sewing machines and, more
especially, the technical expertise of Soviet experts who came to each enterprise to give
guidance and technical assistance in the garment business. Products for export were cotton
and mixed cotton/polyester yarns, clothing of various kinds (shirts, underwear, knitwear,
baby cloth, work overalls, etc.). Between 1986 and 1990, Vietnamese companies supplied
more than 60 million pieces of garment to the Soviet Union in the subcontracting
programme framework.1
1A similar system of co-operation was also used with other East European countries. Hungary, for example,
supplied equipment, materials, technological documentation and technical supervision for Vietnamese
companies and received 4-5 million pieces of clothes in return. Czechoslovakia and East Germany also held
similar contracts. These subcontracting programmes helped Vietnamese companies to significantly upgrade
their production expertise and technological competence in garment-making activities.
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However, the difficulties of this intra-CMEA system (e.g., not all deliveries were
ensured by parties, there was a low probability of getting desirable products in exchange,
etc.) and the need for hard currency encouraged Vietnamese companies to embark on trial
export to non-socialist countries. Japanese trading houses supplied Vietnamese companies
with technologies (mostly in spinning) during the 1980s and later they initiated a modest
exporting business to Japan and other non-socialist markets.
This development of trade with market economies got a strong stimulus from the
reform period post-1986 and after the collapse of the Soviet and East European markets.
Those companies which had been involved in trial trading with Western countries got a
chance to go further. Those which were not ready had to face a tough choice: to shift
quickly to new markets or to collapse. These conditions shaped the unavoidable shift of
Vietnamese companies to new export markets.
A exporting surge came by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s,
with more clothing exports (including jackets, coats and some high quality products such
as suits) going to countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, the EU, etc. Currently,
more than 30% of total clothing production is for export. Change in the reform period
happened not only in the form of market orientation, but also in the types of product
produced, the forms of export contacts (or linkages), and the modes of doing business. In
order to enter totally new kinds of markets, companies had to be more careful in their
product choice. Many companies had previously concentrated only on upstream products
(as spinning, weaving) but they now moved to downstream products like knitwear,
garments and high fashion products. At the same time, the domestic market became more
attractive to producers. Previously, the output of the industry had been distributed via
networks of wholesalers. Liberalisation of the economy, a competitive atmosphere, and
the autonomy of companies led to the opening of shops and showrooms by almost all
textile and clothing plants.
Opportunities for foreign direct investment after 1987 created a rush of companies
looking for new forms of co-operation with foreign partners. Instead of continuing their
passive subcontracting relations - which, in fact, is still quite an effective form for many
companies starting in the export business - some enterprises moved into joint venture,
mostly in garment manufacture. Private companies also took advantage of the new




In general, enterprises belong to the Ministry of Light Industry (MOLI) or to local
governments. Recently, the Association of Vietnamese Garment Enterprises was set up,
which includes not only the SOEs but also private companies as members. As an attempt
by companies to concentrate their resources and efforts on the common purpose of
producing and exporting garments, this Association meets several times a year to discuss
general tendencies, and to consider strategies for developing the sector. It set up some
funding to support the necessary activities of its members, as well as undertaking some
lobbying of government organisations.
The changes in foreign trade mentioned in Section 5.2.3 concerned not only the
market destination of exports, but also the mechanism for managing foreign trade.
Although the Ministry of Trade is responsible for export/import management, companies
are now allowed to make contacts and forge import/export transactions more directly,
provided they satisfy certain conditions on volumes of export and business experience.
The Ministry deals more with the general management of trade, and in order to link foreign
trade more closely with production, two trading companies - Textimex and Confectimex
(which for a long time belonged to the Ministry of Trade and monopolised the
export/import of textiles and garments) - were transferred to the MOLI.
5.2.5 R&D, Education and Training Activities
In MOLI's structure, there are two main research units for the industry: the Research
Institute for the Textile Industry (RITI) and the Research Centre for the Garment Industry
(RCGI) in Hanoi, with filial units in HoChiMinh City. The industry was supplied with its
educated technical labour force and with information from the textile faculties of various
polytechnic institutes in Hanoi and HoChiMinh City, as well as from the information
centre of MOLI.
Although these activities proved useful for the industry's development particularly
during the initial phase, many problems remain. Before 1986, these activities were far
from the actual needs of the companies and provided little help with the day-to-day
operation of enterprises. Due to the old style of R&D management, there was no link
between research and industry (see Appendix 5.12). After the reforms, these research
institutes became more associated with production. Research organisations now rely more
on contracts signed with enterprises.
Many problems remained and new constraints arose. The activities of the
mentioned R&D institutions are not very effective (see Box 5.1). R&D expertise in the
industry is neither innovative nor dynamic enough to support the needs of the companies.
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Training and education organisations are in a similar situation. Until recently, the
Vietnamese higher education system was only able to produce engineers for the textile
industry (through the textile faculty of Hanoi Polytechnic, for example). In addition, the
industry received newly graduated engineers from the Soviet Union and other East
European countries until the end of the 1980s. As for garment activity, the industry relied
entirely on graduates from abroad. Only in the last 3-4 years has Hanoi Polytechnic begun
to offer courses in the garment business to engineers, designers or production managers.
At lower educational levels, two vocational schools (one in the North and one in the South)
train garment workers. Still, the number of trained people only amounts to 200-300
workers per year - far less than is required by the industry. More seriously, these schools
only provide training for workers. There is no training for managers or for workshop
headmasters. This weakness in the training and education system, as mentioned in
Appendix 5.13, has caused major problems for companies in their efforts to secure the
necessary labour force at all levels, a problem which is especially acute at the level of
skilled garment workers. Other institutions serving the industrial infrastructure like those
which provide information sources, documentation or consulting, and related industries
like mechanical or chemical engineering, have similar problems in supporting the industry.
Box 5.1: R&D in the Textile/Garment Industry: RCGI & RITI
In the clothing industry, the only research unit is the Research Centre for the
Garment Industry (RCGI) which aims at designing new collections of garment
products, researching the production organisation of garment workshops, and
dealing with standardisation issues for the industry. When having intensive
business with the Soviet bloc, this Centre produced some models for the market.
When moving to new markets, the Centre has problems in satisfying the needs
of new and more demanding customers. The Bulletin of the garment industry -
an information newsletter published by the Centre - had to cease for lack of
finance. Although the Centre had a staff of 50, only a few worked as designers
producing new collections (recently, this number has been reduced to only one
person). With less and less financial resources from Confectimex (its parent
organisation), the Centre became quite weak and the sources of information and
expertise necessary for supporting companies became more scarce. The
prospect that this Centre may become a research institute, as many would wish,
is unlikely.
The Research Institute for the Textile Industry (RITI) has also many problems.
The Institute has 125 employees, of whom 90 are engineers or with university
degrees, and about 10 of whom possess postgraduate degrees (masters and
doctors). During the 1970s and 1980s, the Institute engaged in considerable
research, training and consulting work for the industry. However, for the last
couple of years, it has became less necessary for firms. Research projects are
not very relevant to the recent needs of the industry, and the findings from these
projects do not seem to be have been taken-up and applied by the companies.
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5.2.6 Summary of Main Features
The textile/garment industry has enjoyed significant evolution over the 1960s-1980s
period. The first advantage of the industry was the abundance of relatively cheap labour
and a long tradition of Vietnamese artisans engaging in small-scale textile activities.
Second, during the period of dominance by state enterprises, small-scale and family-based
production units constituted a important part of a subcontracting network which served the
needs of the large SOEs. Third, the large domestic market of more than 70 million people,
and their increasing purchasing power over the last three to four years, is a good basis upon
which the industry can develop locally.
At the same time, there are some critical weaknesses in the industry. First, the
main feature of the industry's technology is its obsolescence. The industry received its first
technology at the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s from China, East Germany, the
Soviet Union, etc. During the 1980s, some modern plants were imported - spinning
technology, especially - from Japan, Germany and Italy. However, this expansion has only
partly reduced the obsolete technological level of the industry. In the clothing industry, the
situation is better than in textiles. About 20% of the sewing machines in use by centrally-
managed SOEs are less than 10 years old, with 10% older than 15 years. In SOEs under
local management, only 10% of machines are less than 10 years old, due to the fact that
less investment resources are available to local than to central government (UNIDO, 1991).
Post-1986, however, there has been a boom in the garment industry and more new sewing
machines, both ordinary and specialised (like automatic embroidery machines, stone-
washing machines), are being imported to serve the needs of the export market. Not only
SOEs but also private companies are actively participating in this equipment and
technology innovation activity.
A lack of consistent investment policies by the state, a dependency on technologies
stemming from one source of CMEA (up to the beginning of 1980s), and constraints on
capital investment are causes of the elderly technologies found in the firms. Moreover, the
lack of incentives, or competitive pressure, from markets has made company managers
passive about innovation activities. Phenomena like normative profit as a percentage of
production cost 2 have not encouraged companies to innovate technologically in order to
reduce their production costs. The abolition of this old management system during 1976-
2In the old management style, each SOE is entitled to receive normative profit regardless of its performance.
This was calculated as a certain percentage of production costs. Thus, the higher the cost of production, the
more the SOEs get.
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1986, and subsequent reforms since 1986, are radically changing companies' attitudes
towards technological innovation.
A second weakness in the textile and garment industry has been its resource base of
supplies of raw materials. The range and volume of domestically-produced raw materials
are rather limited. Only some cotton is produced domestically, whilst synthetic fibres are
not available. Almost all raw materials have to be imported for the textile industry (e.g.,
cotton yarn, viscose, polyester). In addition, other supplies like chemicals and spare parts
for operating the plants also have to be imported (about 15 million rubbles & USD in
1989) (UNIDO, 1991: 78). The processing equipment for domestically-produced raw
cotton is obsolete and also leads to a low quality of cotton supply. Thus, up till now, the
spinning industry has had to rely on imported raw materials like cotton and synthetic
fibres. Because high quality fabrics cannot be produced by the textile industry, garment
companies have to import their material from foreign partners (about 90% of input for the
industry) if they are to produce top quality products.
The third problem of the textile/garment industry has been that despite changes, the
policy of foreign trade management remains inconsistent. It has changed rather frequently
and created difficulties for companies. Also, this policy has not been effective in
preventing smuggling. With the normalisation of relations with China, control of the
northern border has relaxed and since 1991, Chinese fabrics and yarns have been
increasingly smuggled into Vietnam. Fabrics are also being smuggled from Thailand. For
example, 50% of the domestic fabric market consists of material smuggled from other
countries, and companies simply cannot compete with traders.
At the same time, due to a long period of reliance on one market and a passive
attitude towards doing business, the industry has quite poor international experience in
doing business. Lack of competitive pressure has generated a dearth of interest in, or
knowledge about, marketing activities. Firms are not forced to become technologically
innovative to upgrade their product quality. The private sector of the industry has not
existed until recently, and the main players of the industry are the SOEs.
Following the reforms of 1986, the industry is exploring new opportunities through
co-operating with new foreign partners for export markets. Thanks to these opportunities,
the industry can obtain new resources (capital, technology) for its technological innovation
and learning activities. For the first time, firms are being forced to become interested in
marketing activities.
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5.3 The Electronics Industry
5.3.1 The Periods of Development
In common with the textile/garment sector, the electronics industry has evolved through
only three periods: start-up pre-1975, rehabilitation 1976-1986, and liberalisation post-
1986. During the 1950s, electronics activities were mostly engaged in as a mean for radio
broadcasting. Systems of radio receivers, broadcasting and wire transmission were
developed. Television broadcasting started around 1960 in black-and-white with a small
system of transmission and a studio. TV sets were few and were mostly imported from
Poland.
Before 1954, there were some small workshops in Hanoi and other big cities to take
care of maintenance services and trading activities for foreign firms. Since 1956, together
with the development of radio broadcasting, workshops for repair and maintenance were
developed in all provinces. By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the
government had set up some small factories to assemble amplifiers and transformers and to
produce loud speakers. Main components like condensers, resistors, vacuum tubes, etc.
were imported from abroad (the Soviet Union, East Germany, Hungary). In the South, the
assembly of black and white TVs and radio cassettes from imported parts and components
began before 1975. Four plants with Japanese technology from Sony, Sanyo and
Matsushita started operations when the war ended in 1975.
Colour television broadcasting began in 1982 though the number of TV sets was
limited and mostly relied on imported Soviet and Polish technologies. In the South, using
American technology, TV broadcasting was undertaken to serve American troops and the
urban population in the 1970s. Television broadcasting began using satellite facilities in
1980 with Soviet satellite earth stations.
As for computer use, the first computer system was imported and installed in 1967
in Hanoi and was run by Vietnamese technicians and specialists. Some early units for
teaching computer science were also initiated by that time (APCTT, 1988: 54). In 1966,
the first IBM-360 was installed by the IBM Vietnam company in Saigon. American
experts played an important role in guiding Vietnamese staff in the maintenance of these
systems. After 1975, almost all Southern technical personnel who had worked in the
computer industry had left the country.
By 1977-1979, some production plants were set up for the small-scale production,
repair and maintenance of radio electronics parts. In 1977, a plant was set up with French
assistance outside Hanoi to produce transistors and other parts at a simple technological
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level. Unification of the country in 1976 brought in Southern assembly facilities, physical
infrastructure and some technical personnel who had previously been involved in
production. The government sent many engineers from the North to the South to take joint
responsibility (with old workers and technicians) for rehabilitating those plants which had
had to cease production due to a lack of materials and components. These companies,
together with those in the North, formed a group of enterprises under the Union of
Enterprises for Electronics and Informatics (Viettronics).
By the end of the 1970s, a few Viettronics enterprises purchased equipment from
abroad to produce new products like printed circuit boards. Unfortunately, due to
economic difficulties, these technologies just stood idle. During 1984-1985, these factories
got technical assistance from East European countries and either continued to produce
simple products like electronic parts and components or to assemble TVs from imported
Polish components. In 1986 some Southern firms established relations with Western
companies which enabled them to import Japanese components for assembly work.
However, by 1986, the Vietnam electronics industry was still underdeveloped. Industrial
activity had mainly involved the assembly of consumer products, producing simple parts
and components for the domestic market, together with a few exports activities. A
computer industry did not exist.
The next period (1986 to the present) was characterised by some changes. The first
was the more active production of consumer electronics and the emergence of computer
firms. While electronics companies (most are in the Viettronics group) continue to
produce simple consumer goods (loud speakers, amplifiers, radio cassettes and TV sets,
both in black and white and colour), there has been a shift of highly-educated labour and of
material resources in computer works, towards business from R&D and higher education
institutions. This move happened during the middle of the 1980s (1986-1988). Computer
companies have sprung up, most of which have been occupied with trading and
consultancy. They provide small-scale services, mostly in hardware. Due to the many
extra costs of business start-up (for example, where companies need to install assembly
lines), some prefer to occupy the niche of simple trading or to rely on assembly facilities
abroad. Assembly of PCs in Vietnam is still very rare. Companies mostly import parts
and assemble them without adding much value. Most machines still keep the brand name
of the foreign firms which supplied the parts. Concerning software products, only a few
companies can sell a number of copies tailored for very specific customers.
Since 1990, both electronics and computer companies have developed quite fast in
terms of the quantity and quality of their products and services. The private sector has
emerged as a significant factor in the industry's development (especially in computers). As
the main actor in the state sector, Viettronics re-grouped as the Vietnam Electronics and
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Informatics Corporation (VEIC) and it now has 15 member-companies: 12 consumer
electronics companies, two computers companies and a trading company, Vietronimex.
Both computers and consumer electronics products are now being reoriented to serve the
domestic market more systematically than before. Types of products and services have
become diversified, such that electronics companies not only produce TVs but also audio¬
visual systems. Computer companies not only sell PCs but also software-related products
and they provide package solutions for customers (including hardware, software, related
office equipment, installation, training and maintenance, etc.). Many companies have
diversified their activities to other sectors: real estate, tourism, hotel, construction,
biochemical, garment, etc. This is described as a "complex diversification of business" and
it is one of the main features of the most recent phase of development of the electronics
industry. Figure 5.2 presents the milestones of the electronic industry.
5.3.2 Ownership, Size and Location
Most consumer electronics companies are SOEs (VEIC members are the main actors in the
industry). Private companies are mostly small and provide repair and maintenance services
but do not engage in production. In computers, the number of companies is even smaller,
but the situation is different. SOEs are not very active in computing. In contrast, it is
private firms (set up by technologists) who are the main players in producing computers
and in providing services in this business.
Most companies in the consumer electronics and computer industry are quite small,
ranging from around 50 to 500 employees. For obvious reasons, these companies mainly
concentrate around the two big cities, Hanoi and HoChiMinh City, where they have easy
access to information and R&D expertise, more skilled labour and a good infrastructure.
5.3.3 Export Activities
In consumer electronics, Vietnamese firms first began exporting in the middle of the
1980s. Some Czechoslovakian companies (e.g., TESLA) supplied Viettronics with
materials and technological training in return for the production of electronic parts like
resistors, condensors and transistors which were sent back to Czechoslovakia on a trial
export basis. However, after a few years it became apparent that this success was to be
short-lived since the enterprise lacked the back-up of necessary policy incentives. In the
computer industry, the export of PCs to the Soviet market assembled in co-operation with
foreign partners (e.g., through joint venture or contract manufacturing) started around the
end of the 1980s and was mostly undertaken by private firms. This form of export activity
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declined after 1990 as a result of the difficult situation in the markets of the Soviet Union
and East Europe following the collapse of the old regime. By now, most companies have
begun to reorient themselves to the domestic market.
Still, some firms continue to export to the former Soviet Union and East Europe. In
order to continue exporting, these companies try hard to find new partners and
opportunities to produce new products. A few SOEs have started assembling electronics
parts for industrial robots and for telecommunications equipment for small-scale export to
Japan or other Western countries. Those who still operate in the old and familiar market of
the former Soviet Union have changed their way of doing business: they can sell on credit,
look for tripartite partnerships, arrange payment for buyers, or use a barter system, etc.
Some computer firms are exploring niche products for high-tech developments.
For example, some design software (for cartoon film-making) for sale to targeted markets
in France or Japan. However, the revenues from these sales range from just a few
thousand to tens of thousands USD at most. There is no large-scale export of software
products.
5.3.4 Management Practices
Although electronics and computing have always been considered as one of the
development priorities of Vietnam, the industry is seen merely from the research and
training perspective. The country lacks a national policy for electronics and computer
production and lacks the necessary levels of state investment. Measures to promote this
sector are only temporary and they fail to take a long-term view (Phan Dinh Dieu, 1992:
11). This is the main reason why the industry has developed in such an unstable fashion,
characterised by rapid growth and equally rapid decline over a very short period of time. It
is only very recently that a policy for the national development of informatics technology
has been approved by the government. Many companies continue to develop in an
uncoordinated way through launching their own initiatives and finding their own
opportunities. The development of production and export is fragmented, and is mostly
achieved through the effort of individual companies.
A second problem is that changes in institutional and organisational structures have
caused much confusion. In 1983, in order to give greater priority to the industry, the
government set up the General Department of Electronics and Informatics to oversee the
industry's development. Then, in 1988, this Department was dissolved and was replaced
by Viettronics run from the Ministry of Machinery Engineering and Metallurgy. The
reason for this change was a move to replace a formal ministerial structure (the General
Department had functioned with a Ministry status) with a body directly oriented to
82
production. Changes of this kind have caused much disorder and difficulties for
companies in organising their activities.
In January 1989, the Association of Informatics of Vietnam was established and its
members consists of state-owned and private organisations and individuals. The
Association acts as a bridge between its Vietnamese members and other similar
international organisations, and Vietnamese experts in computer science living abroad (in
France, the US and Canada) who have competence, expertise and resources in IT
development (Nguyen Quy Son, 1992:35). A similar association for microelectronics also
exists and plays a similar role in the consumer electronics industry.
5.3.5 Training, Education and R&D Activities
Training in radio electronics was first undertaken in 1958 in the Hanoi Polytechnic while
other students were sent to train in Eastern Europe. For technicians, a two-year training
programme has been in operation since 1960. A number of workers in the industry have
also been trained, since the 1950s, through short courses in radio electronics. Some
Vietnamese expatriates, who came back from France after 1954, were actively involved in
the initial organisation of these establishments. Up to 1975 most teaching of radio
electronics was undertaken by the polytechnics. At the same time, research activities were
limited.
After 1975, electronics subjects were taught more widely in universities and
colleges like the polytechnics in Hanoi and HoChiMinh City. Some other economics and
statistics colleges, and the vocational school of the General Department of Statistics, also
offered courses on computer programming. Higher degree courses (graduate and
postgraduate) in computer science and electronics were organised, to a limited extent, in
some research institutes like the Institute of Computer Science and Cybernetics (now the
Institute of Information Technology - IOIT) which previously belonged to the National
Centre for Scientific Research (NCSR). Simple courses on computer use and applications
for administrative work, and for electronics assembly, repair and maintenance work were
organised mostly on a part-time and self-study basis through evening classes offered by
various universities, colleges and companies, both state and private.
With the privatisation tendencies in social and economic life of the 1980s, some
private and semi-state organisations were set up at the end of the 1980s to offer formal
education towards university degrees. At present, all colleges and institutes annually train
about 200 persons for university degrees in electronics and computer science, and many
more as computer programmers, technicians and related workers. If we include the
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Vietnamese who have been educated abroad in electronics and informatics, the number of
persons with university graduate and postgraduate degrees amounts to a few thousand.
R&D activities are carried out in some national institutes. The IOIT is the strongest
in computer science. However, research programmes at national are inefficient in terms of
serving the needs of the industry for several reasons: the absence of a coherent and co¬
ordinated policy for the development of the whole sector, the lack of necessary investment
resources, and weakness of market pressure.
At international level, research has also been carried out in co-operation with the
CMEA, which offered its members a programme of informatics development and
application (PIDA) to develop and diffuse electronics and information technologies.
According to some assessments, some Vietnamese participants felt frustrated because very
little, if any, information technology was transferred into Vietnam within the framework of
this programme (UNIDO, 1990: 45).
During the 1970s and 1980s, some research institutions also conducted research on
electronics. Examples are the Laboratory for Semiconductors in the Institute of Physics
(also of the NCSR); the Institute of Microelectronics Technology (IMET) and the
Information System Centre (both belonging to the National Institute of Technology); some
laboratories of the Ministry of Defence; and the Vietnam Radio and Television
Broadcasting Commission. The Ministry of Heavy Industry also created the Vietnam
Institute of Electronics and Informatics (VIELIN) in 1985. These institutes have carried
out various kinds of research in solid state physics, optics, electronics, telecommunications
and other informatics projects. There were some attempts to link all research activities into
a state co-ordinated programme. The latest programme for 1991-1995 is for electronics,
informatics and telecommunications. Many participants in these programmes argue that
the project targets have been too fragmented, with some projects being too theoretically-
oriented.
As can be seen here, the electronics sector enjoyed a rather early start-up in R&D
and training to run in parallel with application activities and these activities helped in the
establishment of the first institutional framework for the sector. In both electronics
(consumer and industrial) and computing, quite massive state-run R&D institutes have
been created, although they do not serve many companies in the industry (see Boxes 5.2
and 5.3).
With the liberalisation of economic activities and the tendency to commercialise
R&D results in the 1980s (see Appendix 5.2), many scientists - frustrated by their wasted
efforts on useless R&D activities conducted under state co-ordination - moved out and
grasped opportunities to set up their own companies so as to commercialise their
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technological expertise. This heralded the set-up of many new computer firms (for more
data on the development of the electronics industry, see Appendices 5.8 to 5.10).
Box 5.2: VIELIN
The Vietnam Institute of Electronics and Informatics (VIELIN) in the Ministry
of Heavy Industry has 81 employees. It engages in various research projects in
industrial electronics (control equipment for production processes in industrial
projects), computing (computing applications and designing software for
industrial use) and communications technology (research on switching systems
and the transmission of data by teletext or videotext). All these projects sound
quite impressive, but they are not linked to similar activities in industrial
enterprises. The Institute acts as an isolated research unit monitored by the
Ministry. Although VIELIN also co-ordinates the state research programme on
automation technology (code KC-02), it only links various similar activities very
loosely. From time to time, it also provides training in co-operation with Hanoi
Polytechnic (graduate and postgraduate courses), but offers nothing that serves
the immediate needs of companies. The only resource that VIELIN offers
companies is some consulting and problem-solving, but even this is not on a
regular basis (Interview with VIELIN director, 1994).
Box 5.3: IMET
Although the aim of the Institute of Micro Electronics Technology (IMET) in
the National Institute of Technology (set up in 1986) was to foster closer links
between industry and technological innovation, it still has not brought its
research activities closer to industry. With 40 employees, IMET specialises in
high-tech areas like research on electronics materials and components,
equipment and ASIC. It also has a division engaged in research on computing
software applications. These projects of the institute cannot be commercialised
since they are far removed from the consumer electronics activities most firms
are involved in, and almost no industrial enterprise can apply their work. As
with VIELIN, IMET and its mother National Institute of Technology are in
charge of another state research programme on electronics, informatics and
communications (code KC-01). Strikingly enough, IMET itself sees this
programme as being too formal and ineffective, lacking co-ordination between
and co-operation amongst the institute's participants, and without making a real
impact on the industry (Interview with IMET director, 1994).
5.3.6 Summary of Main Features
Originating with R&D, training and education activities, and application of consumer
electronics, the Vietnamese electronics and computer industry is still in its infancy.
Consumer electronics is the most developed part of the industry, but the computer industry
has started to emerge over the last couple of years. Reforms in R&D management together
with the liberalisation of the economy has created many new opportunities for researchers
to set up their own private computer companies. Moreover, these computer businesses
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tend to start exporting almost immediately to the very unique market of the former Soviet
Union. However, the volume of production and of export is small and, more importantly,
export activities are still conducted on a trial basis rather than systematically. Assembly
work is simple, using complete-knock-down (CKD) and semi-complete-knock-down
(SKD) components, particularly for computer products.
The two electronics sub-sectors started under different conditions, and with
different initial knowledge and experience, to develop further their technological
competence. While the consumer electronics industry shares some general features with
other manufacturing industries in the country (e.g., most firms are SOEs, created and
supported by the state), the computing industry has had a very different background,
relying more on private initiatives which are commercial spin-offs from R&D activities.
One of the problems faced by the industry is a weak domestic market. The
purchasing power of the population is increasing but this only enables them to afford some
consumer electronics. As for computers, some of the first consumers have been state
organisations which buy computers for small-scale administrative and office use rather
than for industrial purposes. In general, Vietnamese society remains information-poor, and
this is one of the main reasons for the weak domestic market for computer products (Phan
Dinh Dieu, 1992: 11).
A second set of problems relates to Vietnam's poor physical infrastructure, the after
effects of the trade embargo imposed by the US until 1994, and a lack of efficient
international co-operation in the high-technology industries. Foreign investors hesitate to
invest in electronics; it is only recently that a few Japanese firms have launched initiatives
in this direction (Ostry & Harianto, 1995). A few companies have just begun joint
ventures with foreign companies to produce TVs and parts. However, it has only been
possible to find opportunities to engage in international co-operative endeavours in
electronics since the very recent lifting of the embargo and the establishment of full
diplomatic relations with the US.
A third problem points towards the most distinctive difficulty faced by the sector:
the lack of a long-term, coherent and co-ordinated state development policy. This not only
affects over-arching strategies to develop the sector, but also any concrete measures
introduced to support the industry.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented the brief history of industrial development in Vietnam
which can be divided into several periods. These periods have an important impact on the
technology establishment of concerned industries. The transitional reforms from a
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centrally planned economy (some main features of which are the monopoly of the state
sector over economic production; all production and management decisions were planned
from above; the reliance on the Soviet Union and Eastern European markets only;
isolation from other Western markets; and no foreign direct investment) to a market
economy in the middle of 1980s are the most significant change of the Vietnam political
economy. The major reforms included structural change of investment priorities;
decentralisation of economic management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); radical
change and development of financial and banking system; and diversification and
liberalisation of external economic relations. These features of both pre-reform and reform
periods are crucial as the external factors in having impact on the TC acquisition and
learning process of firms as I present in Chapter 8.
The chapter also presented the overall picture of development in the two industries.
The evolution of these industries over time show that they have moved from very limited
abilities in the 1950s towards rather active production and export in the 1990s. Comparing
the development of two industries, some main features can be observed.
Although the two sectors share some features such as the negative attitude towards
development of private ownership, and the influences of unification after 1976 and of
reforms after 1986, there are some distinct differences. The textile/garment sector began
much earlier than electronics. The electronics sector's initial activities were mainly in the
areas of training, education and R&D rather than for industrial purposes. This factor is
proving decisive in shaping the different ways that electronics firms have begun operating
and learning technological capabilities. The phenomenon of spin-off companies is specific
to the electronics sector (especially computing) and is not shared by textile/garment firms.
As a result, electronics firms have a more R&D-based origin than textile/garment firms.
In the textile/garment sector, firms are mainly SOEs, they tend to be large, and
private companies play a less active role. In the electronics sector, private ownership is
more significant although firm size is generally small. As regards export activity, although
both sectors began with CMEA countries and then re-oriented themselves to the local
market and to some new markets of Asia-Pacific or the EU, electronics firms commenced
their exporting activities in a more targeted manner, with single types of product destined
for specific niched markets. Management practice in the two sectors show that the
electronics industry is less guided by a consistent and coherent state policy for the
development of the whole sector. As a result, it has had to face more confusion, and its
development is more unstable than that of the textile/garment industry.
These main features of development at the sectoral level influence the activities of
firms' TC accumulation and learning. These issues are examined in more detail in
Chapters 6 and 7, where I look especially at the sequence of TC accumulation, the extent to
87
which TCs are accumulated and the patterns of usage of different learning mechanisms to
build up these TCs.
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First simple textile plant built by the French.
Division of the country. Migration of technical
personnel and textile facilities to the South.
Construction of new textile plants: Chinese and
Soviet technologies in the North, American and
Japanese technologies in the South. Garment
plants set up in the North.
Garment industry began in the South. Large new
textile plant built in the North.
Unification. Taking over Southern plants. First
export to CMEA.
Purchase of new modern turn-key plants from
Japan, France, etc. Subcontracting agreement in
garment with the Soviet Union, EE countries.
Reforms. FDI: joint venture. Private sector re-
emerged.
Boom in garment export. Export to new markets
of EU, Asia-Pacific countries.
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First radio application. Service workshops:
maintenance and repair.
First factory to assemble consumer electronics:
amplifiers, etc. in the North: technologies
imported from Soviet Union, EE countries.
First black & white TV broadcast.
First computer use.
First assembling of black & white TV and other
audio products in the South: American and
Japanese technologies.
Unification. Taking over Southern plants.
Migration of Southern technical personnel. First
trial production of components and parts.
First colour TV broadcast. Subcontracting for
export of parts to EE countries.
First colour TV assembling with Polish and later
Japanese technologies. Upgraded assembling of
radio-cassettes, etc.
Reforms.
Spin-off companies from R&D. Private sector
emerged. First computer assembling and services.
First export of PC.
First industrial production of electronics and
computer software. First trial export of industrial




PATTERNS OF BUILDING TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES IN
FIRMS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at patterns of TC building within firms in the two industries. The first
research question - examining the existence of TC in the firms - is examined for each of the
six TCs in textile/garment (Section 6.2) and electronics industries (Section 6.3). Then,
emerging patterns of TC building in terms of the existence of TCs and the sequence of TC
accumulation are addressed in Section 6.4, which also discusses similarities and
differences, together with related factors, in TC building between the two industries.
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter, pointing to some further research steps to be addressed
in following chapters.
6. 2 TC Building in Textile/Garment Companies
The main findings of the interviews reveal that the existence of TC differs between firms
within the industry. The mapping of TC accumulation for this sector is presented in Table
6.1. This mapping is made possible according to the taxonomy and check-list of TC for the
textile/garment industry (the criteria for TC accumulation given in Appendices 4.1 and
4.2). As discussed in Section 4.4.3, the firm has strongly developed TC if it has highest
level of autonomy, regularity and extent of tasks performing (Appendix 4.2) and is ranking
with (2). Another extreme is non-existence of TC and ranking as (0) with the lowest level
of these three criteria. Weak TC is in the middle between these two positions and ranking
as (1). Using this assessment, results ofmapping for each TC is discussed below.
6.2.1 Production Capability
Ten companies have strongly developed production capability ranking as (2) in Table 6.1,
while this capability is weaker in four companies, ranking as (1) in the table. Firms with
strong TC are those able to master all activities in production management, production
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engineering, repairs and maintenance. Weak firms in this capability are only able to
conduct some of these activities. Some production capability exists in all cases surveyed:
• In production management, I identified three areas of capability. First, the firms knew
how to operate rather modern machines and equipment in weaving (TG4), spinning
(TG3 and TG6) or sewing. Almost all of them (TGI, TG10, TG9, TG5) were able to
use automatic embroidery machines with computer-aided design (CAD) as well as
other specialised equipment like stoning for making jeans, brushing, etc. without
serious problems. Second, the firms knew how to organise and control textile/garment
production processes for different products. Many textile firms (TG3, TG6, TG4) were
able to organise production of downstream products like garments, while some garment
companies were doing the same for knitwear. Third, firms knew how to interact with
suppliers of raw materials (cotton/yarns for textiles, fabrics and other materials for
garments), and with suppliers of other supplementary activities in mechanical
engineering or chemical (for dyeing), etc.
• In production engineering, three areas of capability are identified. First, the firms were
able to adjust their textile or sewing machines for different products. This was
particularly strong in garment firms which adjusted certain mechanical parts to suit the
requirements of new products when moving from simple products like trousers and
shirts to more skilled operations like jackets (TGI, TG5, TG9, TG10 and TG14).
Second, companies substituted raw materials and did various kinds of trouble-shooting
and test products to meet quality standards. Technical personnel of the firms handled
small trouble-shooting activities, or they knew whom to invite from outside to solve
more serious problems.
• Third, companies maintained equipment and did repairs when necessary on modern
technologies like combing and carding together and open-end in spinning (TG3 and
TG6), jet loom in weaving (TG4) or vertical sewing (TG14).
In general, all these companies were able to run their production facilities using
their own staff and without reliance on outside personnel. Their managers, technicians and
workers were capable of dealing with all production activities. The fact that companies
produced not only for domestic markets but also for export - with four companies TGI,
TG8, TG9 or TG10 producing only for export - is evidence of their production
competence.
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Although the companies achieved this using their own staff, in some specific
production activities a few companies still relied on the involvement of foreign partners in
order to achieve their best performances. For example, quality control in TG2 has been
jointly supervised by its Vietnamese staff and experts coming from buyers like Sanshin of
Japan. Sanshin's staff also took part in the supervision of some production lines, and
provided technical guidance when it was required. Similarly, Korean experts participated
in activities of TGl's special workshop which produced for export (see 9.2).
6,2.2 Investment Capability
The situation is mixed for this capability. All but four companies have some levels of the
capability. Five firms - TG2, TG5, TG6, TG9 and TG14 - possess a strong capability as
they can carry out investment tasks confidently on a regular basis for both pre-investment
and project execution phases. Others firms involved in only some selected activities are
deemed to have a weaker status. SOEs like TG3 and TG6 made their first investment in
new technologies during the 1980s. TG2 and TG10 started their production facilities
earlier in the 1960s. They played a rather passive role in the first investment efforts
initiated by the state, with technologies coming from Japan (TG6), Germany, Italy (TG3)
as turnkey plant projects. The staff only participated in some construction and installation
activities.
By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, real investment capability
came with SOE efforts to expand the range of production. From these activities, the
following levels of investment can be seen:
• In the pre-investment phase, the firms were able to organise and prepare various
investment studies: pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and site selection. Weaving
companies TG4 and TGI5 prepared their investment studies when moving to polo shirt
production. The same happened in TG2 when it reorganised its production planning to
upgrade the quality and range of its knitting products. TG10 upgraded its production
facilities by purchasing and investing in new projects and equipment in order to export
to new and more demanding markets in Japan, and the firm did almost all its own
studies in this phase.
• In the project implementation phase, two types of expertise were found. First, firms
themselves choose the plant design and type of textile/garment equipment - as TG10
did with Japanese CAD embroidery machines and with Korean leather processing
equipment. TG3, in its new phase of expansion from spinning to knitting had chosen
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knitting equipment better suited to its own yarns material. Second, firms organised
designing, sourcing, construction and erection start-up activities. Most of the firms
were able to deal with these problems without serious difficulties, partly thanks to
experience accumulated during the 1970s.
• In starting new ventures at home or abroad, the firms were rather active in moving
either from upstream to downstream (textile to knitting and garment) or vice versa, and
in take-over and merging activities, etc. TG4 took over a spinning plant nearby in
HoChiMinh City in order to ensure its supply of raw materials. Similar new expansion
can be seen in TG6, TG5 and TGI4. TG5 began new production of kimonos for export
to Japan and suits to European countries in 1992. TGI4 purchased new workshops for
producing suits for export to France, using new vertical sewing technology from Japan.
These two firms were finding it easy to undertake investment activities in the
preparation and implementation of feasibility studies and new investment plans.
The two private companies TG8 and TG9 were very active in new investment. As a
private family business, TG8 began all its investment and pre-investment preparation with
its own staff, including choice of technologies, and design of the plant and production
planning. In order to implement their investment plans, they hired local construction
companies to build their new premises for production. Similar capabilities can be seen in
TG9 which is a private company formed from a group of co-operatives and private
businesses. In some start-up activities of its new production, however, TG8 still needed
limited guidance and assistance from the Japanese technology suppliers who had provided
them with sewing equipment and buy-back products. Occasionally, similar situations
occurred in other firms when investing in new facilities, or in choosing technologies.
Four cases (TGI, TG7, TG12 and TG13) did not have any investment capability.
TGI acquired its investment, new sewing and other specialised machines, and expertise
and technological training from foreign sources. All pre-investment and investment
feasibility studies were done largely by a foreign consultancy firm (see Section 9.2). TG7
is a joint venture with British Coats Tootal. Its investment activities, including choice of
technologies, sourcing of materials, installation, erection and start-up all relied on British
expertise. By participating in some activities requiring specific knowledge and skills (like
construction activities under Vietnamese conditions), the staff of these companies partly
improved their investment skills, so that they could do some new small investment in
expanding production facilities. But this is still far from being capable in investment
activities. The investment activities of TG12 and TG13 were usually run by external
consultants and experts assigned by the Hanoi City which owns the company, or from
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experts in ministries. This passive reliance has continued even through the 1970s and
1980s up till the present, when the firms took part in some new investment ventures.
6.2.3 Minor Technical Change Capability
Seven firms developed minor technical change capabilities, while this capability was
weaker in five firms. Only companies which have done minor change activities in all
categories can be considered as acquiring strong capability (TGI, TG2, TG3, TG4, TGI2,
TG13 and TG14). Some other firms like TG7, TG9 and TG10, can be regarded as being
very active in one or two types of minor change, but since they have done very little in
others, their overall capability is weak. In many companies staff were involved quite
successfully in various kinds of minor technical change.
First, firms carried out improvements to existing process technologies (or added
new elements to them) to make the equipment or machine more suitable for the needs of
production. For example: TG2 introduced changes to create new equipment for printing
labels, flowers and other images onto its clothing products; TG3 had changed the
specification of its spinning equipment (reducing the angle of the spinning gears to
increase the quality of yarns or replacing imported spare parts and components by locally
made trolleys, metal and non-metal gears, etc.) to save on foreign exchange. Some
attempts to improve technologies to suit the lower quality of local raw cotton (to replace
imported material or to supply yarns through the tube system, etc.) were taken by TGI3; in
TGI4, new component (metal gear, for example) is widely used for certain operations in
sewing trousers.
Second, some companies have improved product specifications: modification of
foreign models taken from catalogues; improvement of quality and design of products by
changing minor details; and prototype production of new industrial fabrics by using new
weaving techniques. Based on these improvements, some companies introduced their
products with new designs, colours, or other details for trial offer to customers. For
example: TG7 introduced on a regular basis a more diversified range of threads (its main
product) by changing the colour mixture of raw material; and TGI4 offered customers new
models of polo shirts and suits. The proportion of products with their own labels is quite
high in some companies: 100% of clothing products in TG9, 70% of knitwear products in
TG3. Some products have been well accepted in East European markets (10-15% of TG9's
total exports) and are widely sold in the domestic market.
Third, companies made minor improvements in the organisation ofproduction, or
in the arrangement of technological schemes, to achieve more optimal variants. A new
organisational pattern for cutting operations, for example, had been introduced at TG2 to
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save millions of Vietnamese dongs and increase the productivity of workers. The technical
unit at TG14 and TG15 adapted the technology by combining the best variants of existing
production lines to produce new products.
The organisation of change activity in most firms varies but is quite active in many
cases. Some firms have created special units for dealing with technical problems in
production. For instance, TG2 has one small group attached to its technical division for
model design. Most companies have assigned their vice-director to take care of these
technical divisions and allocated to them regular amounts of money for R&D. Receiving
money from Hanoi City's S&T Department to carry out technical development projects,
TG12's technical division has one group specialising in supporting technical initiatives and
improvements.
Box 6.1: Minor Technical Change in TG3
Minor technical adjustments and improvement in TG3 range widely from
sample use of Vietnamese raw cotton material to replace imported cotton, to
changing the consumption rate of other materials. The company has introduced
some technical changes to improve its production performances and save
production inputs. It has:
• replaced imported spare parts with locally-produced ones (some plugs,
carriages, gears, etc.)
• introduced flexible optimisation of production processes to suit local
conditions;
• improved certain parts and technical details of spinning technology to
upgrade the quality of products;
• re-equipped electrical supply facilities using local materials and parts.
Improvement activities also include reorganisation of production plans and
working conditions, such as measures to ensure hygienic conditions for industry
on the site; management structure of the company and of each workshop, etc.
The company has a special unit for designing new models, mostly in knitwear
products (underwear, outerwear, towels, etc.). Each month it produces about
five new models of products which have sold well. Up to now, about 70% of
knitting products have been produced from the designs of the company itself
and only 30% from the designs of buyers. The rate of export of knitwear has
also increased: 70% of total production in 1991 and 80% in 1992 are for export.
In the near future, the company plans to use computers in its design activities.
In general, these minor technical change activities are handled actively and
entirely by the staff of the firm. Clear vision and conscious improvement
programmes designed by the firm's managers are very important factors
contributing to this minor change capability. One reason for this attitude is that
its top managers and most middle level staff are technologically highly-
educated. The General Director of the enterprise is a textile engineer, almost all
directors of workshops or mills are engineers, and one of them has a PhD degree
in engineering from Eastern Europe. Also their average age is rather young by
Vietnamese standards: top managers are in their 40s and 50s; middle level
managers of workshops or production lines are in their 20s and 30s. As a result,
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this company enjoys higher levels of dynamism, pragmatic motivation and
education than most Vietnamese companies. Working for this company is
considered prestigious amongst many new graduates from universities and
polytechnics which, in turn, contributes to attracting a higher quality of new
recruits.
Two companies, TG4 and TG10, developed their organisations to support minor
change activities more seriously. TG4 has a special R&D unit (10 persons) responsible for
the preparation of feasibility studies for new investment plans, and studies of
improvements in technological processes. This activity contributes importantly to more
major technical change in TG4 in the use of microfibre material for its new products (see
Section 6.2.6). The technology and engineering division of TG10 is responsible for
technical improvement and development.
Companies having no special units relied on a 'soft' structure (ad-hoc groups
created by the director of the company which recruit people from different divisions) to
deal with minor change tasks as in the case of TG6. In TG7, all responsibilities for
technological improvements or model changes belong to the production division. Box 6.1
is an illustration of how minor change activity takes place at one firm, TG3.
Two firms, TG5 and TG8, did not have any minor change capability. Although
both have made some changes, these were quite disorganised and any accumulated
knowledge and experience cannot be developed further into sustainable competence.
Initial activities at TG5, for example, were impressive. The firm tried to cooperate with
foreign designers to set up a fashion centre for designing its collection of garments. Due to
lack of resources this attempt was unsuccessful and, with a recent change of the firm's
managers, these activities have ended. TG8, as a small private company, has introduced
some initiatives in making embroidery for Japanese buyers, but these are no more than
simple and individual fragmented actions. In my view, both firms are not yet capable of
initiating and sustaining technical change.
6.2.4 Marketing Capability
All in all, marketing capability is generally still absent in the textile/garment companies.
Only two firms - TG5 and TG9 - have some weak marketing competence. The first aspect
of this capability concerns the ability of firms to regularly gather marketing intelligence on
market structure, trends in fashion design, information about other competitors and buyers,
suppliers of cotton, materials, machines and equipment, etc. Up to the end of the 1980s,
the firms had no need for, and no intention of doing, marketing. Recently, they began
some limited marketing activity. In terms of the organisation of marketing activity, there
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are few special units in these companies. This function is usually assigned to sales and
distribution or production divisions (TG4, TG6, TGI2 and TG7). TG3 and TGI4 have a
unit for marketing but this is aimed at the domestic market only.
The second aspect is the setting up of firms' own distribution channels, and the
supply of both sales and after-sales services locally. Most companies have opened shops
or transaction centres in big cities in order to target the domestic market. TG8 did not have
any marketing activities even for local markets because all of its products were exported;
for this it relied entirely on foreign buyers.
The third aspect is the setting up of representative offices, show-rooms, fashion
centres or shops abroad to promote sales of garments, yarn or fabrics. In almost all
companies, the ability to penetrate foreign markets, and to establish distribution channels
or sale representative offices abroad is not developed. The companies have to rely on
contacts with foreign partners to sell or export their products (through subcontracting or
OEM relationships). By the end of the 1980s, in moving towards a market economy, some
firms have become aware of the necessity for marketing, and have begun to explore foreign
markets more actively: e.g., TG10 (by becoming a member of the Chamber of Commerce
of ASEAN countries); TG12 (by sending people to be based in the Ukraine market); and
TGI3 (by taking part in market intelligence gathering at presentation seminars held by
foreign companies doing business in Vietnam). So far, this awareness is just beginning
and had only led to limited activities.
Box 6.2: Marketing in TG9
In May 1990, as a private company, TG9 began garment production for export.
Products such as sportswear, jackets, coats and wind-breakers are exported to
Germany, the former Soviet Union, Hong Kong, South Korea and
Czechoslovakia. When TG9 received orders for simple shirt production, it gave
these orders to its small subsidiary production co-operatives having about 6,000
employees so the company could concentrate its efforts on high-quality products
like jackets. TG9 opened sales offices in Moscow to take care of business in
Eastern Europe. The company intends to open a new office in France or
Belgium to serve the EU countries. It also has plans to export to the North
American and Scandinavian markets. During the first trip organised by the
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce to the US in April 1993, the company got
acquainted with the regulations, demand and potential opportunities in the US
market. Also it has begun to explore new joint business possibilities with
American companies in Vietnam in exchange for opportunities to export
Vietnamese textile and garment products to the US market. In doing this, in
1994, TG9 concluded preliminary contracts with some US companies (for 4 to 5
million USD) to buy US technology in textile/garment and to organise an
exhibition of American textile/garment equipment in Vietnam.
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TG5 and TG9 are the only two firms with a marketing capability developed to any
significant extent. TG5 has a special marketing unit. In co-operation with foreign
partners, it has opened representative offices in Moscow and France (as a joint venture
company Lega-Scavi with Scavi.S.A, a company of a Vietnamese expatriate living in
France which produces lingerie and women's underwear for export). TG5 has also sold
some of its products directly at various international exhibitions and trade fairs in Thailand,
Hong Kong and Eastern Europe. Through these channels, the company has gained insight
into fashion trends and market dynamics abroad; as a result, it has adjusted its production
plans accordingly. Interestingly, the market division of TG5 also has responsibility for
R&D activities which, according to them, should be guided by market change. This
capability has helped TG5 to increase its exports to the high-demand markets of the EU.
For the TG9 case, see Box 6.2. Although these two companies have made some marketing
efforts, they still face many difficulties in trying to enter the more sophisticated markets of
Japan and the EU.
6.2.5 Linkage Capability
Overall, in my assessment, 10 companies have this linkage capability to some extent.
However, only six firms (TG2, TG3, TG10, TG12, TG13 and TG14) develop all of these
linkage types (with S&T infrastructure, inter- and intra-firms) and can be regarded as
having strongly developed this capability. Although the majority of firms have this
capability, the types of, and partners in, linkages are not the same. The most common link
is co-operation with state-owned R&D institutions for solving technical problems for the
companies, or for repair services. For example, TG2 co-operates with Hanoi Polytechnic
to solve technical difficulties in operating Japanese knitting machines. TG3 also co¬
operates with Hanoi Polytechnic and the Research Institute of Textile Industry (RITI) to
introduce new production technologies. TG4 co-operates with a branch of the RITI in
HoChiMinh City to improve the quality control of yarns. Other firms have had close
contact with the National Centre for Standardisation-Metrology-Quality Control of
MOSTE to set up technical standards (TGI2), or with R&D units in other industries for
different services (TGI3 contacted the Institute of Industrial Construction for water
treatment services). This linkage can sometimes be seen to be at more technologically
sophisticated levels, as when TG14 relied on HoChiMinh City polytechnic for using
computers for pattern design and garment stitching.
Linkages with universities and colleges for the training of staff occurred in a
number of subjects: technical, managerial and in economics. Most firms look to training
and education organisations as a source of training for their labour force. In the North,
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TGI, TG2 and TG3 relied on Hanoi Polytechnic and the Garment Vocational School No.l
or on the Chamber of Commerce. Southern firms TG4, TG5, TG8 and TG14 used links
with HoChiMinh City polytechnic and the Garment Vocational School No. 2.
A third form of linkage is between companies and local enterprises. Many
companies have signed contracts with other firms to provide raw materials in exchange for
training and technical assistance, or for sharing job opportunities and/or sales and
distribution channels (TGI2, TG10, TG14, TG4, etc.). Some companies have created a
network of small subcontracting units (or subsidiaries) for which the large firms provide
technological assistance and parts of their contracts. For example, in addition to co¬
operating with other companies in HoChiMinh City to execute those contracts which are
too large to be done alone, TG8 had four subsidiary small companies in other provinces. It
held a part of their assets (as share-holding companies) and shared with them production
contracts and forms of technical assistance. TG5 and TG14 had a similar network of small
units to implement contracts that require neither very high quality of products, good
delivery time nor high technical standards. This kind of domestic subcontracting was
important for companies because it allowed them to organise their business more flexibly
and dynamically. Moreover, firms usually transferred some of their technological
expertise, skills and experiences to other firms in the same subcontracting network.
As one of the leading enterprises working in knitting production, with the
assistance ofMOLI, TG2 formed a group of nine smaller knitting companies with itself as
the head of the group. This group held meetings once every three months to discuss their
joint plans of action. Through this way of linking, TG2 is better able to organise its
production and business plans, including co-ordinating its technological innovations.
Similarly, TG10 headed a group of 18 garment firms (mostly coming from the provinces
around Hanoi). This group gathers quarterly to share information and jobs and to organise
sales and technical services. TG10, hence, is in a better position to adjust its production
and, in exchange, provides these small firms with various kinds of assistance.
A few companies also have links with local consultancy companies which help
them create economic and technological information databases, as in the case of TG4 and
the Technology Development Company (TEDCO) of HoChiMinh City.
Internal linkages between divisions within the firms were variable. In some firms,
these links were stronger and were organised more systematically than in others. In
general, most firms know how to circulate information and staff, how to link activities
across different units (such as the link between production and sales), and how to relate
improvement activities to market trends.
Four companies are considered as not having any linkage capability. As a joint
venture, TG7 relied very much on the strong network of linkages provided by its British
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partner and it became passive in seeking other linkages (especially local links). TGI has
relied more on foreign partners (see Section 9.2) and considers itself one of the best in the
garment industry. Because of that, the company is not so ready to develop its linkages
with domestic R&D organisations. TG9 did not have strong enough contacts with the
R&D and education system and therefore, is considered as not having this capability.
TGI5 is the weakest firm in this dimension, not having good enough relations with either
the S&T infrastructure or the industrial network.
6.2.6 Major Technical Change Capability
This capability is absent in nearly all cases. Although some firms claimed that they have
some radical R&D and design activities, these remain as plans only. Some firms were able
to introduce design modifications in order to launch new products (mostly in garments) but
without using a new type of machine or equipment. So in the taxonomy adopted here,
these changes count as minor improvements to, and adjustments of, existing models. No
new process technology was developed by the firms. Some attempts were found to
substitute components by using local sources. So far, these attempts have been either
small-scale, unsystematic or unsuccessful. At the highest level of major technical change,
no patentable technological breakthroughs as a result of R&D activities were introduced.
Most R&D activities carried out by companies were below this level and therefore are
classed as minor change. In my view, the only company with a major technical change
capability is TG4 presented in Box 6.3 below.
Box 6.3: Major Technical Change in TG4
The company has 2,433 employees, of whom 180 received higher education
from the Polytechnics of Hanoi and HoChiMinh City, the universities and other
financial and economics colleges. The company was involved in weaving,
spinning and garment assembly and began exporting in 1986 indirectly to East
Europe. In 1988, it started to export polo shirt products mainly to Japan (90% of
total current exports).
For R&D activity, the company set up a division with eight staff which is mostly
responsible for modification to, and improvement of, products. Expenditure for
this type of R&D in 1992 was more than 1 billion VND (about 100,000 USD).
The company also used a system of incentives by increasing salary and other
bonuses for improvement activities. Staff in the R&D unit receive a salary 15-
25% higher than that of other staff. The R&D unit co-operated with technical
staff in other divisions and workshops to introduce some minor technical
changes in designing models for garments (polo shirts). The company
introduced a digital control system instead of an electrical control system and
produced new materials like polyester/wool mix, etc. It has also set up a special
library of textile/garment documentation for its use and has a regular
expenditure on journals and reviews of about 100 USD per month.
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Lately, the R&D unit carries out research on the application of a new principle
using microfibre in the production of fabrics. Up to now this kind of material
has been monopolised by a few Japanese and German companies. According to
TG4 staff, if successful, this attempt will open opportunities to compete equally
with the Japanese in entering the EU market.
Since 1993, TG4 has been producing fabric made from this fibre and the
products compete with imported materials for the garment industry. In addition,
the R&D division conducted feasibility studies for new investment projects
when the company moved both to upstream (spinning) and downstream
(garment) activities, including the choice of equipment and machines from
catalogues. Exchanges of experience and skills with other spinning companies
were quite common practice in this firm. The company offered weaving and
garment expertise to some spinning companies and, in return, received their
expertise on spinning for expanding its new Khanhhoi spinning plant in a suburb
of HoChiMinh City. Also, the R&D division together with some garment
companies studied the possibility of producing fabrics as material for their
export products.
6.2.7 Summary
I have presented findings on the existence of TCs in the 14 textile/garment firms which are
summarised in Table 6.1. Following the ranking of points in TC development (two for
strong TC, one for weak and none for non-existent), we can crudely map the TC landscape
in textile and garment firms. Production capability has received 24 points out of a total 28
available. Similarly, the points ranking of other TCs appear as follows: minor technical
change (19); linkage (16); investment (15); marketing (two) and major technical change
(one).
As can be seen from the table, only three capabilities are most evident in the
companies studied: production, minor change and linkage. The investment capability is
less developed, although almost all companies seem to have engaged in various new
investment activities recently. Marketing and major change capabilities are the least
developed. Companies were involved in developing these TCs to various extents but,
lacking one or two types of activities as set by my criteria (see Appendix 4.8), they cannot
be considered to have strongly developed TC. The ranking of TC also allows for a crude
whole firm assessment: out of a total 12 points available for each firm, firms range from
eight in the most competent firm (TGI4) to three in the weakest ones (TG7, TG8 and
TG15). After the examination of TC building in electronics companies in Section 6.3, I
will come back to the grouping of firms in Section 6.4 to discuss the patterns of TC
accumulation and emerging trends together with an assessment of the relevance of these
findings.
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6. 3 TC Building in Electronics Companies
6.3.1 Production Capability
Among nine firms having production capability, the extent to which they acquired
production competence differs, depending on the criteria given in Section 4.4.2 and
Appendix 4.1. While six firms (El, E2, E4, E5, E10 and El 1) strongly developed their
production expertise, E7, E8 and E9 still have difficulties and their capability is still rather
weak. In these nine firms, production activities were run quite actively, and mostly, by
their own staff. Companies were capable of handling all the mentioned production
functions as we now see.
In production management, they were operating machines and equipment to
assemble TVs, cassettes, VCRs (for consumer electronics) or PCs (for computing) without
major problems; and they knew how to organise the assembly line and to monitor its link
with other supporting activities (supply of materials, sourcing components and provision of
other inputs).
Consumer electronics companies such as El started by simple assembly of CKD
components and moved to higher SKD and IKD (incomplete-knock-down) assembly. The
firm is capable of handling various sources of input material (locally-made plastics and
stereophore packaging in combination with imported CKD from Japan Victor Co. (JVC) to
produce its Viettronics TV. Other firms increased their rate of colour TVs per total TV
production (up to 45% in E10) or moved from TV production to other audio-visual
products like CDs (Ell). A private firm - E8 - producing printed circuit board and other
inputs for TV producers, and E7 providing services in control equipment, were also active
in running their production activities without much help from outside experts. Computer
firms E4 and E5 were already assembling PCs by the end of the 1980s and exporting them
to the Soviet market.
In production engineering, electronics firms knew how to change plant
organisation, to plan the operation of assembly lines, and to carry out tests ensuring the
high standards of products. They also systematically carried out arrangements necessary
for the maintenance and repair of equipment and machines. For example, in E4, a three-
round test (function test, burn-in test and final test before packaging) was applied to ensure
high quality standards of PC assembly equal to that of others produced in the region. To
ensure quality, the company had a test card for each machine and a sales engineer took care
of monitoring quality assurance with buyers after sales. E9, having started as a SOE
producing calculators for the East European market, produced power supply systems for
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PCs in a subcontracting agreement for export to Australia. The quality of these systems is
ensured by the firm to mesh with the PCs produced by an Australian firm.
One exception is E3, which felt it did not have enough resources to develop
production facilities in the country and it also judged that domestic production was less
profitable. All of its production activities were done in Singapore on a subcontract
agreement by which E3 hired Singaporean companies to assemble its machines. Although
maintenance and repair services, as well as quality control, were taken care of by company
staff in its Moscow and Singaporean offices respectively, it did not develop production
capability.
6.3.2 Investment Capability
Results of interviews in electronics firms show that this capability in the majority of firms
remained underdeveloped. Only four firms have some investment competence while the
rest do not yet have this capability. Among these four firms, investment capability was
more developed within E2, E10 and El 1.
Consumer electronics companies El and E7 - having received initial investment
from the state - were only recently involved in investment. At the initial stage of
assembling consumer electronics, these firms participated in investment studies in a rather
passive way. Despite certain skills and experience in investment activity, only three
consumer electronics firms have acquired any investment capability. After receiving
investment from the state for some time, E2 expanded its production facilities in 1989 to
produce industrial electronic components for robotic hands for export to Japan. In
addition, many new investment ventures carried out jointly with Japanese and Korean
partners (especially with Daewoo) have brought investment expertise and experience to
this firm (see E2 in Section 9.5). Both E10 and El 1 enjoyed initial Japanese investment
during the 1970s (E10 as Matsushita Vietnam, and Ell as Sony Vietnam). These firms
had gone through many difficulties in the post-unification period and began to receive new
investment from the state during the 1980s. At that time, they still had a passive attitude to
doing business.1 For their latest ventures, however, these firms were more entrepreneurial
and active in their investment. When E10 wanted to expand its production, it got both
design input and an offer of financing from Matsushita for a new turn-key process. This
was too expensive and the firm decided to install a new facility by itself, using only
designs acquired from Matsushita. E10 bought only the core element - a CKD assembly
line 34 meters long - from Matsushita for 200,000 USD. For the rest, it bought cheaper
'ihadachance to visit E10 and Ell in 1981 and then in 1984, and see their activities develop in the 1980s.
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Chinese components, through a Hong Kong-based trading firm. Combining these two
sources, the firm commenced the new production line, having saved a large sum of money.
This example shows how E10 became more self-determined and confident in new
investment. This confidence can also be seen in El 1 where the firm has invested in many
new facilities since the beginning of 1990s (300,000 USD for an assembly line for JVC
products, including a centre for broadcasting and test facilities; another line of 770,000
USD to specialise on Sony products; and a take-over of some other electronics assembly
facilities in HoChiMinh City).
Among the computer companies, the private firm - E4 - engaged in investment
efforts from the firm's inception, but these were limited and its export success was
temporary. In the later period of 1990s, the firm's investment stagnated and this capability
was not developed further. The joint venture - E5 - has also not obtained this capability
due to all investment activities being done by its foreign partner which has more
experiences and skill. E3 is the only computer company with investment experience. It
undertook more autonomous initiatives in sourcing materials, making investment studies,
implementing investment plans, and negotiating with contractors and parts suppliers. The
avoidance of domestic production by placing orders and contracts abroad was a rather
unique and confident way to implement its investment plans. Its investment capability has
now expanded beyond that of a computer electronics firm only (see E3 in Section 9.6).
6.3.3 Minor Technical Change Capability
Among seven companies involved in minor technical change activity, six firms (E2, E3,
E4, El, E10 and El 1) have developed this competence more strongly than E7 by engaging
in all types of change activities on a regular basis. Companies have made various
improvements to their product specifications. Consumer electronics companies replaced
some components in radio cassettes (E2) or improved the design of TV sets to make them
more suitable to tropical conditions (increasing the range of brightness and colour) and
produced a better quality of loudspeaker (E10). Ell created new plugging sets to replace
imported ones and saved thousands of USD per set. Similarly, El modified TV sets by
adding some small components to make products more multi-functional than before, or to
make them more appropriate for a hot and humid climate. As a service company, E7
specialised in the provision of controlling and monitoring devices to industrial plants in
other sectors like construction or chemical, and the firm created a new control device by
replacing transistors and the heating supply. It also added a cooling system by micro fans
to protect foreign-made control devices that must operate in the very hot environment of
some mechanical engineering plants. Computer company E4 has introduced a new model
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of computer (modified from a Taiwanese model) as a specific product which is sold to the
Russian market. The machine, with the brand name of KB (Knowledge Base), has got a
rather good response from buyers. Similar minor technical change activities in E3 is
presented in Section 9.6.
Another effort at the firms is to change process technology, the way of assembling
TV sets or altering the production arrangement to suit the conditions of less productive
Vietnamese workers (E2). When starting a new production line, El adapted an old
principle of assembling new equipment and so designed a new one.
In the organisational aspect, electronics firms had a professional way of setting up
the divisions responsible for technical change activities. All SOEs in the study have R&D
or technical divisions which organise and co-ordinate technical change in the firms. E7's
large unit of 30 staff was very rigid, did not know which direction of technical change to
pursue, and did not implement any technical change in its process technology.
Three electronics companies did not perform modification and adaptation activities.
E8, as a small company based on a family business, did not have any resources (financial,
human and intellectual) to organise its very limited change activities into more systematic
efforts. E9, according to an assessment by its own director, was passive and only able to
engage in certain technical improvements with the help of outside experts. As a joint
venture with a French company, Bull S.A., to assemble Bull computers, E5 has not
developed this minor change capability because production is fixed strictly by its foreign
partner and all models, components and parts have been kept exactly as they were
supplied.
6.3.4 Marketing Capability
The two sub-sectors have reached very different levels in their development of marketing
capability. While in consumer electronics this capability is almost absent, in computer
companies it has become one of the most important factors ensuring their continued
existence. Overall, among electronics firms, only three computing companies - E3, E4 and
E5 - can be said to have developed marketing capability to some extent (for one market
and one product only). Other firms, having tried to export and to do some marketing,
remain very weak and their marketing expertise is nearly non-existent.
Consumer electronics companies engaged in some export activities on a very
limited scale during the 1980s, when they had to rely on using the channel of foreign
partners for marketing intelligence and for sales. For example, E10 had a subcontract with
a Czechoslovakian electronics company, TESLA, to produce simple electronic parts and
components like condensers. Technology and training were provided by TESLA and it
106
bought back all products. These relations were passive, relying on the planning and
foreign trade experts of each of the governments, and the firm had neither the intention, nor
the resources, to develop marketing activity. More recently, E2 has begun some export
activity but only for products outside its core business of consumer electronics. Although
there were some attempts to move forward in marketing by setting up a joint business
office with a foreign partner, these attempts still remain weak. In the local market, all
consumer electronics firms developed a network of organisations to take care of marketing.
They have shops, showrooms and service centres around the country, both to provide
services and to collect marketing information. Still, these activities were limited to the
domestic market only.
By contrast, computer companies have been more active. Three companies - E3,
E4 and E5 - have entered the former Soviet market and sold their products quite
successfully since the end of the 1980s. For example, E5 got this capability through many
years of having relations with, and experience of, the Soviet market in terms of knowing
the structure of the market, the trading relations, the procedures of foreign trade payment,
banking and other aspects of external economic relations between Vietnam and the Soviet
Union. Moreover, it has a specific know-how in using convertible currency and
transforming it into hard currency through goods and services. Similarly, E3 and E4 have
entered the Soviet market with products designed specifically for this market. Later on, E4
acquired a market foothold in France and Japan, where it sold some software products for
cartoon movie-making (although it was not very sophisticated and of limited volume), and
for multimedia use in education. Thanks to the development of this capability, companies
sustained some level of export performance for several years. But because this marketing
know-how was so specific (tied to the Soviet market and to PC products), companies had
difficulties using this strength in other markets and for other products, once the Soviet
market collapsed in the beginning of the 1990s. At present, all three firms have returned to
the domestic market quite vigorously, offering their products and services to meet the
emerging demand at home. Similarly, computer firm E9 had engaged in some small-scale
export of calculators through the subcontracting framework with the Soviet Union and
Bulgaria of the 1980s. This attempt failed after some trials, but more recently, the firm has
tried to diversify its activities so as to produce a power supply system as part of a PC
package for export to Australia. This deal is a subcontracting agreement, and so the firm
still depends very much on its buyer.
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6.3.5 Linkage Capability
This capability is quite developed in electronics companies. Eight out of ten firms have
acquired this competence to a reasonable extent. Among eight companies with linkages,
only five (E2, E3, E10, E4 and Ell) belong within the range of possessing a strongly
developed capability. They were able to develop all three types of linkages (with the
R&D, training and education infrastructure; with industrial enterprises; and having intra-
firm links) and these linkages became routine activities. Meanwhile, three other firms (E5,
E7 and E9) developed just one or two types of linkage, and did so on a less regular and
systematic basis.
First, they knew how to - and did - cooperate with various R&D institutions, and
universities in Hanoi and HoChiMinh City to share information and to solve their own
problems. The consumer electronics firm E2, for example, had close relations with the
Hanoi and HoChiMinh City polytechnics and the institutes of the NCSR through contracts
for technical problem-solving and through long- and short-term consultancy agreements.
Thanks to this co-operation, E2 produced a new kind of welding metal to replace tin
imported from Japan and Germany for its machines. El 1 was among the firms having the
best relations with S&T and education institutions. It has asked the Institute of Television
and Radio Broadcasting to help with the creation of a radio signal generation station for its
TV test. It also received regular assistance from HoChiMinh City polytechnic. Similar
links with the R&D and education network also occurred in E7 and in the computer firms
E9, E3 and E4.
Computer companies have also developed linkages with their collaborators in
industrial enterprises. As a joint venture with a foreign company, E5 has less need to link
with domestic partners. With the reorientation to the local market once exporting became
difficult, it began to develop domestic links with other computer firms to supply each other
with services and to use technical facilities jointly. Consumer electronics firms linked with
each other through the VEIC (see Section 5.3.1), where they exchanged and co-ordinated
their production and business plans.
Linkages were also developed internally among divisions of the companies. In E4,
the R&D division was responsible for maintenance and repair activities - something which
typically belongs to the production division in other companies. This factor enhanced the
company's chances of getting feedback information on defect rates and customers' needs
for its R&D. This circulation of information among sales, production and technical
divisions was also common in E7, E10 and El 1.
Linkage capability is absent in El and E8. Although El, as a SOE, tried to
establish various connections with R&D institutes, these connections were not very
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effective for the firm. Relations with other organisations were very formal, even within the
framework of state research programmes (see KC-01 in Section 5.3.5). As a small family
company, E8 could not build linkages with any external R&D organisation.
6.3.6 Major Technical Change Capability
This is the weakest capability of electronics firms. In all companies, there were no radical
changes to their production technologies or major improvements in the design of their
products. A few companies were involved in certain R&D activities, trying to develop
skill by investing in R&D units (like the software centre of E3 or the R&D unit of E4).
Their scale of activities, while contributing significantly to the profit-making of each firm,
still remained in the category of minor technological modification and improvement rather
than representing the achievement of any more radical change. As a result, no company
has got this capability. However, judging by the current minor technical change activity
which is quite strong in some firms, it is likely that some of them (see E2 and E3 in
Sections 9.5 and 9.6) - depending on their future investment in new resources and learning
efforts - might become capable of acquiring more expertise in undertaking major technical
change.
6.3.7 Summary
Table 6.2 presents the result of TC acquisition in the electronics firms. Using the ranking
system adopted, the table shows that out of a total 20 points available, production
capability existed in nine firms (E3 had deliberately not developed this capability). It is the
most developed TC with an overall 15 points, and six firms have strongly developed this
capability. Next is the linkage capability (with 13 points) and only two firms do not have
this; five companies have strongly developed linkage capability. Minor technical change
(also 13 points) and investment (seven points) capabilities come next, with six and three
firms respectively having these capabilities at a developed level. Marketing capability is
very weak in electronics firms; only three computer firms have this experience, and none
have developed a strong competence. No companies have competence in handling major
technical change. As for the whole picture of all the firm, out of a maximum 12 points, the
three most developed firms in terms of technological capability (E2, E10 and Ell) have
got eight points, while the least developed firm, E8, has one point.
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6.4 Patterns of TC Accumulation
Results of the interviews concerning the build up of TC in both sectors revealed some
patterns.
6.4.1 Patterns in Textile/Garment Firms
The first observation concerns the sequence and dynamics of TC creation. Most
textile/garment companies have a similar sequence of TC accumulation. Following the
inception of the companies, they first acquired production capability after some years of
operation. Then, minor technical change and linkage capabilities were added during the
1970s and the 1980s. Investment capability only became evident at the end of the 1980s
when the companies became more active and started to expand their production facilities
by themselves. At the stage of initial start-up accomplished through aid programmes or
joint ventures, most had a passive attitude, relying on the state or their foreign donor.
Marketing capability was absent throughout the 1970s and the 1980s in the planned
economy, and only began to be accumulated through the companies' increased integration
into international markets in the 1990s. Major technical change capability is not yet
evident in companies' development.
Different sequences of TC acquisition occurred in the firms depending on their
ownership and the date of their start-up. The sequential feature of TC building mentioned
above does not apply to all the firms, but is common among SOEs. Two private firms
which set up during the early 1990s - TG8 and TG9 - had very different backgrounds to the
SOEs. In my interviews with these firms, I got a strong impression of their commitment to
'seize the opportunity' to make money in a more open and liberalised economy. As private
firms, they could not have afforded the long waiting and struggling periods experienced by
the likes of the SOEs. They needed some investment experience in order to start the
business, and this capability was developed almost simultaneously with their production
capability in the early 1990s, while the other capabilities of minor technical change,
linkage and marketing expertise appeared a few years later. The difficulties of starting up
stimulated these private businesses to develop this capability, while the SOEs were more-
or-less able to rely on state resources (aid programmes, credit) to start-up. Because of
these more favourable conditions for SOEs, there was a more relaxed attitude to
investment issues among the latter.
As is shown in Figure 6.1, there is no significant difference between textile and
garment companies in the sequence of their TC building. The main difference in the
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sequence of TC building is more related to ownership of the firms and their date of
establishment. Second, the extent to which textile/garment firms developed their TCs and
the types of TC acquired is uneven across the firms. As noted in Section 6.2.7, the ranking
of TC acquisition is as follows: production, minor technical change, linkage, investment,
marketing and major technical change. At the same time, the number of firms deemed to
have strong TC produced the same ranking: production (10), minor technical change
(seven), linkage (six), and investment (five). Table 6.1 also outlines a pattern of
distribution of TC creation among firms. Nine firms (TG2, TG3, TG4, TG5, TG6, TG9,
TG10, TG12 and TG14) are among the best; TG14, in particular, has four strongly
developed TCs. This pattern of TC accumulation can be understood better by examining
the learning modes used by the firms, the historical background to their establishment, the
influence of external factors and the responses of firms to these stimuli, which are
discussed in Section 7.2.
6.4.2 Patterns in Electronics Firms
The study reveals different sequences of TC building between firms in the two electronics
sub-sectors, as presented in Figure 6.2.
In consumer electronics companies (El, E2, E7, E10 and Ell), production
capability came first accompanying the start-up of the operations process. Minor technical
change capability arrived later when the companies had a need for, and became involved
in, various improvements, adaptations, and modification activities to increase production
proficiency. Linkage capability came about simultaneously with minor technical change
because the companies needed to interact with potential collaborators. Investment
capability has been developed through companies' recent attempts to handle expansion
activities, while marketing is still almost absent.
In the computer companies (E3, E4 and E5), minor technical change and marketing
capabilities existed from the outset, as their primary assets for starting up the business.
They had been accumulated even before the companies were established, through previous
training and work experience in other organisations. Production and linkage capabilities
emerged shortly afterwards to strengthen the companies' minor technical change capability.
Investment capability was only evident in E3. So far, no firm has achieved a major
technical change capability.
The ranking of the extent of TC building is as follows: production, linkage, minor
technical change, investment and marketing with no firm having major technical change
capability. Electronics firms with strongly developed TC show nearly the same ranking as
given in the Table 6.2: both production and minor technical change capabilities are
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strongly developed in six firms, as is linkage capability in five firms, and investment
capability in three firms, while no firms have developed strong marketing capability.
Concerning the development of whole firms, E2, E4, E10 and Ell appear to have
developed their TC much more vigorously than the rest, with eight and seven points out of
total 12 available. Similarly to textile/garment firms, the TC accumulation patterns in
electronics are addressed in relation to the learning process by these firms in Section 7.4.
6.4.3 Overall Patterns
These patterns of TC acquisition among the studied firms in the two sectors may be
analysed at three levels. First, looking at both sectors, there is a similarity in the overall
extent ofTC development. In both sectors, the areas in which firms are more capable are
production, linkage and minor technical change activities - although different patterns can
be seen to operate between particular firms. Marketing and major technical change
activities are virtually absent in most firms. One of the main reasons is that state support
during the 1960s and 1970s focused entirely on helping firms to begin production and to
maintain it at a reasonable level (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1). Campaigns to promote
production and minor technical change activities were common in the pre-reform period.
Linkages in this period were developed both by formal systems of organisation and by
informal networks of contacts (Section 5.2.2). Also, during the pre-reform period, there
was little new investment expansion. Moreover, relations with CMEA countries, a lack of
competitive pressure and a low demand for quality products resulted in Vietnamese
companies having no need to develop marketing and major R&D activities. For them, the
main concerns of this period were to operate production facilities, to produce standardised
and simple products and to implement some minor technical changes (mostly in their
process technologies).
The reforms have brought new demands on companies to gather intelligence on
new markets, introduce new products and engage in new ventures. Therefore, investment
and marketing activities were less developed before reforms and only began to assume
importance in the 1990s. Hence, the patterns of TC development in these two industries is
the outcome of the previous planned economy, when there were few incentives for product
innovation and marketing, and the focus was more on the quantity than on the quality of
products.
Second, there are differences between the two sectors in their sequence of TC
building. While in textile/garment firms, the sequence of TC building varies by ownership,
in electronics it varies among sub-sectors (the kinds of activity and products). This
difference in TC creation is, in part, illustrative of wider sectoral differences in
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technological innovation (Pavitt, 1984; Bell & Pavitt, 1993). As a more mature
technological sector, the textile/garment industry requires less research-based activity than
electronics. Thus, the patterns of TC accumulation in the two industries were shaped both
by the characteristics of the planned economy in the pre-reform period, and by the specific
features of the technologies and products of these industries.
Ownership is the most important factor differentiating firms in the textile/garment
industry in terms of their TC building. The linear pattern seen in Figure 6.1, starting with
technical experience of production, minor technical change and linkage capabilities then
later moving on to the non-technical skills of investment and marketing, is rather common
for the majority of SOEs in both Vietnamese industries. Compared to private firms, SOEs
in textile/garment were more protected (in terms of their quota allocation for export, their
access to financial and information resources, etc.). The starting conditions were, however,
very different in the 1990s for private firms like TG8 and TG9, who needed more
technological skill and experience from the outset. They also faced more restrictive
regulations and tougher competitive pressure than their state-owned competitors. In
electronics, the differences between private firms and SOEs are less marked. Electronics
firms under different kinds of ownership still operated in rather similar conditions: lacking
long-term policy and specific support from the state for sectoral development, but at the
same time, enjoying a more strongly developed R&D, training and education base than the
textile/garment firms. The more important differences between electronics firms relate to
the historical features of the two sub-sectors. In the 1970s and 1980s, the computer sector
as such was hardly developed while most consumer electronics firms were already in
existence (see Section 5.3.1). Computer firms only sprang up in the 1980s and 1990s, on
the basis of existing TCs (namely minor technical change and marketing). These two
capabilities helped firms to establish themselves as export businesses. The unique context
in which Vietnamese computer firms emerged is the main reason behind the different
sequences of TC accumulation between the two electronics sub-sectors.
Another difference between the two industries is the level of TC acquisition in
marketing. Although the overall development of marketing is weak, marketing seems
more developed in electronics than in textile/garments. This is especially the case for
computer firms. This is again explained by the unique start-up conditions characterising
computer firms, and their consequent learning activities.
Third, within these general patterns of similarity and difference, there are some
firm-specific tendencies. As can be seen from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the study falls broadly
into three groups in terms of the overall level of TC accumulation: average (with six
points), above average and below average. In the textile/garment firms, average TC
development tends to be evident among medium-size SOEs. Firms with above average TC
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are all SOEs, and those firms with weak TC development include a private one, a joint
venture and some smaller SOEs. What does this suggest? Large SOEs (TG5, TG6 and
TG10) with more resources may partly explain their superior TC development as compared
with private companies. As for joint ventures, the passive reliance of the local firm on its
foreign partner is the reason for this weakness. However, the size of firms is just one
factor. Some SOEs of the same size still exhibit very different rates of TC accumulation
(we may compare TG10, TG12 and TGI, for instance). A similar phenomenon can be
observed in electronics firms. Private firms have a rather spread-out distribution among
the three levels of TC development. Most of the firms with stronger TCs are SOEs, with
one private firm as the exception. This suggests that those firms with higher levels of TC
accumulation tend to be SOE, in both industries. Private and joint venture firms tend to be
weaker. This situation can be understood in terms of the attitude of firms towards learning,
which I present in Chapter 7.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented material from interviews conducted with 24 firms in two
industries, regarding their TC accumulation. The first notable finding is the uneven
development of TC, which is also reported in the literature on TC acquisition (Bell &
Pavitt, 1993; Katz et al., 1987). Across different sectors, patterns of TC accumulation
follow different sequences, and firms differ in the extent of their TC development. So this
chapter has confirmed proposition (1) that modes of TC creation are different in different
sectors and firms. The main similarity is that most firms first acquire production
capability, with the exception of computer firms which possess some minor technical
change and marketing capabilities from their inception. In addition to sectoral differences,
the impact of the historical context of firms' establishment on sub-sector characteristics
appears to have had a strong influence on patterns of TC accumulation. This is what the
concept of external environmental factors (Fransman, 1986c; Lall, 1987) has emphasised.
In addition to these findings, some firm-specific tendencies are found which relate
to the firms' attitude to learning, and to issues of ownership. These issues will be
explicated more clearly in the presentation of findings on external factors and firms'
practice in Chapter 8.
Based on several criteria outlined in Chapter 4, the extent of TC development was
broadly divided into three categories: non-existent, weak, and strongly developed. The
first research question has been examined by looking at what kinds of TC exist and in what
sequence they have been accumulated. However, this ranking of TC accumulation among
firms and across different TCs is not in itself the end purpose of the study. Rather, this
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mapping of the technological landscape was used as a step towards addressing the next
research question, on learning activities. Using this mapping, the interactions between the
use of learning mechanisms and the emergent trends of TC accumulation identified in this
chapter can be analysed. Accordingly, I now move to examine the second research
question about the contribution of different learning mechanisms to various types of TC
acquisition. The aim is to identify how this learning process has led to the accumulation of
TC and, in this way, partly to explain the patterns of TC accumulation outlined in this
chapter.
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TGI - 2 2 - - - 4
TG2 2 1 2 - 2 - 7
TG3 1 2 2 - 2 - 7
TG4 1 2 2 - 1 1 7
TG5 2 2 - 1 1 - 6
TG6 2 2 1 - 1 - 6
TG7 - 2 1 - - - 3
TG8 1 1 - - 1 - 3
TG9 2 2 1 1 - - 6
TG10 1 2 1 - 2 - 6
TG12 - 2 2 - 2 - 6
TGI 3 - 1 2 - 2 - 5
TG14 2 2 2 - 2 - 8
TG15 1 1 1 - - - 3
Total 15 24 19 2 16 1
Key: (2) indicates strongly developed TC; (1) indicates weak TC; (-) indicates non-existence of TC
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Table 6.2 Mapping of TC in electronics firms
Investment Production Minor Marketing Linkage Major Total
change change
Firms
El - 2 2 - 4
E2 2 2 2 2 -8
E3 1 - 2 1 2-6
E4 - 2 2 1 2-7
E5 - 2 - 1 i_4
E7 - 1 1 - 1-3
E8 - 1 - - 1
E9 1 - - 1-2
E10 2 2 2 - 2 -8
Ell 2 2 2 - 2 -8
Total 7 15 13 3 13 0
Key: (2) indicates strongly developed TC; (1) indicates weak TC; (-) indicates non-existence of TC
117











Firms did not exist
Firms did not exist
Firms did not exist
1990s Marketing (little) Production
Investment
Minor change
Major change (little) Linkage
Marketing
Major change: none





















LEARNING MECHANISMS AND TC BUILDING
7.1 Introduction
As Part I has shown, theoretical and other empirical studies suggest that there is a need for
more research on learning activities at the level of the firm. To understand the process of
TC accumulation, it is essential to investigate the learning process in detail. The findings
presented in the last chapter reveal similarities and differences in the pattern of TC
acquisition among firms, in terms of both the extent to which the firms acquire their TC
and the sequence of this acquisition. This chapter is the next step in my focusing-in
process: it aims to answer the second research question about the learning mechanisms by
which firms accumulate TC, and their dynamics over time.
Using the taxonomy of learning developed in Chapter 3, Section 7.2 identifies
learning patterns in textile/garment companies: what learning mechanisms are used, and
for which kinds of TC. Section 7.3 deals with the dynamics of the learning process in
textile and garment companies; it uses the periodisation presented in Chapter 5 to try to 'get
inside' the evolution and cumulative nature of TC acquisition in these companies. The next
two sections, 7.4 and 7.5, discuss similar questions in respect of electronics companies.
Section 7.6 discusses the main findings concerning overall learning patterns, across sectors
and sub-sectors, and by ownership of the firms. The chapter ends with a reflection about
learning, TC accumulation and the macro-environmental context in Vietnam, highlighting
the need for further study.
7.2 Patterns of Learning in Textile/Garment Companies
This section presents the learning patterns of textile and garment companies in relation to
each specific TC.
7.2.1 Learning Production Capability
Since production capability is the first capability to be acquired by textile/garment firms
and is also the most developed TC, I will begin by examining the learning mechanisms
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leading to this capability. Patterns of using learning mechanisms for production capability
in textile/garment firms are shown in Table 7.1.
Three learning mechanisms are used by all companies. Learning-by-doing is used
by all 14 cases. By operating machines and engaging in production activities, personnel
learn in informal ways how to run industrial production in its simple forms. Learning-by-
doing activities - such as self-study forms of learning, sharing experiences amongst
workers, and the guiding of new workers by the more experienced - were mainly
accomplished through the firms' own staff. Young and new workers were taught by those
in the firm who had more skill and experience. Knowledge and experience were mostly
informally diffused through working together, rather than by means of organised classes or
courses. Sometimes, learning-by-doing activities significantly increased the experience of
personnel, especially with respect to dealing with routine production tasks. At TGI4, for
example, through the increased knowledge and experience gained by just doing the work,
some workers and technicians were even appointed as the heads of production groups
within one workshop. At the same time, there was no firm that only used this learning-by-
doing mechanism without supporting it with other more active forms of learning.
The use of prior knowledge accumulation was also active in all 14 cases.
Companies hired people who had been educated in polytechnic institutes and who thus
brought ideas to the firms on how to run production facilities. In addition, the firms
recruited many graduates of Soviet or Eastern European universities whose degrees were
predominantly in technical subjects such as textiles, mechanical engineering, energy and
electrical systems. The companies also received some assistance from the MOLI for
training their workers as technicians. With some knowledge and work experience
accumulated prior to joining the firms, these kinds of recruit brought learning elements to
the firms, not only at the graduate level, but also at the level of workers and technicians
who were trained in vocational schools for the textile industry.
All 14 firms used foreign connections as a learning mechanism for production
capability. First, the firms received equipment, machinery and technical assistance from
China and Eastern Europe during the 1960s and the 1970s. Contacts with foreign partners
took different forms, ranging from simple subcontracting to more advanced OEM relations,
by which companies gained access to markets and became involved (to differing extents)
in exporting. For example, TG2 first received its knitting machines from China. From
1965 to 1970, it got some more knitting, dyeing and cotton-processing machines from East
Germany. The company also received guidance and instruction for workers and
technicians from those foreign experts who came with the equipment. Later, while
upgrading their knitting facilities with foreign technologies, TG2 received technical
assistance and guidance from the Japanese supplier, Sanshin. When TG2 linked up with
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the Japanese buyer, Kutakura, this firm transferred knitting technology into TG2 and
included in that transfer was the Japanese way of organising production. To assist TG2,
Kutakura sent two experts each year to Vietnam for six months and helped the local
personnel to run the new production facility. This contract has continued for ten years.
The Japanese also took part in discussions on production plans and other operative issues
like quality control and the normative use of materials.
In all companies, foreign experts visited for various lengths of time (about six
months to a year) to help Vietnamese staff in the installation and early maintenance
activities of the project. Italian and German technology suppliers worked with TG3 and
this firm sent six people to train for six months in Italy and Germany on how to run a turn¬
key project. Through these projects, Vietnamese staff gained production skills and
knowledge from their foreign contacts. Similarly, TG4 received foreign technical
assistance from a French partner which had supplied technology to the company. More
than foreign expertise, technical documentation and information were also supplied as part
of the framework of these turn-key projects. These sources were quite valuable to
companies in learning elements of production capability like how to run new turn-key
projects, how to deal with supplies of raw materials and other technical trouble-shooting,
maintenance and repair issues.
Many firms used mechanisms like on-the-job (13 cases) and off-the-job (12 cases)
training. On-the-job training was organised within firms by their own staff. For example,
TG5 regularly organised activities where managers, technical employees and foremen met
and discussed their experience of running the business. Subsequently, the lessons
approved by the leadership of the plant, were widely communicated to all employees.
After taking part in these activities, many workers were able to improve their qualifications
in later exams. These activities were called "experience lessons" and they significantly
raised the grade of employees' skills.1
At TGI2, training courses on knitting technology were organised every year with
teachers invited from universities and research institutes. These courses were carried out
under a long-term contract with the firm. In addition, the firm held self-teaching courses,
using its own instructors. These in-house courses lasted from one to three months and
were designed to teach technicians and workers how to do maintenance and repairs jobs.
1 In the system of labour management suggested by the Ministry of Labour, there is a seven grade system for
workers. These grades are given not by the number of years of working in the industry, but by the level of
skill workers achieve. In order to get to a higher grade (and by that to earn a higher salary), workers have to
pass exams in theoretical knowledge and in tests of their practical skill in doing certain functions related to
their specialised field. These exams and tests are organised every year at all SOEs. A worker starting at a
company may be a grade 2, while grade 7 is the top level which a few workers might reach before their
retirement.
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Similar on-the-job activities were organised regularly with the assistance of consultants
and experts from the MOLL
The re-training of workers by dint of their employers sending them to schools and
to attend courses organised by other firms, were popular in most of the companies. Almost
all firms sent their personnel to various kinds of training course lasting from a couple of
weeks to some months.2 TG3 had a systematic training programme for hundreds of
workers every year. TG10 set up a long-term plan to train their garment workers through
courses ranging from 18 months to three years. Its goal was to upgrade the skills of all
workers to a minimum skill level of Grade 3. Similarly, TG2 had a massive re-training
programme for workers when it shifted from knitting to garment production. It had also
organised special training programmes for about 300 newly-recruited workers. This
programme had handled about 3,000 workers by 1995. Similar on-the-job and off-the-job
training sessions were held at TG14 and TG13. Even private companies like TG8 - in spite
of limited funding - organised courses on-site to train their workers, albeit on a smaller
scale. Interestingly, at TG7, the joint venture could not organise its own training but
depended on the foreign partner to do so.
In general, off-the-job training in professional vocational schools and short-term
on-the-job training courses organised with assistance from universities and R&D
institutions were among the most common ways for companies to upgrade the skills of
their employees.
Only seven companies used searching information and documentation sources, as
well as consultancy services from R&D institutes and universities, for acquiring their
production capability. The use of both official and informal linkages with R&D
institutions and with other domestic companies received a strong impetus from the need to
co-operate in problem-solving; material incentives were used (e.g., high fees for
consultancy work) to promote such contacts.
As can be seen from Table 7.1, firms' use of learning mechanisms for acquiring
production capability is very active. For this TC, accumulation of prior knowledge and
foreign connections were the two most used learning mechanisms, in addition to learning-
by-doing.
7.2.2 Learning Investment Capability
2Northern Vietnamese firms like TG10, TG12, TG2 and TG13 relied mostly on the training courses of the
Hanoi Polytechnic and the Vocational School of Garment Workers No. 1. In the South, the HoChiMinh City
Polytechnic and the similar Vocational School No. 2 have contributed to learning sources for TG4, TG5,
TG14 and TG15.
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The overall pattern of learning investment capability is given in Table 7.2. The use of
foreign connections occurred widely: 10 firms used this mechanism to get investment
knowledge. At TGI4, thanks to a subcontracting agreement with Hungarian buyers, the
firm learned from them not only production, but also investment knowledge, e.g., how to
purchase equipment, start up facilities and implement subcontracting. In garment company
TG10, the subcontracting programme with the Soviet Union and East European countries
(see Section 5.2.3) brought a new foreign source of learning. This programme and its
experts helped the firm to learn not only about production but also, and more importantly,
about how to manage a new venture. TG10 also gained insights into the international
dimension of exporting on a large scale.
As private companies, TG8 and TG9 also relied heavily on their initial foreign
connections for their start-up. TG8 was supported by the Japanese trading company, Nisho
Iwai, on issues of technology supply, training, guidance and quality control. German and
Hong Kong companies were active in the case of TG9. By working with these foreign
partners, the firms learned how to prepare investment studies for new ventures.
Nine companies acquired their investment TC through prior accumulation.
Graduates from institutes and universities brought investment knowledge to their new
employers. Also, managers from other organisations have been recruited. TG10, for
example, invited the help of an expert from the Institute of Design for Light Industry, who
had extensive knowledge of pre-investment and investment studies, and of cost/benefit and
other financial analyses. As head of the planning/financial division, her experience and
knowledge were extremely valuable to the firm in its new investment activities.
On-the-job and off-the-job training were used quite actively by nine and seven
companies respectively. These were mostly high-level training programmes for those
managers, engineers and directors who had higher education degrees. These courses lasted
from three months (at TG2 and TG4) to 3-4 years of distance learning for university
degrees (at TG14 and TGI5). In some cases, senior managers - like the director of TG14
who had an engineering degree - took second degrees (in his case, economics). This
training, augmenting their former backgrounds, enabled managers to learn new skills in
management and investment. Sometimes, to save working time, instead of sending people
to outside courses, the firms held in-house workshops and provided short-term intensive
training on how to prepare investment application documents, feasibility studies, etc.
Only five cases used information sources such as expert advice and consultancy
services for their investment learning. Some firms had access to documentation libraries,
seminars and exhibitions which upgraded their knowledge and widened their information
pool for engaging in investment activities. Concerning learning-by-doing, 13 out of 14
firms were engaged in some investment activities and thus learned from their various
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experiences of that process. By participating in the investment phase of projects, they
increased their knowledge and experience of how to deal with investment problems.
TGI4, for instance, by repeatedly investing in and expanding its production facilities, have
created a favourable environment for its managers to learn investment skills through doing.
Particularly after the firm lost almost all its facilities due to a fire in 1979, TGI4 engaged
more actively in new investment to rehabilitate the firm during 1984-1985; it bought the
whole street where the firm is now located as the new site for its production workshops.
Through this learning-by-massively-investing, TG14 dramatically increased its
competence at handling investment activities.
Three cases have done some learning-by-doing but still could not acquire
investment capability due to either a lack of other mechanisms to support learning-by-
doing (TGI and TG13) or because as a joint venture (TG7) Vietnamese staff passively
relied on their foreign partner to handle investment activity. TGI2 did not have any
investment capability due to lacking almost all learning mechanisms including learning-by-
doing, training or using information.3 A foreign connection was the only mechanism used
and this was not sufficient for the firm to acquire investment capability. Thus, these
findings show that learning-by-doing has to be complemented by other more active
mechanisms, especially training and foreign connections. In the case of TG13, even the
use of information search was still not sufficient, since there were no training activities at
the firm. This factor may indicate the importance of training and foreign connections over
that of information search.
7.2.3 Learning Minor Technical Change Capability
The learning patterns for minor change capability are presented in Table 7.3. All 14 firms
engaged in doing various minor technical improvements and adaptation. One example is
TG3, which changed its production technology by replacing foreign imported spare parts
with locally-produced ones (bolts, plugs, carriages, etc.). This was mostly accomplished
by being involved in the technical improvement campaigns of the government.4 Learning-
through-doing minor change can also be seen in many other firms, in their process
technology activities as well as in their (re)development of product specifications.
3According to the interview, this firm's managers are quite passive, and lack initiative and creativity in
adopting learning plans.
4Various campaigns promoted by the state to support minor technical improvements have helped firms to
begin engaging in minor change activity. There was a movement of "technical initiatives and rationalisation
of production" supported by the Vietnam Trade Union, the ministry and the companies which became a core
element of the so-called socialist competition activities which have been very popular since the 1960s.
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Through repeated 'trial and error', firms became increasingly confident about initiating
minor technical change activities.
Prior accumulation ofknowledge and experience made an important contribution to
minor change capability. With the exception of TG8, the 13 other companies gained the
technical knowledge necessary for their minor improvement activities, knowledge that was
embodied in recruited personnel.
About half of the firms used on-the-job (seven cases) and ojf-the-job (six cases)
training. Co-operation with people from R&D institutions, universities (whether through
formal contracts or informal contacts) brought the companies training courses and research
and experimental facilities which they used for problem-solving. These activities were
either organised on-site or they took the form of short courses to which firms sent their
people.
Information collection and accessing consultants were used in seven cases. In TG2,
for instance, competitions were organised annually or quarterly among personnel to
increase skills and to identify "the most experienced workers". They also used the CKT
movement (Chat-luong: good quality, Kieu-dang: beautiful design and Tiet-kiem:
economy and reduction of cost) to promote suggestions on new initiatives. MOLI and
other management organisations helped the company to introduce this kind of campaign
and thus to acquire some additional information. Then, the directorship and the company's
trade union kept this activity going. Although this activity has not taken the form of a
formal training course, it has proved crucial in augmenting the firm's capability at handling
minor technical change.
One of the most notable features in minor change capability is the minimal use of
foreign connections: only three cases have benefited from this mechanism. One of the few
examples is TGI (see Section 10.2). Usually, companies found it difficult to learn
technical change expertise from their foreign partners, simply because the foreign contacts
do not provide any of these. In majority, they did not see any experience, or skills applied
by foreign partners in technical change activity. It is clearly evident in many cases of this
study that foreign connections are not always a helpful source of learning technical change.
Table 7.3 also shows that TG8 had learning-by-doing as the only mechanism for
learning how to manage minor change. It seems that this mechanism is not sufficient if a
firm is to accumulate this TC. In the case of TG5, in addition to learning-by-doing, the
firm only used one additional mechanism (prior accumulation). A sole reliance on the
experience and knowledge previously accumulated by the firm's employees appears to be
insufficient when no further training is available to develop the required knowledge and
experience.
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7.2.4 Learning Marketing Capability
The overall picture of learning patterns for developing marketing capability is provided in
Table 7.4. Very few firms were able to learn marketing capability by any mechanism. The
most frequently used mechanism was simple by-doing associated with some recent initial
marketing activities. One of the firms with marketing capability, TG9, has tried to learn
through increasing the rate of its OEM mode of production in total exports, as well as by
opening an office in Moscow to market itself in the former Soviet Union. By 1990, the
company had 10% of its production based on OEM for market economies, and 80% for
Eastern European markets. Moreover, 10% of its total production began to bear its own
trade label - a first step towards an OBM (own-brand manufacture) mode. These deliberate
attempts to enter foreign markets gave the firm first-hand experience of success and failure
in marketing.
TGI, TG3, TG4, TG10 and TG14 have all done some marketing activities, but this
learning-by-doing was either unsupplemented by other mechanisms (TGI) or received
little back-up from other mechanisms. At TG3, in addition to very limited by-doing, the
firm uses information collection at trade fairs and exhibitions to gain marketing skills, but
this activity has only recently been initiated. Even off-the-job training courses, like the one
run by the Hanoi Economic University, are very new and are not systematic enough to
bring marketing competence to the firm. A similar situation pertains at TGI4, where the
firm is quite a novice at marketing.
As for prior accumulation, few training institutions could provide graduates with
knowledge and experience of marketing. On-the-job training and foreign connections
were used by only two firms. The private firm, TG9, sent two people to South Korea to
study international payment and finance. The reliance of this firm on foreign sources for
marketing, in combination with other mechanisms, has proved crucial for their
accumulation of marketing capability. However, examples like this are very rare.
Off-the-job training was used to some extent by six firms to develop marketing
capability. Some companies sent their people to attend courses on business administration
or marketing offered by universities and colleges. TG5 trained its staff through a specific
course on marketing offered by the HoChiMinh City Council, and its director even
attended a short course given by the World Bank in Vietnam. TG9 sent its staff to attend
courses offered by Vietnamese and international organisations on banking, economic
management and marketing. These courses were short, but they gave the firm a more
systematic knowledge of marketing to Western customers. Information sources were used
by five firms to gain some knowledge of marketing: sending people to trade fairs,
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exhibitions, study tours, etc., both locally and abroad. Through attending these events, the
firms got access to the latest sources of information about market trends.
Two cases displaying marketing capability were TG5 and TG9 which had
combined learning-by-doing with other mechanisms in a systematic way. Next to
learning-by-doing (through exporting to Japan), TG5's relations with its foreign partners
moved from simple subcontracting to OEM. It also sent people on marketing courses, and
gathered information through trips to the US. All these activities had a complimentary
effect, bringing the firm confidence in marketing as well as relevant knowledge and
experience. TG9 went further in acquiring this capability. What these two firms hold in
common is the use of foreign connections to learn about marketing. Although a foreign
connection did not necessarily lead to marketing capability, all cases which lacked this
learning mechanism also lacked this capability. This is an indication of the importance of
a foreign connection for acquiring marketing capability.
7.2.5 Learning Linkage Capability
As Table 8.5 shows, prior accumulation has been most helpful for developing linkage
capability, while other mechanisms were used to a much lesser extent. Firms mainly
acquired their linkages thanks to the relations of their staff with university colleagues, etc.
These personal relationships became very important for firms in organising and using
linkages with R&D institutes, universities and other firms. Other managers were assigned
from MOLI, where they had accumulated knowledge of the industry and forged external
links with R&D units. These MOLI personnel contributed to the accumulation of firms'
capabilities, not only in technical but also in investment and linkage experience. In total,
10 firms used this mechanism to accumulate linkage competence. Thirteen companies
were developing links with different organisations and institutions and so gained direct
experience of how to get, and maintain, contacts effectively.
Four firms used information search and documentation as a learning tool - a
mechanism that was used to a lesser extent than in the building of other capabilities. Just
two or three firms made use of on-the-job or off-the-job training, and foreign connections.
Some companies (e.g., TG2) used their personal contacts with Vietnamese living abroad
(in France and the US) to establish foreign links.
7.2.6 Learning Major Technical Change Capability
Little can be said about the learning of major technical change capability since only TG4
has this capability to some extent. As shown in Section 6.2.6, the experience of doing
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R&D has given the firm a better idea on how to organise R&D and how to deal with
difficulties.
7.2.7 Summary
Some general points can be drawn on patterns of learning as shown in Tables 7.1 to 7.6.
First, learning-by-doing is a must for all firms in all areas of TC. The examples of TG12 in
investment, TGI in linkage and many other firms in marketing confirm that, despite
pursuing other active learning activities, these firms could not acquire TCs without
learning-by-doing.
Second, however, learning-by-doing is not sufficient for the firms to acquire TC.
This is illustrated by the cases where learning-by-doing was the only learning mechanism
in use, for example investment in TGI and TG7, minor change in TG8, marketing in TGI,
and linkage in TG7. Moreover, even when learning-by-doing is supported by other
learning mechanisms, some firms have still failed to build up the necessary TC. The
evidence suggests that companies need more than one supplementary active form of
learning to support learning-by-doing.
The third point is the tendency for certain combinations of learning mechanism to
be associated with the acquisition of particular TCs. For each TC, there were differences
in both the combination of mechanisms and in their ranking. More concretely, in addition
to learning-by-doing, the general tendency to combine learning mechanisms can be seen
as follows:
• For production capability: prior accumulation, foreign connections and on-the-job
training.
• For investment capability: foreign connections, prior accumulation and off-the-job
training.
• For minor technical change capability: prior accumulation, on-the-job training and
information search and documentation.
• For marketing capability: off-the-job training, information search and prior
accumulation.
• For linkage capability: prior accumulation and information search.
• For major technical change capability: prior accumulation and information search.
The patterns of learning presented here, however, did not appear all at once. The
use of learning mechanisms - in terms of their type and source - is not static but changes
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over time. It took decades for these firms to come to their present situation. The dynamics
of this learning process is examined in the next section.
7.3 Dynamics of Learning in Textile/Garment Firms
As the first period of industrial development did not have any significant impact on this
industry, this section mainly presents changes in learning mechanisms throughout the last
three periods (see Chapter 5). As seen in Figure 7.1, over these periods, the learning
mechanisms that firms have invoked have changed in their contents and sources and in
their contribution to acquiring different TCs.
7.3.11946-1975
Companies TGI, TG2, TG12, TG10 and TG13 were set up in this period (mostly between
1960 and 1975). They received investment from the state and engaged in the planned
production that implied. Some initial export of simple garments (TGI and TG10) was
arranged by subcontracting agreements between Vietnam and socialist countries. In this
period, the only capability the companies began to acquire was production and only by
very simple means of learning: by-doing and on-the-job training such as courses organised
by ministerial organisations. These learning mechanisms, in addition to production
experience, introduced basic technical knowledge that proved useful for technical change
activities. Prior to 1975, the firms' main learning sources were their first foreign suppliers
or buyers, coming from China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Prior accumulation
also came through the assignment of managers from outside the firms. Off-the-job training
and information collection were almost non-existent in this period.
7.3.2 Pre-Reform: 1976-1986
This period witnessed the expansion of many new production facilities. Companies TG3,
TG5 and TG6 set up in this period and TG4, TGI4 and TGI5 were established after the
unification of the country in 1976. These companies mostly received new investment
through technology transfer from industrialised countries, as well as technical assistance
from their foreign connections. The format of connections shifted from simple
subcontracting to more active relations such as OEM, where companies received materials
and designs from buyers and sent them back their products. Sources of foreign contacts
became more diversified. Using new technology supplied from Western countries, many
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firms began to work in Eastern European markets, particularly through subcontracting
agreements for garment products. In addition to production knowledge, early investment
experience became available to the firms through their foreign connections. Prior
accumulation through massive recruitment from universities and polytechnics brought to
the firms the technical knowledge crucial for their production and minor technical change
capabilities, together with an increased ability to link with academic institutions. In some
firms, like TGI2, recruiting from universities became a strong tradition and has continued
each year since the firm's inception.
On-the-job and off-the-job training were actively used in this period. Direct contact
with R&D institutions - permitted since 1981-1982 - further contributed to the ability of
companies to carry out minor technical improvements and production activities. However,
these courses contributed primarily to mastering technical issues and the same technical
orientation of this period can be seen in the use of information sources. In addition to
production, firms found more opportunities to engage in minor change, linkage, and
investment activities within the context of learning-by-doing.
7.3.3 The Reforms: after 1986
The reforms of 1986 heralded many radical changes for companies, including the
emergence of non-SOEs such as private firms (TG8 and TG9) and joint ventures (TG7).
This period has been characterised by companies making much more conscious efforts to
acquire TCs. The means they have used to achieve their aims are also wide-ranging.
Although foreign connections continue to be an important mechanism throughout
this period, earlier connections with the Soviet and East European markets are being
replaced by connections with the Asia-Pacific economies and the EU. Further, the form of
foreign connections is moving from simple subcontracting relations to more active
participation by Vietnamese firms in producing value-added through OEM and ODM
relations. In some cases, the move is even to an OBM mode of production for the less
sophisticated markets of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As noted in Section
7.2, this mechanism has helped firms to learn modern production technology, new
investment skills, ways of organising linkages and even, in some cases, marketing
knowledge.
On-the-job and off-the-job training mechanisms appear to have both new
advantages and disadvantages. Thanks to changes in the R&D system (see Appendix
5.12), firms have easier access to new sources for their training needs. Following reform,
the need to re-train staff has shifted from a concern with merely technical matters to non¬
technical fields like business administration and economic management. Although firms
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now require non-technical knowledge like investment more than they previously did, it is
still more difficult to access support from the S&T, training and education infrastructure
for help in non-technical as opposed to technical affairs. Training courses are provided on
a smaller scale, and more selectively focused in terms of subjects. The training of workers
has become more difficult than before due to a loss of subsidised funding. Nevertheless,
firms now enjoy more favourable conditions for tapping into new learning sources such as
collecting information and documentation. Contact with R&D and other supporting
organisations is becoming more flexible and business-oriented, allowing for easier
circulation of information.
The main difficulty of the reform period is in recruiting personnel who can
contribute through their prior accumulation of TC. Because of funding shortages,
recruitment is small-scale, cautious and selective. The shift to a more non-technical focus
in recruitment has also strengthened in this period and thus some additional investment and
marketing expertise has been gained. Learning-by-doing in this period has extended to
newer activities such as developing new ventures and engaging in R&D and marketing.
Thus, the radical changes of the reform period are having a significant impact on the use of
different learning mechanisms.
7.4 Learning Patterns in Electronics Companies
7.4.1 Learning Production Capability
The overall pattern of using learning mechanisms for production capability is provided in
Table 7.7, where we can see that three companies - El, E2 and E9 - used all the learning
mechanisms in their accumulation of this capability. Foreign connections and prior
accumulation were the two mechanisms most used by firms. Nine out of 10 cases used
foreign connections to accumulate their production capability.
The first time Vietnamese electronics companies (E10 and Ell) used foreign
connections as their learning source for production was in the 1970s with the setting up of
subsidiaries of Japanese consumer electronics firms in what was then South Vietnam.
Some technical assistance was provided together with equipment to guide Vietnamese
technicians and workers on how to use the technology and organise production. Later
other firms received guidance from Japanese experts in installing and starting-up assembly
lines. Foreign connections were crucial for firms in acquiring knowledge on how to
operate the technology and how to deal with various production issues such as materials
supply, operating routines, maintenance of equipment and quality control.
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In the 1980s, Czechoslovakian experts came to the companies providing technical
guidance, quality control, and maintenance of the technology to produce condensers. At
E10 and Ell, two different Czech companies of the same group, TESLA, supplied them
with input materials and other technical assistance for producing electronics components.
Polytechna - a Czech training service company - at the request of TESLA, provided
training programme for the staff in these two companies. Hundreds of people were sent to
Czechoslovakia for training.
Ell, through its most recent foreign connection, again learned from the Japanese
firms, Sony and JVC. Each year, the firm has sent several groups of personnel to Japan
(three or four people at a time for trips lasting up to a fortnight) to learn the organisational
skills needed for producing Japanese TVs. At the same time, both JVC and Sony seconded
experts to El 1 on a regular basis to assist with the production and management of
assembly (Sony sending people every month, and JVC once for a couple of months).
These experts stayed from two to three months each time to help supervise production,
using Sony's procedures on inventory and quality control and JVC's sales techniques to
advise on local marketing. With the help of Sony, Ell has adopted the system of daily
checking in combination with flexible personnel management. By doing so, the
productivity of the firm in assembling TVs has increased six fold: before using Sony's
method, the firm could only produce 50 TVs per day over two shifts; afterwards, it
assembled 300 TVs per day. To ensure the quality of the product, some products were
chosen randomly to be sent back to Japan for higher quality testing. As a result, El 1 also
gained experience of quality control.
Among the computer companies, E5 acquired production capability in a joint
venture with Bull. E4, in order to start assembling PCs, relied on the foreign technological
expertise of Taiwanese suppliers. Although the suppliers did not take any direct part in
assembly activities, their advice and knowledge were available to E4 through discussion
and exchange of information. E8 was the only case that did not have foreign connections
and it had to rely on local experience gathered through prior accumulation or through its
network of informants.
Prior accumulation was used by nine firms to develop production capability,
through massive recruitment of graduates from the polytechnics and universities. In
addition, managers coming from other organisations have introduced valuable knowledge
and experience of production activities. El, E2 at their start up, Ell after rehabilitation
and E10 have all received support from the Ministry (see VEIC in Section 5.3.1) or the
local city councils in terms of personnel. They received many radio electronics and
mechanical engineers for jobs in various divisions and workshops. Many key managers of
the firms (directors, heads of divisions) came from R&D and education organisations. For
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example, E2 began with the assignment of the Dean of the Radio Electronics Department
of Hanoi Polytechnic as a director of the new firm (see E2 in Section 10.4). Similar prior
accumulation of knowledge and experience occurred at other computer firms through
recruiting people from IOIT and other research institutes (E3, E4, E5 and E9).
Learning-by-doing occurred in nine firms. At E10 and Ell, after standing idle for
a couple of years at the end of the 1970s, the production of components came back in a
subcontracting agreement with TESLA. Growing through this activity, unlike the previous
situation of working for Japanese firms as their subsidiaries, managers of E10 and Ell
have learnt more about running a business independently, especially in relation to
exporting. Workers and technicians who acquired knowledge and experience as former
employees of the Japanese subsidiaries were able to learn the new activity of producing
components. Assembly activity at the Northern firms El and E2, and electronics services
at E7 opened up the opportunity for these firms to practice their operational skills. At first,
El and E2 only learned how to produce with CKD components - the easiest mode of
production. After three or four years, they moved to undertake more complicated
production operations like SKD component assembly. The same 'trial and error' process
was evident in computer firms dealing with PC assembly, particularly in maintaining
quality through various kinds of product testing.
For production capability, between six and eight cases used on-the-job and ojf-the-
job training, and information search. Courses were offered by R&D institutes and
polytechnics, mostly on technical topics related to radio electronics and computer science.
7.4.2 Learning Investment Capability
The companies gained less investment knowledge and experience as compared with
production and this pattern is shown in the Table 7.8. Non-technical learning has been
implemented widely at many firms through doing (nine out of 10 cases). Experience was
gained by staff through investing in various new ventures (E2, E3, El 1 and E7). Almost
all firms have recently expanded their production facilities, thus providing them with a
chance to experience some of the difficulties of investment, and to learn how to solve
problems and avoid mistakes.
Five cases (El, E4, E7, E8 and E9) have done some learning-by-doing but could
not acquire this capability due to a lack of other supporting mechanisms. Besides learning-
by-doing, E7 and E8 only collected some information and documentation for investment
knowledge and did not offer or avail of any training. Similarly, E9 had some minimal off-
the-job training to support its by-doing mechanism. However, this mechanism was too
formal (some seminars, a meeting at the directors' club, etc.) to be effective for acquiring
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this capability. E5 as a joint venture with a French company did not have investment
capability due to lack of learning-by-doing and other training measures, in spite of its
foreign connection.
Only five firms accumulated investment knowledge through prior accumulation
(E3, E2, E4, E10 and El 1) where their managers had worked and studied before joining
those firms. For example, E3's managers accumulated their investment knowledge while
working for a joint venture firm (see E3 in Section 10.5).
The companies have also gathered investment knowledge by cooperating with
foreign experts in their new investments (assembling Japanese and Korean TVs in El, and
new sample production of industrial robotic parts for Japanese companies in E2). Most
commonly, they acquired this knowledge through discussion with foreign technology
suppliers, and by sending a few people abroad for short study tours financed by the foreign
partner. Similarly, E5 learned how to start a joint venture from its French partner
(although this connection was not sufficient for the firm to acquire its own investment
capability).
Off-the-job training was used by six firms. Thanks to recent opportunities offered
by economic institutes and universities, the firms sent some key staff to take part in these
courses. This was easier than organising courses on-site, where they would have had to
take responsibility for organising the whole programme. These courses were on
import/export procedures (E7), investment studies (E9 and E10) and financing (Ell). In
order to learn about investment and purchasing, El sent some of its Hanoi staff to work for
periods in other Southern firms in HoChiMinh City (E10 and El 1), which have experience
of expanding production facilities.
In contrast, no firm could use on-the-job training to learn about investment and
only four firms used information search. For example, El acquired its investment
knowledge (planning, cost-benefit analysis, etc.) by co-operating with local consultants.
Table 7.8 again reveals that learning-by-doing is the first and necessary condition
for acquiring investment capability, but it is not sufficient in itself. In addition, looking at
a combination of learning mechanisms, the firms with this capability share one thing in
common: the combination of prior accumulation with foreign connections.
7.4.3 Learning Minor Technical Change Capability
The pattern of acquiring minor change expertise is rather similar to that of learning
production capability. Table 7.9 shows that eight companies used learning-by-doing. In
these companies, participation in R&D programmes organised by other institutions, state
organisations or by themselves significantly increased the skill base of the companies.
134
Almost all companies engage in R&D activities, either in specialised R&D units, or as part
of a technical division.
The prior accumulation mechanism was used by nine cases. As mentioned earlier,
a specific feature of electronics firms is that they first began as research and teaching
enterprises, especially in computing (Sections 5.3.1 and 6.4.2). When these firms began
commercial activity, they had immediate access to R&D and technical expertise through
the personnel of universities and R&D institutions. For example, El started in 1970 as a
laboratory doing research on electronics technologies. When this laboratory was
transformed into a firm in accordance with the change of the whole Viettronics group, El
was able to use the laboratory's personnel as its first prior accumulation of technical
expertise. In E10, the director was educated in electronics in Hungary. After graduation,
he stayed in Hungary to work for a year in the electronics industry, and spent another two
years in a group of electronics trade service companies. On his return to Vietnam, he
worked for the first electronics laboratory of the Ministry of Heavy Industry. When E10
began its rehabilitation in HoChiMinh City, he was placed in charge of this company
where he continued his accumulation of knowledge by reading documents left by
Matsushita, and by co-working with its former employees.
In computer firms, technical personnel, scientists and lecturers working in R&D
organisations accumulated both theoretical and practical knowledge of computing. This
knowledge was one of their most important assets when they became managers dealing
with the technical aspects of a computer business. Almost from the start, these manager-
scientists knew how to deploy their pre-existing knowledge of minor technical adjustments
to create new computer models. Managers of these firms were all educated abroad in
Eastern Europe. After graduation, they stayed in these countries and worked in R&D
institutes or computer firms before going back to Vietnam. This prior accumulation has
been augmented by their work experience gathered in Vietnamese R&D institutes (NCSR,
the laboratory of Ministry of Defence, etc).
Unlike textile/garment companies, some electronics firms were able to utilise their
foreign connections to learn about technical change. Although only five companies used
this mechanism, it is second only to prior accumulation in importance.
Other mechanisms like on-the-job, and off-the-job training were used to a lesser
extent (only four cases used each mechanism). In training activities, R&D institutions and
universities played an important role. Hanoi Polytechnic and its Radio Electronics Faculty
has regularly supplied instructors for courses at El, E2 and E7. These courses are for both
large classes of workers and technicians, and for small short-duration classes (one or two
days). For example, E7 has sometimes held classes for only two people so as to tackle
very specific technical problems. In the South, E10 and Ell relied on the courses of
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HoChiMinh City polytechnic for knowledge on the technical aspects of electronics such as
radio frequencies and how to adjust different functions of audio-visual equipment. These
courses were more useful for production and minor change activities than for other TCs.
Information search was only used by four companies.
As presented in Table 7.9, E8 was unable to acquire minor change capability since
it did not invoke any other mechanisms beyond learning-by-doing. Two firms (E5 and E9)
did not even do any learning-by-doing in respect of this TC. Although they had some prior
accumulation and even had support of foreign connections (E9), this was not enough for
them to acquire the minor change capability.
7.4.4 Learning Marketing Capability
The patterns for learning marketing are given in Table 7.10. Interestingly, all companies
were able to gain their first experience of marketing through doing various marketing
activities. After 1986, all firms expanded or organised networks of sale points (shops and
showrooms) which proved useful to their learning of marketing. For example, E4 in this
period tried to sell its products (PCs and software) not only in the former markets of Russia
and France, but in some new ones such as neighbouring Cambodia.
Firms made little use of other learning mechanisms. Prior accumulation was only
used in three computer firms (E3, E4 and E5). Some of the would-be managers of
computer firms have worked in various state trading and financial organisations, and have
acquired a sound knowledge of the Soviet market, and of its strengths and weaknesses, and
some financial know-how on how to do business in this specific arena (for a detailed
example, see E3 in Section 10.5). E4's director was educated and worked in France for
many years before coming back to Vietnam. His expertise encompasses not only technical
knowledge, but also knowledge of the French market which is important to the company as
they produce software for French users.
This kind of prior accumulation played a very important role in these computer
firms' acquisition of marketing capability. This factor explains why these computer firms
saw from the beginning how to exploit the Soviet market for computer products
successfully.
Four firms used foreign connections to learn about marketing. While selling
software products to French and Japanese customers, E4 learned more about how to
overcome the standardisation barriers against entering these markets. Further, the
company has strong support from the Chamber of Commerce and the Industry of
Versailles (through its director's long-term French network) to advertise its products and
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promote sales activities in France. In addition, the use of contacts with Vietnamese
expatriates is an effective way to gather knowledge and information, as in the case of E4.
Not surprisingly, given the lack of marketing expertise in R&D, training and
education institutes, training mechanisms were not used very much for acquiring this
capability. Only two firms used on-the-job training, while three used off-the-job training.
Five firms used information search and consultancy sources to develop their
marketing capability. Initially, the main market for computer firms was the former Soviet
Union, so they needed knowledge about how to operate in this market. The role of internal
linkages was very important: companies either have their own or external groups of experts
working in the Ministry of Finance, the Vietnam Foreign Trade Bank, export-import
companies, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Ministry of Heavy Industry, etc. In
interview, companies were reluctant to talk about the activities of these financial, monetary
and maybe even political networks. One of the likely reasons was the competitive need to
keep this marketing know-how secret. Information collecting about marketing also comes
from customers who provide rapid feed-back on defect rates, market trends and specific
requirements.
In sum, in all three cases having marketing expertise (E3, E4 and E5), this
capability was acquired thanks to combining learning-by-doing with other learning
mechanisms, of which prior accumulation was the most effective. Although the use of
foreign connections and information and documentation mechanisms was more in evidence
than prior accumulation, these two mechanisms did not help firms to acquire marketing
competence if they lacked prior accumulation as was the case in E9 and Ell. This factor
may indicate that prior accumulation was the most important mechanism for marketing in
electronics firms. Even some training in El, E7, E9 and E10 was not enough for these
firms to obtain marketing capability.
7.4.5 Learning Linkage Capability
Patterns for this capability are shown in Table 7.11. By-doing and prior accumulation were
used by most firms (10 cases). Prior involvement in laboratories (see Section 5.3.5) was
crucial for firms' managers to develop linkages as well as to acquire production and minor
improvement TCs. For instance, the directors of El and El 1 were senior staff in the first
national laboratory of electronics. Relations between E7's director, and his former
classmates and teachers (the director of E2 had been his professor at Hanoi Polytechnic)
had a similar effect on linkage development.
In contrast, no firm used any training to gain this capability. Hence, the general
tendency is for linkages to be learned mostly through work experience and through
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contacts that firms developed during their activities. The use offoreign connections and
information sources occupied the mid-ground. The active involvement of foreign partners
in the firms' activities helped them gain experience in developing international linkages.
As for internal linkages, in the case of E2 their foreign partner even helped them with
routines for circulating information among divisions (see Section 10.4).
As for information sources, informal and personal contacts among academics
(people still doing research and teaching, and former academics who are now managers in
business) were the most effective means for acquiring and developing linkage capability
(in addition to minor change). This informal network of scientists in electronics has kept
co-operation alive. Activities undertaken under the auspices of the Association of
Informatics and Microelectronics also contribute to co-operation in the context of the quite
small community in this field. This personal network of contacts became even more
important in three computer firms - E3, E4 and E5 - which started up on the basis of their
accumulated capability.
An interesting feature of developing linkage capability is that all 10 firms had very
similar ways of using four mechanisms: all have used learning-by-doing and prior
accumulation, while none have used training activity for linkage competence building.
Thus, the main difference was in the use made of foreign connections and information
sources. Eight firms with this capability used one or both of these mechanisms. However,
the foreign connection seems to be more important than the use of local networks of
information and consulting. Again, this points to the significance of combining various
learning mechanisms as we saw in the accumulation of other TCs such as prior
accumulation and foreign connections in investment capability.
7.4.6 Learning Capability of Major Technical Change
Table 7.12 shows that firms hardly used any mechanisms to learn this capability. Only two
cases (E3 and E10) used learning-by-doing, even though no cases have this capability. E3
was the only company to have an information and consulting network to support learning-
by-doing in this area. Although this firm has still not acquired this capability, it is
progressing rather actively from minor change towards more major technical change
activity. To a lesser extent, thanks to active minor technical change, E2 might also develop
a major change capability.
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7.4.7 Summary
The patterns of learning in electronics firms confirm some of the findings for
textile/garment firms. First is the necessity of learning-by-doing without which some firms
were not able to obtain TC, even where other learning mechanisms were used (e.g.,
investment in E5, minor change in E9). At the same time, the learning patterns of
electronics firms also confirm the need for other learning mechanisms to support learning-
by-doing. T his point can be seen in investment in E7, E8 and E9; minor change in E8; and
marketing in E2, E7, E8, E10 and Ell. In general, learning-by-doing must be supported
by several other learning mechanisms.
The second finding supported by evidence from electronics firms is the need for
particular combinations of learning mechanisms to build up TCs. In general, the
combinatory tendencies are as follows:
• For production capability: prior accumulation, foreign connections and on-the-job
training.
• For investment capability: prior accumulation, off-the-job training and foreign
connections.
• For minor change: prior accumulation, and to a lesser extent, foreign connections.
• For marketing capability: foreign connections, information search and prior
accumulation.
• For linkage capability: prior accumulation (relations, connections), foreign contacts and
information search.
• For major change: nothing was used.
Before turning to the similarities and differences of these combinations with those
found in textile/garment firms (see Section 7.6) I will first discuss the dynamics of the
patterns of learning mechanisms in electronics companies.
7.5 Dynamics of Learning in Electronics Firms
Figure 7.2 shows the dynamic use of learning modes in electronics firms during the three
periods of Vietnamese industrial development. Depending on the specific conditions and
circumstances of each period, learning mechanisms changed in terms of sources, technical
foci and their differing contributions to various TCs.
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7.5.1 Before Unification: 1946-1975
In this period, there were no electronic companies in the North. Most electronics activities
were in training and in applying technological equipment. In the South, only two firms
were set up in 1974 as subsidiaries of Japanese consumer electronics giants: E10
(Matsushita Vietnam) and Ell (Sony Vietnam). Both firms got their technological
equipment from Japanese suppliers to assemble black-and-white TV sets and radios for the
local market. For a short time, they acquired some production experience. Unfortunately,
after the war ended in 1975, the owners and most of the technical staff left the country.
Thus, in this period, any production experience of former employees at E10 and El 1 was
limited and was gathered mostly through their first foreign connections and their learning-
by-doing operations. No other mechanisms were used for learning.
7.5.2 Pre-Reform Period: 1976-1986
Most Northern companies such as El, E2 and E7 were created in the 1980s. As SOEs set
up by Hanoi City (E2) or by the Ministry of Heavy Industry (El and E7), these firms got
their technology through agreements with Japanese suppliers to produce TV sets (black-
and-white and colour), radios and amplifiers, mostly for the domestic market. For many
firms, JVC was the main supplier of equipment, input materials (CKD components) and
technical assistance.
After unification of the country in 1976, E10 and Ell became SOEs and received
some support from the state to reactivate their production. Eastern European experts
supported these companies in building up their production expertise and in exporting to
Eastern European markets. Although the first attempt at exporting turned out to be short¬
lived (the firms ended their subcontracting relationship with TESLA in 1987), foreign
connections had helped them accumulate technological experience, which was then further
developed through production activities. The connection with the Japanese suppliers of
assembly facilities for TV and other consumer goods continued.
Training activities at the firms in this period have been held both on-the job and
through sending people to off-the-job training courses offered by other organisations like
the polytechnics and universities. Reliance of the companies on information search,
documentation collection and consultancy services was not very marked up to the middle
of the 1980s. Most sources of information used by companies such as conferences,
workshops and seminars were organised by the Ministry and the VEIC and were mostly
geared to addressing the technical problems of the consumer electronics industry.
Literature sources like journals, books and blueprints obtained by companies concentrated
140
on a few issues like radio electronics, and the production of consumer products. These
sources of learning were only useful for production and minor change capabilities of the
firms.
Learning-by-doing activity increased in this period, however, and was not limited
to production skills, but also was evident in minor technical adjustment activities. Various
minor improvements have been taking place in almost all firms, mostly thanks to
supporting campaigns organised in SOEs.
7.5.3 Reform: after 1986
Five companies were created in this period (E3, E4, E5 and E9) specialising in computer
business and related services, and one - E8 - set up as a small firm producing simple
consumer electronics. The creation of these firms reflects a very special feature of this
period: the more active appearance of a private sector and of foreign investment. E8
originated as a family business doing some subcontracting jobs in simple electronics like
PCB or loud speakers assembly. E3 and E4 were also share-holding private firms set up
by scientists who formerly worked in other companies or state organisations. E5 was a
joint venture between VEIC and a French company.
The learning dynamics of computer firms appear to be somewhat different from
those of consumer electronics. As mentioned in Chapter 6, research and teaching in
computer science and application activities have been developed widely in R&D institutes,
universities and polytechnics. Through working in this environment, or in other companies
before setting up their own firms, the managers of E3, E4 and E5 accumulated strong
background knowledge and experience. This prior accumulation continued in the reform
period through selective recruitment. Although consumer electronics did use prior
accumulation, computer firms used it much more extensively. In this period, many
scientists working in R&D institutions and universities moved out and set up the first
industrial basis to the sector. They took with them experience and knowledge (in
marketing and in minor technical change) accumulated prior to setting up the firms, and
these became the earliest assets of the computer firms.
The use of foreign connections by firms occurred first in the assembly of simple
consumer electronics, then moved to industrial and service businesses, and later computer
assembly came into play. Sources of foreign learning moved from mainly Eastern
European countries and the Soviet Union to Asian firms in Taiwan and Korea, while
Japanese firms continued to be an important source. In addition to production knowledge,
foreign connections helped electronics firms to learn investment, linkage and to a lesser
extent marketing activities. This suggests two points. One is the significance of foreign
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connections for all the TCs except the technical change capability. Second, it shows the
important impact of the reforms which exposed Vietnamese companies to new external
learning sources.
There was not much change in training mechanisms. Although off-the-job training
switched from technical to non-technical content, no change happened in on-the-job
training. The move from technical to non-technical experience can also be seen in the use
made of the learning-by-doing mechanism. While firms continued to learn by doing
technical exercises, they obtained greater opportunities to gain experience of doing new
things in investment or marketing.
In the reform period, the use of the information, documentation and consulting
learning mechanism became more intensive, and relied more on the informal network of
personal contacts among scientists, researchers, lecturers and managers of the firms. This
mechanism also brought new expertise to the firms in investment, linkage and marketing
affairs.
The overall picture of electronics firms in this period shows the expansion of the
scope and content of technological expertise, and the knowledge and experience of firms.
Expansion and diversification also occurred in the use of various learning mechanisms and
firms began to combine mechanisms more intensively.
7.6 Findings and Comparisons
In the last four sections, I presented the learning patterns found in textile/garment and
electronics firms and their dynamics over time. This section discusses some important
issues about how learning is shaped, by looking at similarities and differences in the
patterns between firms and across the two industries. Then, I provide some explanation for
these patterns. The section moves on further to identify other important analytical issues to
be addressed in the following chapters.
7.6.1 Learning Mechanisms
The first issue concerns the learning mechanisms and their formats and sources and the
difficulties or ease of their use. In Sections 7.2.7 and 7.4.7, I concluded that learning-by-
doing is vital to TC acquisition in all areas. This learning-by-doing usually gave firms a
chance to engage in 'trial and error'. It is the making of mistakes, and the lessons learnt
from these mistakes, that are the most important ingredients in a firm's learning-by-doing.
The knowledge and experience gained through learning-by-doing is not a systematic or
codified knowledge, it does not exist in a training textbook. Just by repetitive doing
142
(mostly through routines) firms could identify patterns worth repeating and habits best
avoided. Moreover, the by-doing actively occurred in firms both before and after the
technological and production systems of the project were installed. As Bell & Pavitt
(1993) and Fleck (1991) have emphasised, this learning-by-active-doing is the starting
point for learning, and it continues to be significant thereafter .
It might be argued that this learning-by-doing is passive and just happens anyway
whether firms promote it or not. In fact, to be able to learn something from this simple by-
doing, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest the importance of a firm's absorptive capacity.
In order to identify a pattern, or draw a conclusion from mistakes, the firm must first have
had a certain basic level of accumulated knowledge, both technical and non-technical,
before they can solely rely on learning-by-doing. In some cases this knowledge may even
be highly-sophisticated and science-based. In computer firms E3, E4, and E5, doing minor
change activity in designing software and organising R&D depended very much on their
prior knowledge of computer science. Similarly, for TG4 to carry out research on
microfibre it had to have a sound knowledge of chemistry and materials science. Without
this previously accumulated knowledge, these firms could not do any simple R&D, nor
upgrade it later. However, in these cases, prior accumulation mostly referred to their
technical knowledge. This factor is explained by the weakness of the training and
education environment in Vietnam, which failed to provide firms with sufficient non¬
technical knowledge and experience. For a long time, the courses and activities necessary
for developing non-technical knowledge in investment and marketing did not exist.
The technical orientation of other mechanisms like on-the-job and off-the-job
training as well as information sources is also evident. Training courses usually provide
knowledge in systematic ways (through reviews, theories and summaries) and give firms
some basic know-why types of knowledge. Know-why knowledge is not usually gained
through learning-by-doing. Firms' experience shows that these training activities reflect
strong technical biases, as was the case in training courses for learning minor technical
change in the textile/garment industry. Similarly, information sources had a predominantly
technical content. The above mentioned weakness of training and education institutions is
observed in the use of information for investment capability, and the use of training for
marketing in both industries. In the context of a planned subsidised economy, knowledge
such as market economics, business administration and marketing were neglected and,
when reforms came, this system was not in a position to offer firms the required
knowledge. In order to compensate for the lack of formal training in non-technical
knowledge, firms had to rely more heavily on their experience of doing things and on very
ad-hoc training and education opportunities. For example, the textile/garment firms used
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ad-hoc off-the-job courses in the marketing of textiles and garments, and electronics firms
used learning-by-doing to gain some investment competence.
The network of personal relations and contacts plays a significant role for both
kinds of firm in how they use information. This was particularly strongly emphasised by
many firms using connections previously accumulated (in universities, R&D institutes,
polytechnics, etc.) for developing linkages and receiving information. In some cases, like
marketing in electronics firms, these personal contacts proved crucial. In order to
substitute for the weaknesses of formal training, they relied on the experience and
information informally supplied by their colleagues and friends (see for example E3, E4
and E5 in Section 7.4.5).
The foreign connections mechanism helped firms to learn about topics related to
foreign sources: technologies, markets, financial payment procedures, investment skills,
etc. So, this learning can be both technical and non-technical. However, this mechanism
was used rather more actively for learning production and investment capabilities than for
learning other TCs. The reasons for this were quite simple. In technology transfer
agreements, foreign partners were keen to help Vietnamese firms handle their production
operations in order to ensure a good supply of products for the foreign partner's markets.
Later, they wanted to support their Vietnamese partners in acquiring some investment
skills to further develop business in a local market from which they might also benefit. To
maintain a good business relationship with local partners was another reason for foreign
firms to cooperate with Vietnamese firms in activities other than production. But at this
point, foreign involvement stopped. The evidence from the majority of companies in the
study reveals little involvement from foreign partners in helping them learn technical
change knowledge and skill, even at the minor change level. The same can be said for
marketing. Although the firms in both industries confirmed that they knew how important
foreign contacts were in learning marketing, it was difficult for them to forge contacts and
use them effectively to learn marketing. This tendency contributed heavily to the weak
level of marketing capability in both industries. There is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that this weakness is caused by the deliberate unwillingness of foreign partners to
help firms learn these two capabilities. However, the lack of foreign assistance in learning
technical change and marketing is so overwhelming in most cases that the suggestion
remains that this is very likely the case.
In addition to the unwillingness of foreign partners to help Vietnamese firms
develop their relationship beyond simple subcontracting, there may be two further
explanations for the weakness of using foreign connections to learn the above mentioned
capabilities. One explanation for this unbalanced use of foreign connections may be that
for a long time Vietnam only had access to one group of foreign learning sources: the
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CMEA countries. As I emphasised in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.5, because the relationship
between Vietnam and the CMEA countries was based on central planning, this limited
Vietnamese firms to quite poor sources of learning about the marketing skills most suitable
to exploiting new types of market. Another reason is the inability of Vietnamese firms to
absorb the technical assistance offered by foreign companies (I will return to this issue
later in Chapters 8 and 10). The use of foreign connections as a learning mechanism,
however, is not identical for the two industries. As shown in Sections 7.2.7 and 7.4.7,
electronics companies were able to use their foreign contacts to greater effect than
textile/garment companies were. This different pattern of using learning mechanisms can
be understood more clearly in the context of sectoral differences as discussed in Section
7.6.4.
Examining learning mechanisms, one can see the inter-relatedness of these
mechanisms. For instance, prior accumulation of knowledge in a foreign university can
equally be understood as prior accumulation of a foreign connections mechanism, as was
the case with ElO's director (see Section 7.4.3). Thus, distinctions made between learning
mechanisms should only be seen as relative distinctions.
In sum, some learning mechanisms appear to be more difficult to deploy than
others. As can be seen above, this difficulty is explained by weaknesses in the training,
education and R&D system; by Vietnam's historic specific market orientation; and by the
types of relation pertaining between Vietnam and its foreign partners. The impact of
factors relating to the external environment in which firms operate will be looked at in
Chapter 8. The learning mechanisms used also varied somewhat according to which TC
was being acquired. I now turn to examine this relationship.
7.6.2 Relationship between Learning and Accumulation
In Sections 7.1.7 and 7.3.7, I demonstrated the tendency to combine different learning
mechanisms for acquiring each type of TC. However, in order to identify a relationship
between learning mechanisms and TC accumulation within the firms, it is necessary to
examine only those firms having the relevant TC. This closer examination shows the
contribution (i.e., the frequency of use) of various learning mechanisms in generating
specific TCs and these patterns are presented in two tables, 7.13 and 7.14, for
textile/garment and electronics firms respectively.
Tables 7.13 and 7.14 reveal that all TCs are accumulated in some measure as a
result of learning-by-doing. No firms having TCs omit to use learning-by-doing.
However, this learning mechanism is necessary, but not sufficient, for the acquisition of a
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TC. As emphasised above, not all cases which use the learning-by-doing mechanism
emerge with TCs. Concerning other learning mechanisms, the following can be seen:
• In both textile/garment and electronics firms, prior accumulation is the most important
mechanism for all TCs, but less so for marketing and major change. This mechanism
contributes to all cases having investment, production, minor change and linkage
capabilities. This is understandable since new recruits (whether new graduates or
experienced managers) bring previously accumulated experience and knowledge and
thus help firms to begin production, expand investment, and initiate minor
improvements. This prior accumulation is very useful for developing linkages;
contacts (often personal) between alumni play a rather important role. This feature is
even more significant for electronics firms which sprang from the teaching and
research environment. All their experience is accumulated in large part through
various kinds of training and working in other organisations before moving into the
industry. In addition to knowledge and experience accumulated elsewhere, the contacts
which companies' managers have obtained become very important in building their
TCs.
• On-the-job training is more important in both textile/garment and electronics firms for
acquiring production, and to some extent minor change capabilities, but is less
significant for the acquisition of other TCs. One reason is that instructors invited to the
firms offer courses (mainly technical in content) which are more useful for production
and minor change although, more recently, course contents have shifted to non¬
technical topics like management and investment studies. When it comes to marketing,
the R&D institutions, universities and training schools lack the expertise to provide
firms with the necessary teachers and curricula. The main difference in using on-the-
job training is that while textile/garment firms use it to some extent in building
investment capability, electronics firms do not. It is likely that on-the-job courses are
not readily available in non-technical subjects.
• The pattern of using off-the-job training is rather similar across the two sectors. This
mechanism is important mostly for production, and less so for the minor change
capability. For non-technical learning, off-the-job training seems to be somewhat used
for investment, but very little for marketing. The situation is quite similar to that of on-
the-job training, where the weakness in the R&D and training infrastructure means that
it cannot serve the learning needs of firms on non-technical matters. A further
similarity between these two training mechanisms is that they do not contribute
146
significantly to linkage and major change capabilities. Despite the overall weakness of
training and education institutions in offering non-technical knowledge, of the two
training mechanisms it seems off-the-job training tends to be more frequently used than
on-the-job training for learning the non-technical topics related to investment and
marketing offered by external organisations.
• In textile/garment firms, foreign connections proved to be very useful for production
and to a lesser extent for investment and linkage capabilities. This mechanism only
makes a small contribution to both minor and major technical change capabilities.
Only a few firms which had close relations with a foreign buyer (TGI4) or a partner (in
joint venture TG7) used this mechanism to gain some experience in technical change.
The experience of the majority of firms is that foreign partners tend only to share
knowledge of routine operations. They offer support on using existing production
facilities, but do not extend that support to teaching firms how to change those
facilities. In electronics companies, the same situation pertains. The assistance of
foreign partners is more evident in TCs like production, linkage and to a lesser extent
investment, and is not so effective for learning minor technical change and marketing
capabilities. As argued earlier, it is quite understandable that foreign companies are
ready to help local firms build and expand their production facilities, but are less ready
to help in changing technology and in becoming more competitive in the international
market. Nevertheless, electronics firms are better able to use foreign connections than
textile/garment firms are, as shown in Section 7.4.7.
• The use of information search, documentation and consulting varies across the two
sectors. In textile/garment firms, it contributes mainly to production and minor change
capabilities, less to linkage and investment and hardly at all to the rest. In electronics
firms, this mechanism contributes to production, linkage and to a lesser extent
marketing and minor change capabilities. Interestingly, this mechanism is used for
investment activity in many firms, but not in those firms who have already acquired
this capability. Here, again, technical issues dominate over non-technical ones.
The patterns given in Tables 7.13 and 7.14 reflect two main factors regarding TC
accumulation. One is the content of knowledge learning, i.e., technical versus non¬
technical. Mechanisms such as prior accumulation which are closer to technical
knowledge contribute more to the group of TCs which need technical background like
production, technical change (minor and major) and linkage. Vice versa, non-technical
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knowledge suitable for investment and marketing can be learnt through mechanisms like
off-the-job training.
However, this factor seems specific to contexts like Vietnam where prior
accumulation tends to be weaker in non-technical than in technical subjects. In a different
national context, this situation could be different and the same learning mechanism could
be useful for acquiring non-technical expertise as well. This suggests a second factor: the
availability (or not) of various learning mechanisms within the supporting infrastructure
(R&D, training and education, etc.). When production facilities became commonplace in
textile/garments, prior accumulation was more available to firms than was information
search. The off-the-job mode of training and foreign connections with CMEA countries
were also readily available for a long period. As a result, for the production capability in
textile/garment firms, the general pattern was to use these three mechanisms more than the
others.
It seems that the two above mentioned factors are more common in countries which
lack experience of doing business in a market economy, but which have well-established
systems of training and education as is the case in the former planned economies. It may
be fair to say these features of the learning-TC relationship are more contingent than
universal for all developing countries.
This situation suggests that the concrete value of differing learning mechanisms
depend upon the environmental conditions surrounding an industry and the types of firm
concerned. Once again, the pre-conditions imposed by the external environment influence
which learning mechanisms assume importance. This issue is examined further in Chapter
8.
The analytical way presented above is relied on Table 7.13 and 7.14, which
aggregate firms having TC, regardless they are strong or weak. To go further than this, the
division of firms into two groups with strong and weak (plus non-existence) TC can give
somewhat different focus on the rate of use and importance of learning mechanisms. For
example, Tables 7.15 (which is in fact an upgraded version of Table 7.2) provides the
picture of learning mechanisms in contributing to investment capability in two groups of
textile/garment firms: low level (non-existence and weak) and high level (strong). In this
Table, there can be observed two tendencies. First, the contribution of learning
mechanisms to TC in firms with high TC is much more than those in firms with low TC.
Average ratio of learning mechanisms in 'low' group is 2.9 per firm, while in 'high' group it
is 5.4. Second, in group of firms with 'high' TC level, these firms used nearly all learning
mechanisms in combination. By using Tables 7.1 to 7.3, 7.5, 7.7 to 7.9, and 7.11, similar
analysis can be done where there is a group of high level TC with ranking (2). The average
ratio of use of learning mechanisms per firm is presented below.
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No firm has strong marketing and major technical change capabilities and Tables
7.4, 7.6, 7.10 and 7.12 are not applicable. The results have shown that in accumulating
strong TC, the firms have to use at least more than three learning mechanisms on average.
For some TC, the average ratio of use could even reach higher. This issue has an important
implication as I will discuss again in 10.2.4.
Textile/garment Electronics
Low TC (0 and 1) High TC (2) Low TC (0 and 1) High TC (2)
Production 5 5.5 4.25 5.17
Investment 2.9 5.4 2.3 3.75
Minor change 2.7 4.4 2.25 4.2
Linkage 1.9 3.3 2.8 3.2
Another issue to be discussed is the rate at which the various learning mechanisms
are combined. As I emphasised in Sections 7.2.7 and 7.4.7, the learning-by-doing
mechanism is not sufficient for the acquisition of TCs and there is a need to combine it
with other mechanisms. The evidence suggests that the more learning mechanisms firms
deploy the more TCs they may acquire, and the stronger TCs are. In the case of
textile/garment firms, the tendency is to use more than one additional learning mechanism
beyond learning-by-doing, and more than two additional mechanisms in electronics firms.
In addition to this general tendency, when it comes to firms having strong TC, as seen
above, the numbers of additional learning mechanisms in use are much higher.
Still, we find some deviation from this general pattern. One example is in how
TG3 went about learning marketing (see Table 7.4). In addition to learning-by-doing, this
firm used off-the-job training and information sources, but it still does not possess a
marketing capability. The reason can be found by looking behind the ranking. At this
firm, off-the-job training was very simple and was only recently embarked upon by the
Institute of Economic Management and by the Hanoi Economic University. Teachers from
these organisations had themselves little experience of international marketing and could
only offer courses on the basis of curricula translated from foreign textbooks. Without
practical knowledge, these courses were too theoretical and too remote from real
experience. Information sources provided by MOLI were mostly oriented to the local
market. Consequently, the firm could not acquire enough knowledge of international
marketing. Similar examples of deviation can be seen in other cases. The whole
discussion here suggests that ranking the rate of use of various learning mechanisms is not
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in itself sufficient to explain why certain firms do not acquire their TCs. In order to
understand this, it is necessary to look at the particular conditions of each specific firm.
Moreover, a learning mechanism, set within the very particular context of any given firm,
may emerge as being more or less useful for that firm's TC accumulation. An examination
which concentrates on the firm and on its interaction with the operating environment, is
perhaps the appropriate way of examining why certain firms fail to acquire TCs, and this is
discussed in Chapters 8 and 10.
7.6.3 Cumulativeness and Dynamics of Learning
Sections 7.3 and 7.5 reveal that, over time, firms move from simple to more complicated
uses of learning mechanisms; from one source of learning to more diversified sources; and
from one to many types of knowledge. This step-by-step movement reveals a tendency for
firms to begin with technical knowledge in production and/or minor change, utilising
simple skills (like subcontracting) and usually deploying codified types of knowledge (in
courses given in schools and thus acquired by firms through prior accumulation). Then,
firms move on to acquiring non-technical knowledge (investment and marketing), utilising
more complicated skills (OEM, ODM) and, at the same time, deploying less codified
technical knowledge. In the next phase, codified knowledge can again reappear at a more
formal level in the form of training courses, programmes and workshops. This step-by-
step move provides clear evidence of the cumulativeness of learning; some things have to
be learnt before others can be learnt. This particular trend is rather similar to a common
pattern found by Hobday (1994) in East and South-east Asian latecomer firms, whereby
they move gradually along the path of learning. Hence, we may suggest that this pattern is
more or less universal for most developing countries. I will discuss this pattern again in
Section 10.3.2. However, there may be some exceptions (as with the computer firms E3
and E4) where - given their specific conditions - expertise in the several technological
areas of minor change, marketing and production may be acquired almost simultaneously,
and almost from the outset.
With respect to cumulativeness of learning, the question presents itself as to what
kind of knowledge must precede what. The experience revealed by this study points to the
most simple prior expertise: to use technology for producing a product. Expertise of how
to improve the technology (both product and process) by changing it comes later. Without
first learning to handle technology and master it, firms tend not to progress to the more
difficult task of changing and improving it. In the case of Vietnamese companies, the
evidence suggests that they are still far from the high ground of innovating in technology.
However, one firm (TG4) which is moving in this direction is doing so on the basis of an
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established and relatively strong capability in handling minor change. It seems that the
sequence of TC accumulation (starting from production capability) is caused by this need
for learning more simple knowledge first. This pattern may be quite universal for firms in
developing countries.
Another issue in the cumulativeness of learning is the order of using learning
mechanisms. Certainly, there are no clear-cut universal patterns, but Figures 7.1 and 7.2
indicate a general trend towards using prior accumulation and learning-by-doing as the first
steps (between 1946 and 1975). In this period, almost no on-the-job training or
information collection occurred. Off-the-job training was only evident in textile/garment
firms. Before 1986, in addition to learning-by-doing and prior accumulation, more training
and information sources came to be used by the firms. In the reform period, all learning
mechanisms were used.
Concerning the use of foreign connections, this mechanism was invoked during
1946-1975 and has continued to be used throughout all subsequent periods. It is also
cumulative in terms of advancing in learning complexity. In format, it moved from simple
subcontracting to more sophisticated OEM and ODM modes. As for sources, with the
prior accumulated knowledge of the technologies acquired from China, the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, textile/garment firms are now able to learn about the more
sophisticated technologies of Japan and Germany. Similarly, without any prior
accumulation, the private firms TG8 or TG9 tend to be weaker than the SOEs in using and
mastering modern technology and they rely more heavily on their foreign partners. Among
electronics firms, the assembly of industrial robotics hands in E2 was an obvious outcome
of previously mastered technology in TV assembly and in other more simple products. In
the case of E8, it is moving towards producing complicated products on the basis of its
experience of simple printed circuit board production.
Among factors mentioned in interview, some are the outcome of the specific
historical context of Vietnam as a planned economy such as the availability (or not) of
learning mechanisms, and their usefulness (or not) for various TCs given the weakness in
non-technical learning and, thus, the technical bias surrounding TC acquisition. These
factors are more common among former planned economies than in developing economies
as a whole.
At the same time, features like the sequence of TC acquisition and the upward
progress in the complexity of what can be learnt are more universal for developing
countries. I will come back to these issues when discussing Vietnam's features as a
transitional and developing economy in Chapter 10.
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7.6.4 Comparison: Textile/Garment and Electronics Firms
There are may similarities between the two industries in the pattern of use of learning
mechanisms: the necessity for learning-by-doing; the need to support it with other learning
mechanisms; and their combination, are all present. Also, the particular strengths and
weaknesses of each learning mechanism (see Section 7.6.1) are rather similar for both
sectors. For example, the technical orientation of mechanisms such as information sources
and training (both on-the-job and off-the-job) are evident in both sectors. The overall order
of importance puts learning-by-doing and prior accumulation at the top, followed by
foreign connections and others mechanisms. Both sectors have used most of their learning
mechanisms for building production capability, followed by minor technical change and
linkage. Similar combinations can be seen in both sectors for creating four capabilities:
investment, production, linkage and major change.
Next to these similarities, there are some differences. The first is in the
combination of mechanisms for minor change, marketing and linkage capabilities. For
minor change capability, while textile/garment firms use prior accumulation, on-the-job
training and information search, electronics firms mainly use prior accumulation, foreign
connections and off-the-job training. The more active use of foreign connections for minor
change by consumer electronics firms such as El, E2, E10, El 1 (see Table 7.9) provides
the exception to the general pattern whereby foreign connections were not deemed helpful
for learning technical change. Interviewees reported that the reason behind this divergence
is the ability of managers at these firms to build up very close contacts with their foreign
suppliers, to learn by hearsay from different partners and to recombine them into more
systematic forms of knowledge (E10, or see E2 in Section 10.4). In the case of El 1, the
firm even informed its Japanese partners of intended technical changes, first discussing
proposed improvements with them and only then implementing adaptations. This factor
indicates the crucial importance of managers' ability to create this exceptional relationship
so as to more effectively utilise foreign connections.
In marketing capability, textile/garment firms use more off-the-job training than do
electronics firms. Instead, the latter use more foreign connections and information sources.
Again, this difference can only be explained by looking through the case material. The
personal relations of managers with their foreign partners at the four electronics firms
helped them to work closely with them, learning from them some marketing know-how -
as illustrated by the relations of E4's director with his French partner. In El 1, JVC even
sent an expert to the firm to assist with organising local marketing activity. Usually, this
kind of relationship is not often seen in textile/garment firms. One of likely reasons for
this difference lies in the background of firms' managers. Managers of electronics firms
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usually come from a research and academic background and are mostly educated abroad.
They have stronger connections with information sources and foreign institutions than do
their colleagues in textile/garment firms. It seems that if textile/garment firms want to
utilise their foreign contacts as effectively as do the electronics firms, they might have to
devise suitable strategies or techniques for building closer relations with foreign partners.
The lack of off-the-job training for marketing capability in electronics firms can be
explained by the fact that R&D, training and education institutions could not offer
marketing courses suitable for the more knowledge-intensive sector of electronics as
compared with the textile/garment sector. This weakness leads to the low rate of use of the
off-the-job mechanism for other TCs as well.
7.6.5 Comparison: State and Private Ownership
The difference in ownership of the firms is particularly strong among textile/garment
companies. Two private firms - TG8 and TG9 - share some features which differentiate
them from the SOEs. Lacking necessary connections with local authorities, these two
firms are keen to seek assistance in investment and production activities from foreign
contacts. Due to its limited resources, and without state support or connections with the
S&T system, TG8, as a small private company, cannot afford training courses to develop
technical change expertise. The firm does not engage in marketing activities and relies
heavily on its foreign partners. TG9, although bigger than TG8 and having more
resources, also has no close relations with domestic S&T organisations and is not able to
develop its linkage capability. These two nascent firms are trying to expand their activities
over a shorter period of time and with fewer opportunities and advantages than SOEs.
Besides investment and production, these two firms have less experience in technical
change and linkage. As for marketing in TG9, the role of its director is important: thanks
to his unique vision and decisive actions, the firm pursues very vigorous strategies to
develop marketing, using almost all learning mechanisms.
Unlike the private firms TG8 and TG9 in the textile/garment sector, electronics
companies E3 and E4 originated within S&T organisations and they enjoy very close
contacts with the supporting infrastructure unlike TG8 and TG9. Because of this
advantage, the difference between private firms and other SOEs in electronics is not as
marked as in the textile/garment industry. The same can be said for small private firm E8
which does not differ very much from other SOEs like E7 which are of the same size and
can tap into the same kinds of resources. Therefore, the main difference among electronics
firms is not between private and SOE firms, but between two sub-sectors: the consumer
electronics and computer firms, which I examine below.
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7.6.6 Comparison: Consumer Electronics and Computing
The four computer firms - E4, E3, E5 and E9 - differ from the consumer electronics firms
in how they use learning mechanisms. Most of them were set up by scientists or enjoy
close relations with scientists. Managers of these firms are dynamic and have a long-term
vision for developing their competence (except for E9 which is less active). The prior
accumulation mechanism in E3, E4 and E5 has been useful in acquiring minor change and
marketing capabilities. These three firms have been only recently established, and so must
upgrade their capabilities very quickly as compared to the SOEs. Thus, the starting
conditions and backgrounds of these firms make them different from other consumer
electronics firms which share a more typical background.
To sum up the overall comparison, the main factors shaping the different patterns
of using learning mechanisms to accumulate TC are the origin of the firms (i.e., their start¬
up conditions), and their managers' subsequent actions and strategies. Springing from the
S&T system, the computer firms became unique in the electronics industry as technical
change-driven firms. In the meantime, a lack of any close relationship with the S&T
system has left the two private firms - TG8 and TG9 - without the training mechanisms and
information sources necessary to develop technical change capabilities. Actually, because
the majority of consumer electronics firms are SOEs, they share many features with the
SOEs in the textile/garment sector, including early state support and a more relaxed
attitude towards doing business.
7.7 Conclusion
In order to answer the second research question on how firms accumulate their TCs (i.e.,
by means of which learning mechanisms) this chapter has presented the learning patterns
of firms in the two industries studied. The main findings confirm that learning-by-doing is
the most important mechanism for firms to accumulate TC, but in itself this is not
sufficient. It has to be supported by other mechanisms, with prior accumulation as the
most significant of these. The chapter also reports on the dynamics of the learning process
within these firms: moving from simple formats and sources of learning to more
complicated arrangements, and from one type of TC (mainly production) to other TCs over
time. The findings also reveal that certain combinations of learning mechanism are used
for acquiring particular TCs.
There are emerging trends which show that some learning mechanisms appear to
support the acquisition of some TCs over others. Between the two sectors, electronics
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firms seem to have more science-based learning activities than textile/garment firms. Also,
differences exist in terms of ownership, sectors and sub-sectors.
Still, the general question of why certain patterns exist in the learning and
accumulation of TC - and of whether such patterns are universal or contingent - demands
further research. It looks as if some of these features are quite universal to many
developing countries (e.g., the sequential and cumulative features of learning, and the
general weakness of the R&D system). Others, however, may only be characteristic of
former planned economies which are now in transition (e.g., the lack of marketing
awareness and competence, and the bias towards technical learning), or may even be
specific to Vietnam. Further, questions such as which external factors have the greater
impact on the learning process, and why, remain to be answered. The learning patterns
revealed by this study can be explained better by looking at the impact of factors like the
influence of the whole external business environment, including state policies, the
efficiency of the S&T supporting infrastructure and market changes. Some of the
deviations from the general pattern can only be explained by closely examining those
issues which are most relevant to any given specific firm. Only in-depth analysis of firms
can help us understand what actually happens within them and why. In the next two
chapters, I will continue to address these issues. The question of external environmental
factors is addressed in Chapter 8. In the case studies presented in Chapter 9,1 will examine
in greater detail the process of learning and TC accumulation in a few firms with respect to
the interaction ofmacro factors with firm-level strategies and actions.
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Table 7.1 Learning mode for production capability in textile/garment firms
Firms TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-t-job Foreign Information
acc. train. train. connection document.
TGI 2 + + + + + +
TG2 1 + + + + + +
TG3 2 + + + + + +
TG4 2 + + + + + +
TG5 2 + + + + + 0
TG6 2 + + + + + 0
TG7 2 + + 0 0 + +
TG8 1 + + + 0 + 0
TG9 2 + + + + + +
TG10 2 + + + + + +
TG12 2 + + + + + +
TG13 1 + + + + + 0
TG14 2 + + + + + 0
TG15 1 + + + + + 0
+: use of learning measure for TC accumulation
0: this learning measure has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
Table 7.2 Learning mode for investment capability in textile/garment firms
Firms TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the-job Foreign Information
acc. train. train. connection document.
TGI No + 0 0 0 0 0
TG2 2 + + + + + +
TG3 1 + + + + + 0
TG4 1 + + + + 0 0
TG5 2 + + + + + 0
TG6 2 + + + + + +
TG7 No + 0 0 0 0 0
TG8 1 + + 0 0 + +
TG9 2 + + + + + 0
TG10 1 + + 0 + + 0
TG12 No 0 0 0 0 + 0
TG13 No + 0 0 0 0 +
TG14 2 + + + + + 0
TG15 1 + 0 0 + + +
+: use of learning measure for TC accumulation
0: this learning measure has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
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Table 7.3 Learning mode for minor technical change capability in
textile/garment firms
Firms TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the-job Foreign Information
acc. train. train. connection document.
TGI 2 + + + + + 0
TG2 2 + + + + 0 +
TG3 2 + + + + 0 0
TG4 2 + + + 0 0 +
TG5 No + + 0 0 0 0
TG6 1 + + + 0 0 0
TG7 1 + + 0 0 + +
TG8 No + 0 0 0 0 0
TG9 1 + + 0 0 0 +
TG10 1 + + 0 + 0 0
TG12 2 + + + + 0 0
TG13 2 + + + + 0 +
TG14 2 + + 0 0 + +
TGI 5 1 + + 0 0 0 +
+: use of learning measure for TC accumulation
0: this learning measure has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
Table 7.4 Learning mode for marketing capability in textile/garment firms
Firms TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the-job Foreign Information
acc. train. train. connection document.
TGI No + 0 0 0 0 0
TG2 No 0 0 0 0 0 +
TG3 No + 0 0 + 0 +
TG4 No + + 0 0 0 0
TG5 1 + 0 0 + + +
TG6 No 0 0 0 + 0 0
TG7 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG8 No 0 + 0 0 0 0
TG9 1 + + + + + 0
TG10 No + 0 + 0 0 0
TG12 No 0 0 0 + 0 0
TG13 No 0 0 0 0 0 +
TG14 No + + 0 + 0 0
TG15 No 0 0 0 0 0 +
+: use of learning measure for TC accumulation
0: this learning measure has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
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Table 7.5 Learning mode for linkage capability in textile/garment firms
Firms TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the-job Foreign Informatii
acc. train. train. connection documenl
TGI No 0 + 0 0 + 0
TG2 2 + + 0 0 + +
TG3 2 + + 0 0 0 +
TG4 1 + + 0 0 0 0
TG5 1 + + + + 0 0
TG6 1 + + 0 0 0 0
TG7 No + 0 0 0 0 0
TG8 1 + + 0 0 0 0
TG9 No + 0 0 0 0 0
TG10 2 + + + 0 + 0
TG12 2 + + 0 0 0 +
TG13 2 + 0 + + 0 0
TG14 2 + + 0 0 0 +
TG15 No + 0 0 0 0 0
+: use of learning measure for TC accumulation
0: this learning measure has not been used by the firms
l:weak TC; 2: strong TC
Table 7.6 Learning mode for major technical change capability in
textile/garment firms
Firms TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the-job Foreign Informati
acc. train. train. connection documenl
TGI No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG2 No 0 0 0 0 0 +
TG3 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG4 1 + + 0 0 0 +
TG5 No 0 0 0 0 + 0
TG6 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG7 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG8 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG9 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG10 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG12 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG13 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG14 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
TG15 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
+: use of learning measure for TC accumulation
0: this learning measure has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
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Table 7.7 Learning mode for production capability in electronic firms
Firm TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-t-job Foreign In
acc. train. tr. connection dc
El 2 + + + + + +
E2 2 + + + + + +
E3 No 0 0 0 0 + 0
E4 2 + + 0 + + 0
E5 2 + + + 0 + +
E7 1 + + + + + +
E8 1 + + + 0 0 +
E9 1 + + + + + +
E10 2 + + + + + 0
Ell 2 + + + + + 0
+: use of learning mechanism for TC accumulation
0: this learning mechanism has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
Table 7.8 Learning mode for investment capability in electronic firms








El No + 0 0 + 0 +
E2 2 + + 0 + + 0
E3 1 + + 0 0 + 0
E4 No + + 0 + 0 0
E5 No 0 0 0 0 + +
E7 No + 0 0 0 0 +
E8 No + 0 0 0 0 +
E9 No + 0 0 + 0 0
E10 2 + + 0 + + 0
Ell 2 + + 0 + + 0
+: use of learning mechanism for TC accumulation
0: this learning mechanism has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
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Table 7.9 Learning mode for minor technical change capability in electronic
firms
Firm TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the: Foreign Information
acc. train. job tr. connection document
El 2 + + + + + 0
E2 2 + + 0 + + 0
E3 2 + + 0 0 0 +
E4 2 + + 0 + 0 0
E5 No 0 + 0 0 0 +
E7 1 + + + 0 0 +
E8 No + 0 0 0 0 0
E9 No 0 + 0 0 + 0
E10 2 + + + 0 + +
Ell 2 + + + + + 0
+: use of learning mechanism for TC accumulation
0: this learning mechanism has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
Table 7.10 Learning mode for marketing capability in electronic firms
Firm TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the Foreign Information
ace. train. job tr. connection document
El No + 0 + 0 0 +
E2 No + 0 0 0 + 0
E3 1 + + 0 0 + +
E4 1 + + 0 0 + +
E5 1 + + + 0 0 +
E7 No + 0 0 + 0 0
E8 No + 0 0 0 0 0
E9 No + 0 0 + 0 +
E10 No + 0 0 + 0 0
Ell No + 0 0 0 + 0
+: use of learning mechanism for TC accumulation
0: this learning mechanism has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
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Table 7.11 Learning mode for linkage capability in electronic firms
Firm TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the Foreign Information
acc. train. job tr. connection document
El No + + 0 0 0 0
E2 2 + + 0 0 + +
E3 2 + + 0 0 0 +
E4 2 + + 0 0 + 0
E5 1 + + 0 0 + 0
E7 1 + + 0 0 0 +
E8 No + + 0 0 0 0
E9 1 + + 0 0 + +
E10 2 + + 0 0 + 0
Ell 2 + + 0 0 + 0
+: use of learning mechanism for TC accumulation
0: this learning mechanism has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
Table 7.12 Learning mode for major change capability in electronic firms
Firm TC By-doing Prior On-t-job Off-the Foreign Information
acc. train. job tr. connection document
El No 0 0 0 0 0 0
E2 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
E3 No + 0 0 0 0 +
E4 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
E5 No 0 + 0 0 0 +
E7 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
E8 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
E9 No 0 0 0 0 0 0
E10 No + 0 0 0 0 0
Ell No 0 0 0 0 0 0
+: use of learning mechanism for TC accumulation
0: this learning mechanism has not been used by the firms
1: weak TC; 2: strong TC
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Table 7.13 Contribution of learning mechanisms to TC in textile/garment firms
Invest. Prod. Minor Marketing Link. Major
change chang.
Cases have 10 14 12 2 10 1
TC
By-doing 10 14 12 2 10 1
Prior accum. 9 14 12 1 9 1
experiences
On-the-job 7 13 7 1 3 0
training
Off-the-job 9 12 6 2 2 0
training
Foreign 9 14 3 2 2 0
contacts
Inform. 4 7 7 1 4 1
consult.
Table 7.14 Contribution of learning mechanisms for TC in electronic firms.
Invest. Prod. Minor Marketing Link. Major
change chang.
Cases have 4 9 7 3 8 0
TC
By-doing 4 9 7 3 8 2
Prior accum. 4 9 7 3 8 1
expereince
On-the-job 0 8 4 1 0 0
training
Off-the-job 3 7 4 0 0 0
training
Foreign 4 8 4 2 6 0
contacts
Inform. 0 6 3 3 4 2
consult.
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Figure 7.1 Dynamics of learning in textile/garment firms
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Figure 7.2 Dynamics of learning in electronics firms






















































































































































































































































EXTERNAL FACTORS AND LEARNING ACTIVITIES
8.1 Introduction
In the last two chapters, I examined the firms' patterns in building their TCs and in using
different learning mechanisms to accumulate them. Some specific patterns and tendencies
were identified, but not all of them can be understood without looking at the context within
which the firms operate and at their particular strategic responses. The theoretical questions
of macro-micro links are crucial for examining TC and the learning process. The overall aim
of this chapter is to understand why the firms in the study have the particular dynamics that
they do in their patterns of TC accumulation and of learning. The chapter addresses this
question by looking at the influence of factors external to the firms in their activities, their
interactive behaviours (or responses) to these factors, and how all these factors influence
learning and TC acquisition.
Further insight into firm-level strategic behaviour will be provided by the case studies
in Chapter 9. Following the discussion in Section 4.3, external factors are divided into four
main groups:
• macro-economic policies of the government: financial and taxation policies; monetary,
banking and investment policies; policy of labour and management; and trade policy.
• marketfactors: both domestic and international.
• supporting infrastructure: R&D, education and training; activities of other organisations
which have a bearing on factors such as information, documentation, consultancy,
standardisation, quality control, industrial property rights, etc.
• other social and culturalfactors.
The chapter begins by looking at the influence of external factors on firms' business
activities in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 examines responses of the firms to these factors.
Section 8.4 addresses the impact of these two-way interactions on TC acquisition and
learning activities within the firms. In the last section (8.5), the chapter discusses some
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emerging trends of external factors' influences on the firms' activities, and the interaction of
firms' strategies with these influences. The four groups of factors will be the main influential
categories to exercise impact on the business and learning efforts of firms. At the same time,
the transition from a planning to a market economy system is the most significant feature of
Vietnam, which in turn, has decisive influences on all four groups of factors. Therefore,
these influences will be examined more closely, in terms of both positive and to a larger
extent, negative aspect.
8.2 Influences of External Factors on Firms' Business Activities
The ranking of influences of external factors on firms' business activities is given in Table
8.1: most of the firms indicated that macroeconomic policies and the supporting system were
the most influential factors. In the interviews, firms' managers tended to argue more about
the problems they faced rather than overall influences, whether positive or negative.
Therefore, in addition to these arguments, I also try to interpret the positive influences of
external factors on learning and TC accumulation, although to a lesser extent than the
chapter's concern with negative influences.
8.2.1 Macro-Economic Policies
Thirteen (out of the 14) textile/garment and all the electronics companies reported that they
have problems with macro-economic policy factors, divided into four main themes as
follows:
Financial and Taxation Policy
Financial difficulties pose the most severe constraints on companies. They have to pay too
many different taxes for one complete product life cycle (e.g., import duty for imported
material, turnover tax, commercial tax, income tax, etc.) which results in a higher cost of
production. This phenomenon of 'tax after tax' when applied to electronics companies
means import tax for parts and components, followed by turnover tax and then income tax.
As noted by Nguyen Ngoc Ngoan (1992), in order to produce a TV set, a company has to
pay out 40.9% of their total profit in the form of taxes. Typically, the total cost of producing
an electronics unit from within Vietnam is higher than the cost of importing the whole unit.
Some firms, like E5, reported that taxes levied on production can be as high as 8% of total
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turnover, while tax on imports is only about 2%.! This practice is a strong disincentive for
firms to attempt more complicated technological manufacture, and has led them to
concentrate on simple - but more profitable - trading activities. E4 and E5 reported that they
are not motivated to try to do new things and cannot afford to accumulate technological
experiences by experimenting, because they risk higher financial losses.
Another aspect of financial policy is inequality of tax rates across firms under
different forms of ownership, noted by E2 which argued that foreign-owned enterprises
enjoy greater tax incentives than local firms to produce the same product for the same
market. Restrictive regulations on the financial budgeting of SOEs also make it difficult for
them to do business. As for private companies such as E3, E4 or E8, financial policies
discriminate against the private sector (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2.2), and discourage them
from using their own resources as freely as they would like.
Monetary/Banking and Investment Policies
With the long time lag involved in producing for export and its cumbersome procedures,
many companies have to borrow from banks to pay their taxes on the expectation of getting
their money back later. Due to the high lending rate of the banks, companies see their money
being eaten away by tax and interest payments. This, in turn, reduces the revenues available
for investing in various other activities, including technological development.
Companies in the textile/garment industry argue that the lending rates of bank are too
high for them and that they cannot bear the high cost of banking services (interview with
S&T department, MOLI). Despite the reforms (see Appendix 5.11.4), banks still treat
customers differentially within the various sectors, giving priority to unprofitable state-
owned companies. Most privately owned firms have to turn to informal means of raising
working capital such as borrowing from friends, family or collective financial groups. One
study revealed that only 8% of private business in Hanoi and 18% in HoChiMinh City are
able to get credit from their banks (Hiebert, 1993). TG8 pointed out that banks discriminate
against private companies by imposing more complicated procedures for raising credit, and
imposing higher interest rates, etc. Electronics firm E8 also experienced a similar problem.
As a joint-venture, TG7 has not been allowed to open accounts with foreign banks in
Vietnam, while the functions offered by Vietnamese banks are very slow and ineffective.
TG4 and TGI3 see government investment policy as being fragmented and lacking a
long term vision. As SOEs, they depend on the state for planning their long-term expansion
in terms of material incentives, access to financial credit and other assistance. Because of this
1 Since February 1994, taxes on assembly have been reduced and taxes on imports have been increased by up
to 5%. Still, this is not enough for companies to recover the expenses of production.
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weakness, they do not have a clear enough orientation towards planning future investment.
Long-term development policies in the electronics sector are even less elaborated than in
textiles (see 5.3.6). The electronics SOEs - El, E2, E7, E9, E10 and El 1 - all felt that the
state did not have clear enough idea how to develop the electronics sector. Because of the
lack of guidance and support from the state, companies have to fight for survival by
themselves, each in their own way depending on their particular circumstances, and they lack
the basis for designing long-term business strategies. Besides the incentive provided by the
state, another factor which explains why SOEs tend to look to the state for their long-term
planning is their inability to think strategically and to operate independently in a new market
context.2
Labour and other EconomicManagement Regulations
Management practices still differ between SOEs and private firms, both local and foreign.
These differences create a very unstable and unequal business environment for firms.
Generally speaking, SOEs have the most favourable conditions for getting funding, sourcing
information and forging connections for doing business. As E3 stressed, the preference
given to SOEs continues to reproduce unequal competitive conditions for private enterprise.
This strongly discourages many private firms from doing business since it reduces their
credibility in creating co-operative ventures with foreign companies (see Section 5.2.2 and
Appendix 5.11.3). In contrast, for SOEs, state ownership poses another kind of problem.
E2 argued that state ownership encourages passivity and an unwillingness of employees in
those companies to work harder or to be innovative, adding to the firms' general inertia and
lack of long-term strategic thinking.
Also, the limits on the freedom of SOEs prevents them from implementing flexible
recruitment policies, and wage regulations cause them difficulties when they need to change
staff. For E2, labour policy is not consistent between different management bodies such as
Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the trade union. This inconsistency creates
confusion within the company's recruitment activities, particularly with respect to graduate
recruitment. In the case of E9, rigid wage and salary structures together with low material
incentives (which are less flexible and attractive than those of private companies, for
instance) have caused a brain drain from the firm.
Trade Management Policy
2Interestingly, many compared their situation as being like chickens who are used to being fed in industrial
farms and who are then made free-range and expected to find their own food. This is called "industrial
chicken" syndrome in Vietnam.
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The majority of firms criticised the absence of a coherent and consistent trade policy
(including quota allocation), especially for foreign trade. For them, the government does
not, as yet, have a clear policy to protect domestic production or to promote exports.
Customs regulations are unstable and usually cause confusion for the firms. Smuggling is a
serious problem and it badly affects the performance of companies (5.2.6). So far, the
government has not devised sufficiently effective measures to protect the domestic market
from smuggling. For those companies which rely on the domestic market to supplement
their exports, all of their efforts are seriously hampered by (untaxed) smuggled trade.3 This
undermines companies' motivation to produce and to engage in technical experiments. As
E10 mentioned, "we sometimes feel hopeless about improving our technological
competence, because of the mass of cheap products which of sufficiently good quality
coming from outside to beat our products". This comment provides evidence for the
argument that the state still lacks the means to intervene selectively (and so to protect)
domestic industries, which I discuss later in Section 10.4.4.
8.2.2 Market Factors
Market factors are critical in the transition to a market economy. All in all, eight
textile/garment and seven electronics companies complained about market factors. As
mentioned in Section 5.2.6, problems of the pre-reform period - such as low market
expectations about the quality or range of products - are serious. Companies, as argued by
TG3, TG10 and TG12, are not motivated to upgrade their product quality or design. A
comfortable attitude to low product quality, an orientation to just one market (CMEA), and a
state monopoly on foreign trade had rendered marketing, and the need to provide incentives,
unnecessary. The reform period post-1986 marked a turning point in both the attitudes and
actions of companies. They can no longer rely on the state and so must take care of
everything themselves. The changes in this period are working to generate a market-pull for
technological innovation in SOEs, whereby they face increasing competition.
Thanks to the emergence of a domestic market and the diversification of a multi-
sectoral economy, companies increasingly exploit new sales opportunities. The
textile/garment SOEs (TGI, TG2, TG10 and TGI4) see strong competition coming from the
private sector and from other countries. Consumer electronics firms, like El, argue that the
domestic market is still rather weak and fragmented. Most consumers are country-dwellers
and can only afford to buy products at the low-end of the range, like black-and-white TV
3The retail price of fabrics produced locally turn out to be higher (due to old equipment, lower productivity,
many taxes) than the retail price of smuggled products. Domestic production is unable to compete with
foreign made products, whether imported officially or smuggled from neighbouring countries like Thailand.
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sets. While few can buy colour TVs or VCRs, the number of city-dwellers customers, who
potentially have more to spend, is increasing. A disorganised and very fragmented market
also makes it difficult for computer companies to forecast future business trends.
The collapse of the CMEA makes future relations between Vietnamese companies
and this foreign market uncertain. In general, the need to augment product quality, to
diversify the range and design of products, and to find new delivery mechanisms for
products and related services increases the pressure on companies. But, changing
orientation to meet the conditions of market economies is not simple.4 Textile and clothing
firms like TGI, TG3, TG4, TG5, TG10 and TG12 have been particularly affected by market
factors (see 5.2.6).
Computer firms like E3, E4 and E5 did enjoy some initial export success at the end
of the 1980s, but then they suddenly lost the market of the former Soviet Union after 1990.
According to them, the heavily-protected markets of other countries and the fast-changing
life-cycle of computer products contribute to a very difficult situation for firms who are
trying to enter Western markets. In the meantime, continuing to do business in the old
market of the CMEA means dealing with new competition from other countries, and with a
very uncertain payment capability of buyers.
8.2.3 Industrial Supporting Infrastructure
The number of cases that mentioned factors related to industrial infrastructure are second to
policies factors (12 out of total 14 textile/garment and nine out of 10 electronics firms).
Training and Education System
Training institutions for workers are very weak, especially for the garment industry (see
Sections 5.2.5 and 5.3.5). TGI, TG4, TG9 and TG14 all complained that although the
training system worked rather effectively prior to the transition to a market economy,
companies now have to rely on their own efforts; certain advantages of the socialist
construction period, like free education and training, are no longer available to them (see
Appendix 5.13). This factor seriously affects the supply of workers possessing a secondary
education and other relevant skills.
The higher education system contributes more to firms' activities than vocational
training does but training programmes are still very theoretical and fail to ensure that students
learn practical knowledge, especially in areas like business administration, marketing and
4Lack of quotas for EU markets, high pressure from non-quota markets (like Japan on subcontract prices),
and very severe and rather chaotic competition in the domestic market (without co-ordination by the state) are
just some of the problems.
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economics. TG2, TG4, TG14, TG10 and TG12 and almost all electronics firms (nine out of
10 cases) highlighted this as a serious problem, e.g. the dearth of potential recruits with
garment and design engineer degrees.
R&D Institutes
The weakness of R&D institutions, discussed in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.3.5, is reported by the
firms. Neither their physical facilities nor their research activities are sufficient to provide
firms with the services they need. Many firms cannot benefit from the help of R&D
organisations. For example, according to TG4, the branch of the Textile Research Institute
(ofMOLI) in HoChiMinh City has very weak capabilities, is short of research funding, and
its projects are remote from the needs of industry. Consequently, the only support that the
company gets from its laboratories is some simple testing. Before the reforms, contacts
amongst industry, R&D institutes and universities were weak; direct company-company, and
company-institution linkages were not allowed formally. Thus, de facto problem-solving led
to the creation of informal networks between and amongst companies and R&D institutions.
Through these informal networks, companies can still rely on domestic R&D sites to sort out
problems acceptably well at a reasonable cost.
Physical Infrastructure
Due to poor electricity provision in the South, many companies in both sectors in
HoChiMinh City must limit their operations to certain days of the week. The prevailing state
of other physical facilities, like telecommunications, also cause problems for firms when
collecting necessary information or obtaining consultancy services. The weaknesses of other
industrial support organisations were mentioned by the companies, for dealing with affairs
such as information-documentation, industrial property rights, standardisation, quality
control, consulting bodies, and professional associations. In the experience of El, the
National Office of Invention (now the Department of Industrial Property Rights), the
National Centre for S&T Information and Documentation (NACESTID) and the library
system do little to provide the firm with information. Poorly-developed standardisation of
both PC applications and software developments is most obviously a hindrance for high-tech
electronics activities, particularly for computer companies E4 and E5. Computer companies
see this lack of standardisation as inviting chaotic development standards in computing.5
In the textile sub-sector, the lack of a domestic source of raw materials (like cotton
and chemical spare parts), and the obsolescence of their technologies, pose serious
5Among the more than 5,000 sets of computers in use in 1990, there were about 1,000 different types and
sources of supply. Although they are compatible they are not standardised (VAI, 1990: 6).
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problems. In garments, the lack of provision from domestic sources (the weaving industry)
of high quality fabrics hinders companies' efforts to be more independent and active in
business planning and expansion (5.2.6). TG10 sees the domestic shortage of high-quality
fabrics and of other parts (zippers, buttons, colouring) as a serious hindrance to its ability to
export garments. Similarly, the electronics industry depends heavily on the development of
other related industries (such as mechanical engineering, plastics, and the chemical industry)
none of which are well advanced.
Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
TG4, TG8 and TG9 pointed out that the weak and non-transparent legal system has a very
serious impact on their ability to protect their industrial property rights, and to settle labour
and business disputes. The underdeveloped system of industrial property rights is also
critical for electronics companies El, E3, E5 and E10, in terms of enforcement regulations.
The more actively the firms try to learn sophisticated technological activities (like software
design in E3 and E5), the more problems they encounter with property rights issues related
to their own or foreign products.
8.2.4 Summary of external factors' influence on business of firms
As Table 8.1 shows, macro-economic policies and failings in the supporting infrastructure
present the most serious problems for companies in doing their business. Although they
tend to complain about the difficulties they have to face they all agreed that they enjoy certain
advantages from the external environment. The existence and functions of the R&D,
education and training facilities (despite their problems) are among the most noteworthy
positive factors affecting firms in their evolution throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
Although the firms complained less about market factors than about other groups of
factors, in my opinion, market factors are critical to the firms' continued activities. The
fundamental shift of Vietnam's economy and society from being centrally planned to being
driven by market forces, and its new orientation to the wider international market as opposed
to its old reliance on CMEA, marks a turning point in Vietnam's industrial history. Although
companies face more competition in domestic markets, or experience great difficulty in
entering export markets, the overall benefits which accrue from adopting a market economy
are enormous in terms of new technology supplies, sales opportunities and business
contacts. As a result, the companies see this market change as having a positive rather than a
negative impact, and so offer little criticism of market factors. Indeed, in my view, market
changes have quite positive influences on general business and learning activities as will be
seen later in Section 8.4.2.
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The influences of socio-cultural factors are not very distinctly visible. These
influences and the firms' responses are discussed in section 8.3.4
8.3 The Firms' Strategies in Response to External Factors
The previous section outlined the influence of external factors on the business activities of
the firms, focusing on the transition from the pre-reform to the reform period. Here I
present information about the general business strategies which have developed in response
to the above mentioned external factors.
8.3.1 Responses to Policy Factors
Among 13 cases having problems with government policies, only nine said they had found
some way of dealing with these problems. TG5 and TG7 have not yet found effective
measures for tackling banking and labour problems. According to TG9 and TG14, solving
the difficulties of foreign trade management procedures and customs regulations, (these are
obstacles to learning and to using the foreign connection mechanism), must remain a
government responsibility.
Textile/garment companies have responded in several ways. Nearly all firms have
diversified their business in order to secure more sources of income, and to use these
additional financial resources to overcome the problems caused by financial constraints and
monetary/banking policies. This diversification is reflected in their ways of doing business,
and in types of product they make. In particular, many companies have expanded their
traditional production to include new products: moving from textiles to garments, or vice
versa. TG8 and TG9 have even diversified their activities beyond their existing production
field of textile and garment, moving to other more profitable businesses such as
construction, tourism, property development, and seafood products to capitalise on the
greater income-generating capacity of these businesses.
In order to be more successful after diversifying, some companies have chosen to
produce sophisticated and higher value-added products which leads to intensive
specialisation. For example, TG4 has invested a lot of money (from the limited financial
resources available to them) to develop new garment products using new kinds of fabric,
i.e., microfibre.
Electronics companies have also been diversifying their businesses. As a state
company assigned to work on calculators and computers, E9 has tried to do business in
consumer electronics (assembling TVs) to generate new revenues and become more
independent in planning future investment. Due to restrictive regulations on joint ventures,
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E5 cannot diversify into other non-computer businesses but can still diversify by providing a
greater variety of computer services, i.e., packaged software and mainframe networking.
By serving diversified customers, the company can accumulate financial and technological
resources. To overcome financial and monetary difficulties and secure more business, firms
E3, E4, E7 and El have tried to get involved in activities other than electronics.
To react to difficulties caused by labour and other management policies, the
electronics firms have tried to avoid rigid salary structures or restrictive regulations by using
more flexible modes of labour management such as exchanging personnel and information
without paying fees in a kind of barter agreement.
8.3.2 Responses to Market Factors
The disorganised domestic market and the weakly developed labour market pose substantial
problems for many companies. Increasingly, they are side-stepping the problems of
economic isolation by market diversification and by seeking out foreign partners across a
wide range of businesses. Concerning export activity, as a response to market problems,
many firms are pursuing the following gambits:
• seeking new markets in the industrialised countries of Europe, Canada and Asia-Pacific
by increasing quality and improving design and other product criteria.
• maintaining established business in the former Soviet Union and East European markets,
while changing their way of doing business there.
Going in this direction also, garment companies are adopting some different
approaches, one of which is to avoid quota markets and enter non-quota ones such as Japan.
This is reducing the difficulties of meeting cumbersome foreign trade regulations and also
avoids the industrial heritage caused by export embargo to the US market. However, the
non-quota market demands very high product quality which, in turn, poses new challenges.
A few textile/garment companies have clear and explicit strategies for investigating
niche markets. For example, TG10 targeted the Japanese market with two kinds of product:
low-end products like cotton underwear and high-end products like hand-made woollen
coats. By identifying and satisfying niche markets, companies can get a better deal from
their new foreign sales. Electronics companies are also adopting a niche approach by trying
to identify those activities that are under-exploited by others or that still offer opportunities
for further economic exploitation. Electronics companies (El, E2, E3, E4, E5, E10 and E9)
now engage in one or another kind of business specialisation. E5, for example, has
diversified to the more technically difficult area of PC networking, and has specialised in
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local area network (LAN) services for big customers like banks and oil companies, hoping to
dominate this market in the long run. E7 specialises in control equipment for industrial
manufacturing. Although this business is less profitable than consumer electronics, the firm
avoids competition and saturated markets due to the limited numbers of firms involved. E8,
a private firm, has also found its own niche: producing cheap audio products (e.g., loud
speakers) for poor rural customers. Relying on economies of scale in mass production, the
firm has also established for itself a certain stable market share in this niche.
Many companies started from simple subcontracting work (assembly) on behalf of
foreign partners in order to obtain production technology and marketing skills, and at the
same time to avoid the restrictions of the US embargo. El, E9 and E10, for example, started
from CKD and SKD assembling, and hope to go further with IKD products using foreign
inputs. Increasing supplier-buyer links with neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, and
offering more flexible sales conditions for customers in the former Soviet Union market (as
E3 has done), are some ways that companies are keeping old markets while entering new
ones.
8.3.3 Responses to Problems in the Supporting Infrastructure
To solve problems related to the shortage of training facilities and in order to rely more on
their own training, companies are now developing new forms of training and education.
These courses mainly provide the specific or new knowledge that official training
programmes of education institutions cannot or do not teach. Companies increasingly rely
on foreign partners or personal linkages with people working in universities, research
institutes or other companies to act as their teachers. Barter agreements for training courses
among companies (in TGI3, for instance) are also a common way to reduce the cost of
training. Increasing the recruitment of personnel with prior knowledge and experience is
another option. Companies also try to recruit engineers with more diversified competences
(possessing not only technical but also economic, management and foreign languages skills).
TG2, for example, requires new graduates to have two university degrees (engineering and
economics).
Private companies which survive the various anti-private actions of the state, adopt
different approaches. For them, the first concern is to get a company started. TG8 and TG9
are willing to depend on a foreign partner initially in order to get contracts, to produce and to
earn income from exports. This is why simple exporting subcontracting relations have been
preferred by private companies from their outset. Also, the lack of any support from the
state has made them more conscious and active in gathering knowledge by relying more on
their foreign partners. By doing so, they are able to redress the unequal situation of
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competing with SOEs for training facilities and access to the R&D system. TG9, for
example, instead of relying on state-owned training and R&D organisations, is using its
Hong Kong and German partners for providing staff with knowledge of investment activity.
Electronics companies also increasingly rely on foreign sources for their technology
and technological expertise. El co-operates with large Japanese and Korean firms. E10 and
Ell also rely more on foreign firms, not only for technical knowledge but also for
management and business administration know-how, to address the insufficiencies of the
domestic supply of labour force and expertise. An example is the use of Sony's
management practices by El 1. It is clear that many firms (E5, E3, E2 and El 1) are trying to
enter the networks of transnational companies in order to ensure that they have market
access, that they can keep up-to-date and that they can guarantee strong technological back¬
up.
New ways of gathering information and documentation for business are being used
by many firms. Close and long-term co-operation with suppliers and buyers (mostly
foreign) can ensure that companies have a regular supply of new designs, and new
knowledge about the management of production (the organisation of garment workshops,
for example). Increasing their connection with each other companies, both foreign and
domestic, is seen as important by firms. The exchange of staff and information and the
mutual supply of input materials by various textile and garment companies provides an
example. Grouping themselves around various organisations, like the Vietnam Garment
Association or less formal groups, also helps companies forge more interconnections for
accessing information sources.
However, redressing the problems of the infrastructure and supporting system
largely remains beyond the capabilities and resources of individual firms. No one firm can
tackle the inability of related industries to supply parts; the imperfect legal and institutional
infrastructure; and the weaknesses of supporting institutions over the regulation of industrial
property rights.
8.3.4 Influences of Socio-Cultural Factors and Firms' Responses
Five textile/garment firms - TGI, TG2, TG4, TG6 and TG10 - and two electronics
companies - E3 and E9 - complained about socio-cultural factors. They mentioned the
generally poor quality of the labour force - in that sense that workers and other technical
personnel tend to think and act passively - as a hang-over mentality from the planned
economy period. The absence of incentives during the pre-reform period has led to
passivity, lack of initiative, and unmotivated industrial habits among workers. Some cases
(E9) even mentioned poor discipline and community spirit among workers (it may be call a
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'subsidised mentality'). This specific situation has had a negative influence on the prevailing
working habits of employees.
To overcome the passive attitude and unmotivated behaviour of personnel, the firms
now use economic incentives. Workers and technical staff who perform well or who seek
higher qualifications or better skills get higher wages and other material benefits and
bonuses. At the same time, other administrative measures are being applied. Regulations in
some firms (like TG10) are getting tougher, especially for those staff who have not upgraded
their competence and qualifications. A more strict regime of work discipline is being
implemented to deal with irresponsible personnel. Change of jobs, some sanctions and even
dismissal are being used against them. Still, these measures only partially help to overcome
inertia among Vietnamese personnel within two electronics firms which still encounter such
problems (E3 and E9).
8.3.5 Summary of Business Strategic Responses
For both the textile/garment and electronics sectors, the general business strategies of the
companies can be broadly divided into three types. The first type of strategy is the tendency
toward diversification and flexibility of firms' business in terms of products, markets and
types of business linkage. The second type of strategy is specialisation and increasing
competitiveness aimed at niche areas. This response is based on moving up to higher value-
added products or trying to enter a niche market. Due to the high cost of all these activities,
and other factors such as the high level of personal commitment and skill and expertise
required from the companies' managers, only a few companies are able to move in this
direction. While the first type of response is widely used by all companies, only a few large
companies with firmly committed leadership and good accumulated resources (like TG4,
TG9 or to some extent E2) have been attempting the second approach. In the context of
structural turbulence of transitional economies, the distinction between diversification and
specialisation could be difficult. However, in this study, the diversification tends to happen
in firms which are trying new things ranging quite widely, from one to another type of
activity. In the meantime, the specialisation of firms tends to focus narrower in a few
selected range of activities. For example, firms avoiding to expand to too many kinds of
products, or businesses could have a specialisation response, while in contrast, diversified
firms explore as many as they can opportunities of new business and products.
In order to put some pressure on the government (which has a decisive role in
introducing policies), most companies have deployed a third type of response that can be
called co-ordinating actions. By creating Associations like those in garment and informatics,
companies try to group themselves around an organisation which can protect their interests
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and co-ordinate actions. The use of local domestic networks is also important to companies
in the sense expressed by E5's manager: "competition through co-operation".
The three types of responses mentioned above seem to help the firms to a certain
extent to deal with the difficulties posed by external factors. Still, many problems remain
which still have no solutions. Firms' future activities depend significantly on more radical
changes from the state concerning its macro-economic policies and on an overall
performance of the industrial supporting infrastructure. Also, in order to pursue different
strategic approaches, firms need to acquire new capabilities, which in turn require learning
efforts. In that way, the need for learning is caused by the demand to acquire different TCs
in pursuing various business strategies. The interactions between external factors, learning
efforts and TC acquisition are examined in the next section.
8.4 Influences of External Factors on Learning Behaviour and
TC Acquisition
8.4.1 Relationship between Business Strategies and TC Acquisition
In the previous section, the strategic responses of the firms to their external environment
were discussed. The firms adopt different means to achieve their business targets, one of
which is learning and accumulating TCs. In order to understand how firms develop their
learning efforts, this section examines their requirements for TC accumulation in the pre-
reform and reform periods.
In the pre-reform period, the lack of motivation for TC and innovation was well-
known (see Sections 5.2.6 and 5.3.6). The main concern in this period was to produce
according to plan. There was little incentive to develop marketing activities (see Section
5.2.3). Products were simple and technical change was mainly aimed at producing more
(but not necessarily better or higher quality) goods. In this context, the firms mostly needed
production and some technical change capability. Investment and business linkages were
required on a very ad-hoc basis. Marketing did not need to exist at all. Hence, up to the
middle of the 1980s, the firms mostly acquired production, minor change and some linkage
capabilities.
The reforms have changed the conditions for doing business. To respond to changes
in external factors, the firms needed different TCs for each of their strategies. First, in order
to diversify businesses or products, the firms now need to know new technologies of
production and product design. For instance, a textile firm moving into garments has to
know how the garment business operates, know the design skills of clothing, etc. In short,
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the firm needs production competence for new products. There is a similar need to acquire
capabilities for investment activities in diversified business areas. The firms' experiences
show that many have been able to acquire these diversified competencies. The move to
exporting activities has created a strong stimulus for firms to learn knowledge and skills in
producing new products (see 6.2.1), in investing into new ventures (6.2.2) or in entering
new markets (6.2.4 and 6.3.4). This has required firms to significantly upgrade their
competence, not only in production, investment, linkage and marketing, but also in minor
technical change which helps to improve product specifications and, thus, enhances their
range and saleability (6.2.3 and 6.3.3).
A similar observation can be made for the specialisation approach where a few firms
have moved into niche areas. In order to produce niche products, and to increase the
competitiveness of the firms, they need some specific technological competence. For
example, technical change activities must be done at a more sophisticated and advanced level
in order to move from ordinary products to more competitive products. This was the case of
computer firms E3 and E4 when they wanted to produce a specific package of software to
sell abroad (see 6.3.3). Their minor technical change was carried out more vigorously and
in some cases, they moved closer to major R&D activity (6.2.6). Production of niche
products (microfibre at TG4, high fashion garments in TG5 and TGI4, software in E3 and
E4, robotics electronics in E2) all required the firms to articulate more specific production
skills. More exact and sophisticated knowledge was required not only in production, but
also in investing in new niche activities, and in marketing niche products. Experiences of the
firms show, however, that not many firms are able to acquire this specific knowledge. Only
a few textile/garment (TG4 and TG14) and electronics (E3, E2 and E4) firms have obtained
the expertise to deal with niche products to some extent. As a result, although many firms
want to follow a specialisation strategy, only a few have been successful.
To support their businesses, all firms need to develop their linkages and the co¬
ordination approach is widespread among them. They have different measures to develop
their connections, and to maintain effective relationships, with the R&D, training and
education system, and with industrial organisations.
Comparing the TCs that the firms need and those they have acquired so far, one
conclusion is that most firms possess the TCs needed for diversification activity. However,
even among these TCs, non-technical knowledge (of investment or marketing) is much less
developed than technical knowledge (of production or technical change), as a consequence of
specific historical circumstances. In order to co-ordinate their businesses, most firms
develop linkage capability. As for the more specific and sophisticated capability required for
specialisation, very few firms have been able to enter this area.
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8.4.2 Influences of External Factors on Learning Activities
The number of companies reporting on the impact of various groups of external factors on
each learning mechanism is presented in Table 8.2.
Macro-Economic Policies
Macro-economics policies strongly influence firms' business activities and, in consequence,
also strongly influence specific attempts at technological innovation and learning. The
difficulties posed by financial and taxation policies create overall funding shortages for the
firms which prevents them from investing more heavily in learning activities, such as hiring
experts for on-the-job training, buying information or sending people to off-the-job courses.
The cumbersome banking procedures also produce a similar effect when the firms need to
borrow money from the banks to invest in these activities. Due to an absence of coherent
and long-term investment policies, the firms do not have a clear enough vision of their future
investment plans and so it is difficult for them to set up training programmes, especially
those which meet long-term objectives. Consequently, the firms experience great difficulty
in using prior accumulated knowledge (not knowing whom to recruit, nor how many people,
nor from which educational backgrounds) and in organising off-the-job training courses. In
TG2, labour regulations (rigid wage and salary structures and limited freedom in
recruitment) has discouraged workers from upgrading their knowledge or from embarking
on further study to gain higher education degrees as engineers. For the joint-venture TG7,
the minimum wage of workers is guaranteed (at 30 USD monthly) which has had the effect
of making them less motivated about upgrading their skills. Consequently, the self-learning
efforts of by-doing and on-the-job courses have been affected. At the same time, because of
the brain drain problem (see 8.2.1), long-term planning for on-the-job and off-the-job
training is severely jeopardised. In both cases, labour policies have caused insecurity about
the future of any learning efforts that the companies may pursue.
The firms also found that trade regulations and mechanisms were not effective
enough to help them deal with smuggling. Because of this, companies are now losing their
motivation to produce new things, and so, to learn by-doing and by on-the-job training.
Passivity, confusion and hesitancy in doing business (see Section 8.2.1) caused by
ownership problems also have an impact on learning activities. Due to weak credibility
caused by their lack of state support, private firms such as TG8 and E8 have greater
difficulties in attracting new foreign connections and this also discourages learning-by-
doing. For example, E8 complained that because of its private status, it experienced
difficulty in developing a connection with a Korean partner to expand its PCB production for
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export, despite its ability to do so. At the same time, lack of incentives in SOEs have created
problems for on-the-job and off-the-job training and by-doing mechanisms.
As for learning-by-doing, it should be noted that not all companies could concretely
specify the influence of external factors upon this learning mechanism. However, three
textile/garment cases mentioned the impact of macro-policies on this mechanism. For
example, TG6 specifically pointed out that the policy of foreign currency management
prevented the firm from having reserves for maintenance and repair activities and, because of
this, self-learning by workers and technical personnel in dealing with the technical services
of the plant have been severely affected. As shown in Table 8.2, on-the-job (for TG firms)
and off-the-job training were most influenced by policy factors.
Market Factors
The fragmentation and weakness of the domestic market, especially for electronics products,
caused firms difficulties in forecasting sales and in launching production plans.
Accordingly, investment in learning efforts have been affected. Attempts by some
electronics firms to move from low-end assembly products like CKD or SKD to more
sophisticated products like IKD do not have sufficiently strong support from the domestic
market. El, E10 and E2 find little incentive to learn more complicated competences in
production, particularly involving learning mechanisms such as by-doing, on-the-job and
off-the-job training.
Due to increasing competition in a more open domestic market, E3 has found
difficulty attracting people from other firms to act as teachers in their on-the-job training
endeavours. E4 and E5 have had problems getting necessary information from competitors.
Concerning leaming-by-doing efforts, many companies complain that the domestic market is
not conducive to them increasing their knowledge sophistication or skills by doing
production locally. Instead, they have to consider other business options, such as trading or
moving away from computer assembly.
Almost all firms engaged in exporting need to change their technological base and to
learn new knowledges. Hand-in-hand with the positive influence of entering international
markets, there are also some serious problems. The loss of the familiar CMEA markets, and
the embargo imposed by the US have made the acquisition of foreign connections - and the
consequent learning through these connections - quite difficult, whether it be with foreign
buyers or technology suppliers. These difficulties were encountered by most textile/garment
firms, all computer firms and some consumer electronics firms.
181
Supporting Infrastructure
The companies admitted that thanks to the training, education and R&D system provided by
the pre-reform structure, they have been able to use prior accumulation of knowledge and
experience very actively in technical areas. This has helped in recruiting technical graduates
from polytechnics and universities, as well as in tapping valuable information sources.
Through technical improvement campaigns, companies are able to use learning-by-doing or
on-the-job training for enhancing their production and minor technical change capabilities.
Still, the technical bias and the overly theoretical orientation of courses has seriously
distorted the quality of the training mechanism (see 8.2.3).
With the move to a market economy and less state subsidies for education, this
system has become less useful to firms and has especially hindered their use of on-the-job
and off-the-job training, and prior accumulation of knowledge and experience by recruitment
activities. The weakness of R&D organisations is an obstacle for many firms in using on-
the-job and off-the-job training (due to a poor supply of expertise), and as a source of
information.
Due to poorly-developed areas of the legal system (e.g., industrial property rights),
the use of foreign connections is difficult when foreign products have not been protected
from piracy. Similarly, the intention of Vietnamese computer firms to learn by-doing by dint
of expanding their software development (like E3's VietWind - a Vietnamese version of
Window) is negated once those products are pirated without any legal redress. Garment
firms TG14, TG5 and TG9 also face difficulties in co-operating with foreign designers in
developing high fashion models. Weak standardisation and quality control have created
hurdles for forms of co-operation between Vietnamese and foreign firms. In electronics, the
disorder of standardised development for both hardware and software products makes it
difficult to use foreign connections as a learning mechanism, and undermines firms' attempts
to integrate with international networks of producers, suppliers and buyers. As E4 put it, the
firm has to deal with too many different foreign standards for PC assembly 6, while there is
no single and unified standard format for the Vietnamese market. This causes the firm a
great deal of difficulty in trying to learn through co-operating with foreigners. The use of
foreign connections is also affected by the shortage of information back-up, both technical
and business. In this respect, E7 encountered a problem in dealing with Control Technique
Singapore (CT - a subsidiary of a British firm). Initially, co-operation seemed to go
smoothly until the Singaporean office wanted to take over some business from E7. E7 did
not know what to do and tried to contact the headquarters in Britain. However, poor
communication facilities and a shortage of information in general (about relations between
^FCC of the US, TUV of European countries and CSA of Canada.
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Control Technique Singapore and its UK parent, or about any other potential technology
suppliers and collaborators that might replace CT) exacerbated the dependency of E7 on CT.
Companies in both industries complained about the weaknesses of related industries
which are not able to support their learning, especially when they want to experiment with
something new through learning-by-doing or through inviting experts from outside.
According to E10 and Ell, their efforts to augment their technological skills either through
by-doing innovation or by getting information have suffered from the poor input from
industries like mechanical engineering, chemicals and plastics. Some of their attempts to
experiment have been abandoned due to a lack of support from these industries. Table 8.2
shows that the use of information sources has suffered more from the inadequacies of the
supporting infrastructure than from either policy or market factors. Similarly, on-the-job and
off-the-job training have been seriously affected because of these factors.
Socio-Cultural Factors
As mentioned in Section 8.2.4, two main difficulties for business stemming from this group
of factors are the passive mentality of personnel and an uncooperative attitude among R&D
staff. Due to these problems, some firms have experienced difficulties in their learning
activity. The use of simple by-doing and on-the-job training courses have suffered most, as
can be seen from Table 8.2.
Summary ofInfluences ofExternal Factors on Learning
Using the number of complaints given by firms in interviews when referring to the influence
of external factors for each learning mechanism, some trends can be identified. These are
mostly related to negative rather than positive influences. Still, the trends serve to sketch the
difficulties faced by firms and so may act as a template for those issues which need to be
addressed by policy measures.
Except for the mechanism of collecting information (over which most pressure is
exerted by supporting system factors), all other mechanisms were chiefly influenced by
macro policy factors. This is followed by other factors in a descending order of importance:
the supporting system, market factors, and socio-cultural factors. Comparing this ranking of
importance with the ranking of external factors' influences on general business (given in
Table 8.1), they follow the same order. More specifically, financial, taxation and banking
problems (which contribute to the shortage of capital available to firms) are more serious
than other policy factors. As for the supporting system, the deterioration in the quality of
training in the post-reform period - especially for the vocational training of workers and the
deficiencies in the general knowledge pool (both before and after reforms) - is the main
obstacle.
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As mentioned above, depending on which group of external factors is being
considered, different learning mechanisms can be influenced to varying degrees. However,
the picture is not exactly the same for all the capabilities concerned. For example, in
textile/garment firms, off-the-job training and. foreign connections mechanisms face less
pressure from external factors than information and on-the-job training. However, the
former are less useful in accumulating both major and minor technical change capabilities,
compared to the latter (see Table 7.13). It seems that although companies have access to,
and contacts with, foreign partners and external sources of learning, the knowledge and
experience that they can learn from foreigners only amounts to simple operating knowledge.
Knowledge of technological change lies beyond the range of these connections. Only those
companies which are in a position to pursue more vigorous strategies and efforts can utilise
their foreign connections to facilitate more advanced learning.
As can be seen from the above, external factors influence the learning process in two
ways. First, Section 8.3 demonstrates that the transition to a market economy is a strong
stimulus for firms to change their business approaches, and thus, the transition creates a
need for learning new technological knowledge and expertise as discussed in Section 8.4.1.
Second, this transition has changed the overall context of other factors to do with the
supporting infrastructure, market conditions and even the mentality of the work force (see
8.4.2). As a result, the learning process of the firms occurs in the context of new incentives
to develop and new conditions (which are not always necessarily easier to negotiate) within
which that development must be situated. The impact of external factors on the learning
process is quite similar to the impact of those influences on general business activity. In the
next section, the learning behaviour of the firms is examined.
8.4.3 Learning Behaviour in TC Accumulation
The acquisition of TC in the firms depends on the impact of external factors and also on the
ways they respond to these factors in order to learn. Since the sorts of difficulties posed by
external influences on business activity and on learning processes are similar (8.4.2), in
most cases, the ways that firms deal with learning difficulties are not very different from
their general business responses.
Facing the constraints of financial policies - and in order to fund their technological
innovation and learning activities - the firms look for additional financial resources, or they
seek out new mechanisms of learning that do not require payment. They use barter
agreements with other companies to exchange training programmes and courses in order to
save resources, and to diversify the capabilities of their existing personnel. For example,
textile workers are sent to learn garment skills, while garment people learn knitting activities
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at other firms without any fees being paid. Some companies hope that by diversifying into
new areas they can accumulate extra financial income not only for other commercial
purposes, but also for supporting learning efforts in familiar activities. Diversification can
be seen as the most common response by the firms to accumulating more resources for
learning, both financial and technological. However, this response does not always work.
Not all firms know how to diversify as successfully as they would hope for. The shortage
of funding to finance their business needs in general, and their technological learning in
particular, is always a problem. This factor has recently reduced the use of on-the-job and
off-the-job training and firms' ability to buy information.
As presented in Section 8.4.1, the market system in the pre-reform period produced a
situation where firms had no incentive to learn marketing competence. As the reforms
unfolded, among the responses of the firms to market challenges, the diversification of
market connections and a return to domestic markets (by exporting firms) has had effects not
only on doing business, but also on learning. By means of these responses, the firms have
had more access to new sources of learning through link-ups with diverse foreign
connections. Having realised that learning technology is a process of incremental
accumulation, the firms moved from simple to more complex relations with foreigners.
Many firms reported that they have had to start from low-end products (production of black-
and-white in combination with colour TVs at El, or E2's early reliance on consumer
electronics which was followed by a switch towards industrial electronics and computing
business), and then later progress to more sophisticated products in order to learn step-by-
step. This cumulative move can be seen in textile/garment firms, shifting from simple and
passive subcontracting agreements towards more active OEM relations for garment products.
To deal with the weaknesses of the supporting infrastructure - whereby access to
learning facilities has became more difficult in recent times - sources of learning are being
made more flexible by the firms. Companies are trying different ways of obtaining
expertise, including new forms of recruitment; combining methods of training; using
personal and informal contacts; and taking people from other firms. By not relying on just
one or two learning mechanisms, the firms try to ensure that, in conditions of a less efficient
training, education and research system than obtained previously, they can nevertheless still
have access to the right people to provide them with the necessary information and training.
The knowledge and information that firms now try to acquire is also economic and
managerial as much as technical in content. In E8, the knowledge which the firm has
acquired through its informal contacts is proving more crucial than that acquired through
training courses, especially since the firm cannot avail of much support from state-run off-
the-job training programmes. Thanks to these efforts, some firms have began to learn not
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only technical knowledge but also the non-technical knowledge necessary for investment and
marketing TCs.
The new learning sources that market changes have brought in their wake usually
support diversification strategies. New foreign learning sources assist the firms with
knowledges useful for changing products and markets, rather than for special and more
competitive products. This factor also contributes to the reason why most firms are
following a diversification strategy, while not many firms make a conscious effort to
specialise in new products or markets.
8.5 Micro-Macro Interactions: the Firms and their External
Contexts
The influences of external factors on doing business in general, and on learning processes
for TC accumulation in particular, are almost the same as indicated in Sections 8.2 and
8.4.2. The firms respond to these influences by adopting different strategic behaviours
(such as diversification) which support their way of doing business at the same time as
supporting their efforts at technological innovation and learning. However, some firms
focus primarily on diversification as the means for financial accumulation and only
secondarily on using that as the means for accessing new sources of equipment and
expertise. In this case, new technological learning sources are being traded off against more
general business strategies. Thus, the firms' responses to influences of external factors in
order to secure funding for new business activities, is the same as those that the firms use for
learning purposes.
Looking at the wider influences of external factors on the activities of the firms and
their learning processes, the problems and opportunities of the transition from a planned
economy to a market economy have emerged as central. Throughout the historical evolution
of the two industries, the change that took place towards the end of the 1980s and the
beginning of 1990s was the most important factor in deciding the behaviour and status of the
firms, not only in their business performance, but also in their technological development.
This move has shaken all the firms in their activities and subjected them to conditions very
different from previous ones. In order to survive in this new environment, the firms have
had to struggle and become more mature in terms of experience and knowledge.
Technologically speaking, the firms have become more skilful and experienced. Hence, the
macro environment has shaped the behaviour and growth of the firms in their technological
development and learning. It can be seen through these firms that the trend noted by
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Rosenberg (1980) and others that macro-factors provide the context for micro-action is
indeed the case.
The role of the state is important in this macro-micro interaction. During the pre-
reform period, the Vietnamese government had a central role in deciding all business plans
for the SOEs. The cases' experiences have confirmed that even in the present transitional
period to a market economy, the state still has a crucial role to play in introducing conducive
policies, and creating a favourable environment, not only for SOEs as before, but also for
private companies. In particular, many firms have emphasised the need for state assistance
in maintaining the supporting infrastructure. This task is beyond the resources of any
individual firm. In many cases, the firms want state subsidies for training, education and
R&D. The importance of interrelated industries and the whole industrial supporting system
(Rosenberg, 1982; Pavitt, 1984) can also be clearly seen in the case of Vietnamese firms. It
is important that the state maintain its role in developing the general business environment
within which firms may learn and acquire TCs.
However, as the experiences of firms in this study suggest, the involvement of the
state in the technological development and learning of the firms to date is both excessive in
some respects and inadequate in others. This interesting phenomenon occurs as the state
intervenes too strongly and deeply in activities that firms want to control (e.g., financial,
taxation and other regulations in labour and foreign currency management, etc.) In this area,
the role of the state is considered to be unnecessarily intrusive. At the same time, with
respect to activities such as providing more a efficient supporting infrastructure, the state has
left the scene and firms now have to address their training, education and R&D needs using
only their own very limited resources. Comparing this situation with other Southeast Asian
countries such as Singapore (Hobday, 1994 & 1995a), it seems that Vietnamese firms are
both overly regulated and insufficiently supported by the state.
The ownership of firms is also a noteworthy issue. The attitude of the state towards
industrial firms is unbalanced as mentioned above. Private firms suffer most from the
unequal practices of the state in enforcing almost every single policy. Many private firms
argue that, due to this factor, mere survival is their biggest concern; they cannot afford to
allocate resources for the purposes of learning and TC creation. Even for the SOEs which
have benefited from state support, problems remain. Theoretically, the directors and
managers of SOEs are free to do business. In reality, many of them still have to wait for the
state to decide on many practical issues.
The firms' experience also suggests that their strategic response is very important in
shaping how they acquire expertise and sustain competitiveness. The firms in this study are
not mere passive recipients of the forces which define their external environment. They also
react to this environment in several ways. This interaction has created both new demands for
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TCs, and new conditions for learning to occur. There is no doubt that learning and TC
acquisition in these firms is the outcome of the firms' interactions with the influences of
external factors.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that firms in two sectors are under both positive and negative impact
of four groups of external factors. While firms can benefit from some positive aspects of
science and technology infrastructure, mostly in pre-reform period, they have to face very
strong pressures from various groups of external factors, which affect their business
activities and learning efforts. For both sectors, influences of the macro-economic policies
of the state, and functions of the supporting system (which is more deficient after reforms)
are the most serious factors hindering the learning activities of the firms.
To react to these factors, firms have chosen strategic approaches such as
diversification and specialisation. Nevertheless, as a result of a kind of trade-off against
business strategies, the learning behaviours of the firms mostly remain linked to the
diversification trend. So far, not many firms have been able to upgrade their TCs or to use
learning mechanisms which are more oriented towards encouraging specialisation.
The process of learning and TC acquisition is taking place in the interaction with the
external environment, and hence, is shaped by firms' micro behaviour and by external
factors. In this, the role of the state, the transition to a market economy, and the ownership
issue are the most significant factors. Specifically, the transition has brought both negative
and positive influences on the ways firms do their business and learn technological
competence. Still, these external factors do not always explain firms' behaviours. In some
cases, a deviation from general trends might occur (as the concrete company cases in the next
chapter show) and may only be understood by looking at specific firm-level factors such as
managers' backgrounds. Consequently, Chapter 9 will examine some of these specific
circumstances by means of focusing on some selected firms.
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The 24 study firms were investigated through interviews and the firms' archival material. I
collected more detailed case material on four firms in order to build up a picture of the wider
context of the firm, within which TC accumulation and learning takes place. In this chapter,
two firms from the textile/garment sector (TGI and TG6) are analysed in Sections 9.2 and
9.3. Section 9.4 compares the most interesting features of these firms. The electronics
firms E2 and E3 are discussed and compared in Sections 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7.
The selection criteria were simple: I chose those firms on which the most information
was available. In the textile/garment sector, TGI is above average in its garment-exporting
performance among Vietnamese companies. Its pattern of TC accumulation is common to
most firms in the sector, including substantial foreign influence. As a foreign turn-key
project, TG6 is among the modern spinning companies of Vietnam and is actively moving
into the garment business. E2 is among the best performing electronics state-owned firms in
Vietnam and is moving from consumer electronics to industrial electronics. E3 is a private
firm set up by scientists and is unique in having established production activity abroad.
Looking at this firm can shed some light on very interesting patterns of learning and TC
accumulation in the context of recent changes within the electronics industry in Vietnam.
In general, the four chosen firms are above average in terms of performance and TC
building. In some respects, they could serve as a model for other companies for learning
and accumulating TCs. At the same time, compared to some other firms in the study (for
example, TG14 or El 1), these four companies are not the best at some kinds of TC like
marketing, or major technical change. An examination of the chosen firms can thus also help
to understand why some expertise and experience cannot be easily learnt. Each case is
presented in a very condensed format highlighting the most relevant findings. Full
descriptions and analyses are provided in Appendices 9.1 to 9.4.
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9.2 Garment Company TGI (TLG)
9.2.1 The Business Context
TLG was set up as a state-owned enterprise in 1958. It produces different products for
export (jackets, jeans, trousers, baby clothes, blouses, etc.) but shirts are the main product.
The company started with 50 employees and now has more than 2,500. In 1958, TLG had
only 25 sewing machines (non-electric), mostly supplied from the Soviet Union, East
Germany and China. Now, it has about 800 modern electrical sewing machines of different
makes (Juki, Singer, Amato, Kanshai, etc.), mostly supplied from Japan. The company's
rate of production, turnover and export are given in Table 9.5.
TLG started its production by receiving cut pieces from Soviet contractors, sewing
them together and sending them back. Jobs were carried out by plans set at government
level. The company had neither the incentive nor the opportunity to develop its capabilities,
except for simple subcontracting production. In the middle of the 1980s, TLG participated
in a subcontracting programme (see 5.2.3 as well as Appendix 9.1) with the former Soviet
Union and so was able to upgrade its technological facilities. There was no possibility of
entering new markets. With the industrial rehabilitation programme supported by SIDA
(Swedish International Development and Co-operation Authority), in 1988 TLG received
new sewing machines and modern equipment for garment production as well as new
personnel with degrees from universities or polytechnics. After this, the company
considered expanding its export activities with the opening up of the Vietnamese economy.
In 1989, GunYoung Trading Co. Ltd of South Korea began business with TLG by
providing all materials and designs for producing high quality jackets and blouses. TLG set
up a separate workshop for GunYoung, with its own staff of a foreman and workers. The
workshop mainly used TLG sewing machines but GunYoung provided some stitching,
patterning, dotting and zipper equipment. It also sent experts to supervise the organisation
of production lines and quality control, and took part in discussions on production plans
with TLG. All products of this workshop were bought by GunYoung for export to Japan.
Between 1989-1991, other foreign companies developed co-operative relations with TLG
like Shilton (Japan), Quell (Germany) and Hennes&Maurice (Sweden) which provided their
sample designs for TLG manufacture. These companies then bought the products for export
to different countries. Currently, the main export market of TLG is Japan (80%) while the
EU countries of Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden account for the remaining 20%.
Before reforms, and till the end of the 1980s, TLG had relations only with CMEA
markets and no chance of accessing diversified sources of technology and information. The
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company did not have any idea of how to do business with market economies. Activities
were planned by the government, and the firm had little motivation to change the situation.
After the reforms, TLG gained new market opportunities in EU and Asia Pacific countries.
Through new foreign contacts, new business opportunities became possible and new
knowledge and information on production were acquired. At the same time, TLG now has
difficulty in adjusting to new markets which require quotas for export. By the end of the
1980s, after the abolition of subsidies, the free supply of trained workers ended. Current
sources of competence are not very useful: technical schools, universities and polytechnics
do not produce graduates specifically for the garment industry.
In this context, the overall response of TLG to changes caused by external factors
has been to diversify its business activities and products to serve new market opportunities.
There is little evidence of it pursuing other types of response. The firm diversified its
product range by producing more sophisticated products for export. It searched for new
partners in Germany and Sweden, bought new sewing equipment from Japan, entered the
new market of the EU, and also began to look seriously at the domestic market.
9.2.2 TC Accumulation and Learning Mechanisms
The interviews and archives reveal that TLG acquired quite strong production and minor
technical change capabilities, for which it used almost all learning mechanisms. Prior
accumulation and foreign connections have been the most important mechanisms in
supporting learning-by-doing efforts. As for other capabilities, although the firm has some
experience of investment, marketing and linkage activities, these capabilities are still not
developed. Major change capability is totally absent.
Investment and marketing capabilities had not been obtained in the pre-reform period
when there was no need or opportunity to engage in these activities. Later, when the firm
used only learning-by-doing for acquiring these two types of technological expertise, its skill
base in these respects did not greatly improve. Without the support of any other mechanism,
learning-by-doing is not enough for the firm to learn these two capabilities. This confirms
the need to combine different learning mechanisms and sources. TLG has succeeded in
doing this most effectively for production expertise which comes from various foreign
partners. The knowledge brought by prior accumulation and foreign connections was quite
technical and, therefore, more suitable for production and minor technical change. When it
comes to non-technical knowledge and experience, prior formal training and foreign partners
alone have not contributed much. The weakness of using foreign connections for
developing investment and marketing capabilities can also be explained by an apparent
reluctance on the part of its Korean partners to assist TLG with non-technical learning, as
193
well as by passivity and weak absorptive capacity on the part of the firm (see more in
Appendix 9.1.3). Moreover, recent learning-by-doing has been the only mechanism used
for mastering the non-technical subjects of investment and marketing, and TLG has not
acquired these two capabilities.
At the same time, TLG does not have a strong commitment to developing any linkage
competence (especially linking with the R&D, training and education system). The absence
of learning-by-doing is the most likely reason for this TC weakness. Despite the
involvement of foreign connections and some prior contacts, the firm still lacks the ability to
link with, and effectively utilise, the S&T system.
The contribution of the various learning mechanisms to TC building at TLG can be
seen in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Learning Mechanisms at TLG
TC Investment Production Minor changeMarketing Linkage Major change
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Information 0 + 0 0 0
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The case material confirms the importance of absorptive capacity (associated with the
passive attitude of firm's managers), without which TLG could not learn more actively from
two phases of foreign assistance: the SIDA programme and GunYoung direct investment.
The pattern of using learning mechanisms is influenced by external factors and by
TLG's interaction with these factors. During the 1970s and 1980s, pre-reform advantages in
training and education contributed to the prior accumulation of TLG. It relied heavily on the
R&D, education and training system for a free and continuous supply of personnel from
higher education, both technicians as well as workers. But the weaknesses of this
supporting system (such as poor curricula, the technical bias of training courses and slow
and ineffective information flow) led to the firm remaining weak in its non-technical
learning. The specific market conditions (i.e, dealing only with CMEA) also prevented the
firm from being stimulated to acquire investment and marketing competencies. Regulations
of the state governing relations with foreign partners were cumbersome and TLG had
difficulty in maintaining flexible relations with its foreign buyers and technology suppliers.
This has prevented the firm from pursuing its limited learning opportunities for acquiring
knowledge, information, and experience from foreigners.
Reforms after 1986 landed the firm in a new situation. In terms of what it needs to
know, there is now a higher demand for knowledge of investment, business administration
and marketing. The most important change is that due to the competitive pressure of market
changes, TLG has changed its attitude to technical change activity, and its staff has also
regained a positive learning attitude. The firm has to do more product modifications which
require minor technical change capability. With respect to its learning through prior
accumulation, both new opportunities and difficulties have arisen. TLG has to take
responsibility for supplying its own skilled garment workers but shortage of funding
influences its off-the-job training, since fees for courses have increased. Even when the firm
can pay, the existing training curricula is less suitable to addressing new changes. Thus,
TLG has had to retrain its educated technical personnel to undertake garment activities,
through promoting working experience and providing subsequent training.
In reaction to external problems and being sensitive to long-term opportunities for
business, TLG tried to diversify its activities, its markets, its products and its business
relations with partners. This response, although aimed at meeting a business strategy, has
also brought new learning and information sources to the firm. Diversifying by developing
connections with foreign partners (both Western European and East Asian) has helped the
firm to access new information, and to gain new experience. By diversifying its
involvement with foreigners, the firm's managers have learned different kinds of
knowledge, piecemeal, from different sources.
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In addition, TLG is trying to find new non-traditional ways of acquiring knowledge
and information. Since 1991, the firm has been demanding certain technical qualifications
from potential employees. TLG uses an informal network of consultants to obtain necessary
experience and information. It has upgraded the activities of its showroom and sales centre
to gather market intelligence. And, to improve training (on-the-job and off-the-job), TLG
has designed more incentives for those employees who are willing to learn more actively.
Still, TLG cannot so far find sufficiently appropriate solutions to the problems posed
by external factors. TLG's managers stressed that this depends on further changes to
government policies. Due to weaknesses in the domestic sources of expertise and
information for the garment business, TLG has tended to rely more on assistance from its
foreign partners.
9.3 Textile Company TG6 (NTC)
9.3.1 The Business Context
The company was formed in 1982 with a contract worth 50 million USD between MOLI and
Itochu Co. of Japan which was aimed at establishing a complete cotton and polyester/cotton
spinning mill with a capacity of 100,000 spindles, provision of building materials, necessary
utilities and technical assistance, including training. The mill also has a line with Open-End
technology which uses rotors instead of looms to make best use of poor quality cotton.
NTC has about 2,000 employees and now produces yarns and knitting and garment products
as shown below.
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Products







In 1983, NTC began exporting yarns to the Soviet Union but the volume of export
was small and the quality of yarns was low. In 1989 and 1990, due to changes in this
market and start of textile joint ventures in Vietnam which need yarn for their production,
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NTC began to sell yarns to local companies with payment made in USD (42% of the firm's
total yarn production). Also, yarn products are more recently being exported to other Asian
markets like Taiwan and Singapore. In 1992, reflecting a downstream shift of NTC from
producing only textiles towards knitwear and garments, the company was reorganised as a
firm with three plants: a spinning plant (1,291 employees), a weaving-dyeing-garment plant
(700 employees) and a services workshop (100 employees).
In September 1992, NTC's long-term Japanese partner - Itochu - signed a contract to
help the firm invest in knitting and garment activities and then to buy back its products. In
1993, NTC exported one million garments with a value of 2,200,000 USD to Japan. By
1994, it was exporting two million products (worth about 4 million USD). By 1994, it
exports to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore (yarns), Japan and South Korea (knitted
garments). In addition, NTC has also begun exporting 60 new models of garment to France
and Italy. This trial effort seems to be meeting with success in European markets as well.
For NTC's business activities, macro-economic policies are influential, the first of
which is the planning and allocation of productive companies in the textile industry. Because
of this unique policy (to evenly distribute industrial capacities throughout the country), NTC
was relocated to an isolated central province of Vietnam without the necessary infrastructures
of roads, a harbour, electricity, storage or communication facilities. The great distance of
NTC from HoChiMinh City caused a great deal of problems for the company in maintaining
and expanding its business activities. It also created difficulties for gaining access to the
industrial support system, with respect to providing training, gathering information and
expanding its connections with new foreign partners. Regulations of foreign currency
exchange are strict and NTC cannot keep its foreign exchange to satisfy the needs of new
business activities - including technical change, repair and maintenance activities.
After the reforms of 1986, and with the increased need of Vietnamese-foreign joint-
venture enterprises in yarns, the domestic market became more profitable for NTC.
However, the smuggling of yarn from China (an outcome of the inefficient trade and
customs policy) has done considerable damage to this business.
In the face of these external factors, NTC managers have made some responses. To
secure funding for new businesses, the company has diversified its production by moving to
downstream knitted garment products. This is the way to utilise NTC's own yarn products
for a more value-added products (e.g., ready-to-wear clothes aimed directly at end users).
This move to knitting has also been promoted by the increasing difficulty of doing business
in spinning, due to the yarn smuggling problem. Hence, diversification to the new business
of knitted garments is quite an important move for NTC. By doing this, it can tap more
sources of income and accumulate reserves for new investment choices. The firm can also
pursue its technological innovation and learning activities such as hiring experts, inviting
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teachers and instructors, sending people to courses, etc. In this way, the firm's response to
its business problems and its learning efforts are almost the same.
At the same time, to secure better sources of supply, to widen its market channels,
and to find the kinds of assistance that it cannot receive from the state, NTC continues to
upgrade its long-term relationship with Itochu Co. Having worked with this Japanese
trading company for almost two decades, NTC has established a very close and effective
relationship that proved helpful in both the starting phase of spinning and the expansion
phase of garment production. According to interviews with NTC's managers, the aim of the
firm is to become a more equal partner with Itochu, not only in the textile business but also
in other types of business in the near future. This may relieve NTC from dependence on
serving the unstable needs of the domestic market, especially in yam products.
However, NTC's location continues to cause problems for the firm, although to a
lesser extent than before. The weakness of the labour market still poses a difficulty. To
expand production and recruit new workers, without the back-up of the training and research
environment in HoChiMinh City, NTC will have to spend a lot of money on training and
technical consultancy.
9.3.2 TC Accumulation and Learning
NTC has developed strong investment and production TCs, but weak minor change and
linkage capabilities. The firm has not acquired marketing and major technical change
capabilities.
The pattern of learning TCs in NTC is given in Table 9.2. NTC use all learning
mechanisms for the two capabilities investment and production in which it is strong.
Learning-by-doing was used for most TC acquisition, supported by other learning
mechanisms, of which prior accumulation was the most important mechanism bringing to the
firm both technical and non-technical knowledge. In addition, foreign connections and
training mechanisms were used actively for developing investment and production
capabilities. The connection with Itochu contributed significantly through its complete
training programme for NTC.
Compared to investment and production TCs, minor change and linkage were weaker
in a context where learning-by-doing has received less support from other learning
mechanisms (two for minor change and one for linkage capabilities).
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Table 9.2 Learning Mechanisms at NTC
TC Investment Production Minor changeMarketing Linkage Major change
strong strong weak no weak no
Learning
By-doing + + + 0 + 0
Prior + + + 0 + 0
accumulation
On-the-job + + + 0 0 0
training
Off-the-job + + 0 + 0 0
training
Foreign + + 0 0 0 0
connection
Information + 0 0 0 0 0
As mentioned above, the most visible NTC response to the difficulties posed by
external conditions is to diversify its business activity from spinning to garments and
knitting, and the firm needs to acquire the competence necessary for investing in and
producing newer products (garments). In this context, the assistance of its familiar partner,
Itochu, was a suitable option and NTC was able to acquire these two capabilities. Even
though foreign connections was the most active learning mechanism for investment and
production TCs, it did not contribute significantly to change, linkage or marketing activities.
Regarding marketing capability, the pre-reform context of doing business with
CMEA countries and of planned domestic production created a situation where NTC had no
need to acquire marketing knowledge. When NTC moved to more sales-oriented market
economies, it began to need more marketing experience, especially in doing business with
market economies. Still, despite its efforts, off-the-job courses were the only means by
which the firm could learn marketing. Since all sales in the expansion phase into garment
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production have again been implemented by Itochu, and since it lacks sufficient learning-by-
doing - a necessary mechanism for all TC acquisition - the firm has not been able to acquire
any marketing capability.
By diversifying to avoid the problems facing its business, NTC can in many respects
reduce the difficulties of learning, but this might not always be the case. In order to deal
with market factors and the difficulties caused by state policies and weaknesses in the
supporting infrastructure, NTC is developing its ties more closely with Itochu Co. At the
same time, however, the firm is not diversifying its foreign connections to access newer
learning sources.
9.4 Some Distinct Features of These Two Textile/Garment Firms
Both firms share similar sequences in TC building, with production capability coming first
and others arriving later. However, while TLG has acquired only production and minor
change capabilities, NTC has also developed investment and linkage capabilities. This TC
accumulation pattern is explained by the way the two firms learn. The patterns presented in
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggest that the firms need to have (i) learning-by-doing as a necessary
mechanism, then (ii) at least one other learning mechanism to achieve some degrees of TC.
In order to obtain strong TC, they need to use more mechanisms. In the case of linkage
capability, both firms used two mechanisms. The main difference is the essential learning-
by-doing mechanism used at NTC - which TLG did not try. In TLG, without this learning
mechanism, the other two mechanisms of prior accumulation and foreign connection have
not proved sufficient for building up the capability. Neither learning-by-doing alone (in
TLG), nor off-the-job training without leaming-by-doing (in NTC), is sufficiently effective
for marketing capability accumulation.
The first distinct feature is the different use made ofprior training and accumulation
ofexperience by the two firms. While NTC can enjoy non-technical investment knowledge
brought from other work places by its new director and managers, TLG's managers mostly
have technical knowledge suitable for production activity. Thus, prior accumulation has
contributed to investment capability in NTC, but not in TLG. Both firms used this prior
experience and connections to develop their linkage competence, but with different results:
NTC has got this capability whereas TLG has not. This is due to the combined use of this
mechanism with leaming-by-doing in NTC. The policy of putting experienced managers into
NTC from the start has contributed positively.
There is another difference in the way that training has contributed to the TC
acquisition of the two firms, depending on the attitude of their managers. Compared to
TLG, NTC managers are more active in maintaining good connections with R&D and
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training institutions and bringing consultants in to give courses. The attitude of NTC
managers, in this respect, is crucial for deciding to what extent the firm uses sources for on-
the-job training. Also, concerning off-the-job training, NTC seems to have a more
conscious commitment than TLG to sending its staff on courses, in spite of the long distance
from HoChiMinh City.
TLG tends to send its people on training courses held by Hanoi polytechnic or
university on quality control or textile mechanical engineering. Investment appraisal or
marketing courses have only very recently started and do not as yet contribute to the firm's
accumulation of non-technical knowledge. Therefore, this mechanism has mainly helped the
firm in learning knowledge suitable for production and minor change capabilities. At NTC,
training includes knowledge and experience relevant for investment competence. In addition
to the technical knowledge that NTC gets from the training programmes of MOLI, the
company has acquired greater knowledge of economic and business management - mostly
from institutions in HoChiMinh City. The availability of more non-technical expertise in
HoChiMinh City than in Hanoi is a result of the more favourable historical circumstances of
Southern industrial development (see 5.1).
The next feature is in the use offoreign connections. TLG used this mechanism
mostly to acquire engineering and management experiences suitable for production and
minor change capabilities. TLG's heavy reliance on the SIDA programme and its Korean
direct investor (contributing to the firm's passive attitude in both pre- and post-reform
periods) prevented it from gaining marketing and investment knowledge and experience. In
contrast to TLG, and in addition to learning production expertise from Japanese suppliers,
NTC has been more active in investment activity while dealing with foreign partners,
especially in its expansion phase into the garment business. Due to the prior knowledge
accumulation of managers coming from elsewhere, the absorptive capacity of NTC is higher
than that of TLG. This explains why, for investment capability, NTC is able to utilise
foreign connections more than TLG. This fact suggests that the use of foreign connections
to some extent depends on a firm's use of the prior accumulation mechanism.
Honesty and openness are also important attitudinal differences separating the two
firms with respect to their co-operation with foreign partners. For example, when Itochu
Co.'s managers were asked their general opinion on project implementation, they cited one
reason for the successful technology transfer to NTC as the honest attitude of its Vietnamese
managers, including the most senior people such as the director, towards the Japanese
partners, as compared with other Vietnamese managers. At the same time, not all TLG
managers were open-minded towards their Korean partners (see Appendix 9.1.3). Only the
Vice-Director and some of his junior managers seemed willing to learn from the Korean
experts. Apart from these few people, I got the impression (from talking to other junior
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staff) that there is still a general reluctance to co-operate, on the part of the director and other
managers.
In general, the different attitude to learning can be understood in the context of the
different background of the staff in the two firms. There is more evidence of managers at
NTC having an entrepreneurial orientation and a keeness to learn from outside consultants
than in TLG. Moreover, the managers of NTC constitute a more coherent and
comprehensive group who have been working together, almost since the beginning of the
project. Therefore, they are more ready to get on and co-operate, sharing a willingness to
ensure the technological progress of the firm. This fact is a reminder that a firm's learning
behaviour is influenced significantly by the background of the firms and its managers'
attitudes.
Both TLG and NTC face very severe pressure from external factors in their business
activity and learning efforts, especially in terms of the macro-economic policies of the state
and the supporting system of training, education and R&D and other service institutions.
Accordingly, the two firms are pursuing a similar strategy of diversification. However, they
differ in the scope of the diversification and therefore in the types of TC they need. TLG
diversified its range of products mostly from within garment production, which required
almost the same sewing techniques albeit with a need for new finishing skills. NTC
diversified into the knitting and garment business and its managers have had to take certain
risks to learn the TCs required for products unfamiliar to them. Although it is more difficult,
this way of learning-through-struggling with new technological issues has given NTC's
managers a reward which TLG does not have: the acquisition ofmore diversified production
skills and new investment competence.
The different strategies of the two firms are observed in their long-term co-operation
with their foreign partners. In upgrading its relations with foreign partners, TLG's
managers preferred to expand to new partners (German, Korean, Swedish) for the same
depth of relations and learning, while NTC has upgraded its relations with a single partner
(Itochu), to a more intertwined and co-operative link. This difference in pursuing foreign
contacts has given TLG more diversified foreign sources from which it can learn minor
change and linkage and it reduces its dependence on a single foreign partner. NTC's close
relation with Itochu has brought mid-term benefits (more training and consultancy), but in
the long run it may make NTC too dependent on this Japanese trading house and thus reduce
the chances of finding new learning sources. Interestingly, the too-close relationship of
NTC with Itochu turned out to be a disadvantage for learning minor technical change skills.
The new turn-key plant seems to raise both psychological and technical barriers for NTC's
staff in thinking about changing their technical specifications. The Japanese partner did not
undertake any technical change or give advice on this issue, and NTC's employees were
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unable to learn technical change expertise from their foreign partner. Besides, a dependency
may arise in exploiting new market opportunities, and thus prevent the firm from learning
from other sources for new marketing knowledge.
In using foreign connections, NTC managers are also sometimes less creative than
TLG's vice director - a spin-off from learning from GunYoung workshop in TLG, for
example (see Appendix 9.1.3). If NTC can remedy this weakness, the firm may be in a
much better strategic position and thus continue its current stronger status of learning TCs as
compared with TLG.
9.5 Electronic Firm E2 (HAL)
9.5.1 The Business Context
HAL was set up in Hanoi at the end of 1984 as a local state-owned enterprise. The company
started with about 100 staff, and now has five member enterprises specialising in materials,
mechanical engineering, industrial electronics, consumer electronics and repair and
maintenance activities. The total labour force is about 500 (on average 40 to 50 per
enterprise), including its joint venture subsidiaries. At the outset, HAL produced black-and-
white TV sets, simple radio cassettes and some audio equipment. Now, its range of
consumer electronics has expanded to include colour TV sets, TV tubes and a sample
production of VCRs and hi-fi equipment like karaoke machines.
From the beginning, the company aimed to produce consumer electronics for the
domestic market together with some measurement and control equipment. In 1985 HAL
chose JVC (a Matsushita company) as a partner in a technology transfer agreement. JVC
supplied the complete equipment for assembly lines which could produce colour TVs, radio
cassettes and some hi-fi equipment, as well as instruments for testing, measurement and
quality control. By 1988, HAL expanded its foreign relations to other Japanese and Korean
companies, also on the basis of business contracts which stipulated the transfer of all the
equipment for the production lines.
Five years after its establishment, the company was still only operating in the
domestic market. However, in 1989, it signed a contract with a Japanese company to
produce industrial electronic parts for the robotic hands used in NISSAN's car assembly
plant in Britain. Production is carried out on the basis of OEM agreements: the design and
technical specifications are provided by the Japanese company, while HAL organises the
production arrangements and the supply of almost all inputs. However, these products are
simple, mostly involving metal-working, and some specific components are still provided by
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the Japanese partner.1 Up to 1992, the company produced 50 sets of equipment on average
each year, worth more than 100,000 USD. The Japanese partner took care of all marketing
and distribution activities and the contract marked HAL's first involvement in exporting. For
other activities, HAL tried to approach the Soviet and East European markets with consumer
electronics products such as colour TV sets and radio cassettes but without meeting any
success. It could only occasionally export very small volumes of product. Recently, HAL
has tried to explore the possibilities of exporting its products to remote locations in South
China where similar Chinese-made products are of lower quality.
In the domestic market, HAL actively co-operated in 1993-1994 with foreign
companies, especially Daewoo. The firm has signed contracts to assemble tubes for
Daewoo's colour TV sets for export purposes. The project is worth 170 million USD and
has involved setting up a plant to produce about 1.6 millions tubes per year, 80% of which
are for export. The company is also co-operating with Daewoo to set up a plant to assemble
colour TV sets for export in Vietnam (where 70% of the components are to be made locally).
In addition, HAL has approached other large firms like French Thomson CSF, and the
American companies, Digital Equipment Co. (DEC) and AT&T, in its attempt to pursue its
future expansion in the computing business.
Among external factors, the heavy taxation burden receives the most criticism from
this company. Its unequal position, as compared with foreign investors, concerning tax
rates and incentives make local firms like this one less competitive. For example, while
domestic companies have to pay rather high taxes without any exemption period, foreign
investors are exempted from tax for a period of four years after profitable production has
started. As HAL sees it, this problem makes it less able to accumulate resources for
attempting various kinds of new investment.
The lack of long-term policies to develop the electronics industry as a whole (see 5.3)
also hinders the efforts of this SOE firm to orient itself towards making long-term
investments, and it is difficult for HAL to anticipate how it may best co-operate with foreign
firms.
State ownership poses its own kind of problem for HAL. Salaries are low and are
rigidly set. Although there used to be perks attached to jobs in this kind of company - such
as housing and social security benefits - these became minimal following the reforms of
1986. The managers of SOEs cannot implement flexible incentive systems, as is possible in
private companies. Nor can they regulate themselves financially or in terms of their
recruitment or labour practices.
lrrhe name of this new Japanese partner was not disclosed during interview for competitive reasons.
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Market problems also cause some difficulties for HAL. The weak development of
the domestic market for industrial electronics and computing has led to a poor demand for
high-tech products. This situation renders electronics firms like HAL a disincentive to
making an effort to produce more sophisticated products. Meanwhile, the consumer
electronics market is becoming increasingly competitive.
To lessen the difficulties of generating adequate capital, one of HAL's priorities has
been to pursue many different foreign partners. Using the assistance of foreign partners
during the initial stage, the firm hopes to accumulate sufficient resources to ensure that they
can invest back into their own core electronics activities. Moreover, the aim of the firm is to
become more equal with its foreign partners, and, consequently, to become an independent
and strong player in the electronics business, both at home and in international markets.
Therefore, HAL is attempting to expand beyond electronics into other types of business
through its three joint ventures with Daewoo: picture tubes; TV sets and electronic
appliances; and a business centre and hotel complex (see Appendix 9.3.3)
To deal with market factors, HAL pursues a mixed approach of diversifying its
product range as well as searching for niches that the firm can comfortably enter. While
continuing with its production of consumer electronics, the company also actively looks for
opportunities to do something quite new, e.g., assembling electronics hands for robots.
New products like this may help the firm to exploit a niche market with the Japanese
producers and to become part of that particular niched network globally. In addition, the
firm is currently searching for new partners (who are not Japanese or Korean) for other
higher value-added products. Its current negotiations with American AT&T and DEC seem
quite promising for gaining them a foothold in the computing and telecommunication
business. This represents one way for them to side-step the weak local demand for their
high-technology products.
9.5.2 The Accumulation of TC and Learning
HAL's profile (see Appendix 9.3.2) shows that the firm has developed three capabilities
quite strongly: production, minor change and linkage. An investment capability is also
beginning to appear, as the company has recently attempted various new ventures. So far
the firm does not have marketing and major change competencies. The use of learning
mechanisms within HAL is given in Table 9.3.
As can be seen here, learning-by-doing occurs in almost all activities, but HAL has
only acquired four capabilities. It is still inexperienced in marketing and, so far, even its
foreign connections are not proving sufficient for acquiring this capability. This lack is
compounded by the absence of any formal training being undertaken by the firm.
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Foreign connections, extended from JVC to Daewoo, is the mechanism most used by
HAL and is deployed quite creatively by HAL's managers: they have invited their foreign
partners to take part in their technical improvement activity. This may explain why HAL is
one of the few firms able to utilise this mechanism for acquiring a technical change
capability. As for prior accumulation, the background of HAL's managers as former
scientists (the Director was the head of the Radio Electronics Department at Hanoi
Polytechnic) has contributed not only to strong linkage capability but also to high absorptive
capacity which is useful for utilising foreign connections in a more active way.
Table 9.3 Learning Mechanisms in HAL
TC Investment Production Minor changeMarketing Linkage Major change
strong strong strong no strong no
Learning
By-doing + + + + + 0
Prior + + + 0 + 0
accumulation
On-the-job 0 + 0 0 0 0
training
Off-the-job + + + 0 0 0
training
Foreign + + + + + 0
connection
Information 0 + 00 + 0
Macro policies and market factors are the most influential of the external factors on
the learning activities in HAL. The strict regulations which apply to an SOE's financial
management (see 8.2.1) reduce speed and flexibility in using resources for technological
innovation activities. The difficulty of doing business without first having a strategic view
206
of the whole sector also hinders the efforts of this SOE firm to orient itself to long-term on-
the-job and off-the-job training programmes. Similarly, HAL has difficulty in organising its
learning through foreign connections over the long run, due to the state's confused industry
development policy. The weak domestic market for industrial electronics and for computing
business also conspires to reduce HAL's active self-learning attempts. The firm's
willingness to try to produce more competitive products - implying the need to master more
TCs - is jeopardised by a lack ofmarket motivation.
HAL's responses to external factors also contribute to shaping its TC acquisition and
learning. As mentioned in the last section, diversification into new business areas and
specialisation in niched products (like robotic components) are HAL's main strategies. The
firm needs to acquire TCs such as how to invest in new business or engage in large-scale
production. Moreover, the specialisation strategy in particular requires specific knowledge
of robotics assembly. Although encountering few problems with the industrial support
system (thanks to good informal connections, a strong background in R&D and high
absorptive capacity), HAL still has difficulty in acquiring marketing and investment
competence, and it looks to its foreign partners to complement its dearth of non-technical
knowledge. Besides, there is a desire to explore more business opportunities and to secure
its funding. All these factors encourage HAL to forge closer links with foreign partners; the
foreign connections mechanism is one of the most important learning devices of the firm.
The behaviour of this firm is, thus, the joint outcome of external constraints posed by
investment policy and market factors and of its reactions to these constraints.
The interviews reveal that the interaction of HAL's managers with their environment
is crucial to how the company uses its available learning mechanisms in the most effective
way.2 However, the role of the government in implementing policies which are suitably
supportive to encourage the firm further in its learning efforts is no less important. So far,
HAL's experience reveals that the Vietnamese government does not yet have a suitable
selective policy to support the learning efforts of electronics firms.
9.6 Computer Firm E3 (3C)
9.6.1 The Business Context
3C was established in 1989 as a private share-holding company in Hanoi by scientists who
had moved out of state-run R&D organisations or companies. The company started with 15
2By co-operating with various partners at the same time, HAL's managers can gain varied knowledge and
experience and then subsequently recombine them in ways most useful to them (see Appendix 9.3.3).
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people who mainly worked in a Hanoi office. The Director had worked for many years in
banks and trade and financial organisations. The Vice-Director and the Chairman of the
Governing Board were both scientists who had worked in Vietnamese and foreign-owned
organisations before setting up the firm. After about two years, the company had grown to
about 50 staff. 3C now has four main units in Hanoi, HoChiMinh City, and two overseas
offices in Moscow and Singapore (see Appendix 9.4)
At the outset, the company had established that the computing market in the Soviet
Union was huge but disorganised; that buyers there did not demand high quality from
computing products; and that a close relationship between customers and producers was
lacking. Imported computers were not 'Russianised', it was difficult for Russian users to
handle the Latin script of the typical imported keyboard, and there was no system of
maintenance or repair available. All these shortfalls pointed to an excellent opportunity to do
business in Russia. 3C has designed a model 3C-286 specifically for sale in the Soviet
market, which includes a main board, a keyboard, and a Russian-tailored software package.
This solution was granted a patent by the Vietnam National Office of Industrial Property.
The production location for these computers was planned to be in Vietnam, but it
turned out to be too expensive (it would have needed about 200,000 to 300,000 USD to
install the necessary production line). 3C hired a Singaporean company to assemble the
model using Singapore core hardware. 3C's managers learned of potential Singaporean
partners in 1988, and by 1989 - almost immediately after the firm's establishment - had
initiated a co-operative deal with a Singaporean partner. This decision addressed their need
to find good technological facilities and to begin manufacturing at a reasonable cost. They
could thus avoid setting up a more expensive plant within Vietnam, and they were confident
of the mutual benefits accruing to themselves and their Singaporean partner as they had
established rather good personal relations with them.
Thus, from the beginning, 3C had a very specific orientation: to supply one product
to one designated market. The initial efforts of the firm were geared to exploiting the unique
opportunity offered by the huge market they had identified in the former Soviet Union. This
way of starting business, therefore, depended on their possessing some initial knowledge
assets and this, in turn, strongly influenced how the firm proceeded to accumulate TCs later.
Since 3C started as an export-oriented company, the production performance of the
firm can be judged through its export results. From 1989 to 1991, on average each year 3C
exported about 1,000 sets of PCs. In 1990-1991, the turnover of company was 4 million
USD. After its exports fell following the collapse of Soviet market, 3C began to turn to the
domestic market, although it still retains its relationship with its Singapore partner for selling
PCs and providing computing services. By now, the company only exports on a fairly
modest scale. There have been some recent attempts to export products to markets in
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Cambodia, Southern China and the Eastern European countries, but without any great
success. The volume of products for trial export remains negligible.
At this stage, 3C's activities have shifted to engaging in newer ventures, though it
continues to maintain its computing business both in software and hardware provision and in
other industrial electronics services. Its first effort to expand into non-computing activities
was to produce specialised equipment such as electronic balance and data-transfer blocks for
use in industrial projects. It also became involved in providing maintenance services for
medical equipment such as ECGs (electrocardiographs) and in supplying telecommunications
videotext for use in remote provinces (i.e., designing software for district-level broadcasting
stations which carries text over satellite television transmissions). The company is also
active in non-electronics businesses such as bio-chemistry, construction and even the
garment industry. By taking this tack, 3C aims to accumulate sufficient financial strength
and investment skill to enable it to return, in the long run, to its core computing activities.
An embryonic form of venture capital to serve technological innovation can be seen in 3C's
non-electronics activities; this company has invested in well-tested innovations which are
owned by other firms that lack the initial capital to proceed any further with their
development (Appendix 9.4.2).
Among the problems posed by external factors, the most significant for this
company, is that private companies cannot compete with SOEs on equal terms; they are
subject to higher tax rates levied on their sales and their financial systems are more strictly
monitored by the authorities. In general, 3C argues that it has to face greater difficulties than
the SOEs in doing business. The well-known discrimination against private entrepreneurship
(see 5.1 and Appendix 5.11) makes it more difficult for them to accumulate financial
reserves. Another difficulty is related to market activity. The firm currently finds it difficult
to export and although the domestic market is expanding, it is still rather small and
disorganised. Infrastructural systems, both physical and legal, also create difficulties for the
firm, especially as its access to these systems is not as favourable as it is for the SOEs.
In response, 3C has diversified its activities beyond computing as it tries to
accumulate financial reserves from non-computing business to subsidise new investment in
the development of software products. The firm is thus using diversification not only to
develop new markets and products, but also to maintain its old market. After the collapse of
the Soviet market, the firm had to cease trading in this area for some time, although it has
continued exploring the options for new business opportunities in this market. A new
approach that 3C is exploring is to review how it may conduct its business more flexibly.
Instead of just selling PCs, the company now also acts as a middle-man in arranging
business deals. It first looks for potential customers, and than finds the money to finance the
deal - arranging payment on behalf of those organisations which lack this kind of capability.
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Also, instead of transferring goods back to Vietnam, the company involves other partners
from third or fourth countries to arrange for payment in the form of goods that bring the best
results. Thus, by acting as the broker in tri-partite international contracts, 3C continues it
activities in Russia.3
In addition, 3C is attempting to exploit other computing niches, replicating its
strategy for its initial PC production project, although it has been less successful this time
round. It does not yet have sufficient marketing knowledge to engage in the international
sale of software packages. The marketing expertise required for entering the Soviet market
is not relevant for entry into other markets. In general, without a change in government
policy, this company continues to wrestle with a number of problems which they have not
yet been able to solve or side-step.
9.6.2 TC Acquisition and Learning Mechanisms
The evidence from 3C shows that this firm has got four TCs: investment, minor technical
change, marketing and linkage, among which minor technical change and marketing were
largely established assets at the firm's inception. Production and major technical change
capabilities are non-existent. Investment and marketing capabilities exist but remain weak,
despite 3C's combinatory use of learning mechanisms (e.g., it used learning-by-doing and
three other mechanisms for acquiring marketing capability). This suggests that the ranking
of frequency of use of learning mechanisms may not always correlate with TC accumulation.
A closer examination of each learning mechanism in the specific context of the firm may
explain this.
A full picture of 3C's use of learning mechanisms for its TC accumulation is given in
Table 9.4. Prior knowledge and experience accumulation and collection of information are
the most important learning mechanisms for 3C. Foreign connections have contributed
significantly to TC accumulation while training mechanisms have not been used at all.
3One of possibilities that 3C is now considering is to open a production facility in Czechoslovakia, where
the import of SKD components is tax free. From this assembly facility, the firm may be able to serve its
market in the former Soviet Union and in other countries as well. According to the firm, this strategy may
carry some advantages. Setting up a business (sales offices, shops, service centres or assembly facilities) is
easier and cheaper in Eastern Europe than it is in Russia, and the business environment is also more stable
and safe. In addition, this strategy means that the firm can utilise the existing academic strengths of Eastern
European organisations. Meanwhile, the firm's Russian business has shifted towards non-computing
activities. For example, in 1992 3C signed a deal worth more than 3 million USD for selling garment
products there. It is also involved in financial brokering such as arranging financial exchanges and staff
transfers for Vietnamese organisations operating in Russia. The firm stands to gain about 20% of its total
exchange from this kind of business.
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Table 9.4 Learning Mechanisms at 3C
TC Investment Production Minor changeMarketing Linkage Major change
weak no strong weak strong no
Learning
By-doing + 0 + + + +
Prior + 0 + + + 0
accumulation
On-the-job 0 0 0 0 0 0
training
Off-the-job 0 0 0 0 0 0
training
Foreign + + 0 + 0 0
connection
Information 0 0 + + + +
There is an explanation for why training mechanisms have not been deployed. In
3C, prior accumulation is one of the most important mechanisms for gaining knowledge of
minor technical change and marketing, and the recruitment of researchers and engineers
plays a crucial role in this regard. This emphasis on previous accumulation suggests that this
firm is over-reliant on this mechanism since it provides no further training for its staff.
Although a lack of funding and of sufficient state support for private firms constitute part of
the reason for this situation, 3C's over-emphasis on using prior experience may also be a
contributory factor.
3C's profile also highlights the significance of the barter approach (i.e., using
informal and personal relationships) to ensure access to information and technological
expertise (see Appendix 9.4.3). Indeed, the difficulty of learning-by-doing (in marketing
software products, for instance) means that this mechanism is not at all straightforward, but
involves active trying and struggling.
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External factors also create their own difficulties for how the firm uses learning
mechanisms. Discrimination against private enterprise makes it more difficult for this kind
of company to accumulate financial reserves which can then be dedicated to learning
activities. Market factors have had an important impact on the learning activities of 3C. In a
competitive market, it is costly to find, establish and use foreign contacts for learning
purposes. The domestic network of R&D institutes and universities cannot support the firm
in its innovation and learning activities. The problems include the lack of modern laboratory
facilities and the unsuitability of the curricula of the available training and education
programmes for meeting the need of the computing business. The way research
programmes and co-operative relations are structured do not encourage scientists to co¬
operate with 3C in formal contractual agreements. At the same time, these public sources of
training and expertise are not easily available to a private firm like 3C.
As discussed in the last section, 3C has responded to its external environment and
these responses have influenced how the firm has proceeded up its TC acquisition learning
curve. Diversification both within and beyond electronics is one of 3C's main strategies for
developing its business. This strategy requires that 3C acquire new kinds of knowledge and
experience about, for example, entering new markets. By moving from a Singaporean
partner (a suitable relationship for producing PCs) towards forging new links with advanced
US firms for doing software business, 3C hopes to diversify its foreign learning sources as
well. Hence, diversification represents more than the attempt to accumulate additional
financial resources for business activities; it also becomes a means to support learning and
innovation efforts. In trying to deal with problems like the poor system of support and
discrimination against private companies, 3C tends to seek out alternative business, leading it
to explore even more foreign connections. Joining a larger network of software producers is
another approach. Again, to identify a niche market and to specialise in a niche product is
not only a business strategy, but also a crucial solution for augmenting the firm's knowledge
and experience. Moreover, this might help the firm to overcome the problem of protecting
its industrial property rights.
Although these reactions seem quite workable in the short term, 3C may encounter
more difficulties in the years to come. Until now the firm has relied too heavily on its
existing competence, accumulated long before the firm starting trading. This prior
experience accumulation has helped 3C to gain an edge by winning huge profits in the Soviet
market from a very unique business. But without any kind of training (on-the-job or off-the-
job), the company will find it difficult to maintain its level of expertise in the fast-changing
computing business.
As the firm's diversification strategy has also involved it in a shift away from its core
computing business, this will have an impact on the extent to which the firm can deepen its
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technological competencies. Whether 3C can maintain its role in the high-tech computing
business in the future remains to be seen. At the same time, as a private company, the firm
can do nothing about discriminatory state policies. This factor must be addressed at a level
higher than the individual firm; it demands new government policies.
9.7 Some Distinct Features of Two Electronic Firms
While HAL has production capability and no marketing expertise, one of 3C's most valuable
assets is its marketing skill although it has no production competence. This difference can be
partly explained by the general situation of the electronics industry in Vietnam. But, in
addition, the explanation lies in the specific circumstances of the firms where 3C
intentionally did not try to produce its own products, but relied on its previously accumulated
marketing and minor technical change capabilities for starting up in business. This is quite a
unique feature compared to other computing companies in this study.
The HAL case study also suggests that the company probably has the potential for
major technical change capability because of its good minor change capability, its academic
background, its initial steps in R&D activity and its active collection of information. The
director of the firm also has a very clear vision about training programmes and has concrete
plans to enhance his engineers' knowledge. 3C's ability to develop major technical change
on the basis of its quite good minor change capability remains to be seen.
One of main features of both firms is that they both benefited from using prior
accumulation of knowledge and experience. Their managers came from a research
background, which helped them acquire the minor technical change capability and to develop
their linkage capability. The same can be said for investment knowledge and experience,
since both HAL and 3C employ experts either from Hanoi City or from financial and trade
ministries. The two firms use collection of information to differing extents. HAL used this
mechanism only to learn production and linkage, while 3C used this mechanism more
efficiently for marketing, linkage and even technical change capabilities (although it could
acquire only minor change and not major change capability). Interestingly, this difference
can be understood as a spin-off ofR&D development in the electronics industry. Because
research activities take place much more actively in computer sciences than in consumer
electronics (see 7.2.), 3C was able to utilise this factor as a strength: ensuring better access
to information and documentation, and greater availability of research experts who could act
as consultants for the firm.
Both firms have relied heavy on foreign connections although this has led to different
results, mainly with respect to marketing capability which 3C has acquired but HAL has not.
The valuable time spent at GenPacific and collaboration with DEC have contributed to the
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marketing capability of 3C's managers. Although HAL has had an active approach towards
learning from foreigners, this had been geared more towards acquiring technical knowledge,
with marketing efforts still being too new to have achieved any significant results. It seems
that in 3C, its director's previous experience of working in financial and banking circles
better prepared that firm to absorb the new knowledge provided by the foreign partner than
was the case with HAL's director who was just a scientist.
Both firms used learning-by-doing in combination with other learning mechanisms
which, as discussed earlier, is a must for their TC accumulation. 3C's lack of involvement
in production has prevented the firm from learning this capability through leaming-by-doing,
in spite of its co-operation with a Singaporean partner.
The extent to which the firms combined their learning-by-doing with other
mechanisms also differs. As mentioned above, in HAL learning-by-doing is supported by
more mechanisms than in 3C for most TCs, except marketing. Although HAL's managers
initially relied on prior knowledge and experience and on foreign connections, at a later stage
they continued to upgrade their capabilities by intensive on-the-job and off-the-job training
programmes. This continuity by provision of training did not occur in 3C and this factor
plays a large role in positioning HAL as having more formal knowledge of investment and
production activities. As for international marketing, ifHAL can continue its creative attempt
to learn this capability through learning-by-doing and using foreign connections more
vigorously for export links, it is very likely that it can catch up and even surpass 3C in the
long term.
Both HAL and 3C have diversified beyond electronics into other businesses in order
to secure more financial and technological resources. They have also both attempted to
specialise in a niche area of business: industrial electronics and customer-led software
production. So far, HAL seems more successful than 3C in its diversification and niche-
entering strategies, the main reason being that the two firms have faced different external
environmental problems relating to their background: the issue of ownership, and the
technological area in which they are specialising.
Due to different ownership, 3C has had to face many more government policy
problems than HAL, of which discrimination against private enterprise is the most serious.
Although up to very recently both firms have enjoyed the advantages of the supporting
system for their prior accumulation, the unequal playing field offers HAL more favourable
conditions than 3C in doing business. Specifically, HAL has easier access to financial
resources and it can more easily use facilities and forge contacts with foreign partners in
investment ventures. This difference explains why HAL has been involved in many more
investment projects than 3C over the last four years. As a 'pet' company of Hanoi City,
HAL has a better business future than 3C, a small private company.
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These differences have shaped the manner in which the same macro-environment has
nevertheless had differing impacts on firms' learning. First, because of different ownership,
more learning sources are available to HAL than to 3C, and HAL enjoys easier access to
expertise and knowledge sources. Unlike 3C, HAL has few problems in getting access to
the learning sources provided by the supporting system. Taking into account that R&D and
training activities in computer sciences are more active than in consumer electronics, the
problems of 3C are even more stark. As a result, 3C has little opportunity to deploy any
training mechanisms, and the firm has also less credibility in developing foreign connections
and collecting information. Because of this, 3C's managers choose not to pursue training
courses and this may well lead to a serious weakness with respect to its ability to maintain its
learning efforts as mentioned above.
Second, both firms encounter the learning problems caused by policy factors, albeit
in opposing ways. While HAL can enjoy the many advantages of being an SOE, 3C sees
the inequality applied against private companies in many incentive regimes as a barrier to
learning. In the meantime, HAL complains about the restrictions on SOEs that a private
company does not have to face (concerning financial management, taxation, labour policy,
etc.). The firm does not even see state ownership as an advantage but as a difficulty (see
Appendix 9.3.). However, in my view, HAL enjoys more advantages than disadvantages
with respect to its ability to leam as compared with 3C. The kind of difficulties that 3C deals
with are much more serious and systemic than the problems facing HAL.
The business areas of the two firms are different (consumer and computer
electronics) and they have differing access to market opportunities. For HAL, the local
market of consumer electronics is more developed but rather saturated. The computing
market is undeveloped and weak. In the meantime, export markets for both consumer and
computer electronics are fairly inaccessible. As a result, although both firms tend to forge
links with foreigners as a way to bypass market barriers and to access more learning
sources, these foreign partners differ depending on which area of business is under
discussion (Asian firms for consumer electronics versus US firms for computing).
An overall comparison between these two firms reveals the different extents to which
they react to learning difficulties, with HAL displaying more conscious learning efforts.
Although the different ownership backgrounds and business areas are crucial in shaping the
whole context for their learning, the role of managers is also very decisive. HAL's
managers seem to be able to better utilise their firm's advantages (being state owned, for
instance) to build long-term plans for learning. One indication of this is the continuous
attempts by HAL's managers to support their previously acquired competence by sending
their people off to gain new knowledge and skill; something not seen at 3C. Although HAL
and 3C have both diversified their connections with foreign companies, diversification is
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stronger and more vigorous in HAL. The move from JVC to Daewoo, followed by the
expansion to their Japanese robotics producer and other Korean partners, provides an
example. Hence, the specific management practices within each firm contribute importantly
to their learning behaviour.
9.8 Conclusion
This chapter has presented four company cases from a whole firm perspective. First, the
evidence presented confirm the earlier conclusion that TC accumulation depends on
combining learning-by-doing with other mechanisms, among which prior accumulation and
foreign connections are the most important. However, as the cases of HAL and 3C have
shown, this process must be actively maintained through training programmes geared to
upgrade previously accumulated expertise. This is especially important in order to acquire
new knowledge and experience which is simply not available through prior accumulation.
The evidence of these case study firms also reconfirms that the learning behaviour of firms is
shaped both by macro external factors and by individual strategic responses to these factors.
Particularly, the difference in ownership explains the many variations in the ways the two
electronic firms leam and acquire their TCs.
The factors of the supporting infrastructure such as the research background and the
spin-off from R&D activities (especially in electronics) is crucial. It has even led to the
higher absorptive capacity of firms like HAL, a pre-condition necessary for fully utilising
other mechanisms like foreign connections. The availability (or not) of suitable learning
sources in the supporting system is also important in shaping whether or not firms can
acquire new non-technical knowledge. This factor explains the difference outcomes from
using prior accumulation in TLG and NTC.
Next to amplify the findings in previous chapters, case studies show that the ways
companies specialised or diversified (within the scope of their traditional activities as in
TLG, or beyond them as in NTC), and whether with one partner (Itochu) or with many,
affected their accumulation of competence. In addition, the background of the firms, their
historical circumstance, and managers' backgrounds, all play an important role in micro-
macro interactions. One of the most distinct features to emerge from these cases is the role
of managers in enabling learning efforts (or not). This feature affects how firms use training
to support other learning mechanisms. Instead of being mere passive receivers of external
impacts, firms actively respond through their managers' actions. Even within the same
macro environment, firms take different management strategies which, in turn, leads to
different outcomes for learning attempts and TC accumulation. This can be seen most clearly
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between TLG and NTC in developing their business, acquiring technology and accessing
market channels.
The cases also point to the role of government in creating favourable conditions for
learning to take place, through conducive policies; through the supporting infrastructure; and
through how it deals with issues like ownership. The specific current history of as a
transitional economy also emerges as an influential factor. The relevance of these findings to
wider theoretical issues is discussed in the next chapter.
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Table 9.5 Production and export of TGI
Production
Year 1958 1985 1988 1992
Pieces 421,261 n.a. 4,403,000 5,730,000
Turnover (in VND millions)
Years 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
VND 25 195 372 1,852 5,498 6,203 14,464 60,000 n.a
Share of export to hard currency area
Years 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993




In Part II, I presented empirical material based on 24 firms from two Vietnamese industries.
In Chapter 10,1 explore the relevance of this material to the theoretical framework of the
study and compare the findings of this study with existing empirical evidence. Chapter 11
presents the conclusions and implications of the study, for national policies from the firm-





This chapter analyses themes in accordance with the main research questions of the study.
Section 10.2 deals with patterns of TC building, learning modes, and their relationship to
TC. Section 10.3 analyses the sequential features of TC building and the dynamics of the
learning process which have emerged as important from the study. Next, Section 10.4
analyses the specific Vietnamese context and its influence on TC building and learning.
Sectoral differences and a firm-specific focus are addressed in Sections 10.5 and 10.6. Each
section refers to both the theoretical background and the relevant empirical evidence. Some
comparisons across different dimensions and aspects are also provided (i.e., sectors,
ownership and national and regional perspectives).
10.2 The Relationship between TC Accumulation and Learning
10.2.1 Limitations of Technical Change and Marketing Capabilities
The first research question of this study was to examine which TCs have been obtained by
the firms. Comparing the findings in Chapter 6 and the existing TC taxonomies in literature,
it can be said that most of the TCs developed by the firms in this study belong to the start-up
level of functions, comprising operational capabilities in the taxonomy of Baranson & Roark
(1985), or the capacities to use a technical system mentioned by Bell and Scott-Kemmis
(1985b). The technological change capabilities of the firms in this study are not very
developed, and certainly far from being the innovative (or innovation) capabilities mentioned
by Baranson & Roark (1985) or Westphal et al (1985). Few firms seem able to conduct
institutional search for innovation and/or basic research as defined in Fransman's taxonomy
(1984).
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The existence of some firm-level TCs but not others shown in this study was found
by others (Westphal et al, 1985; Fransman, 1995) mentioned in Chapter 2. In particular,
this finding is rather similar to the experiences of Korea as a NIC, where production and
investment capabilities were more developed than innovation capabilities (Westphal et al,
1985). However, this study shows more concretely than others which TCs are being
acquired by the firms. Among technical change capabilities, the majority of Vietnamese
firms in this study have developed minor technical change capability geared to
improvements, adjustment and adaptation of technology, whether process or product. The
major technical change capability, involving R&D or design has been much less developed.
Only a few firms such as TG4 (or see E3 in Section 9.5), after long experience of engaging
in minor technical changes, took the first steps towards attempting any major technical
change activities. This feature is not specific to Vietnam, but is rather common in developing
countries where major technical change activities are out of reach.
Another distinct finding in this study is the much weaker development of non¬
technical compared to technical competence. For example, compared to production and
minor technical change capabilities, investment and, to a larger extent, marketing capabilities
were less in evidence. This point is rather important since in many industries, marketing has
proved to be a crucial competence if a firm is to be competitive, in domestic as much as
export markets. Similar findings can be found in other studies of software and computing
(Ernst & O'Connor, 1993; Katz, 1987b), and the fashion garment industry (Lall &
Wignarajar, 1994). Studies of other developing countries show that this is mainly due to the
difficulties experienced by specific industries. For instance, in the computer software
industry, internal and external barriers1 cause problems for firms in exporting and in learning
marketing. In the top-end garment industry, such as high fashion, similar problems exist:
the dominance of some selective top fashion designers in the international market, the rapid
change of product trends, the high cost of activities to support the design, etc. (Mytelka,
1991).
However, in the case of Vietnamese firms, this problem is even more systemic.
There is a lack of marketing competence in almost every Vietnamese firm, regardless of
which industry is under discussion. Firms working in low-value product areas, like
spinning or weaving, and in consumer electronics all lacked marketing capability, even for
the domestic market. When it comes to the export market, the problem is even more severe.
As a result, it would be fair to say that weaknesses in marketing capability are inherent to
1 These problems are high quality standards, shortages in qualification or lack of methodologies, poor
infrastructures, the small domestic markets of developing countries, the lack of support for accumulating
financial resources, and the dominance of US producers in an international market which is highly
competitive (Correa, 1996).
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Vietnam's condition, not only as a developing country, but also as a country whose
economy has had a history of being centrally planned. Similar findings emerge from other
studies of transitional economies (Radosevic, 1993; Balasz, 1995). This weakness is also
apparent in other non-technical knowledge areas like business management, and economic
analysis of investment activities such as cost/benefit analysis and feasibility studies. The
lack of competitive pressure and the slight regard for performance in terms of quality all
contributed to firms having no need to develop this kind of non-technical competence in the
pre-reform period before 1986. During this period, when a subsidised and passive mentality
among producers was dominant (see 5.2.3 and Appendix 5.11), awareness of marketing - in
particular, recognition of the importance of this activity for both sales and innovation - was
absent. The whole business culture in pre-reform firms can be regarded as lacking market
consciousness and incentive motivation.
After reforms, the weaknesses of training and education facilities in offering firms
non-technical knowledge was another serious constraint. Thus, the cause of the
underdevelopment of non-technical expertise shifted from a lack of desire to develop it, to
the lack of facilities to learn it (in terms of access, sources of expertise, and experience) and
non-technical capabilities continue to be weak. Since these capabilities are still
underdeveloped among the Vietnamese firms of this study (reasons for which will be further
analysed in relation to specific features of transitional economies in Section 10.4), this issue
is very important for both firms' managers and policy-makers.
10.2.2 Patterns of Learning
My second research question concerns the learning mechanisms used by firms in the two
industries to accumulate their TCs (see Chapter 4). As shown earlier, the types of
knowledge needed partially shapes the forms of learning mechanisms used. This section
specifies the rough proximity of different learning mechanisms to the various kinds of
knowledge firms need to learn. The more concrete relationship between learning
mechanisms and TCs, such as the contribution of different learning mechanisms to the type
of accumulated TC, is addressed in Section 10.2.3.
The pattern of using learning mechanisms has been examined in Chapter 7. As
presented in Section 7.5.1, the learning-by-doing mechanism is central to the TC
accumulation of firms, occurring in all firms of this study. The practice of Vietnamese firms
indicates that this learning mechanism is a must for firms to obtain TC - whatever capabilities
are being developed. However, learning-by-doing may sound too general, failing to capture
the different nuances of this activity that emerge within the differing circumstances of the
firms. In his study of Celltech, Dodgson (1992) called learning-by-doing 'learning-by-
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solving' the technical problem. Von Hippel & Tyre (1995) referred to learning-by-
templating. In the Vietnamese firms, this mechanism was a process of trial and error;
learning by trying to get things done. In some cases, firms' efforts to try something, adjust
and then try again were so lengthy and painful that I found Fleck's (1991) term "learning by
struggling to get it to work" very relevant (see Section 3.5.4). In other words, the important
implication is that learning-by-doing is not simply the act of just-doing-the-thing, but the
whole painful process of making a conscious effort to try something in order to get some
technology (process and product) to operate as wished. Without these conscious and
constant attempts at adjustment for better results - what Bell (1984) calls learning-by-
changing - the simple and passive repetition of functions by the firms has less importance for
TC accumulation.
My findings also show that no firm can obtain a TC simply through deploying the
learning-by-doing mechanism alone. Most use other learning mechanisms to supplement
learning-by-doing.
The importance of previously accumulated knowledge and experience in facilitating
the process of learning gives support to the notion of absorptive capacity suggested by
Cohen & Levinthal (1990). Still, the importance of this capacity does vary in relation to
different types of knowledge. Most prior knowledge came through two types of recruitment:
new graduates from universities and experienced managers from other organisations and
firms. Depending on the specific background of the graduates or the experienced new
recruits, the absorptive capacity of the firms is likely to support one type of knowledge over
another. As shown in Section 6.4, recruitment by the firms mostly introduced people with
technical backgrounds. This is an obvious outcome of the situation where R&D institutes,
universities and colleges mainly run courses in technical subjects and can supply firms with
people having engineering skills. Similar technical biases also exist in the recruitment of
people who worked elsewhere as engineers or scientists (e.g., in firms whose directors have
technical and engineering backgrounds (see cases of TG6, E2 and E3 in Chapter 9). It has
been impossible to recruit graduates having non-technical backgrounds due to the lack of
training courses in subjects such as business administration, marketing, and economic or
investment analysis. These are all poorly developed in Vietnamese universities and colleges
(see Sections 5.2.5 and 5.3.5 and Appendix 5.13). The recruitment of managers only
introduced non-technical experience to a limited extent. Nonetheless, the majority of firms in
this study were unable to find people with skills and experience suitable for their business,
especially in the post-reform period. Few firms were able to recruit managers with the
financial and management experience of someone like E3's director (see Section 10.5).
Hence, this bias of technical over non-technical prior knowledge and experience can be
attributed to the kinds of knowledge and experience imparted by training institutions and
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other organisations. The nature of this knowledge, in turn, is the result of policies in
training and education development; the Vietnamese context before reform did not place a
high priority on the provision of non-technical knowledge. So far, the recruitment of people
with previously accumulated expertise is more useful for acquiring technical competence in
production or technical change.
The evidence of the firms in my study also confirms that training (on-the-job and off-
the-job) can greatly enhance the TCs of firms. As Enos (1991) mentions, the effects of on-
the-job training seem to be substantial. Indeed, in my study I found this learning
mechanism, which is mostly informal, to be important for supplementing formal education to
upgrade the TC of the firms.
Learning through foreign connections is one of the most significant mechanisms used
by the firms in this study. Though, as I pointed out in Section 7.6.1, the foreign
connections mechanism was less helpful for learning technical change and marketing than for
other capabilities. This finding is rather similar to those of some other studies on the textile
and electronics industries of developing countries. For instance, Lall and Wignaraja (1994)
found that German involvement in the garment industry of Sri Lanka did not lead to the
development of higher level capabilities in the local firms. Both forms of German
involvement (subcontracting and direct investment) stressed the efficient utilisation of
imported technologies rather than the development of independent design and process
capabilities in the local partners. The strategy of these German firms in Sri Lanka was
premised on the idea that investing in the development of higher technological capabilities in
local Sri Lankan firms would be uneconomical for them. As a result, the foreign connection
proved necessary for starting up some technological capabilities, but was not sufficient for
upgrading these TCs. A similar study by Mytelka (1992) of the textile industry in the Ivory
Coast found that reliance on foreign companies did not help local training and that, due to a
preference for using expatriates rather than local staff, no learning took place.
In a more optimistic study, Ernst (1995) shows that Korean electronics firms used
their connections with foreign companies to learn important knowledge, during the initial
period, about investment and production activities. In some cases they could even learn
adaptive engineering skills, but they still could not learn about major technical change nor
develop their own R&D competence. Evidence from other developing countries suggests
that this situation is typical when using foreign connections for technological learning. The
Vietnamese firms in this study seem to be in a similar situation. Although it may be likely
that foreign partners hesitate to help Vietnamese firms develop their relationship beyond
simple subcontracting (see Section 7.6.1), there are also some other reasons for this problem
which I discuss in Section 10.2.3. So far the evidence does not permit us to conclude that
this is a conscious strategy deployed by foreign companies in Vietnam.
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Another point mentioned in Section 7.6.1 is the importance of informal networks
based on personal relations and contacts among the firms for collecting information,
documentation and offering consulting services. As discussed in Section 3.5.3, the
significance of networking is widely recognised. It should be noted that the networking
concept can be used to emphasise different levels of interconnection: regional, national or
international. Some authors (Nohria and Eccles, 1992) use the networking notion to include
strategic alliances and partnerships. Regardless of what emphasis is placed, and at what
level, the networking notion highlights the interrelationship between various types of actors
and organisations, and its importance in technological innovation. Examples include
Mytelka's (1993) survey of Latin American networking, and a study of global networking
by Japanese electronics firms (Baba & Hatashima, 1995). Most of these studies present
networking as a formal relationship between organisations and firms or between the
personnel of these organisations. There is no doubt that formal networking can be crucial in
technological learning. However, these studies are not explicit enough regarding the extent
to which informal networking among actors (subcontractors, suppliers, buyers and
producers) contributes to such learning. The informal dimension of networking can help the
flow of technological knowledge and experience, though this has not received as much
attention.
In the Vietnamese firms of this study, networking contributed to the flexibility of
production organisation, where many big firms (most are SOEs) subcontract their work to a
network of small private and household companies in order to fulfil their workload more
quickly using a less rigid organisation of jobs (see Section 5.2.2 for the textile/garment
sector, for instance). Informal relationships are also vital for the accumulation of those
technological knowledges which help firms to overcome some of the difficulties of the
formal R&D, training and education system, both before and after reforms (see Sections
7.4.5 and 7.5.3). This feature of informal networking has been observed among industrial
firms and R&D organisations in other countries, such as those of Central and Eastern Europe
(Balazs et al, 1995) and of the former Soviet Union (Shaw, 1995) in their transition to
market economies. This observation highlights the specific character of centrally planned
economies, where formal and rigid relationships, cumbersome regulations, and a lack of
incentive systems inhibits dynamic and efficient innovation activities. As a result,
bureaucratic structures are by-passed as actors use their informal networks to learn from each
other. An illustration of this was where E3's director used his informal connections to do
business in the former Soviet Union. He secured a unique financial arrangement thanks not
only to his know-how, but also to his know-who knowledge of the Ministry of Finance, and
of various banks. I will return to this issue in the context of transitional economies (see
Section 10.4.2).
225
In the study mentioned in Chapter 3, Enos (1991) observed that mutual support
between different actors in firms through the pooling of scarce resources can help to override
the constraints which individual firms face. He also felt that there was little evidence from
developing countries to show that TCs can be created through co-operative efforts, formal or
informal (my emphasis). It seems that my case studies provide new evidence on the
significance of collective networking efforts in the TC building of firms in developing
countries, especially through the channels of informal networking.
10.2.3 The Relationship between Learning Mechanisms and TC Building
One part of my second research question is to examine the contribution of each learning
mechanism to different types of TC. In the above section (10.2.2), I mentioned the
availability of different learning mechanisms offering various kinds of knowledge to firms.
As was discussed in Section 7.6.2, the relationship between learning mechanisms and TCs
can be seen by looking more specifically at each mechanism and its use in accumulating each
TC.
First, learning-by-doing. Despite the difficulty in assessing this mechanism, the
experiences of firms in both the textile/garment and electronics sectors have confirmed that
for most types of TC, this mechanism exists in all firms with TCs. No firms have TC that
did not use learning-by-doing. It seems quite obvious that any firm wishing to accumulate
TC in any function must practice and gain experience through trial and error. By operating
machines and checking certain technical functions, most firms learn to identify and solve
problems by making improvements. Similarly, they learned by-doing various tasks of
investment, undertaking technical change activities or developing linkages. The use of active
learning-by-doing (through struggling or trying as discussed in the last section) in
Vietnamese firms is rather similar to the learning mechanisms presented in Lapid's (1994)
study of layers of learning, and in Von Hippel & Tyre's (1995) work on templating, where
problem identification and solution-finding are done through practical tests, checking and
problem-solving. Thus, the argument given by Rosenberg (1982) that doing or using is
necessary (due to the complexity and unpredictability of interactions between the product and
its use environment) is also borne out by Vietnamese firms.
The importance of leaming-by-doing can be especially great during the phase of rapid
growth of labour-intensive (supplier-dominated) industries and firms (Bell & Pavitt, 1993
and 1997) such as textiles and garments. This is also true of my study, where most firms in
the textile/garment industry and even in the electronics industry are still in the start-up phase,
and expansion is mostly on the basis of labour-intensive assembly.
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Among learning mechanisms to support learning-by-doing, prior accumulation of
knowledge and experience seems to emerge as the most important mechanism for almost all
firms in both sectors. Formal training and work experience accumulated elsewhere play an
important role, although there is a bias toward technical knowledge. The prior accumulation
mechanism - despite being present in almost all TCs - is not as important for marketing and
major technical change capabilities, especially in textile/garment firms. The reason for this is
simple. The lack of marketing awareness, the technical orientation of Vietnam's education
system and the way that ministries support industry (see Sections 5.2.6, 5.3 and 6.4.3)
contribute to this bias in the accumulation of TC among firms. In addition, these factors
could not satisfy firms' needs for specific non-technical learning such as are required to deal
with economic and investment issues.
Foreign connections is the second most important mechanism of learning. The case
evidence in my study shows that in both sectors, this mechanism is mainly used for building
capabilities in production, investment and linkage, but contributes little to marketing
capability (see Section 7.6.1). Also few firms were able to learn technical change and
innovative competencies from their foreign connections (see Sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2).
These findings are similar to other studies on the East Asian economies of South Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan (Hobday, 1995b; Ernst, 1995). These studies
recognise the importance of foreign connections for learning, and at the same time point out
the limited learning provided by foreign connections for developing major technical change
capability. As Bell & Pavitt (1993) suggest, although in general international technology
transfer can be of significant help to firms in developing countries in building up their TC,
with some exceptions (e.g., East Asian firms) the utilisation of foreign connections through
international transfer tends to help the expansion of production capacity rather than the
building of TCs. This study of Vietnamese firms confirms this observation. Moreover,
while East Asian firms (e.g., in Korea) seem able to learn minor technical change from their
foreign connections, most Vietnamese firms are still unable to do so.
According to Lall (1993a), foreign investment is not always geared to transferring
innovation capability; indeed foreign firms tend to base such capability in their home
countries. While this may partly explain the absence of R&D and design capability in the
Vietnamese firms in this study, it cannot explain the weakness of using foreign connections
for learning even minor technical change. As shown in Sections 5.2.5, 5.3.5 and in
Appendix 5.12, local efforts at R&D and technical improvement activities are not very
effective and there is a lack of a dynamic linkage between the S&T infrastructure and
industry - a common feature of centrally planned economies (see Balazs et al, 1995).
Despite this, many firms in my study were still able to learn minor technical change skills
from non-foreign sources. At the same time, only a few firms with conscious strategies and
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capable managers knew how to utilise foreign contacts for learning technical change (i.e.,
E2, E10, Ell and TG14).
As a result, it can be said that the weakness of Vietnamese firms in using foreign
connections for learning technical change is related first of all to the limited abilities of
Vietnamese firms to adopt the necessary strategies and measures to utilise their foreign
contacts (see Section 7.6.1). Similarly, the study shows that the majority of firms found it
difficult to use foreign connections for learning marketing. Only those firms who know how
to devise flexible strategies and techniques (like E2's ability to combine various foreign
sources) can learn marketing experience from their partners.
In both sectors, a similar relationship exists between TC and training mechanisms
(on-the-job and off-the-job), offered by the S&T, training and education system. Unlike
foreign connections, these mechanisms do contribute to building up minor technical change
capability, in addition to production and investment capabilities. The results of this study are
rather similar to the findings of other studies regarding the role of training and education
programmes in accumulating TC in developing countries. As noted by Bell & Pavitt (1993),
there is little information about the use of learning mechanisms such as training for TC
accumulation in most of developing countries (with the exception of some NICs in East Asia
and Latin America). This study of Vietnamese firms contributes to filling this gap in our
knowledge. For example, the study of East Asian late-comers (Hobday, 1995a and 1995b)
does not provide a concrete illustration of how firms use training courses to support foreign
connections, which was the study's main focus. In contrast, my study shows concretely
what kinds of training courses Vietnamese firms use, in what format, for how long and for
what type of TC. By focusing on these questions, the study is able to reveal, for example,
the absence of local training mechanisms for Vietnamese firms to learn marketing and major
technical change capabilities.
One interesting contrast is found between the Vietnamese experience and the findings
of another study where, surprisingly, formal technical training was found to have a negative
influence on TC accumulation. Massaquois (1995) shows that in the case of the informal
sectors in some African countries (Kenya and Sierra Leone), many specialised training
centres use expensive imported machinery, producing an undesirable 'demonstration effect'
in the trainees which leads to excessive capital intensity. In contrast, the training facilities
available to Vietnamese firms were less modern than the production facilities (see Sections
5.2.5 and 5.3.5 and Appendix 5.13). Although this can cause other problems (a lack of
practical experience, for instance), training programmes in Vietnam do not have the above
mentioned undesirable effect on learning. Another reason for this difference is that in the
above-mentioned African countries, training courses were related more to small-scale firms
operating in informal sectors. These activities were not massively organised as in the case of
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Vietnamese SOEs, and tended to be isolated from other industries which are more obsoletely
equipped. The point to be emphasised here is that in spite of the deficiencies in the training
and education system, training courses still have an important effect on the learning efforts of
Vietnamese firms. This point confirms the known importance of training and education in
other East Asian countries, mostly for the acquisition of technical knowledge and, more
recently, non-technical knowledge.
The dominance of technical knowledge (capabilities in production, minor technical
change, and linkage) can also be seen in the case of information and documentation
collection in both sectors. The only difference between the two sectors is in the area of non¬
technical learning. While textile/garment firms use this mechanism for learning about
investment but not marketing, electronics firms tend to learn more about marketing and
nothing of investment. The reasons behind this difference lie in the different background to
each sector's development, which I will return to in Section 10.5.
Drawing on earlier discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of each learning
mechanism and their associations with various TCs (see Sections 7.6.1, 7.6.2 and 10.2.2),
some general features of these learning mechanisms may be identified. Prior accumulated
knowledge through recruitment is the most important mechanism for active learning. This
provides the firms' personnel with the initial assets to climb up the learning curve, together
with the absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levithan, 1990) to know what to learn next, and
how. Foreign connections are more helpful for learning investment and production
capabilities and less so for technical change (see Section 7.6.1). Among the two training
mechanisms, on-the-job training seems to serve better for learning the routine skills of
production and minor technical change capabilities, while off-the-job training seems to
support the learning and updating of knowledge that is newer to the firms. For instance, the
firms could not acquire much expertise in investment and marketing through recruitment or
on-the-job training, but relied instead on off-the-job training, such as short-term courses,
seminars or workshops.
As mentioned in Section 7.6.2, the use of learning mechanisms depends on the
availability of particular types of knowledge from these mechanisms (technical versus non¬
technical). Since the learning sources available to Vietnamese firms are more competent in
providing technical knowledge and experience like production or minor technical change,
firms tend to use mechanisms (such as prior accumulated learning, training and information
and documentation) more for acquiring technical expertise than non-technical expertise. In
the case of foreign connections, the firms use this mechanism for non-technical learning like
investment (and in some cases, also marketing). This depends both on the ability of firms to
utilise their foreign connections, and on the actions of the foreign partners. As a result,
when asking the question "what learning mechanisms are most suitable for which TC?", the
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question "what knowledge and expertise are offered to firms, and how do they utilise what is
on offer?" comes into focus. In turn, this question leads us to consider the activities of the
R&D, training and education infrastructure - indeed, the whole external environment of
learning - as well as the strategic behaviour of the firms in their environment. This latter
focus reveals that, the use of learning mechanisms depends not only on the availability of
relevant knowledge, but also on the types of knowledge (TC) firms want to acquire. These
TCs can be the outcome of the aims which firms want to pursue (e.g., commercial
objectives, strategic directions, etc.), and, these aims are likely to change over time. As can
be seen in Chapter 8, the overall external environment conditions the strategic responses of
firms. These responses then shape the firms' TC needs and, accordingly, their use of
appropriate learning mechanisms. Hence, the importance of the external macro-environment
and its interaction with the strategies of firms is a central issue in understanding the
relationship between learning mechanisms and TC. The specific conditions of Vietnam's
macro-environment will be addressed later in Section 10.4 and the question of firms'
strategies and learning in Section 10.6.
Thus, the relationship between using learning mechanisms and TC accumulation in
Vietnam can be presented as a two-way connection. First, the issue of which knowledge is
to be learnt is important. The question of what to learn (i.e., whether technical or non¬
technical knowledge is required) suggests how it may be learnt (i.e., by means of which
mechanisms), provided that firms have their own conscious strategies for utilising these
mechanisms. Second, the availability of learning mechanisms (i.e., which learning
mechanisms are offered by the supporting system, or by the national system of innovation)
has an important influence on the kind of knowledges that can be learnt. Firms face
difficulties in learning a specific knowledge like marketing, if it is not available from any
source. Taking into account the notion of learning as the means to accumulate TC suggested
by Bell & Pavitt (1993), I schematically represent the relationship between learning and TC
in Figure 10.1.
In Figure 10.1, the purposes of learning (which TCs firms need to acquire) depend
on the macro-environment and the strategic directions firms take in this environment (e.g.,
whether to export or not; whether to diversify products and markets or to just concentrate on
a few specific things, etc.). The macro environment and firms' strategies should decide the
means for, and the activities of, learning: what learning mechanisms can be, and are being,
used by firms. These factors are varied, and depend on firms' formation, the industry, and
the ownership of the firms. In other words, it depends on firm-specific conditions. As a
result of learning, some TCs (or knowledge) accumulated by the firms may, or may not, be
the same as those they had originally anticipated.
230











WHICH TC ARE NEEDED BY FIRMS
MEANS









Figure 10.1 tries to present the preliminary sequence of actions in the learning
process. However, learning might not have such a straightforward linear pattern. It is,
rather, a constantly changing process. Although it is very difficult to distinguish clear-cut
patterns of interaction within this relationship, one thing is certain. The conditions of the
macro-environment and firms' behaviour are major determinants of the suitability of
particular learning mechanisms for accumulating certain TCs. This could also be termed
more fully as "conditional suitability".
Despite these difficulties, according to experience of firms, we can find some
patterns in the combination of learning mechanisms, and these are centred around certain
TCs. I will turn to these specific combinations in the next section.
10.2.4 The Combination of Learning Mechanisms
As mentioned above, it is difficult to provide a ready-made recipe as a way of bench-marking
firms' learning activities. For example, it is not simply a case of stating which learning
mechanisms firms have to use in order to achieve what kinds of TC. Still, some points can
be specified as the results of my empirical studies. First, the need to combine various
learning mechanisms in order to acquire a TC - as argued in Section 3.4.2 - has been
observed in my study (see Sections 7.2.7 and 7.4.7). However, when it comes to the more
concrete issue of which combinations are best, few studies have been done. Many
unanswered questions remain such as "what is the necessary rate of combination?" (i.e.,
how many learning mechanism are sufficient to learn a certain TC) or "in what patterns are
learning mechanisms combined? and for which TC?".
The results ofmy study can straight-away answer the first question about the rate of
combination. As mentioned in Section 7.6.2, the general picture is that textile/garment firms
need at least two extra interactive learning mechanisms in addition to learning-by-doing to
acquire a TC. As for electronics firms, at least three extra mechanisms are required (see the
tables in Chapter 7). These additional mechanisms tend to be prior knowledge accumulation
and foreign connections. Other mechanisms are less frequently present. The differences
between the sectors are probably due to the specific nature of electronics as a more
knowledge-intensive industry than textile/garments, and it therefore requires more learning
mechanisms to obtain a particular TC. However, when it comes to only firms having
strongly developed TC, the rate of using learning mechanisms is mugh higher, ranking from
3.2-3.3 for linkage capability to 5.17-5.5 for production capability in both sectors.
Regarding the question of patterns of combination, the task becomes more
complicated. The practice of TC acquisition among Vietnamese firms shows combinations
involving not only learning-by-doing with other mechanisms, but also of various non-doing-
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based mechanisms. Investment and production capabilities are accumulated mostly through
a combination of prior knowledge, back-up from foreign partners, and then off-the-job
training (for investment only) or on-the-job training (for production only). This pattern is
similar for both textile/garment and electronics firms. Prior accumulated knowledge
supports the initial effort, while foreign connections place the firms on a more substantial
footing. Still, relying on foreign connections seems too passive and therefore, training
courses (on-the-job or off-the-job, depending on the TC) update expertise and enable the
learning to become more independent of foreign sources.
Prior knowledge continues to support minor technical change capability, but it is
combined with training and information collection (for textile/garments) or with training and
foreign connections (for electronics). While training and information collection serve as
ways of updating knowledge, foreign connections play little part in helping firms to learn
minor technical change capability. The exception here is a few electronics firms, which are
able to learn something from foreign partners for this TC (e.g., E2, E10 and El 1), thanks to
the special relationship of the Vietnamese managers with their foreign counterparts
(especially in E2).
To learn marketing competence, the firms use prior accumulation in combination with
either off-the-job training (in textile/garments) or information collection (in electronics).
Some electronics firms have added foreign connections as well. Although, as pointed out in
Section 7.6.1, firms have a tendency to make little use of foreign connections in learning
marketing, some electronics firms did consciously use their foreign partners for this end.
The reason why some electronics firms are more proactive than others is addressed in more
detail in Section 10.5. Firms in both sectors use similar combinations of mechanisms for
learning linkage capability. In addition to prior accumulation, they use information collection
to develop and maintain their network of relations. Electronics firms can combine these with
foreign connections.
The patterns of combining learning mechanisms presented here suggest a probable
guideline for firms. As emphasised before, however, this is not a recipe which guarantees
that a firm following this combination will acquire an appropriate TC. The possible
universality of these findings (if there is any) demands further comparative research across
many firms and countries.
10.3 Sequential Features of TC Building and Learning Dynamics
10.3.1 Sequence of TC Building
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As part of my first research question on patterns of TC accumulation, the study confirms the
sequential nature of TC development as discussed in Section 2.4.1. The majority of firms
commence the process of TC building at the level of simple kinds of production capability,
then move on to acquire the further capabilities of minor technical change or investment.
This attitude of "getting into production first" is seen in Section 6.4. This sequential nature
has been discussed as being related to path-dependency (Metcalfe & Boden, 1992;
Rosenberg, 1994) through which technological knowledge grows. As consequence of this
is the more firms know the more they learn.2
The sequences of TC building in the two sectors share one thing in common: both
start with production capability. Subsequently, the sequence differs across sectors and sub-
sectors and also across firms, depending on firm-specific characteristics such as ownership,
circumstances of operation and establishment, etc. In textile/garment companies, for
instance, the sequence of TC accumulation depends on the ownership of firms, with SOEs
having accumulated TCs gradually while private firms have, so far, had much less time to
accumulate their TCs. In electronics firms, differences exist between computing and
consumer electronics companies.
At the same time, differences between the two sectors in the sequence of TC building
is related to the interaction of the firms with their external environment. In some specific
conditions, it is not necessary for firms to begin with production capability; several
capabilities may come together. The cases of private firms TG8 and TG9 in the post-reform
period illustrate this 'jumping in' pattern, as we saw how they accumulated various TC at the
same time (see Section 6.4.1). Similarly, electronics firms (most are private like E3 and E4)
show that coming from within R&D, the personnel of these firms can go straight to various
kinds of activities with little or no production capability (see Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.2). This
by-passing of the production mode of starting a firm result from some special conditions,
e.g., R&D-based activities and experience of personnel and unique start-up circumstances
(see Section 10.5 for the E3 case). However, these cases provide the exception to the
overall pattern of sequencing. Comparing the findings of this study with the model of East
Asian late-comer firms (Hobday, 1995b), we can see that this jumping-in mode of
Vietnamese firms does not offer an instance of a leap-frogging pattern where a firm can cut
short its learning path and accumulate TCs in a less gradual way. In fact, these Vietnamese
firms still exhibit the same pattern of learning: they start with well-proven and mature
2It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the path-dependent nature of TC accumulation which, as
Rosenberg (1994) observes, is a major task. In his study, Rosenberg himself has dealt mostly with the path-
dependent relations between science and technological innovation, rather than between various types of TC
accumulation.
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technologies and then "move back" - to use Hobday's (1994) term - to more untested and
newer technologies. In sum, it is still a gradual process similar to that of the Asian late¬
comer firms.
10.3.2 Cumulative Dynamics of Learning
The second research question is also addressed by the findings of this study, which supports
the key characteristics of learning (presented in Section 3.4) such as the observation that
learning is not costless and automatic. Firms' experience shows that learning is not one-go
switch but an on-going accumulation process from nothing to something and, further still,
from something simple to something more complex requiring additional knowledge contents
(see Section 7.6.3). This pattern of learning Bell (1985) called the "technological learning
escalator" and the cumulativeness of knowledge has been specified by Saviotti (1992). The
cumulative pattern of learning found in this study is similar to the generally observed pattern
of learning among firms in other developing countries, especially in East Asia (Ernst, 1994
& 1995).
The dynamic nature of learning (changing over time in terms of its sources,
mechanisms and content) is also found in this study (see Sections 7.3 and 7.5). For
instance, the Vietnamese firms started with learning-by-doing, prior accumulation of
knowledge and some simple training. Information collection and other on-the-job training
came later. In using foreign connections, firms moved from a simple subcontracting format
to an OEM mode of relations; sources of learning also changed from the Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries to the EU and Asia-Pacific countries. The content of learning
also expands over time.
The changes in learning taking place in Vietnamese firms - presented in Figures 7.1
and 7.2 - are similar to those found in some other empirical studies, such as the study of East
Asian firms by Hobday (1995b) who identifies the changing nature of both learning content
and learning mechanisms over time. All the features found in the model of export-led
technological learning for late-comer firms suggested by Hobday are quite similar to the
findings in my study, e.g., that the sequencing of learning starts with mastering simple tasks
and with complex learning and R&D coming later. In addition, within this pattern, some
exceptional new start-up firms may jump in at an advanced level, missing out the early stage
of innovation as the case ofMTI and Acer in Taiwan (Hobday, 1995b). These experiences
are somewhat similar to the case of E3 in my study (see Section 10.5) when the firm jumped
directly into producing PCs and software. Indeed the cumulativeness, diversity and
changing dynamics of learning mechanisms found in my study are similar to those found in
the studies of Lapid (1994), Lall & Wignaraja (1994), and von Hippel & Tyre (1995).
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Furthermore, the learning process is changing over time in terms of learning sources,
contents and forms of learning, in accordance with the changing external environment and
firms' actions.
The third research question of this study is to consider why firms accumulated their
TCs using the learning patterns they did. The findings of Chapters 6 and 7 revealed what
kinds of TC firms acquired, and through which patterns they learned. The reasons behind
the similarities and differences of TC accumulation, for example, are attributed mainly to two
factors: ownership of the firms in textile/garment industry, and historical establishment
features across the two sub-sectors in the electronics industry. This evidence supports the
arguments of Lall (1987), Fransman (1986c) and Lundvall (1992) that factors external to
firms' activities play an important role in conditioning the technological development of
firms. The concept of a national system of innovation (NSI), in the experience of this study,
can be observed through the activities of various macro-policies exercised by the state, the
emergence of competitive pressures on firms both locally and in export markets, and the
activity of the supporting infrastructure, etc. Still, the influence of external macro
environment factors alone cannot decide the learning process. The interactions between
these factors and firms' strategic behaviour in the light of their impact on their learning
activities are analysed further in the following sections.
10.4 Vietnam's Context: a Developing and Transitional Economy
Many of the features specific to Vietnam, not only as a developing country, but also as an
economy in transition from being centrally planned to being more driven by market forces,
have already been presented in Section 5.1 (see also Appendix 5.11). The reforms initiated
in 1986 and which continued until the beginning of the 1990s, affected all social and
economic aspects of the country. The change to the external factors after reform became one
of the most important influences on the business activities and learning efforts of the firms
(see Sections 8.2 and 8.4.2). The distinguishing features of the Vietnamese transitional
economy are: reform of the R&D, training and education systems; and the diversification and
opening up of the economy to wider international trade. These two factors will be addressed
in sub-sections 10.4.2 and 10.4.3. I then address the role of the state in the transitional
period (Section 10.4.4), state and private sector ownership (Section 10.4.5). First, I review
the impact of external factors on doing business and on learning.
10.4.1 The Influence of the Macro-Environment on Business and Learning
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As presented in Chapters 2 and 3, macro economic policies of the state are always central to
discussions on external environmental factors (see Sections 2.4.3 and 3.6.2). These
external factors are discussed as supply-side and demand-side factors, comprising policies of
the state, the functions of market factors, and the activities of the S&T and education
infrastructures (see Section 2.5.4 and Chapter 4). All these factors are undoubtedly
important in understanding the learning process in TC accumulation. Nonetheless, most
studies do not provide an answer as to which factors are most influential on which types of
learning. Although these studies specify the impact of these factors on either the general
performance of firms or on their innovation activities, they do not cross-check each factor
against various forms of learning. Therefore, the findings of this study represent a further
step in specifying the influence of external factors on firms' learning processes; they help to
show more clearly what hinders or facilitates learning by means of ranking those influences
in terms of their effects on forms of learning. As presented in Chapter 8, my data presents
the firms' perspectives on the influence of external environmental factors on business
activities in general (Section 8.2), and on learning activities for TC accumulation in particular
(Section 8.4). For each of the four groups of factors, firms offered an opinion an both
positive and negative influences. The findings in Chapter 8 report that the influences are
almost the same for both doing business and for learning activity, in terms of the type of
factor and of the ranking of groups of factors. State policies and the supporting system
emerged as the most influential.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the influences on business, while Tables 8.3 and 8.4
offer an overall picture of the influence each group of factors has on different learning
mechanisms. Some tendencies have emerged from these tables. Policy factors such as
policies of the state on taxation, financial, banking and labour issues, and management
regulation influence almost all learning mechanisms for both sectors. These factors have a
mostly negative effect on the business and learning activities of the firms: they have the effect
of imposing funding shortages, cumbersome regulations, and an overly strict labour
management practice, just to name a few. The supporting system - R&D, training and
education institutions; the activities of other support and service organisations governing
issues on standardisation, metrology and industrial property rights; and legal and physical
infrastructures - has a considerable influence on training (on-the-job and off-the-job), and
especially on information sources. This is to be expected since training courses, provision
of documentation, information collection and consultancy depend directly on the expertise
and activities of the R&D, training and education organisations. This system helps firms to
accumulate their initial technological knowledge through recruitment and training. However,
the main characteristics of the system (e.g., poor curricula for training workers, and the lack
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of a dynamic linkage with industry) make it less effective in helping firms use learning
sources.
One interesting finding is that market factors, like the change of the market structure
and the pressures of domestic and international markets, are not considered by companies to
be as negatively influential on learning as macro-economic policies and the supporting
system. There might be an explanation for this finding. Although the influence of market
factors on general business activities of the firms are severe, at the same time they also create
many opportunities for firms to learn TCs, in terms of new learning sources and formats,
mostly coming from foreign partners in the EU and Asia-Pacific markets (see Section 8.2.5).
Surveys of firms' opinions show that although the opening of markets has created
difficulties for firms in adjusting their activities, at the same time the changes have had
positive impacts on firms' learning. The benefits that firms gain from market changes are
greater than the problems they also bring in their wake (see Section 8.3.2). Considering the
benefits versus difficulties, the firms tend to criticise market changes less than other external
factors. This factor, in any case, has a significant impact on learning and TC accumulation
in the Vietnamese context, as I will discuss in section 10.4.3. The majority of firms in the
study are involved in export activities and depend very much on foreign partners as learning
sources. Therefore, as market factors change, most firms in both sectors feel that their
learning through foreign connections are being influenced by these changes. Social and
cultural factors have similar influences on both sectors: the special mentality and learning
traditions of the Vietnamese have an impact on on-the-job training and learning-by-doing
mechanisms (see Section 8.2.4).
In the following section, more specific issues of Vietnam's context and its impact on
TC and learning will be addressed. I will discuss the main features of Vietnam as both a
developing country and as a country in transition; market changes, especially with respect to
the export market; and the role of the state. All of these have an impact on the TC
accumulation of firms.
10.4.2 Some Features of Vietnam's Transitional Economy: the Impact on
Learning
In this section, I discuss in more detail some of those features of Vietnam as a transitional
economy which have had the most profound impact on learning and TC accumulation, viz.
the changes in the industrial infrastructure (R&D, training and education); informal
networks; and the uniqueness of Vietnam as compared with other economies.
First, changes in the industrial infrastructure. As mentioned in Section 8.2.3, the
heritage of the command economy has had both positive and negative influences on learning
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activity. Prior to reforms, the free, regular and subsidised supply of new university recruits,
educated workers and other technical staff were significant sources of learning for firms.
Continuous support received from state campaigns to promote learning was another strength.
At the same time, the weaknesses of the pre-reform period such as limited market access
(only the CMEA countries were accessible) and the deficiencies of training and education
programmes are well-known (see Sections 7.5.1 and 7.3.2). Similarly stemming from the
heritage of a centrally planned economy, other problems associated with the pre-reform
period - the lack of an incentive system; a lack of concern about the quality dimension of
performance; the passive subsidised mentality of producers; and the absence of any market
awareness - are common among industrial firms (see Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.6).
With the transition to a market economy, things changed. R&D, training and
education were liberalised and became more dynamic, thanks to the entrepreneurial attitude
introduced into the system by the reforms. This has meant that more learning resources have
become available to firms. Many scientists have even moved out of state organisations to set
up their own technical institutions, thus providing firms with additional expertise and skill.
In some cases, they have become the owners of newly set-up firms. The creation of spin-off
companies from R&D and education institutions is characteristic of many other transitional
economies in China (Gu, 1996), and in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Balazs, 1995;
Mosoni-Fried, 1995). This has had a positive influence on these firms' ability to learn: a
good deal of expertise has been accumulated by staff even before they start trading.
Not all the reforms to the industrial infrastructure have had a positive impact on
learning. In particular, the R&D, training and education system is now less supportive of
industry than it used to be. Poorly equipped, and enjoying even fewer state subsidies, the
system has become outdated and is inefficient at serving industry. Although Vietnam's S&T
system is still intact, its state funding has been cut and many research institutes must
supplement their funding with contracts. When they fail to win research contracts, R&D
institutes now have to rely on providing various kinds of service. This has significantly
diminished the scientific expertise as well as the potential learning resources of R&D
institutions. This trend is mirroring the experience of the CEE countries as they shift their
R&D towards the downstream activities of the spectrum (Radosevic, 1993). In addition,
Vietnamese firms no longer have access to free education and training for their personnel
(see Sections 7.3.3, 8.2.3 and 8.4.2).
The reforms of the transitional period, as Vietnam's experience shows, have brought
both good and bad times for firms in utilising the industrial supporting infrastructure. This
situation echoes that of other countries who are also moving from a centrally planned to a
market economy. For instance, Shaw (1995) shows the difficulties experienced by Russian
industries in securing financial support for R&D to develop new competence, even in such a
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prestigious industry as aerospace. In China, the problems within the R&D, training and
education system and with its relation to industry, are similar to those of Vietnam (Baark,
1994; Zhang & Reeve, 1995; Jamison & Baark, 1990). For instance, Gu (1996)
emphasises that the new technology enterprises forming China's computing industry are
spin-offs from the restructuring of R&D institutions. According to her, the technology
market in China is not effective enough to link R&D institutions to their industrial users, and
there is a fundamental problem of organisation separation: the R&D capability still lodged
within the state system remains under-utilised. Also, the innovative potential of Chinese
S&T personnel is limited by both political compromise and the inertia of the economic
system (Baark, 1994).
In the CEE countries, the same situation can be seen. Before the changes, the R&D
system was also structured, like Vietnam's, into three separate parts: academic, universities
and industrial branch sector institutions. Links between these three areas are fragmented.
For example, there is only a slight liaison between S&T and industry. Marketing and
business interests are largely notable for their absence (Balasz et al, 1995). This system is
inefficient and weak. Due to its rigid structure and the formal barriers of the planning
system, people have devised ways to get around the system, e.g., relying on extensive
informal networks. This way of communicating has helped them to get things done. Like
Vietnam, the CEE countries are also experiencing many radical changes to the R&D and
other supporting infrastructures for industrial firms. New problems have emerged in the
transition, such as lack of capital and tax incentives for new ventures (Balasz, 1995). The
creation of spin-off companies from R&D institutions can also be seen in many CEE
countries, such as Hungary (Mosoni-Fried, 1995) and the Czech Republic (Muller, 1995).
In the context of reform, what are the observed similarities and differences between
Vietnam and these other transitional economies? One similarity is that the lack of any
overview in co-ordinating R&D activities has led to poorly co-ordinated government
strategies (Balasz, 1995). This problem is especially evident in Vietnam's electronics
industry which does not have a coherent industrial strategy. Another similarity is the
preoccupation of industrial firms with short-term issues (Balasz et al, 1995) which is
common for the majority of Vietnamese firms. Not many firms in my study could
demonstrate that they had developed a long-term strategic perspective.
Informal networks of connections are another important issue associated with the
transitional period. I argued in Section 10.2.2 that informal networks are crucial for learning
in Vietnamese firms. Also discussed elsewhere is the importance of small private firms
which serve as subcontracting networks for larger firms (usually SOEs) in implementing
large contracts (see Section 6.2.5). But I would like to emphasise the role of personal
networking in building TCs in the firms. This factor plays a pivotal role for using learning
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mechanisms (prior accumulated relations, training and information sources) to accumulate
various kinds of TC (see Sections 7.2.5 and 7.5.5). One of the main reasons firms use
informal links so extensively is the heritage from the command economy where formal
contacts were rigid, cumbersome, and slow to react to the needs of industry. In many cases
forming such contacts was even illegal.3 This situation is quite common in other Eastern
European countries and in countries of the former Soviet Union, as Balasz et al (1995) note.
Before the reforms personal networking did, of course, exist in Vietnam as
elsewhere. However, after 1986, the situation changed somewhat. The case of R&D in the
Russian aerospace industry illustrates that close informal networks diminish with open
competition (Shaw, 1995). In the CEE countries, the transition has disrupted those informal
links which previously had helped to get things done (Balasz et al, 1995). However, in spite
of the loss of many old contacts (people moving to new jobs or losing old ones), these
networks still have some relevance. People in the CEE countries have learned to use
informality - to trust friends more than bureaucrats - and new start-up firms thus tend to rely
on family support rather than bank credit for capital. As a result, informal relations between
people have re-emerged as a way of getting things done even after reform, although to a
lesser extent. New connections are being built on old ones, and they continue to evolve in
terms of the skills, knowledge, capabilities, and local knowledge accumulated from the past
(Balasz, 1995).
This kind of relationship is still working in the Vietnamese context. During the
reform period, the use of learning mechanisms such as information, documentation and
consulting services have became even more heavily dependent on this kind of informal
connection. Informal networking in Vietnam takes two main forms. One is non-political; it
concerns connections among classmates, former colleagues, friends and relatives. The other
has more political links where party connections are used by informal groups and factions
within the party and the administrative organisations. Other forms of informal networking
(e.g revolving around religion, race, cultural tradition or habit) are almost non-existent in
Vietnam. The experience of Vietnamese firms shows that personal and informal contacts
have not been greatly disrupted by reforms. Unlike the CEE countries, they did not
submerge only to re-emerge later. In Vietnam, they have simply always been operating.
The first reason for this is that the political structure of institutions (i.e., the communist
party) is still in place. In spite of the reforms, old connections (both party and non-party)
have not been disrupted, rather they have adjusted to the new conditions of a market
economy. A second factor behind this continued informal link is the mentality of Vietnamese
3Until reforms, the contracts between R&D organisations and industrial firms in Vietnam were not allowed
by law. For more details, see Appendix 5.12.
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staff. For a long time now, they have not been in the habit of using consultancy services,
seeing that occupation as an untrustworthy one. The only mechanism for creating
confidence and credibility is the personal trust built up over a long period through very
informal social relations. The continued reliance on this old way of working seems common
to many other post-communist and transitional economies, but seems stronger in Vietnam's
case.
Another difference is the more active role of government in Vietnam as compared
with other CEE countries in supporting the formation of new entrepreneurial enterprises like
science parks, technology parks and professional associations. In the CEE countries, these
efforts are undertaken by individuals and research organisations, while in Vietnam and, to a
similar extent, in China (see Gu, 1996), government has been more involved in initiating
these activities. Again, the explanation lies in the fact that the whole political and
administrative system in the CEE countries has been shaken to its roots, while in Vietnam
and China it has not. The role of the state will be discussed further in Section 10.4.4.
Having discussed the features of transitional economies and compared them to
Vietnam, one should bear in mind that, in many ways, Vietnam is not comparable to these
other countries. There is a fundamental difference between Vietnam and these countries:
while resembling the CEE countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union in that they
all share a history of communist political ideology, Vietnam is far less developed
industrially. Economic transition in the former countries came about as a result of, and
together with, radical political changes. This is not the case in Vietnam. In this sense, China
shares more similarities with Vietnam, although the huge scale of the Chinese economy
makes further comparison difficult.
As a result, Vietnam is a unique developing and transitional economy. While
retaining a political structure which has not been dismantled, profound economic changes
have taken place. In comparison with other transitional countries, Vietnam is unique in
terms of its low level of industrial development and its slower pace of reforms. At the same
time, compared to other developing countries in Southeast Asia, it has a more bureaucratic
administrative structure and has less market awareness of the whole socio-economic system.
One can note that in this unique context, there are some features that resemble those of other
transitional economies, and some of other developing countries. These characteristics are
sometimes the same for both types of countries (for instance, the importance of various
external environmental factors on learning and TC acquisition), but more often they are
different.
On the one hand, the commonalties between Vietnam and other transitional
economies (such as the weaknesses in learning non-technical knowledge, the limitations on
marketing capability, the lack of consciousness about product quality and qualitative
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performance) are less apparent in developing countries. Developing economies typically
have had more exposure and access to the market pressures of the international economy.
The problems of formerly centrally planned economies (both before and after reforms) are
surely unique to those countries; they are not problems that are shared by other developing
economies.
On the other hand, features such as the limitations on technical change capability, and
the weakness of domestic R&D in providing technical expertise for technological absorption
and adaptation, are more often observed in developing (mostly non-NIC) countries than in
the CEE countries, where the NSI has accumulated a relatively good industrial basis for
innovative activities. Similarly, the weakness of foreign connections in helping local firms
to learn technical change and marketing can be seen quite clearly in the experiences of
Vietnam and also in some developing countries (Lall & Wignaraja, 1994), while that
difficulty is less obvious in the CEE countries.
Since not enough empirical studies have been conducted, it is difficult (and beyond
the scope of this study) to comprehensively compare the characteristics of developing and
transitional countries in their technological development paths.4 Nonetheless, one thing is
clear. Vietnam exhibits features of both developing and transitional countries. Some
features are similar and exist in both types of country. Some even apply to all economies,
e.g., the importance of informal networking for innovation activities. As for other features,
these differ among the two types of country. In consequence, the way these features blend
in Vietnam suggests that Vietnam experiences most of the difficulties of both developing and
transitional economies. Still, some features of Vietnamese reforms which seem a
disadvantage, in fact turned out to be an advantage for R&D. For example, the slower pace
of political change in Vietnam (in governmental, political and administrative structures) as
compared with the CEE countries, seems to have prevented Vietnam's NSI from free-falling
into chaos as has happened in some CEE countries. Paradoxically, after some years of
abandoning subsidies for education and training, the role of government in this respect is
now being reassessed. The East Asian belief that developing countries require their
governments to play a strong hand is returning to Vietnam also. I will discuss this issue in
Section 10.4.4.
4One of the few comparative studies available is the work of Henderson (1996). This study finds some
similarities between Eastern European and East-Asian countries such as the role of the state, a weak
secondary association, the role of education and training, and similarities in economic coordination and
income inequality. As for differences, these include the role of trade unions, the nature of economic and
administrative bureaucracies, the function of the rule of law, family and kinship relationships, issues of
development versus restructuring, differences of geo-politics, location in the world economy and systemic
changes. According to this work, Vietnam and China float between these two poles. However, this study
focuses on political and economic issues, rather than on technological orientations.
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10.4.3 The Opening Up of Export Markets and the Emergence of Local
Markets
The transitional period has brought many radical changes. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
role of users in creating TC is well established (Justman & Teubal, 1995). Market changes
have brought Vietnamese industry closer to meeting the needs of their users. As outlined in
Sections 8.2.2 and 8.4.2, market changes have shaken Vietnamese firms out of their long
period of inertia, bringing them closer to buyers, especially for export products. Given the
newly-created market pressures, the firms in this study have had to change their business
activities and this, in turn, is changing their learning behaviour.
The importance of a competitive environment, or competitive pressure (Fransman,
1995), and of market factors (Lall, 1994a) is obvious. Dalum et al (1992) emphasise that the
market is the necessary mechanism for abandoning obsolete products and processes and for
selecting firms with a future as opposed to those with no learning capability. Fransman
(1995) observes that as a source of competitive pressure, export markets can be very
important. He compares Japan, where exports tend to be the result of the accumulation of
competencies, with Korea and Taiwan, where export activities are the cause of the
accumulation of competencies. These notions are not new. However, when looking at the
role of market changes in the Vietnamese situation, some points can be noted. As my case
studies reveal, export activities and a closer orientation to export markets have increased the
level of technological capabilities within the firms involved. Similar findings can be seen in
other studies of Thailand (Poapongsakom & Tonguthai, 1997), Malaysia (Kassim & Salleh,
1997) and Indonesia (Wie & Pangestu, 1997). Hence, Vietnamese industrial firms - as late¬
comers - tend to follow a pattern similar to other small NICs in South East Asia; this pattern
also resembles that found in Korea and Taiwan. According to Hobday (1993, 1995a and
1995b), export markets play a crucial role in helping firms to learn. Although he notes that
this is a model specific to attempts by East Asian late-comer electronics firms to catch up, in
my view it is also relevant to the experiences of late-comer firms in Vietnam and other South
East Asian countries.
My case studies also contribute to Hobday's study in another area. Hobday argues
that in theory it is possible for a firm to acquire advanced technological skills yet still to
remain at an early stage of marketing competence. My study of Vietnamese firms, however,
shows that this is happening in practice. While most of the firms achieved at least an average
level of skill handling process technologies (process adaptation and incremental
improvements) and product technologies (reverse engineering and prototype development),
their marketing activities still remain at an early stage of development (i.e., simple OEM and
243
sub-contracting). This is understandable since Vietnamese firms have accumulated certain
technological rather than marketing skills in advance of their ability to develop markets.
Indeed they have not accumulated any marketing competencies in preparation for competing
in a market economy. However, it is because marketing experience is new and rare among
Vietnamese firms, that their new access to international markets becomes even more
significant.
The recent changes in Vietnam have not only opened up export markets, but have
also introduced new opportunities to exploit the domestic market. Although in general the
purchasing power of the population is still weak, it is increasing rapidly and newly-created
local businesses make firms more aware of competition. New actors in the domestic market
(e.g., private firms and firms enjoying foreign investment) create stronger competitive
pressure. Companies must now take active measures to improve their product quality, range
and specification. At the same time, new business opportunities force firms to innovate just
to keep up with the new requirements of the market; they must continually adjust their mode
of production if they are to hit the moving target of what to produce and how to produce it.
Thus, together with new export markets, the emergence of a local market is a new feature of
Vietnam's transitional period, and is proving critical for learning and TC accumulation as
new challenges and opportunities emerge.
10.4.4 The Changing and Contrasting Role of the State
With respect to the effects that the transitional period has had on the industrial supporting
infrastructure, one question comes into focus. In considering the balance between the
positive and negative aspects of reforms in R&D, training and education on the learning
activities of firms, one should look at the role of the government in supporting these
activities (or not) through subsidies and other intervention measures. This question provides
the focus for this section.
When reforms leading to the market economy were initiated, many Vietnamese
argued that the government should no longer play a dominant role. Indeed, in economic
theory, a belief in the powerful role of markets and a commensurate reduction in the need for
government intervention has been widespread in political and economic circles. Against this
view, Lall (1994a) criticises approaches that minimise not just the role of technological
activity in developing countries, but also the need for policies to support, protect and induce
such activities. He goes further to emphasise the crucial role that government policies must
play to promote technological development. Similarly, Bell & Pavitt (1992) emphasise the
importance of government in market economies, where the administration supports
technological accumulation through investment in education and training. According to
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them, an effective education and training policy must be designed to promote learning, and to
create change-generating human resources. My aim here is not to engage in the debate as to
whether government intervention is good or bad, but merely to point out that - even in a
market economy - government intervention remains important. Its role seems even more
significant in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam. In this
period, when the old structural and institutional framework is undergoing radical change,
and a new one is still absent or nascent, the guiding and co-ordinating role of government
looks irreplaceable. McMillan (1995), for example, suggests that reforms must come from
the state which address crucial topics such as pricing, privatisation and trade liberalisation
issues, in order to free up the economic potential of the country and to create favourable
conditions for doing business.
What can the experiences of my case studies contribute to this debate? Chapter 8
suggests that the majority of the firms still advocate a certain role for government in
supporting their TC accumulation. Two main groups of external factors (macro-policies and
the functions of the supporting infrastructure) are the direct outcome of government actions.
It is important too devise macro-policies (for trade, financial, banking and labour affairs) that
support a market economy not only for aiding the general business performance of firms (see
Section 8.2.1) but also augmenting technological learning and TC accumulation (see Section
8.4.2). Furthermore, the activities of the whole industrial infrastructure (R&D, training,
education and other services organisations) have, until recently, been managed by the
government; it lies beyond the capacity and resources of any single firm to address or reform
that infrastructure.
Given the importance of government as discussed in Section 3.6.2, the question here
is to what extent it is important and what specific modes of intervention would prove more
beneficial? Should the government (continue to) subsidise some of the internal activities of
firms, e.g., providing them with free education, research services or the like? The evidence
of my case studies indicates that some activities provided by the national system of
innovation are beyond the resources of any single firm - or even a group of firms - to supply
alone. Only government has the resources to deal with macro problems, such as providing
training facilities for both vocational training and higher education. The same can be said for
S&T, especially for funding large-scale and complex research programmes. Here, although
I entirely agree with Justman & Teubal's (1995) point on the catalytic role and stimulating
influence of government, I would be more reluctant to revoke all subsidisation of R&D as
they advocate. The role of government should go further than just guiding activities.
Government should concentrate on measures (such as funding policies, tax incentives and
banking and labour management regulations) that help firms to learn, and help them to
conduct their businesses more effectively. Moreover, government subsidy is still necessary
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to help firms generate technological capabilities through underwriting some specific activities
such as training, especially in primary, secondary and technical vocational schools and for
some strategic R&D.
One further consideration is the need for a holistic view of the industrial supporting
infrastructure in Vietnam. The problems of input sourcing (see Section 8.2.3), the
dependency of both textile/garment and electronics firms on other industries (e.g.,
mechanical and chemical) all point to the interrelatedness of industries (Rosenberg, 1982).
This infrastructure includes not only R&D, education and training activities but also other
types of activity such as industrial services in standardisation, metrology and quality control,
the legal and institutional framework and the creation of associations and other new
organisational forms of innovation promotion like S&T parks, etc. All these elements
constitute the national system of innovation which governments can help to develop and
promote. As argued in Section 2.4.3, the role of government in developing and supporting
the NSI is also important in more industrialised countries, e.g., Japan (Fransman, 1991), the
Nordic countries (Edquist & Lundvall, 1992), and the US (Nelson, 1993). In addition, the
government has a crucial role to play in bridging this system with the socio-economic
environment of the country so as to create favourable conditions for these institutions to
interact with industry. So far, these important measures have not yet been put in place in
Vietnam. The opinions and the practices of firms described in Chapter 8 indicate that, on the
one hand, the Vietnamese government still seems unable to create a sufficiently favourable
macro-environment or to enact sufficiently conducive policies to promote technological
learning in industrial firms. Despite the reform, the grip of government remains hard with
respect to many business activities of firms (especially private ones, see E3 in Section 10.5).
Firms feel that government over-intervenes in this area. On the other hand, the firms also
indicate that they feel under-protected by state policies and that the NSI does not promote
their efforts at technological accumulation.
The reason for over-intervention is that the government believes that, even in
transition to a market economy, it still needs to retain a certain level of control over industry.
In large part, this belief is based on the political motives of the government to exercise
control over most societal activities. Moreover, the negative attitude towards private firms
exists within the context of a government fear that the private sector could over-run the
economy, which would be dangerous for socialist development. Concerning the second
phenomenon (under-protection and lack of promotion), the government feels it does not have
enough resources to continue subsidise for the sake of economic reform (budgetary and trade
balance deficit problems, etc.). Adding to the confusion, in certain circumstances, the
government does not know what to do because, for instance, it simply lacks the information
necessary for taking effective action. The absence of a long-term strategic view mentioned in
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Section 10.4.2 is the outcome of this factor. As a consequence, the Vietnamese government
is now in the situation of controlling its industries without promoting them. One solution to
this dilemma is for the government to selectively intervene utilising its scarce resources
wisely. So far, no decisive and clear intentions of the government can be seen in the
selectivity of its actions.
The experiences of the firms in my study also point to another important role for
government, i.e., its co-ordinating role in supporting, linking and guiding the learning
efforts of different firms to create their TCs. As Dalum et al (1992) argue, the government
should be didactic, shaping the overall coherence of the national system of innovation as well
as the cohesion of the social system as a whole. The evidence for this argument is the strong
need felt by Vietnamese electronics firms for a coherent, long-term policy designed and
supported by the state to develop the whole sector. Electronics firms in this study are facing
enormous problems in orienting their learning efforts because there is no long-term and
consistent strategy for developing the sector. This can be considered as one of the specific
features of Vietnam's transition to a market economy. After some years of reform, with the
government loosening its grip on firms, firms miss the traditional forms of support offered
by the state (regardless of how weak and uncomprehensive this support used to be) and now
they want it back. This phenomenon of wishing to revitalise state involvement coincides
with the drift away of state control in favour of market forces.
Another issue is the scope and scale of the government's intervention in supporting
firms' technological learning. Advocating the importance of industrial policy in his critique
of the World Bank study, Lall (1994b) argues that government intervention should be
selective, and should be separately specified for each industry to ensure efficient resource
allocation. Uniform protection is not equally effective for every industry. In garment
assembly, where the learning period is relatively brief, protection may not be necessary. For
complex activities, where learning takes years or even decades, protection is more crucial.
Selective intervention can even by applied in respect of one product but not another within
the same industry (Lall, 1993a).
In the case of Vietnamese industries, as I show above, it is clear that the government
cannot, and should not, be involved in all kinds of intervention into all activities. Due to its
many commitments and its limited resources, it cannot subsidise everything. On the other
hand, it should step back from intervening in the daily internal affairs of firms. The
necessity for selective intervention is obvious. Nonetheless, there is not enough data to
establish what form of deliberate and selective state intervention there should be in either of
the two industries considered in this study. It seems that they continue to face the macro-
economic constraints after reform as they did before, and must continue to rely on the same
industrial supporting infrastructure. The strengths and weaknesses of the two industries
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(Chapter 5) are broadly similar albeit with a few differences (I will discuss some of the
sectoral differences in Section 10.5). Still, there are some policy measures being
differentially applied to the two industries (e.g., the tax rates imposed on imports). If we
can find instances where different treatments are being meted out to the two industries, it
seems likely that these rest on spontaneous selectivity rather than on harmonised and co¬
ordinated policy-making. Further, there is little evidence of government selectively applying
measures to each sub-sector (garment v. textile; consumer electronics v. computing).
However, looking at criteria like the support different industries receive from R&D
organisations, it can be said that the textile industry has got more and earlier support than the
garment industry. The same can be seen in the electronics industry, where computing
activities tend to receive more attention then consumer or industrial electronics in terms of
training, research and education facilities and promotion. Whatever differences exist within
sub-sectors, these are rather fragmented and do not form part of a coherent and co-ordinated
state intervention policy.
As Section 8.5 points out, what now characterises government intervention in
Vietnam is simultaneous over-intervention and under-protection. Those activities that firms
want greater personal control over (e.g., management and salary regulations) are subject to
quite considerable state control. Conversely, those functions that require state support (e.g.,
education, training and support for research and technical development) are left to companies
to tackle alone as best they can. In the firms' view, this is a situation of "both redundancy
and shortage". Governmental action (or lack of it) with respect to technological learning is
thus another feature of Vietnam's transitional economy. The selectivity of government
intervention in this case (intervening more heavily in firms' economic affairs than in
industrial support activities) creates an undesirable balance in the view of the firms
interviewed.
Another feature of the government's role is its attitude to state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and the public sector. The experiences of the reforming economies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union illuminate the weaknesses of SOEs as compared to
private businesses in sustaining economic competitiveness. This can lead to the extreme
assertion that SOEs have no future in a market economy - a view especially prevalent among
Vietnamese policy-makers and research circles - with the implication that everything should
be privatised. However, some recent outcomes of reforms in many Eastern European
countries, and in China and Vietnam show that state-owned firms have significantly
improved their performance while remaining under public ownership. This evidence thus
contradicts the assertion that it is impossible to reshape SOEs without the incentives provided
by private ownership (McMillan, 1995). Similarly, my study reveals that although the
majority of SOEs are in bad shape, some SOEs can remain rather competitive providing their
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managers adopt suitable policy measures and strategies. The existing competitiveness and
technological learning of SOEs such as E2, TGI and TG6 (although differentially
successful) provides the evidence to support this point. The significance of this observation
is that, helped by the necessary support from the state, the strategies exercised by certain
managers in some SOEs are important for learning and TC acquisition.
Nonetheless, there are some basic differences separating SOEs and private
companies. These, in turn, lead to different learning behaviours and TC accumulation
abilities. In the next section I will compare these two types of firm.
10.4.5 State and Private Ownership
The history of Vietnamese industrial development shows that government support is
preferentially offered to SOEs at the expense of the private sector. In Chapter 5,1 reviewed
how various state campaigns worked against private enterprise. In some transitional
economies like Russia and China, similar discrimination against the non-state sector can be
found (McMillan, 1995), with the exception of a few pet companies as joint ventures with
foreign firms (whose local partners are SOEs). This discrimination against Vietnam's
private sector causes many problems for doing business as a private firm (Beresford, 1989).
In technological terms, the influence of these activities on the accumulation of TC is severe
(see Section 5.2.2 and Appendix 5.11). One consequence is that SOEs have much greater
access to industrial support than private companies do. This, together with differential
access to financial resources and credit, provides SOEs with indisputable advantages over
competing private firms (see Chapter 8).5 The discriminatory external environment leads to
different patterns of TC accumulation and learning. In Chapter 6, we saw that the sequence
of TC building in the textile/garment sector differs depending on type of ownership. The
relaxed attitude to investment activity, and a lack of competitive pressure - a pressure which
is pivotal to TC building (Fransman, 1995; Bell & Pavitt, 1993) - caused the SOEs to fail to
acquire investment and marketing capabilities. On the other hand, the 'production first'
attitude contributed to the sequence where such firms tend to learn production capability
initially (see Section 6.4.1). As for private firms, by setting-up after 1986, TG8 and TG9
followed a very different sequence of TC creation. This is largely explained by the
difference in ownership. Private companies must begin with some capabilities and cannot
rely on the technical expertise of R&D institutions which SOEs usually can (see Sections
^The difference between SOEs and private firms refers not only to (discriminatory) state policies and access to
the supporting infrastructure. It also encompasses issues of management style, work conditions and labour
standards as found by the study ofWIDER/UNU (Moghadam, 1994).
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6.4.1 and 6.4.3). Section 7.6.5 also points to the difference in learning behaviour of firms
under the two kinds of ownership. In most cases, private sector firms have to face more
severe problems in pursuing learning efforts.
Nonetheless, the SOEs have their problems too. In the transition period, Vietnamese
SOEs face serious competition from private enterprises, especially those that can enter joint
ventures or can make significant contacts with foreign partners (see also Moghadam, 1994).
In order to react to the changes wrought by the reforms, SOEs must also radically improve
their management expertise. While enjoying favourable conditions, SOEs managers enjoy
fewer decision-making freedoms (see Section 8.5). Also, some SOE directors see public
ownership as an eternal safety net; they feel no particular incentive to secure the long-term
viability of their firm, especially as their retirement package is poor. As a result, both
publicly- and privately-owned firms encounter distinct problems as a direct result of the
ownership issue - albeit that those problems differ between them.
The cases in my study confirm that SOEs face different pressures and so learn
technological capabilities differently than private companies do. Taking into account that
competitive pressure has such an important impact on the competence-building ofmany East
Asian countries (Westphal et al, 1985; Amsden 1989; Fransman, 1995; Wade, 1990), and
the notion that external pressure can influence the learning behaviour of firms, the issue of
ownership (as one element of external environmental pressure) might not be unique to
Vietnam's economy but may exist in other countries as well.6 However, this notion could
be specific to Vietnam in one sense. It would appear that the private sector in Vietnam is
subject to greater surveillance and control than is the case in most other developing countries
(including those whose economies are in transition) and the specific differences in
opportunities and behaviours of the two types of firm seem more acutely drawn. My study
reveals that the influence of the ownership issue in Vietnam is more pertinent to the
textile/garment industry than it is to the electronics industry. Although ownership
differences do exist among electronics companies (due to the different start-up conditions
between consumer electronics and computing companies), patterns of TC accumulation and
learning differ between these two electronics sub-sectors rather than being explained in terms
of the ownership variable. As a result, the ownership issue in the electronics sector hides
beneath the more obvious differences in the trading conditions of the two sub-sectors. The
features separating the textile/garment and electronics sectors and those separating the two
electronics sub-sectors will be addressed in the next section.
6We find different learning behaviours among Indian firms depending on whether they are publicly or
privately owned enterprises (Deolalikar & Sundanam, 1983), and Argentinian firms under different kinds of
ownership adopt different attitudes to risk-taking (Lucangeli, 1983).
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The nature of firm ownership, then, is one of the key factors influencing the business
and technological learning of firms. This finding is somewhat different to that given by Enos
(1991). According to Enos, the ownership status of the competent firm seems to matter not
at all, whether private or public. Although he emphasises the indifference of competent
firms, it seems to me that he does not give enough emphasis to how ownership may affect
attempts at competence-building. Furthermore, Enos stresses that internal affairs are more
significant for competence-building than external factors. He focuses on the competent
firm's ability to attract skilled and motivated staff, its stability, its training opportunities, its
access to learning and its raison d'etre. Nonetheless, in my view, all these internal matters
are influenced significantly by external factors such as state policies which, in turn, are not
uniform for firms under different kinds of ownership. Here, the close interaction of internal
and external factors becomes significant. External factors present firms with both
opportunities and hurdles. How to overcome the hurdles and take advantage of the
opportunities then depends on each firm's specific behaviour. At this level, managers'
actions and strategies really matter. In order to help firms respond to external factors - and
because the ownership issue clearly does affect a firm's ability to learn - the state must devise
promotional policies which are suitable for both types of firm. As Bell & Pavitt (1992) note,
effective policies that induce firms to invest more substantially in training so as to create
change-generating personnel are still rare in developing countries. A specific policy geared
for the private sector might be needed (Massaquois, 1995) because managers of private firms
face different commercial conditions than do managers of SOEs (Mytelka, 1985). In this
context, policy intervention by the Vietnamese state to promote learning and TC
accumulation should also be selective across the two types of ownership.
10.5 Sectoral Perspectives: Some Comparisons
In this section, I examine in more detail differences between the two sectors in order to
evaluate whether the role of government is identical in both, and to assess whether there is
any need for different policy measures to be devised for each. This study can offer valuable
insights in this respect, without underestimating the similarities between the two sectors. As
shown in Section 6.4.3, although the firms are similar in the type and extent of TCs being
developed (more of production, investment, minor technical change and linkage, less of
marketing, and almost nothing for major technical change capabilities), they follow quite
different sequences across the textile/garment and electronics sectors. The sector-specific
focus of innovation discussed elsewhere by Bell and Pavitt (1993), Katz (1987a) and Pavitt
(1984) offers a useful theoretical background for evaluating my findings.
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Pavitt's work (1984) on the sectoral pattern of technical change deals mainly with
innovating firms. In addition, however, we find sectoral differences not only in relation to
innovative activities but also in sectoral patterns of TC accumulation and learning (see
Section 3.6.1). The experiences of the Vietnamese firms in my study show that across the
textile/garment and electronics sectors, the patterns of TC accumulation differ, both in terms
of TC types acquired and in their accumulation sequence. For each industry, the firms also
display differences in the pattern of using learning mechanisms. However, these differences
do not apply to all features of TC accumulation and learning.
In an extended work on sectoral variation, and as discussed in Chapter 3, Bell &
Pavitt (1993) identify five sectoral categories that capture many of the different paths towards
technological accumulation. The two industries in my study fall into two of those categories.
The textile/garment sector is, in these terms, supplier-dominated, while the electronics sector
is science-based. In their work, Pavitt (1984) and Bell & Pavitt (1993 & 1997) outline some
of basic innovative features of these two sectors. In the supplier-dominated textile sector,
firms have a high degree of dependence on external sources for process technology and a
relatively small level of activity devoted to product innovation; a relatively small average size;
technological diversification is mainly vertically into production technology with very little
movement into other product markets. In contrast, science-based electronics firms make a
relatively high contribution to their own process technology and a high proportion of product
innovation that is used in other sectors. They are relatively big, and conduct most of their
technological diversification non-vertically.
It is impossible to comprehensively compare all these features in this analysis due to
a lack of sufficient evidence (and it was not, in any case, the main purpose of this study).
Nonetheless, based on the experience of my case studies, we can observe those sectoral
differences which relate directly related to a firm's ability to learn a TC. Concerning
technical change activities in textile/garment firms (see Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.6), these are
mainly minor improvements in and modifications to production methods or associated
inputs. Some firms improve their product technologies but these are mostly modifications of
existing models. Changes of production organisation also occur in textile firms. No firm in
the study was able to engage in major technical change. Electronics firms, in contrast,
prioritise product specification over technical change activities (see Section 6.3.3). Fewer
electronics firms rearrange their production processes.
The argument of Bell & Pavitt (1993) and Pavitt (1984) on the way firms diversify
their activities are less clearly seen in my study than other criteria of comparison.
Vietnamese textile/garment firms tend to diversify their production activities vertically but not
into non-textile business areas: textile firms work downstream towards knitting and
garments, while some garment firms do the reverse. Electronics firms tend to diversify their
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activities into new areas or products which concentrate around electronics: industrial
electronics, computer services in banking and financial services. There is also some
diversification into tourism or construction, but these are exceptions which reflect Vietnam's
particular national context.
My findings differ from Pavitt's (1984) in one respect. According to Pavitt (1984),
textile firms tend to be small while electronics firms are big. In my study, this was not the
case. Most of the older textile/garment firms are large (with more than 1,000 employees),
while electronics firms are small or medium-sized, and are more recently established.
Dependence on the mechanical engineering and chemical industries to complement
technological innovation is evident in both the textile and the electronics sectors.
With the exception of firm size, these observed features seem to support arguments
that sectors differ from each other, although we find a less clear-cut pattern in the case of
Vietnam. While the textile/garment sector - "supplier-dominated" in Pavitt's terminology
(1984) - developed its TC in a traditional way, firms in the "science-based" electronics sector
developed their TC more from their R&D activity. The creation of electronics firms by
scientists from academic circles can be considered as a diffusion of R&D activity into a more
technology-driven kind of enterprise. The comparison made here is based on the learning
and TC accumulation efforts of the firms, while the notion of sectoral differences suggested
by Pavitt is addressed at understanding the innovation activities of firms in more
industrialised countries. Whether this explains the weak similarity with Vietnamese firms (in
addition to the specificity of Vietnam's conditions) remains a question to be explored further.
The differences between the two sectors in using learning mechanisms, as argued by
Lall (1993b), Preverez & Shohet (1995) and Andersen (1992), can also be seen in my study
(see Chapter 7). Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that electronics firms - being located in the sector
most closely linked to the R&D, training and education base of the country - have less
problems than textile/garment firms in using prior accumulated knowledge as a learning
mechanism. Further, the two sectors deploy different combinations of learning mechanism
for acquiring minor change and marketing capabilities. The main difference is the greater use
electronics firms make of foreign connections (see Section 7.6.4). Indeed Bell & Pavitt
(1993) also consider that science-based firms are more likely to use foreign contacts given
the relative strength of research scientists and engineers in such firms.
As Cooper (1995) notes, the concept of innovative competition better characterises the
electronics sector, but is less relevant to understanding the traditional profile of the
textile/garment sector. Therefore, the ways that firms in these two sectors compete with
other firms, link up with foreign partners and create new firms differ, and this factor
provides us with a better understanding of firms' behaviours. The superior use made by
electronics firms of links with foreign partners can also be explained by the conscious
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strategic behaviours of their managers; in general, they are more dynamic and efficient than
their counterparts in textile/garment firms. This, in turn, helps those managers to make
better use of their foreign contacts for learning marketing as mentioned in Section 10.2.4.
Thus, the question of firm-specific strategies remains important and is addressed in Section
10.6.
Differences can also be seen between sub-sectors. Although differences in the
pattern of TC accumulation are not so clear-cut between textile and garment firms, they are
rather marked between consumer electronics and computing firms, which follow distinct
sequences of TC accumulation. As mentioned in Chapters 7 and 8, these differing
trajectories mainly stem from their different dates of establishment, and the different
historical development of both Vietnamese electronics sub-sectors. They are also partly
explained by the peculiarity of computing activities. The characteristics of computer
production in general, and of software activity in particular, are well-known; they include
skill intensity, a basis in R&D activities, the customisation of products and the high required
levels of tacit technological knowledge (Correa, 1995). Perhaps because of these
characteristics the computer and software industries are placed in a special group of sectoral
development by Bell & Pavitt (1993). For instance, software activity is categorised as
belonging to the specialised-supplier sector where firm size tends to be small. The three
computing firms involved in software production in my study - E3, E4 and E5 - are small
and, thus, conform with this categorisation.
10.6 Firm-Specific Features and Firms' Strategies
10.6.1 Firm-Specific Focus of Learning and TC Accumulation
In the literature review, I discuss the firm-specific nature of TC accumulation and learning.
My findings clearly support this notion. I found that firms differ both in terms of their
historical emergence (e.g., history of establishment, ownership, etc.) and in terms of the
personalities and backgrounds of individual managers (see Chapter 8). Firms in the
textile/garment industry differ in their TC building patterns with respect to their ownership
status as opposed to their sub-sectoral location. These findings echo the conclusions of
African (Mytelka, 1985) and Greek (Tsekouras, 1995) studies of firms, where firms are
understood to differ in their learning behaviours to become technologically competitive on
the basis of managers' actions. Similar evidence of the importance of managers' activity
(i.e., the significance of a firm-specific factor) can be found in Katz (1987a), Rhee et al
(1984) and Laurence (1980).
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Moreover, even when firms have many things in common (whether in terms of
technological behaviour or TC building patterns), case evidence shows that each firm is still
unique in its actions. The cases of HAL and 3C or of TLG and NTC, presented in Chapter
9, are examples of how firms in the same sector nevertheless adopt their own unique "special
techniques" for learning TCs. It seems that the specificity of TC accumulation at the level of
the firm is more pertinent than any sector-level specificities. These "special techniques" (or
technological learning behaviours) are, in fact, the strategies firms deploy - with various
degrees of clarity and vigour - to respond to external factors. As Cooper (1995) notes, the
decisions that particular firms make determines the direction of their learning.
Having recognised the importance of firms' specific strategic approaches to learning
and TC acquisition, the next question concerns the strategies of the Vietnamese firms in this
study. I will now address the question of what kind of strategies the firms in the study
devise, and how they influence the process of learning TCs.
10.6.2 Strategies of Firms and Learning: Vietnamese Experiences
As presented in Section 8.3, the firms in this study first adopted strategies for doing
business in response to changes they experienced in the external environment. Although
firms can respond to the influence of external factors (e.g., policy factors, market factors and
supporting infrastructure and social-cultural factors) both through conscious strategies, and
through ad-hoc tactical manoeuvres, in general, responses can be grouped into three types
(see Section 8.3.5).
The first trend we can identify is the diversification of business development during
the transitional period, when firms tried to diversify their products, markets and business
relationships. To respond to limited market opportunities and increased pressure, companies
(especially in the textile and garment sector) tried to increase their product quality, expand
their product range and strengthen their business relationships with foreign buyers (see
Section 8.3.2). In addition, the textile companies - TG3, TG4, TG5 and TG6 - re-oriented
themselves to selling in local markets by rearranging their core activities to include knitwear
or garment production. This tendency towards market and product diversification has led to
another tendency to diversify business linkages with foreign partners in order to secure
access to almost everything: capital, technologies, markets, supplies of materials, expertise,
etc. Diversification can be understood as the response firms make to the changing (and
problematic) supporting infrastructure (see Section 8.3.3). For private companies like TG8,
TG9 or E8, diversification is synonymous with their survival strategies; it is the means by
which they can acquire new technologies and sales channels. Being forced by the desperate
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need to tap alternative resources (of finance, knowledge or technology), these firms pursue
the diversification strategy as a deliberate action.
Specialisation - increasing their competitiveness in niche markets through niched
products or services - defines the strategic behaviour of some firms. Companies seek to
augment their product quality; the efficiency of their business organisation; their investment
in R&D activities; their systematic training efforts by means of both formal programmes and
on-the-job training; and the quality of their staff through special recruitment campaigns.
Some companies move quite consciously to higher value-added products or they try to enter
niche markets. Examples in this study include the attempts to enter high fashion design
(TG4 and TG5), software production for specific users (E3 and E4), and industrial
electronics in robotics (E2). Some companies - like E3, which for some time
individualistically tried to sell specialised software - have realised that it is a very tough
business, and that it is better to join a network of international specialist software producers
and sellers. Being a small part of this network is more productive than working alone in the
market place. Some computer companies, in addition to continuing their business in the
former Soviet Union, are trying to link up with more powerful foreign partners to produce
parts of their product package. By doing so, they have access not only to new technologies,
but also to new markets and to some crucial material inputs.
Through a lack of long-term strategies for development, and insufficient support
from the state, firms are regrouping and consolidating their common activities. I find
evidence of joint efforts and new associations which lobby for change in government
regulations, incentives, and in the accessibility of market intelligence. It should be noted
here that although (selective) efforts to join forces constitutes third type of company response
to external conditions, any collective such activity being pursued irrespective of whether the
company is diversifying or specialising.7 In the main, there are two different strategies
adopted by firms, and therefore I will only focus on issues relevant to them.
Studies of types of business strategy have identified various groups of strategic
options. For instance, Gemunden and Heydebreck (1995) identify five clusters of business
strategic stances: the technological leader, the customer-focused developer, the cost leader,
the specialiser and the dissipater. Among these groups, the cost leader stance most
resembles the diversification strategy of Vietnamese firms. Firms occupying this position
offer customers a wider range of products than any other type of company. Cost leaders try
to diversify their products by copying and modifying other producers' products, and can
achieve a high level of novelty. Vietnamese firms adopting a diversification strategy also
7Almost all firms adopting one or another strategy have recently consolidated (some of) their activities in
response to the increasing pressures from the external environment.
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modify many foreign products to diversify their product range, and the low price of products
is also important, especially among textile/garment companies. Although the names are
similar, the specialiser group of companies - which sell products that offer little opportunity
for differentiation through superior quality - is not similar to the specialisation strategy of the
firms in my study. Unlike the specialiser cluster, i.e., firms that rarely undertake any
development activities at all, some Vietnamese companies are adopting a specialisation
strategy geared to offering niche products to niche markets. In order to do so, they have to
develop customer-oriented solutions to meet the specific needs of a single customer or of a
small niche. This feature suggests that firms pursuing a specialisation strategy in my study
more resemble the customer-focused developer group.
The diversification strategy is also common in other developing countries. For
example, in the textile/garment industry of developing countries, we find marketing
strategies based on product differentiation and continuous fashion change (Mytelka, 1991).
The diversification tendency in Vietnam, however, exists not only in products, but also in
markets, and in the ways of doing business. Some firms in the study, especially in
electronics (e.g., E2, E3 and E4) even try to diversify across the borders of their traditional
sector. This is due to the reforms where - cut off from state subsidies and with limited
sources of finances and technologies, etc. - firms have to struggle to find solutions to their
market constraints (see Chapter 8, and the cases of E2 and E3 in Sections 10.4 and 10.5).
Still, this diversification strategy, as Ernst (1995) shows through the experiences of Korean
companies, can have a negative effect on TC accumulation in the long run.8 In the case of
Vietnamese firms, the diversification of products and markets can bring new income and
reserves, and new business opportunities and markets. The specialisation strategy of aiming
for niche products and markets can be very different from country to country (Chen, 1990).
Which products to produce, and for which markets, is determined by both the economic and
political context of the country concerned, and by the more specific nature of each firm (e.g.,
managers' backgrounds, and the strengths and weaknesses of firms in a given range of
products).
In the context of developing countries, Kim (1990) - on the basis of Korean
experiences - divides firms' strategies into two types: apprentices and imitators. Depending
on financial resources, size and the organisational ability of managers, firms may adopt an
aggressive technological strategy which leads them either to become apprentices or imitators.
Small firms like E2 (see Section 10.4) or E3 (see Section 10.5) which both pursue
8According to Ernst (1995), octopus-like diversification across sectoral boundaries prevents continuous long-
term accumulation and development of TCs for a given set of products. It may also lead to a neglect of
selective and gradual product differentiation within a given product category, as well as a neglect of
technological deepening.
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aggressive strategies resemble the imitator type. Through a process of imitative learning,
these firms have been trying to add their own technical improvements to existing foreign
products (e.g., the change of TV set specification). Reverse engineering (done by
technically competent individuals who come mainly from an R&D environment) is a
common activity in these firms. TG6 (see Section 10.2) is an apprentice type of firm; it has
relied on foreign technologies from the outset and has assimilated these technologies and
learning through training mechanisms. Having said this, I should emphasise that not all
these firms fall strictly into one or other category. There is no distinct demarcation between
firms. Although primarily located within one category, a firm may also possess features
which are associated with the other category.
What influence can these strategies have on the technological learning of the firms?
The learning process is shaped by the combined impact of external and of internal factors
such as the strategies of the firms (Saviotti, 1992). This interaction has several kinds of
influence on learning and TC accumulation. First, it determines the purpose of learning.
Depending on the strategy adopted, firms set different priorities on acquiring particular TCs
and this affects their pursuit of skills, knowledge and experience through learning activities.
Dodgson (1992), in his study of Celltech, notes that this firm gradually shifted its learning
focus from R&D skills, to manufacturing competence and then to marketing functions. In
my case studies, as presented in Sections 8.4.3 and 8.5, learning activities (as the means to
achieve TCs) have changed since the pre-reform period when there was no need to learn
marketing. Now, in the reform period, as firms adopt diversification strategy, they need to
learn knowledge suitable for this strategy, such as marketing in diversified markets. The
evidence show that most of the study firms are following this strategy and some of them
have successfully acquired the TC necessary for this strategy (see Section 8.4.1).
The number of firms embarking on a specialisation strategy are fewer. Section 8.4.1
also indicated that not many firms can acquire the specific technical knowledge necessary for
the specialisation strategy. Some companies, such as E2 and E3 in electronics or TG4 and
TGI4 in textile/garment, have taken their first step towards specialisation in producing niche
products for niche markets. These firms have one thing in common. They diversified from
traditional products (or markets) to new ones so as to gain access to better financial resources
and to further their learning. On this basis, they then selected new activities and new niche
products (consumer electronics to robotics in E2; PC assembling to software in E3; ordinary
weaving and garment products to high-quality microfibre in TG4; and high-fashion for top
quality markets in TGI4). Up to now, this combined strategy of both diversification and
specialisation seems to be working for these firms. However, in the long-term, if they
pursue both diversification and specialisation strategies - especially diversification across
sectoral boundaries - they may encounter problems. For instance, in the case of E3 (see
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Section 10.5), the specialisation strategy may be suitable for producing software for niche
markets. The export of niche products is appropriate for firms engaged in exporting
software from developing countries and may have a larger impact than other strategies on
learning and building up TC (Correa, 1995). However, the on-going diversification of E3
beyond electronics to construction and real estate, for instance, may divert the firm's
resources and energy away from upgrading its specialised products. Similarly, in the case of
E2 (see Section 10.4), the first step of specialisation in robotics parts to serve Japanese
components and parts suppliers is a positive one to enter a niche market and become part of
an international production network. On the other hand, E2's joint venture with Daewoo in
providing hotel and business services signals that the firm may move further away from its
core electronics activities, for the sake of new business opportunities and financial gains.
As can be seen here, firms adopt strategies in response to macro external factors, and
this has led to particular types of knowledge and TC being acquired. The purpose of
learning, hence, is the outcome of the interaction of firms' business strategies with those
macro factors.
The second influence of the interaction is on the enrichment of learning sources of
firms. The practice of the firms here shows that as an outcome of diversification strategy,
Vietnamese firms are able to find more learning resources, and to access new technological
experience and expertise. The textile/garment companies diversifying from upstream to
downstream product areas, and from CMEA markets to EU and Asia Pacific markets, all
point to this. Similarly, electronics firms' diversification from consumer electronics to
industrial electronics (such as E2) are further examples of how firms can learn more
technological skill and knowledge through diversification. Nonetheless, where some firms
diversify beyond the boundaries of their traditional sectors, the impact on learning might be
negative in the long run (fragmentation of activities; lack a sufficient concentration of
technological strength). This situation is similar to that mentioned by Ernst (1995) with
respect to Korean companies, where the over-diversification of chaebols like Samsung or
Daewoo reduces the ability of these firms in deepen their technological competence. For
learning activities and technological deepening to take place, firms should concentrate on
differentiation within a (limited) range of products and activities rather than diversifying to
numerous types of business. At a later stage, when resources and expertise permit, some of
them may choose to adopt a specialisation strategy which may have a greater impact on the
technological deepening process.
The main implication of this discussion is that - depending on the context of macro
factors (pre-reform or post-reform) - firms may have different requirements for learning and
different means to achieve that learning. In this framework, learning and TC acquisition are
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shaped in accordance with the strategic behaviours of firms in doing business and with the
interaction between these behaviours and external factors.
The last point to mention in this section is that learning - as the means to achieving
certain TCs required by specific business strategies - could be a strategy in itself (Coombs et
al, 1992b). This notion is strongly stressed by Teece et al (1990) and Dodgson (1992).
Such a strategy places great emphasis on the creation of new dynamic capabilities through
the firm's learning process. It is beyond the purposes of my study to comprehensively
examine the business strategies of study firms. However, it would be fair to conclude from
this study that the learning activity of firms is closely intertwined with their strategic
behaviour. This relationship is also partly presented in Figure 10.1 on the learning-TC
relationship. In this figure, the activities of learning (i.e., which learning mechanisms are
used by firms) are decided by the strategic behaviour of firms (managers' actions, for
instance). In addition, the purposes of learning (i.e., which TCs are needed by firms) are
also conditioned by macro environmental factors and the business strategies of the firms.
Again, as mentioned in Section 10.2.3, the interrelations between strategies and learning
presented in this diagram are non-linear.
10.7 Conclusions
Concerning my research question as to what TCs exist within the firms, in this chapter I first
discussed the patterns of TC accumulation and learning and the relationship between them.
The case studies confirm some well-known features of learning and TC building such as that
TCs are unevenly acquired, and that technical capabilities are more developed than non¬
technical ones. This unevenness is seen across both industries, as well as across sub-
sectors. One significant commonality among the firms studied is the very weak development
of marketing and major technical change capabilities. Concerning the sequential features of
TC accumulation, although all firms followed a sequence, this sequence differed across
sectors and sub-sectors; it was most affected by the ownership issue in the textile/garment
industry, and by the sub-sectoral location issue in the electronics sector.
With regard to the second research question of how firms learn their TC, the study
confirms that active learning-by-doing is a must for TC accumulation. A technical
orientation, and a corresponding weakness in the non-technical learning required for TCs
like investment and marketing, can be seen in the use of many mechanisms. The foreign
connections mechanism is significant for learning production and investment capabilities, but
is rarely deployed for learning technical change and marketing knowledge and skill. These
tendencies may be due to both the hesitation of foreign partners to help Vietnamese firms and
the weakness of Vietnamese firms themselves in devising necessary measures to learn from
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their foreign contacts. Another reason for the weakness in learning technical change and
marketing is that, until recently, competitive pressure and marketing awareness were absent
due to the fact that the CMEA countries were the only foreign source of learning for
Vietnamese firms. The study also found that networks of personal relations and contacts
also contribute to the TC accumulation of many firms.
Also observed in both industries is a tendency to combine learning mechanisms for
each type of TC. Learning-by-doing contributes to all types of TC but it is not enough on its
own; it has to be combined with other learning mechanisms, among which prior knowledge
is the second most important, followed by foreign connections.
The degree to which learning mechanisms are combined differs across the two
industries, with more mechanisms combined in electronics than in the textile industry.
Although no ready-made solutions can be provided, some trends can be observed. For
example, investment and production capabilities are often accumulated by a combination of
prior knowledge, foreign connections and training mechanisms. In the textile industry,
technical change capability is usually acquired by combining prior knowledge with training
and information collection, while in the electronics industry the same capability is acquired
by combining prior knowledge with foreign connections and training. Marketing capability
is obtained through a combination of prior knowledge and training with information
gathering.
The importance of prior knowledge revealed in this study underlines the cumulative
nature and dynamics of learning. Companies move from simple learning mechanisms to
more complicated ones; from one source of learning to more diversified ones; and from one
to more types of TC acquisition. This step-by-step movement shows the tendency of firms
to first begin with something like technical knowledge in production and/or minor change
and to first obtain simple skills (like subcontracting) and codified knowledge (in courses
given in schools through prior accumulation). Then, they proceed to acquire non-technical
knowledge (investment, marketing) and/or more complicated forms of obtaining skill (OEM,
ODM) and they engage in continuous leaming-by-doing.
In order to address the third research question of this study as to why firms learned
their TCs in the ways that they did, I have discussed Vietnam's specific features as both a
transitional and a developing economy. Looking at the influence of external factors on the
activities of firms and on their learning processes, there are some notable findings. In their
learning efforts, firms in both the textile/garment and electronics sectors have to face strong
pressures coming from various groups of external factors. Problems generated by state
economic policies and deficiencies in the supporting system, are the two main groups of
factors hindering the learning activities of firms. At the same time, the opening up of export
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markets and the emergence of the local market are generating both positive and negative
features which affect the TC accumulation of firms.
The process of TC accumulation and learning in Vietnam bears the characteristics of
both a South East Asian developing country and a transitional economy. Some of these
characteristics are similar, but most are different. On the one hand, as a developing country,
Vietnam suffers from the weakness of the industrial infrastructure, and the deficiencies of
R&D and training organisations together with their isolation from industry. On the other
hand, like other transitional economies, it faces difficulties such as the lack of competitive
pressure and marketing awareness; the absence of exposure to competition in global markets;
and imperfect market structures and legal and institutional frameworks. These factors -
combined within one country - create additional problems for Vietnamese firms in
accumulating their technological competence. They combine to produce a weak industrial
system, which is unable to support adequately firms' attempts at learning how to handle
technical change. Indeed, the poverty of actual experience; the limited access to sources
which may enable firms to learn marketing expertise; the technical bias of knowledge; and
the lack of a long-term strategy for learning, are all the direct outcome of this unique context.
Thus, these problems are often more serious in Vietnam than in other countries.
Vietnamese firms see the government's role as important, although the state over-
intervenes in some areas like firms' day-to-day operations, and yet fails to support firms in
areas like market protection and the subsidising of training and R&D activities. The main
conclusion is that, although the government should intervene, this intervention should be
more selective. The state needs to step back from controlling the daily business of firms,
and turn instead to developing general measures to support their TC accumulation and
learning. It may do this by means of designing conducive macro economic policies such as
reducing taxes; promoting a more flexible and efficient banking system; ensuring greater
freedom for firms to negotiate their own labour relations; and subsidising training and
education programmes and R&D activities. In addition, state intervention must be selective
in the sense of being sensitive to the specific conditions of the post-reform era, and to the
particular contours of each industry or sub-sector. So far, supporting activities such as
designing long-term development strategies for industry; providing efficient and affordable
services to firms in using learning sources such as R&D and training institutes; and creating
a stable and favourable incentive system of taxation and credit are all still absent in Vietnam.
Another issue concerns the ownership of firms. State attitudes towards industrial
firms are unequal between private and state-owned enterprises. Private firms suffer most
from the discriminatory practices of the state and, as a result, cannot avail of many resources
to support their learning efforts. Even SOEs (which receive greater state support) have
chronic managerial problems due to a lack of incentives and the rather close supervision of
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their daily activities by the government. These factors contribute to the different patterns of
learning and TC accumulation among industries. The difference in learning modes between
firms of different ownership is more marked amongst textile and garment companies than
amongst electronics firms.
Comparing the two industries, some main differences are found. First, with regard
to the sequence of TC accumulation, jumping-in patterns are more evident in electronics than
in textile and garment firms, the latter having making more traditional and gradual progress.
Second, electronics firms use more foreign-related and R&D-based learning mechanisms
than do textile and garment firms. Third, consumer electronics and computing follow
different patterns of TC accumulation. The reasons why textile/garment and electronics
firms vary depending, respectively, on the issues of ownership and sub-sectoral location are
mainly due to the firms' origins; macro-environment factors; and managers' strategic
responses those environmental factors. Variations from the general pattern of TC
accumulation and learning can be explained by closer examination of firm-level activities. To
respond to the influence of environmental changes, the Vietnamese firms in this study have
adopted two main business behaviours: diversification (undertaken by the majority of firms)
and specialisation (undertaken by a few). Affected by each of these strategies, the use of
learning mechanisms by firms has varied. In the main, Vietnamese firms have been able to
acquire TCs more suitable for diversification than for specialisation strategies, the latter being
more critical for technological deepening. More broadly, the process of TC accumulation
and learning in Vietnamese firms is the outcome of micro-macro interactions between firms'
outside environment and their reactions to this environment. Micro-macro interactions are
significant in shaping the relationship between learning mechanisms and TCs which is
presented schematically in Figure 10.1.
In sum, the evidence of this study throws additional light on theoretical arguments
and augments the findings of empirical studies done in other countries. The experience of
Vietnamese firms can be quite usefully applied to policy-making in other countries which are
in a similar economic and political situation. In the next Chapter, I will draw some
conclusions concerning my study's contribution to our general knowledge of development
and technology studies, and to the implications of using particular research methods. I will





This study has tried to answer the three research questions outlined in Part 1 (Chapter 4).
Chapter 10 analysed these issues, drawing on the empirical evidence explored in Part II.
This chapter reviews the main research questions and highlights the findings of the study
(Section 11.2). Next, Section 11.3 shows the relevance of the main findings of this study to
the body of general knowledge on both technology and development studies. In Section
11.4 some policy implications for policy-makers at both the national level of the developing
country and at the level of firms will be presented. Specific recommendations for
Vietnamese organisations will be made. Section 11.5 discusses issues concerning the
methodology used, its strengths and problems. A perspective and a possible agenda for
future research are suggested in Section 11.6.
11.2 Research Questions and Summarised Findings
11.2.1 Research Questions
As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis examines the learning process and TC accumulation of
selected firms in the Vietnamese textile/garment and electronics industries. By conducting
interviews and case studies of 24 firms, the study looks at several research questions. The
first set of issues includes two main research questions (see Section 1.1), the first of which
examines what TCs are accumulated by firms and draws their general technological
landscape, in preparation for the next step of examining the learning process. The study
looks first (in Chapter 6) at the existence of TCs and assesses the status of TC accumulation
in the firms. The second research question relates to the learning process, and the
relationship of different learning mechanisms to various types of TC. The study, in Chapter
7, investigates the use made by firms of different learning mechanisms to achieve these TCs
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and clarifies the relationship between them. The third research question, referring to another
set of issues, concerns the interaction between macro external environmental factors and
factors operating at the micro level of firms, and the influence of this interaction on the
learning process and TC accumulation. To look at this question, I have examined the impact
of four groups of factors (macro policies of the state, market factors, problems of industrial
infrastructure and other socio-cultural factors outlined in Chapter 4) on the business activities
of the firms in general. I have then reviewed how firms react to these impact in terms of
their different strategic responses. As a result, the combined effect of this macro-micro
interaction on learning is identified (see Chapter 8). Following the main research questions,
some propositions are examined. In the next section, I highlight findings that confirm well-
established theoretical propositions of other studies. Findings based on the experience of
Vietnamese firms which expands and extends our existing knowledge are provided in
Section 11.3.
11.2.2 Arguments Confirmed by This Study
This study confirms the findings of various well-known studies on innovation, by providing
additional empirical evidence from Vietnam.
With respect to the first research question, features such as the unevenness and the
sequencing of TC accumulation, together with the firm-specificity of this accumulation, are
seen throughout the firms' experiences, presented in Chapter 6. The sequence of TC
accumulation tends to begin with production and minor technical change capabilities,
subsequently moving on to others. The extent of TC accumulation is uneven; production,
investment and minor technical change are more developed than other capabilities.
Proposition (1) suggesting that patterns of TC accumulation are different in different sectors
(see 4.2.2) has also been confirmed by the differences found between textile/garment and
electronics firms.
The examination of the second research question, on the nature of learning and the
relationship between learning and TC accumulation, has confirmed that learning is neither
costless nor automatic. Its cumulative and dynamic nature are clearly observed in the learning
patterns of Vietnamese firms (see Chapter 7). The experience of Vietnam's firms also shows
that learning is a gradual rather than a leap-frogging process (see 10.3). The evidence also
supported the need for conscious investment efforts in learning, whereby they combine
active learning-by-doing with different learning mechanisms for the acquisition of various
TCs. In addition, firm-specific (and to a lesser extent, sector-specific) features of learning
have been shown to exist. Proposition (2), that different learning mechanisms are used for
accumulating different TCs, has been supported by Vietnamese empirical experience as well.
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Based on the findings of this study, it appears that, whilst firms need to engage in
learning efforts in order to build up their TCs, the precise deployment of learning
mechanisms may differ across different contexts. As Cooper (1991) and others similarly
argue, this study implies that the generally well-established concept in innovation studies of
TC and learning activities may commonly be applied to firms in different countries, including
the applicability of the concept to the case of developing countries.
However, because learning is localised in accordance with various contexts, the
patterns of learning may differ depending on the macro environmental conditions which
pertain in any given context. Learning must be a firm-based effort and it is influenced by the
strategies adopted by firms. Therefore, learning patterns differ among firms even where
those firms operate in the same environment.
In examining the third research question concerning the reasons behind patterns of
TC accumulation and learning, this study also supports the argument about the importance of
macro environmental factors on firms' business and learning activities. The more interactive
macro-micro link, and its influence on firms' learning and TC acquisition as suggested by
propositions (3) and (4) (see 4.2.2) is a new finding elaborated by this study, which I
present below. Moreover, the influence of each group of macro factors, and the extent of
this influence in the specific context of Vietnam, also constitutes new evidence which this
study has explicated.
11.3 Main New Findings and Extended Arguments
In addition to confirming some well-accepted arguments in both innovation and development
studies, this study has also established some new arguments, and has extended existing
arguments by providing an additional perspective backed by new evidence. Moreover, this
study sheds some light on the specific conditions of Vietnam as a developing country and as
a transitional economy which suggests that Vietnam shares some of the characteristics of
both types of economy. The main new findings of the study are summarised below.
• TC accumulation:
among TCs, technical change (major technical change, in particular) and marketing
capabilities are less developed than others due to a lack of competitive pressure, and a
consequent lack of a need to engage in marketing or to innovate products in terms of
range and quality (see 6.2.4 and 10.2.1).
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• The nature and mechanisms of learning :
- among learning mechanisms, active learning-by-doing is necessary to achieve a TC, but
is not in itself sufficient (see 7.6.2).
- learning through foreign connections, in Vietnamese firms, is weak for acquiring
marketing and technical change capabilities, due to the ineffective utilisation of these
connections by Vietnamese firms themselves and very likely a lack of readiness by
foreign partners to help in this area (see 7.6.1).
• The relationship between learning and TC:
- there seems no clear-cut linear relationship between the use of learning mechanisms and
TC accumulation which is universal regardless of circumstances.
- as a result, learning must take place and be examined in a specific context: decisions of
what learning is appropriate for acquiring which TCs, and by means of which learning
mechanisms, tend to vary across different contexts (of firm, period and sector).
• The unique context of Vietnam:
- the joint interaction of both macro environmental factors and firm-level micro factors is
an important influence on learning and TC accumulation.
- personal networking is crucial in the Vietnamese context for learning and, even
following the reforms, remains more significant that is the case in other Central and
Eastern European countries.
- the government plays a contradictory role. It over-intervenes in industrial activity in
some respects yet it simultaneously offers inadequate support for other activities.
There is little evidence of selective intervention.
- ownership is an important issue for learning and TC accumulation. There is a tension
between private and state ownership.
- firms' strategies such as diversification and specialisation in niche products in response
to influences of macro factors are important determinants of the learning process and
TC accumulation.
I will now review these findings in more detail.
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11.3.1 TC Accumulation, and Learning Mechanisms
First I will consider the new findings concerning TC accumulation - particularly the
weakness ofmarketing and technical change capabilities compared to other capabilities such
as production or investment (6.4.3). This might be related to the unique context of Vietnam
which I discuss in Section 11.3.3. Depending on the context of different firms (i.e., the
strategies they follow, what they want to produce, and for which market), they need
different types of TC and therefore, adopt different ways of learning. Each context
determines the precise TC needs of the firm and this, in turn, leads to their using different
learning mechanisms. As a result, because of the localised specificity of learning activity -
and in contrast to the universality of the need for learning - there might not be a single
universal pattern of learning which describes all contexts.
As I mention above, the notion of combining different learning mechanisms is not
new. However, this study has extended this notion into a more concrete finding. Learning
mechanisms have to be combined in multiplicity, albeit that the leaming-by-doing mechanism
remains the single most used device. Again, next to this need to combine learning
mechanisms - which is quite universal across various firms, sectors and countries - the
patterns of combination vary depending on background. The use of learning-by-doing, for
instance, has to be backed up with at least two other mechanisms in textile/garment firms,
and with more than two in electronics firms, if they are to acquire a TC. As for developing
strong TC, firms need to use nearly all six learning mechanisms in both sectors.
For each of the six learning mechanisms, there are some relevant findings. First,
even though the learning-by-doing mechanism requires less investment from firms than other
mechanisms, it still has to be actively and consciously pursued by them if they want to learn
anything. The notion of learning-by-struggling or learning-by-trying (Fleck, 1991 and
1994) is evident in many firms. Furthermore, most firms acquiring TCs have experienced a
pains-taking and long process of tests and checks, where they make errors and continuously
adjust their activities to address such errors. The suggested active notion of learning-by-
doing in the taxonomy for this study has worked well. Rather than just by-doing (or by-
using) technology once the technological system has been set in place, learning-by-trying has
to take place even prior to this, and becomes evident in the process of installing the new
system.
Concerning the use of foreign connections, this study shows that Vietnamese firms
have difficulties in using foreign connections to learn technical change capability for two
reasons: the ineffective utilisation of this mechanism on the part of Vietnamese firms
themselves, and the likelihood that foreign partners not willing to help them in this area
(discussed in 7.6.1). The implication of this is that the learning mechanism through foreign
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connection is not the one-for-all solution for the technological accumulation of developing
countries. Firms should not passively rely on this mechanism, but should try to exploit this
connection more consciously and creatively. The contrasting examples of TLG with its quite
passive attitude towards using foreign connection (see Section 9.2) and HAL which very
actively tries to learn from foreign companies (see Section 9.3) illustrate this point.
Whilst using learning mechanisms such as training, information collection and
search, documentation and consultancy services, the practice of firms in this study reveal the
significance of personal networking and of relationships between people working in different
organisations. In many cases, personal relationships contribute a firm's ability to learn those
skills and knowledges which formal relationships cannot provide them with. The extensive
reliance of electronics firms HAL and 3C (see Section 9.3) on this informal network of
connections confirms this claim. In particular, the way 3C uses informal relations for
learning knowledge through a "barter arrangement" - to use Faulkner & Senker's (1993)
term - reveals its importance both to this firm and to other similar firms, which lack
alternative resources for acquiring new knowledge and information.
Although, as noted above, the cumulative sequence of learning is not a new finding,
one element this study reveals - matching that found by Hobday (1994 and 1995b) and Ernst
(1995) in NICs - is that leap-frogging cannot replace the hard slog of learning if TCs are to
be accumulated even by late-comer firms (see 2.4.1, 2.4.4 and 3.5.2). The gradual learning
process starts with the acquisition of simple skills, first on mature products and well-
established technologies (through subcontracting and OEM arrangements), and then moves
on to engaging in more complex tasks, working on newer products and process technologies
in ODM arrangements and beyond (10.3). There are several reasons for why this long and
hard road towards learning must be travelled, all related to the nature of knowledge
accumulation, and to the conditions of developing countries. Knowledge is complex,
cumulative and tacit; it takes times to learn; it is specifically located in the sense that it must
accord with particular contexts; and its acquisition requires that organisations have absorptive
capacity - a capacity which is limited in the case of firms in developing countries which
cannot learn different kinds of complex knowledge all at once. As discussed in Section
10.2.2, the implication of this finding is that learning is not a quick and easy activity. Firms
must devote many inputs to achieve their learning purposes. Those who might attempt to
leap-frog or to take short-cuts have to take this feature of learning into account. This may
provide quite an apposite lesson for many Vietnamese companies - or other firms operating
in similar economies - in considering scenarios for their industrial development.
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11.3.2 Learning and TC Accumulation Relationship
One of the important research questions of this study (the examination of the relationship
between learning mechanisms and TC) was a novel concern in this area. The purpose of this
thesis in linking these aspects was to find out if there is any relationship between them, and
if there is, what the nature of the connection is.
The overall answer to this question is that, it looks like that there might exist a
relationship between learning and TC accumulation and they influence each other: by using
certain learning mechanisms, one can acquire certain TCs. However, as discussed in 7.6.2
and 10.2.3, this study has found that this relationship might not be universal across
developing countries, but more specific to Vietnam (or similar conditions). There is no clear-
cut linear relationship between TC accumulation and learning; they are intertwined with each
other.
By exploring how learning mechanisms and TC acquisition relate to each other with
respect to the frequency of use made of particular mechanisms, the study has also identified
some concrete ranking of learning mechanisms in relation to their contribution to TC
accumulation. Active learning-by-doing is the most used mechanism, followed by
accumulation of prior knowledge through recruitment.
Another important learning mechanism is training, and the study found that training
in Vietnam tends to have a technical rather than a non-technical orientation. As a result, it
may be possible to provide some recommendations about what learning mechanisms should
be used for accumulating which TCs. However, these recommendations cannot suggest a
universal pattern suitable for all firms, because conditions vary from context to context. For
instance, depending on a firm's background and on the type of TC to be accumulated, there
can be different (successful) ways of combining learning mechanisms. Thus, the
relationship between the use of certain learning mechanisms and the accumulation of
particular TCs needs to be considered in the context of specific firms. Outwith this context,
the relationship becomes quite vague and indeterminate.
This conclusion points to another question. Is it possible - or even necessary - to
make the relationship between TC accumulation and learning more clear-cut and, by so
doing, provide firms with a kind of model of learning? The answer to this question seems to
be mixed. On the one hand, it is both possible and necessary to examine the relationship
between learning mechanisms and TCs in the context of one firm in a specific industry or
country. From this, one can provide some bench-marking and some recommendations
based on the 'technological health' of that particular firm - something akin to a management
consultant's assessment of the 'business health' of that firm. More concretely, by assessing
a firm's problems over the course of a particular period of its development, some desirable
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goals might be nominated for special attention. Under this kind of analysis, a firm might be
usefully advised on which TCs to accumulate, and which specific know-how and skills it
should set about acquiring, in accordance with the business orientation and the priorities of
that firm. And accordingly, which learning mechanisms are most likely to achieve this
objective.
On the other hand, this study reveals that it is extremely difficult to offer a universal
prescription for different firms in the same industry, or the same country, because of the
firm- and sector-specificity of learning and TC accumulation. Moreover, it might not be
useful to attempt this exercise. This suggests that further examination is required on the
question of TC and its relationship with learning to see how this relationship might vary in
various contexts.
11.3.3 The Impact of the Macro-Micro Link and Vietnam's Unique Context
The importance ofexternal influences and internal responses
This study has investigated the research question of the impact of macro-micro factors'
interaction on learning. The main findings support propositions (3) and (4), that is, that
learning activity is the jointly-shaped outcome of both sets of factor. Neither macro nor
micro level factors have separately influenced the learning process of the firms. An
important contribution of this study is its empirical evidence of the activities of Vietnamese
industrial firms. I will draw more attention to this specific context in examining the macro-
micro link.
Macro policies of the state are the most influential external factors on all learning
mechanisms used by Vietnamese firms. The deficiencies of the industrial infrastructure have
a significant influence on training mechanisms, and on the search and collection of
information by firms. In my view, the change from a command to a market economy, which
is the crucial element in Vietnam's transition, is also having a significant influence on the
way firms do business, learn knowledge and become more competitive. In reacting to these
influences, the study suggests that there might be an interesting link between business
behaviour of firms and the kind of knowledge necessary for them, the way they search for
TCs, and the learning mechanisms they adopt for this purpose.
In addition to features similar to other transitional economies in Central and Eastern
Europe, China or the former Soviet Union - such as the phenomena of spin-off companies,
of the lack of a strategic long-term view of development, and of the existence of informal
networking (see Section 10.4) - the transitional period in Vietnam also shows some other
specific features. One of these is that informal networking in Vietnam has survived almost
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intact from the pre-reform period, and continues to play a greater role in the learning process
of firms than in most other Central or Eastern European countries. The mixture of
characteristics of both a developing country and of a transitional economy leaves a unique
imprint on the ways that Vietnamese firms operate and on how they learn technological
expertise, which I discuss below.
The contradictory role of the state
In the transitional period, the question of the role of the state emerges as an important issue
in relation to learning activity. In common with other former centrally-planned economies,
the state's role has traditionally been perceived as dominating Vietnam's society and
economy. However, this study shows the contradictory role of the state in Vietnam: it has
over-intervened in the daily business of the firms, and at the same time not offered sufficient
support in creating an environment conducive for learning and TC accumulation. This role
can be described as one of controlling without promoting industrial and technological
development.
Although the role of the state for learning and TC accumulation is necessary, it has to
be selective and it must be favourable for doing business. In the case of Vietnamese
industrial firms, there is little selective intervention as yet, at least in the form of explicit
promotional policies such as tax rate reductions and exemptions, adjustable financial
incentives, or flexible regulations on labour use and recruitment, etc. The criticism mounted
by the firms in this study about the lack of an efficient trade management system (see Section
8.2) which could help them deal with smuggling problems, is one example of the shortage of
protection measures for domestic industries. The observed phenomenon of rolling back the
state seems unique in Vietnam's case but is understandable in the context of the search for
suitable models for industrial and technological policies. Here, Vietnam's similarities with
the East Asian NICs - where the state plays a strong and successful role in promoting
economic growth and technological development - is quite attractive to Vietnam. This
situation is rather different from that of the transitional economies in Central and Eastern
Europe where the whole structure of state administration has changed so radically that the
current wisdom is that the role of the state should be as minimal as possible or, in some
cases, should be totally redundant.
The tension ofownership issue
In the context of Vietnam, the question of ownership also becomes important for learning
and TC accumulation. In countries where state and private ownership coexist within a well-
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established and transparent legal framework, this issue is not so crucial. Given the context
of Vietnam where the state has a strong anti-private attitude, the tense competition between
these two forms of ownership has been pushed to the limit. The inequality within the
competitive environment creates various kinds of problems for firms - especially privately-
owned ones - in exercising their business as well as in engaging in their learning activities.
That private firms have less access to R&D, training and education facilities, are subjected to
stricter financial and tax regulations, and have more limits placed on their opportunities to
use bank credits are just some examples of this discrimination. While both private and state-
owned firms have their own problems, this factor strongly influences their learning. As a
result, it might be necessary to devise suitable policies and measures to support learning and
TC accumulation for differentiated ownership within the framework of selective intervention
for different sectors, which might be a concern peculiar to Vietnam. However, this depends
largely on the government's orientation towards supporting firms under different kinds of
ownership which I discuss again in Section 11.4.2.
One interesting finding of this study is that SOEs in some specific conditions - for
example, ones which are sufficiently supported by the state, pursuing the correct strategies
and being properly steered by capable managers - can become good learners, and achieve
positive performances in holding or increasing their competitive position. This finding is
quite contrary to the traditionally poor image of SOEs in a centrally-planned economy. This
is not to suggest that the perception of SOEs as being ineffective should be overturned
wholesale but that, given the right conditions, SOEs can be successful as private firms.
Still, SOEs such as HAL or NTC in this study (see 9.3 and 9.2) are exceptional: their
managers are quite capable of devising creative learning techniques and have adopted an
active approach in utilising learning mechanisms. Again, I would emphasise the importance
of the strategic behaviours undertaken by these firms' managers.
Firms' strategies are key
As the other half of the macro-micro link, the strategic responses of firms to external
pressures are crucial for how they proceed in doing business, and for their TC accumulation
and learning. The study has identified two main types of strategy that firms pursue:
diversification (undertaken by the majority of firms) and specialisation (undertaken by a
few), despite the difficulty of distinction between them (see 8.3.5). Although there are other
strategies available, like exporting or exploiting the domestic market, actual observed
strategies tend to concentrate around the two aforementioned choices (one question could be
an interesting further exploration is that depending on the type of strategy, firms may require
different types of TC). As mentioned in Chapter 8 and in Section 10.6, these tendencies are
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the main responses of firms to changes in the macro external environment. Most of the firms
following the diversification strategy are intent on maintaining their business performance in
a more difficult situation. The few firms adopting specialisation are seeking to gain more
value-added in their activities, and they are aiming at bettering their performance in the long
run. Because no attempt has been made to deal with these strategic issues exclusively, the
study is not in a position to provide a more specific comparison between these two strategic
behaviours. However, these two tendencies can be regarded, respectively, as a strategy for
survival and a strategy for growth. They each require different types of knowledge, and
different levels of knowledge complexity and range.
The issue of differentiation versus specialisation may have a very significant
implication. It is suggested by Ernst (1995), and supported by this study, that first of all
firms need to concentrate on differentiating their products and services within a chosen and
limited range of activities, rather than diversifying into too many types of business. Only
later, when resources permit, can some firms adopt specialisation strategies on the basis of
their accumulated and core technological knowledge. This gradual approach should ease the
strain on firms' learning processes. Examples of firms which have adopted both strategies
show that they are currently performing well (e.g., HAL and 3C aiming at niche products,
and NTC's diversification beyond knitting), although in the long run, this may not remain
the case. Some companies are diversifying beyond their traditional product areas. Even
firms aiming at specialisation have shown some signs of pursuing both strategies at the same
time (e.g., HAL's joint venture with Daewoo in the construction business, or 3C's non-
electronics activities). These activities may weaken the ability of those firms to concentrate
their resources for technological deepening as Ernst (1995) found in the case of Korean
firms. The diversification strategy, if it is over-done, could eventually have negative impacts
on the learning activities of firms.
Whatever strategies firms pursue, the attitude of managers to learning is crucial for
upgrading their knowledge. The passive attitude of TLG's managers cause difficulties for
them in using foreign connections more effectively, which may be attributed to the
subsidised mentality generated by the old centrally-planned economy (see 9.2.1). In the
meantime, NTC's managers have a more active approach to risk-taking (e.g. trying to get
their new knitting technology working) and, as a reward, they have learnt investment
capability where TLG has not. The continuous efforts of HAL's managers to organise
training mechanisms to support their previously accumulated knowledge while 3C's
managers have omitted to do the same thing may give the former learning advantages over
the latter. The earlier mentioned "special technique of learning" (see Sections 9.2.3 and
9.3.3) - the ability to know how to exploit learning opportunities in the most effective way -
is mostly associated with the role of a firm's personnel: its managers, technicians and
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workers. Thus, "learning how to learn" is also influenced by firms' strategic behaviours.
This supports the notion of "learning to learn" which depends on previously accumulated
learning, i.e., the knowledge and experience gained by firms' personnel over a learning
curve (3.3). After each period of development, staff know more about how to learn and
how to alter their learning formats and sources.
As mentioned, the above issues may also exist in other countries, whether
developing or transitional or both. In Vietnam, they have been seen quite distinctly and carry
implications for policy-making at the national level and at the level of the firm.
11.4 Policy Implications
There are some implications and recommendations for policy-making in terms of improving
learning and TC accumulation at the firm level. First, I will consider some implications by
taking the firms' perspective.
11.4.1 From the Perspective of Firms
It is obvious that firms should clarify what they need to learn and how they need to learn it,
depending on their business orientation and strategies. As a coherent part of their business
plan, firms have to identify what is required for each period and specific context and which
kinds of knowledge they are searching for, and then decide on how to acquire this
knowledge and bend their learning efforts accordingly. Instead of learning on an ad-hoc
basis, this activity should become a key and permanent means for firms to become more
competitive. A conscious approach to investing in, planning and organising learning
activities is necessary for learning to take place in firms.
The role of managers is important if they want their firms to be competitive. They
should be creative in devising their own "special learning technique" which suits their own
context (this context can vary greatly), in order to fully exploit all the learning sources and
opportunities available to them. More concretely, firms have to institute a plan of action for
using each learning mechanism, for each period. They must consciously pursue learning-
by-active-doing (or struggling) and they must train their staff and maintain their access to -
and effectively utilise - R&D expertise and the S&T infrastructure. They have to combine
learning-by-doing with as many other learning mechanisms as possible. They should also
utilise their existing linkages and networks, both formal and informal. Indeed, firms should
continue to promote their informal connections (such as class mates, alumni clubs, family
relations, etc.) in support of their goals.
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In the main, Vietnamese firms are probably still not active enough about augmenting
their learning activities. In many cases, they tend to look to government to take the lead and
they wait passively for governmental measures to be taken. My argument is that the
government should play a role (as discussed below), but that firms should also be more
active in taking the lead. They should introduce new initiatives in their relations with the
government concerning policies conducive for learning. For example, they should submit
proposals to government, and organise lobbying pressures in order to obtain regulations in
their favour. The establishment of the Associations of the garment industry and of the
electronics and informatics sector is a step in the right direction, but attempts of this kind
should be even more vigorous. In any case, firms have to prepare themselves for doing
business, learning, and upgrading their TCs without expecting too much from the state. As
marketing is one of the weakest capabilities, and there is a lack of training courses providing
this kind of knowledge in Vietnam, firms should learn more by-doing. Firms have to throw
themselves into the market place; their managers and personnel should be more
entrepreneurial and creative in learning from marketing experiences.
To side-step the serious funding shortage, firms need to devise flexible mechanisms
for learning which do not require heavy levels of funding, e.g., the "barter" or exchange of
knowledge and training courses, and the organisation of mutually beneficial services.
Among TCs, major technical change and marketing capabilities are less developed than
others. In order to further develop these TCs, Vietnamese firms need to take some concrete
actions. The recruitment of young graduates from available courses in non-technical subjects
such as marketing is useful, but is hindered by the relative dearth of such courses.
Therefore, this learning mechanism should be complemented by recruiting experienced staff
from other organisations - especially from R&D and administrative institutions like ministries
and banks. Moreover, firms should invest step-wise, setting up special units to take care of
R&D and major technical change activities. This can also be done for marketing by creating
a network of shops, showrooms and sales offices, both locally and abroad. More
importantly, the function of these units should be reviewed regularly to draw necessary
lessons for improvement.
The utilisation of foreign connections is especially important for Vietnamese firms
and they should be more aware of the advantages and disadvantages of this mechanism.
Vietnamese firms need to be more active in this respect. They need to stop relying passively
on "receiving" knowledge and substitute that passivity with conscious "intelligence
gathering" (by which I mean seeking out experience, information, skills, and know-how)
while working with their foreign partners. The experience of HAL and of some other
consumer electronics firms in using their foreign connections purposefully may provide
other firms with a useful model of how to proceed. It is important to put people working
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closely with foreign partners right from the start of the project, in order to gain insight into
the 'nuts and bolts' of the technology, and to prepare vigorously for the day when the
foreign experts are no longer available to them. Firms should seek joint implementation of
different kinds of technical improvements, using this as a chance to learn the ways foreign
companies handle technical change activity. The practice adopted by E2, E10 and El 1
provide examples of this behaviour. The firms can do the same thing for learning marketing
skills. By becoming part of a larger network of producers and suppliers, such as that of the
Japanese electronics giants in East and Southeast Asia, firms may be able to learn more about
marketing. Firms such as E3, TGI4, TG5 and E2 have began to do this. Different foreign
sources could be used in combination to create new learning expertise. In textile/garment
firms, the strength of European partners in design and fashion trend-setting should be
complemented by the advantages proffered by Asian companies in terms of their work
organisation and management techniques. The experience of some consumer electronics
firms such as E2 and E10 in combining Japanese, Korean and Chinese sources of
technological expertise also provide a good example.
Vietnamese textile/garment firms tend to place more emphasis on changing their
process rather than their product technologies. They need to learn the design skills that are
crucial for product innovation. In order to do so, they may have to be more active in
developing their relations with foreign partners beyond simple subcontracting. One
improvement would be to better utilise the services of local R&D institutions such as RCGI
or RITI, including embarking on joint research projects with these institutes to resolve their
technical problems.
Pursuing a consistent strategy is necessary for the deepening of technological
competence. Vietnamese firms should distinguish between which of their actions contribute
to meeting their long-term strategy, and which only meet their tactical or short-term ends.
The selectivity and flexibility in changing their business orientation may need to be done
more cautiously to avoid fragmenting their limited resources and efforts. The too-wide
diversification of so many firms into businesses unrelated to their core activities (e.g., into
construction and tourism) should be seen as tactical manoeuvres to solve short-term
problems, but not as meeting long-term strategic goals.
11.4.2 From the Government's Perspective
For learning within firms to take place, their own efforts are not sufficient. Support and
intervention measures by the government are also necessary. As the policy-maker, the
government should create the general framework for industries to develop - a framework
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which includes regulations relating to macro economic stability and the generation of
socially-favourable conditions e.g more business friendly attitudes of government officials,
especially toward private entrepreneurship. Among other things, the government should
create more conducive conditions and provide more learning resources for firms in R&D,
training and education. Possible initiatives include promoting technological development by
issuing S&T policies for the whole country, devising plans suitable for each sector and
providing incentives for firms to do business and to learn.
The government's catalytic role in guiding and co-ordinating the activities of firms
and other organisations is important. A necessary set of governmental tasks includes the
reorganisation, funding and co-ordination of R&D institutes, training schools, and other
educational organisations to ensure the effective functioning of the whole industrial
supporting infrastructure. The government should enhance activities which support
standardisation and quality control and establish or subsidise information and documentation
centres and industrial property offices. Also, the government should take care to create an
effective legal and institutional framework for industrial activities. Moreover, even in the
transition to a market economy, the government should continue supporting - even
subsidising - crucial activities for firms' learning such as education, training, and strategic
R&D. The experience of industrialised countries shows that, even in a market economy, the
government should play an active role in these activities. This approach also lends continuity
to the heritage of the socialist period in Vietnam, but in a more effective and selective way.
On the basis of these general points, what can be said for government's role in the
Vietnamese context? First, the contradictory role of the state should be changed to support
firms' activities. The role of the state should be redirected towards selective intervention.
The government should intervene less in the daily business activities of firms, and at the
same time, be more supportive in creating conditions conducive to firms' activities.
More specifically, it should revise its banking, financial, trade, investment, labour
and management policies to help firms in general, and augment their scope for learning in
particular. For instance, it should abolish the situation where firms prefer to trade rather than
to produce locally (mostly in electronics) since, currently, the import tax on components is
too high and the tax on complete products is not high enough. The import-export taxation
system should be revised and updated flexibly (but not too frequently). The system of
financial management, foreign currency management, taxation, accounting and credit -
especially for long-term technological innovation and learning purposes - should be
reformed. Banking procedures must be reformed more radically to smooth the business of
firms, by imposing a less rigid and cumbersome structure for lending for the purposes of
technological innovation and learning. Labour and immigration regulations could be
improved, allowing firms more freedom to develop their human resources (e.g., whom and
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how to recruit or sack, how to organise training activities, whom to invite in or to send
abroad for co-operation, etc.). Trade management and custom regulations have to focus
more strictly on solving the smuggling problem which is very serious for both the
textile/garment and the electronics sectors. Some of these specific policies would have a
direct impact on the learning activities of firms. For example, more liberalised regulations on
labour and recruitment could make it easier for firms to use prior accumulated knowledge.
Some other policy changes, like financial incentives that lead to the availability of new
resources, can have an immediate impact on doing business, while having a more indirect
influence on the learning process.
Second, state support for the whole industrial infrastructure in both the
textile/garment and electronics industries should be continued after reforms. Some initiatives
are needed for both industries, while others are more peculiar to one or other industry. One
example is that textile/garment firms are less supported by R&D activities than are electronics
firms. This could be changed by reforming the R&D system, making RITI and RCGI closer
to the needs of firms in specific industries. In particular, upgrading RCGI's research activity
could significantly enhance the fashion and design capabilities of garment firms. The legal
system should be more transparent and should be sufficiently consistent that firms have time
to readjust their activities accordingly. Improvements to the industrial supporting
infrastructure should include the physical infrastructures of information, telecommunications
and transport. The need for improvements stretches beyond these particular two industries,
to the development of other related industries such as mechanical engineering, plastic,
chemical and packaging industries without which both the textile/garment and electronics
industries experience difficulties.
The government should embark on creating a long-term policy and development
strategy for both industries. This is crucial. Although firms have to decide on their own
plans and strategies by themselves, without a long-term view of the industrial and
technological development of the whole country, it is difficult for the firms to orient
themselves and to devise the moves they need to make accordingly. This factor is important
for both private companies and SOEs, although SOEs are more dependent on this set of
policies being put in place since they are directly controlled by the state and depend on the
state budget for implementing their long-term investment plans (including their training and
learning goals). So far, the electronics industry in Vietnam has not had any sound long-term
development strategies and this creates great problems for firms. Co-ordinating the sector
can be pursued through the improving state electronics research programmes in such areas
such as information technology, or in promoting the activities of the Vietnam Association of
Informatics.
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In the textile/garment industry, the Association of garment industries for example,
could be made responsible for managing and overseeing the chaotic competition among local
subcontractors. The curricula of vocational schools and training centres should be upgraded
to meet the requirements of a market economy and the increasing need for appropriately
skilled workers. Universities and other higher education institutions could train more
personnel for new professions such as garment fashion design. Research institutions
serving the textile/garment sector should be reorganised to suit the newer needs of that
industry.
In electronics and computing, some specific measures can be suggested. Training
programmes of universities, vocational schools and training centres should be reorganised to
offer courses with a more practical orientation, updated and augmented by the knowledges
necessary for operating in a market economy like business administration, investment and
marketing. Research institutes such as VIELIN, IMET and IOIT should be restructured and
geared more to serve the practical needs of firms. Issues of protecting industrial property
rights, and of standardisation (very important for computing and software development)
should be addressed more vigorously by government organisations like the Ministry of
Science, Technology and Environment.
The problems of ownership should be dealt with more consistently. Only in a non¬
discriminatory environment can healthy learning take place. Therefore, the government
should treat firms under different ownership equally. This does not contradict the selective
intervention principle applied to differences between sectors.1
One point relates to both firms and government organisations. Firms and other
actors involved in learning activities (e.g., government agencies) have to work together
through dialogue to devise the most appropriate recommendations for learning to take place,
such as strategies of firms and conducive macro-policies of the state. The results of my
interviews with external organisations show that these organisations tend to see the same
things differently, based on different facts and figures. As a result, they act quite differently
from each other, sometimes blaming each other and wasting scarce resources. The S&T
department of the Ministry of Industry (the merger of MOLI and the Ministry of Heavy
Industry) and industrial associations have an important role to play in organising this
dialogue.
1 The role of private enterprises as the engine for economic growth in many economies is well-known.
However, the role of private and state enterprises in Vietnam's economic development depends on the
political orientation of the government - an issue which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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11.5 On the Methodology of the Study
In this section I will reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used in
this study.
11.5.1 The Use of a TC Taxonomy
The first point to consider is the value of the TC taxonomies used in the study. Thanks to a
detailed taxonomy of TCs, it has been easier to separate technical change activities into
different types and levels of capability, which other categorisations would have difficulty
handling. For instance, the use of marketing and linkage capabilities has been useful in the
context of Vietnam where there is a shortage of marketing competence, and where the
existence of informal networks is clearly visible. By using marketing capability, the
importance of marketing activities in manufacturing industries can be emphasised and
examined more explicitly. Similarly, without separating minor and major technical change
capabilities, it would be difficult to assess the status of Vietnamese firms with respect to their
ability to tackle technical change, because they tend to be more active and competent at
carrying out minor improvements than at R&D and major technical change activities.
However, distinguishing between minor and major technical change capabilities may cause
some confusion: a technical change that seems minor in terms of investment or technical
improvement can also be quite significant in terms of economic gain and vice versa.
Therefore, this division might need to be adjusted to capture the subtleties of what the
capability involves.
Knowing what to leam and how to learn certain TCs assumes importance across all
the six capabilities explored in this thesis. Therefore, it might be appropriate to include in the
taxonomy the capability of 'strategic learning'. This capability might be defined as the ability
of a firm to identify what is required to meet its business purposes (e.g., targeting
technological knowledge, experience, skills or know-how), and then to conduct systematic
strategic learning behaviours to accumulate the desired assets. This ability can be associated
with all six of the capabilities explored in this thesis. However, this point needs to be further
clarified through more empirical analysis.
11.5.2 The Use of the Learning Concept and Taxonomy
The expanded and revised taxonomy of learning mechanisms used in this study seems
workable. In particular, the functional focus of this taxonomy makes it easier than would be
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the case with other taxonomies to tap into firms' activities through the interview method.
The use of notion of active learning-by-doing - a combination of Bell's (1984) learning-by-
operating and by-changing and Fleck's (1991 and 1994) learning-by-struggling or by-trying
- usefully covers the difficult process of adjusting the production system both before and
after it has been installed. Thus, in the future research, instead of general term learning-by-
doing, it might be useful to suggest a more precise the term of learning-by-attempting. This
effort may be worthwhile to distinguish traditional concept of passive leaming-by-just-doing
(without any conscious effort to try something done), and a new notion of learning-by-
active-doing, where firms (persons) attempt to achieve some improvements through doing
tasks, as well as to emphasise the importance of the latter.
The use of foreign connections as a separate mechanism assumes greater importance
in the context of a developing country like Vietnam, which relies heavily on this source of
technological knowledge and expertise and where the opening up of export markets is crucial
to growth. The reason for identifying this as a separate mechanism is the current
significance of foreign contacts for Vietnam which has been isolated for such a long time.
However, the use of this mechanism may not be so crucial in the context of studying firms in
developed countries, where the activities of learning through foreign connections may be re¬
allocated into other learning categories such as training (by foreigners), searching out
(foreign) information, etc.
One more observation from my experience of using learning mechanisms for
research purposes is that it might be useful to distinguish additional learning mechanisms
such as learning through informal connections. Although, in my study, informal learning
operates through many other mechanisms as a kind of sub-activity (for example, in searching
out information, learning informally by hear-say, or from working with experts in on-the-job
training) it may be important enough to justify its being highlighted as a separate learning
category. It seems likely that the use of one or other taxonomy depends on the focus and
purpose of the study, but this suggestion needs testing.
11.5.3 Case Studies Approach
As I mentioned earlier, this study is a micro-level and firm-based investigation. This is a key
advantage of the study, allowing us to take a close look beyond the gates of the firm, to
focus on learning which is inherently a firm-based process.
In the theoretical framework, it is assumed that the focus of this study is how specific
skills and knowledge are accumulated which are geared to improving the firm's
performance. Therefore, it is the concrete actions of individuals and firms - most of which
can be best examined through qualitative research methods - which are central to this study
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on learning. In many other studies, economic performance has been used to reflect learning
activities and TC improvements. Consequently, the indicators of those studies are more
quantitative than qualitative and bear a closer resemblance to econometric methods. In
contrast, the case study method used here is qualitative in style, based on description and
analyses of activities over time, rather than on quantitative calculation of results. In terms of
studies explicitly focused on learning in the context of developing countries, not many
researchers have used this bottom-up approach before, with the exception of Bell's extensive
work (1982 and 1984), the more recent studies of Hobday (1994 and 1995b), and those of
Lall & Wignaraja (1994).
The bottom-up approach made possible by this case study method offers one more
advantage. In my study, it helps to understand why some firms display rather different
patterns of learning and TC accumulation as compared to patterns found more generally in
the study as a whole (see Chapters 6 and 7). Indeed, it is only in the context of each firm
that can one see what is happening and understand the reasons underpinning the observed
behaviour.
11.5.4 Collection and Interpretation of Data
In assessing the use of separate learning mechanisms, I have met some difficulties. It can be
seen from the case studies of TLG (see Section 9.2) and NTC (see Section 9.3) that it is
extremely difficult to actually describe learning-by-doing. Unlike training mechanisms,
where a number of indicators are clearly identifiable and quantifiable (e.g., how many
courses are organised, where people are sent for training, for how long, how much training
costs the firm etc.), few obvious indicators are available for learning-by-doing against which
the activity can be measured or assessed. The only way to proceed is to describe what has
happened, and when and how, and to consider who is doing what, etc. Although it is easier
to gather and interpret data for other mechanisms like prior accumulation or foreign
connections, I still have to rely mostly on description and firms' records. There is little
possibility of using quantitative instruments for this kind of research issue.
Another problem of data interpretation is the difficulty in assessing the status of TC
accumulation. Although I tried to introduce different levels of technological competence
(i.e., strong, weak or non-existent), it was sometimes difficult to evaluate whether firms
possessed the same level of TC acquisition when they were working with different kinds of
technology. It is even more difficult to assess the contribution of each learning mechanism
to each TC - an assessment which is less marked in establishing whether a particular TC is
present or not, but which becomes increasingly difficult when attempting to establish the
extent to which mastery of that TC has been gained. For example, I can say that a particular
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firm used one or another learning mechanism for accumulating this or that TC. But it is
more difficult to identify how much this mechanism contributes to this or that TC, or which
one is contributing more. The same can be said for the notion of combining learning
mechanisms. Despite being able to identify some 'lumping' patterns, where identifiable
clusters of learning mechanism combine to contribute to acquiring a particular TC, it is still
unclear how these mechanisms combine in actuality: which ones come first, which ones
come later, how they complement each other, etc. To rank learning mechanisms in their
order of importance is not quite enough to understand this relationship. Again, in this case, I
have had to address the firm's specific context to make sense of the patterns which emerge.
11.5.5 Other Issues
In addition to the above mentioned issues, there are some other points to note. First is the
question of time. In order to understand changes at the level of the firm in the learning
patterns used and in the modes of TC creation, it is necessary to take more than a snap-shot
view. Learning is a long, cumulative and step-by-step process. The framework design of
longitudinal research would be necessary for capturing the dynamic, cumulative, and
evolving nature of learning. However, the data for some firms is not available or is
inadequate over particular periods. Therefore, this study has been limited to the five years
between 1989 and 1993 and this might not be sufficient to fully capture the dynamics of the
learning process.
My second point concerns the appropriate research methods. The choice of two
sectors and 24 firms using very different types of technology and products may cause
difficulties. Having to deal with too many issues at once can divert the research effort from
achieving an in-depth analysis of any one topic. Therefore, a shift from breadth to depth of
research could be a useful way to clarify certain issues, such as the relationship between
learning mechanisms and types of TC. A whole research project based on a very detailed
study of one or two firms might be more appropriate for achieving greater depth of
understanding. Have said this, ethnographic methods are not easily applicable to this
research. It is difficult just to come and stay with the firms to observe what they are doing.
Moreover, some firms are reluctant to share their views or their data on what they have done
or are currently doing. For example, two firms - TGI 1 and E6 - initially agreed to supply
data and to be interviewed, but then refused to continue. The solution found for this study
was to combine formal interviews with informal chatting, and to study the recorded data of
the firms. Personal and long-term relationships with people at the firms are useful for
getting that kind of access, and for being able to do direct observation at the firms.
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Third, in doing this study, I have deviated somewhat from my initial plan. The first
shift came with my decision to consider the interaction of macro and micro factors rather than
to merely focus on macro factors and their influences on learning and TC accumulation.
This happened as a consequence of my case interviews and firm studies, when the
importance of firms' strategic behaviour emerged to a greater extent than I had first
anticipated. Another shift of focus is from establishing the existence of TCs to a more
pronounced concern with understanding learning activities. Although the question of TC
accumulation was - and is - one of the research issues I was interested in exploring, the
extent to which firms develop their TCs should not be seen as the purpose of the study in
itself. Rather, the presence or absence of TCs should be understood as providing the
landscape of technological development where learning activities take place and contribute to
TC accumulation. Therefore, evidence of TC accumulation in firms provides the
background map against which the learning process can be brought into focus. Though
these deviations from my original intentions have not changed the outcome of the research,
there have been some research reorganisation and design modification en route.
11.6 Further Research Agenda
The results of this study provide a basis for future research in the same field.
11.6.1 TC Accumulation and Learning
The first area concerns the evaluation of TCs. Some other studies have shown that there is
not usually enough evidence to assess the status of firms in accumulating TCs (Viana,
1984). The question remains unanswered of how to accurately judge the TC accumulation
of firms when they are using, creating and dealing with different types of technology.
Whether the concept of 'learning to learn' (Lall, 1993b), and assessing whether a firm has
acquired that ability, can lead to a new kind of TC needs to be addressed further. The
difference between production capacity and technological capability - as Bell & Pavitt (1993)
have mentioned - may also be further addressed.
A relationship between specific TC and learning mechanisms found in this study of
Vietnamese firms might not applicable to other conditions. Thus, it could be worthwhile to
explore how this relationship varies in different contexts. Perhaps this issue can be
addressed in more detail. For example, some questions can be explored to find out more
about the importance of each learning mechanism to each TC: which learning mechanisms
contribute more to the different levels of TC development? what kinds of combination are
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best? and for what type of TC? and under what conditions? etc. Although the academic
value of this research could be important, it would be quite a difficult topic to study because
of the intertwined nature of the learning and TC relationship.
Another issue concerns the sequencing of TC accumulation, that is, the possible
contribution of previously accumulated TCs to other TCs which are accumulated later. In
this area, the concept of path-dependency could be developed more specifically to study TC
accumulation.
11.6.2 The Perspective of Developing Countries
There are some research possibilities related to the context of developing countries. Given
that the current conditions of most developing countries differ from those of the decades
when Japanese and other late-comer NIC firms learned their technological capability (Bell &
Casiolato, 1993; Bell & Pavitt, 1993), a study of how current conditions help or hinder
learning is worthwhile. Is there any possibility for the developing world to leam and catch
up in today's fiercely competitive international markets? Is the theory of a window of
opportunity (Perez & Soete, 1988) still applicable to the present development of poorer
countries? What are the conditions necessary for catching-up to happen? And what are
specific implications for the technological development of developing countries?
The role of the state in developing countries in supporting TC accumulation and
learning is an issue that would benefit from further discussion. In order to learn some
lessons, evidence which demonstrates that poorly thought-out policies (such as over-
protection or overly liberal attitudes) have an impact on learning (Bell & Pavitt, 1993) can be
examined through analysing less successful cases. The role of the state in exercising
selective intervention (Lall, 1993a) is usually an important issue. But in terms of how this
selective intervention should be implemented in practice, more specific questions can be
investigated such as how different interventions affect different industries, or how firms
under different forms of ownership may not be competing on a level playing field (as we
saw in the case of Vietnam). Although these questions have been dealt with to some degree
in the context of other countries, more specific research on countries like Vietnam could be a
further step. Also, the argument that protection is sometimes not sufficient for dealing with
macro external factors (Bell & Pavitt, 1993) begs the question of what else is required if
firms are to learn.
Another direction is to examine more specifically the models or approaches suggested
by other authors, e.g., the stages of development model as providing the scenario for
developing countries (Lee et al, 1988) or the model of gradual learning suggested by Hobday
(1995b). Are these models applicable to other late comers countries? If they are, under what
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conditions do those models work? Is the pattern of gradual learning universal, or is there
any possibility of leap-frogging? Again, if leap-frogging in learning is sometimes possible,
what conditions are necessary for this to occur? This research could be very useful to late¬
comer countries as they develop scenarios for catching-up and competing equally with
developed economies. The ways that Vietnamese computing firms started their business - by
directly jumping into some activities - suggest that there might be some chance to do this, if
the context is right. Some questions can be further addressed, such as whether leap-frog
learning and the jumping-in pattern are the same phenomenon or whether they are different
things? Is the notion that engaging in software activity in Vietnam may be the means for
electronics firms to catch up in the sector generally a feasible strategy? Can Vietnamese
electronics firms rely on the relative strength of Vietnamese academic achievements in
mathematics and computer science to advance the industry? Under what conditions might
this be possible? Can Vietnamese electronics or garment companies become part of a larger
network of producers, suppliers and subcontractors (Baba & Hatashima, 1995; Mytelka,
1993) and thus learn more successfully in the long run?
The issue of firms' strategic interaction with external environmental factors is crucial.
Besides diversification and specialisation as observed in Vietnamese firms, there are other
strategies for responding to external factors and these are addressed in business and
management research. However, when it comes to learning and TC accumulation, this issue
can be examined more specifically. For instance, concerning the diversification of firms,
what are the advantages and limitations of diversification? Will the difficulties of
technological learning experienced by Korean chaebols in adopting diversification (Ernst,
1995) be replicated in other contexts? What are the implications for countries like Vietnam?
Other research questions can also be further investigated. Some examples are the
issue of foreign firms' role and the role of TNC (UNCTAD, 1991); the issue of ownership,
of local versus foreign-owned companies (Enos, 1991; Lall & Wignaraja, 1994; Mytelka,
1992; Fransman, 1985; Lall, 1994b); and of private versus state-owned enterprises.
Although all these research areas have been addressed to a certain extent in many studies,
more empirical studies could contribute to our knowledge of technical change, especially in
the context of late-comer non-NICs which are currently enjoying less favourable conditions
than previously.
287
11.6.3 The Perspective of Transitional Economies
Many of the key issues for transitional economies mentioned in Chapter 10 so far remain
unresolved.2 The various ramifications of reform, which define the current confused status
of many transitional economies, are enormously complex. It is reasonable to point to some
issues relating to the technological development of these economies. One interesting
question could be to address the issue of the "big bang" approach to reforms versus the
gradual approach of instituting piecemeal adjustments - in Haggard et al's (1996) terms - as
in the cases of Russia and the Central and Eastern European countries on the one hand
versus the cases of China and Vietnam on the other, in order to assess the affect each of
these approaches have on learning and TC accumulation. Other questions concern the
changes to the R&D system and the S&T infrastructure in transitional economies following
reforms. What is the role of the R&D community in facilitating learning and TC
accumulation in industrial companies? What is the impact of reduced state funding on this
system? What are the changes in human resource development in R&D institutions and what
influence do such changes have on learning sources for industries? What contribution can
R&D personnel make to firms, in the general terms of their knowledge, skill and experience
and in the particular terms of the phenomenon of spin-off companies?
The question of networking is important and should be further addressed. Is the
importance of networking specific to transitional economies or is it equally significant in
other developing countries? How does informal and formal networking compare, and what
is the relationship between formal and informal patterns of networking? Do party
(communist) connections still influence whether and how TCs are accumulated in the
industrial firms of transitional economies?
In addition to comparing European and Asian modes of reform, among the Asian
transitional economies further comparisons might be made between Vietnam and China.
Concrete issues which might be explored more thoroughly include: macro policies versus the
role of micro institutions; the shaping influence of state and administrative hierarchies; the
importance (or not) of party versus non-party connections; the role of research think tanks;
the role of civil society; and the effect that personal networks, trust relationships and family
ties have on industrial development, learning and TC accumulation. Are they similar to the
East Asian patterns observed in Korea, Taiwan, or Singapore? What are the outcomes when
the features of a transitional economy are combined with a specifically Asian route towards
development?
2For a more detailed overview of these issues - in particular of those questions relating to R&D activity in
Central and Eastern European countries, see Balazs et al (1995).
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The list of potential research questions to be addressed could be enlarged to
encompass the development of the national system of innovation, and the technological
activities in industrial firms. Whatever research agenda is taken, future research could enrich
our knowledge of technology and development studies, could contribute to our
understanding of transitional economies, and could offer key insights into the combined
effect of different contexts which are the new phenomenon of the 1990s.
11.6.4 Epilogue
As this study ends, I have the feeling that it has produced more questions than answers. No
research is perfect, and this study is no exception. However, some findings of the study can
serve as a stepping stone to further research which deals with the learning process and TC
accumulation.
One point is certain. Learning is the means by which companies and nations acquire
the technological capabilities which are so necessary for their long-term economic growth
and development. One question posed by Clark (1985) in a review on learning studies is
whether this new tradition of learning studies, initiated by Arrow and continued by many
authors, informs the formation and implementation of S&T policy? My study adds one more
voice to the answering chorus: yes it does, and it should have more impact on the agenda of
S&T studies in general, and on S&T studies of developing countries in particular.
Vietnam as a developing country has recently embarked on a road of reforms in the
transition to a market economy. Some economists tend to argue that Vietnam might become
another economic tiger in Asia, whilst other say it might not. This remains to be seen. One
question concerns the path of technological development in Vietnam: will Vietnam repeat the
success of other NICs in becoming a learning nation and in accumulating TCs for the
purposes of economic growth? There are some signs that this learning process is on-going
in Vietnamese industries. Regardless of which direction the country takes, one condition is
necessary for a prosperous future: Vietnamese firms and policy-making organisations have
to work together to promote the learning process at all levels to achieve the technological
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Appendix
Appendix 4.1 Criteria for being qualified as having technological
capabilities (check-list)
A company can be considered to have TC if it can do certain activities as follows
1. Investment capability (new investment project, or for substantial expansion of existing old
projects during the last 5 years)
1.1 Pre-investment phase
- preparing the economic-technical feasibility and pre-feasibility studies
- choosing the firm to do these studies
- site selection
- start of offshore investment venture (if there is any)
1.2 Project execution phase
- choosing the design and types of machinery and technology suppliers
- negotiation of contracts/bargaining for suitable transfer conditions
- designing the plant (engineering)
- preparing the order books (sourcing)
- plant construction: link to suppliers, contractors and other services for construction,
installation
- production start-up, arranging some training from machinery suppliers
- recruitment of work force
2. Production capability 3 types of activities to be carried out on the daily basis:
2.1 Production management
The company knows how to operate machines, equipment, how to organise and control
(monitor) production processes and interactions with upstream, downstream and ancillary
activities.
2.2 Production engineering ..
The company can do:
- machinery adjustment to produce designed products
- raw material control
- production adjustment and scheduling, modify plant lay-out
- trouble shooting
- quality control: test products for quality standards
2.3 Repair and maintenance ofphysical machines, equipment
3. Minor change capability Adaptive engineering/organisational adjustment to be carried out
systematically (monthly and/or quarterly, annually) such as:
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- modify machinery to do more functions (tasks) or do the functions better or faster,
more effectively
- substitute components or inputs material
- adjust production process accordingly for different (new) products
- modification and redesign products, change structure to make them more improved:
functions, quality, to add new features and elements, for marketing purposes (easier
to sell or with higher prices)
- change of product mix (assortment, move to upstream or downstream products).
4. Marketing capability. Company has TC if it can do by itself almost all following activities
regularly (on the monthly basis):
- gathering marketing intelligence to find out trends, structure, etc of markets
- collecting information about competitors, suppliers, buyers
- establishment of international and local distribution channels and provision of
customer services (sales and after-sales services)
- set up its own representative/branch offices abroad for dealing with export activities
5. Linkage capability. A firm can have TC if it has at least 2 of following 3 types of activities
to be implemented regularly (1 and 3, or 2 and 3):
5.1 Linkages within the firm
- sharing information/interactions among different division and business functions
(R&D, design, engineering, procurement, production, marketing, sales and customer
services)
- rotation of personnel/exchange of experiences
5.2 Inter-firm linkage
- exchange of information with suppliers, procurement of material, parts and
components, services
- sharing marketing and distribution activities
, - sharing and joint development of R&D results, product design and production
technology
5.5 Links with S&T infrastructure
- to get available pool of human resources, to use new R&D results and technology
development, expertise
- to have close relations with R&D units (formal or informal with persons).
6. Major technical change capability. If a company can do following activities in a planned
and conscious pattern (to be reviewed and implented annualy) by its own staff, it has this TC:
- design new products which require new machinery or tooling
- develop new process engineering
- choose new machinery, equipment, organise the purchase of these inputs
- have programme or activities to develop local component supplies
- introduce new applied and/or basic R&D results which can be patentable.
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Appendix 4.2 Degree of TC acquisition















The intensity of activities is not compatible to those of global companies, but mostly to
regional standards of firms in South East Asian countries like Thailand, China, Indonesia.
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Appendix 4.3 Learning mechanisms
1. Learning-by-doing: learning through doing different kinds of functions, before and after the
technology is installed in the company.
2. Learning by accumulating previous knowledge (or Prior accumulation): through recruitment
from universities, R&D institutes, or from other workplace, companies, organisations.
3. Learning by on-the-job training: through training courses and programmes organised with
people keeping their jobs, usually on the site of the company.
4. Learning by ojf-the-job training: formal training courses, workshops, seminars, etc.
organised when people are sent for certain period of time and usually off the site of the company
(in R&D institutes, schools, colleges, etc.)
5. Learning through foreign connections: all forms of learning with the involvement of foreign
partners, including training, technical assistance, provision of information, documentation and
consultancy.
6. Learning through searching information, documentation: mostly by searching and using
sources of information, documentation and other consultancy services locally.
Appendix 4.4 Groups of macro external factors
1. Government policies, laws and regulations concerning:





- Industrial property right and technology transfer issues
- Other regulations implemented by the government
2. Marketfactors: structure, scale and scope of market activities for both local and export market;
other specific market practice.
3. Factors ofsupporting system: activities of the whole industrial infrastructure including R&D
institutes, training and education organisations, industrial services such as standardisation,
metrology, quality control, information and documentation, library services, consultancy, etc.
4. Socio-cultural factors: specific factors related only to the country's conditions in terms of
historical tradition, cultural habits, social context, etc.
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TGI: Thang Long garment company (or TLG)
(18.7.1992; 1.8.1992; 11.9.1992; 7.10.1993; 19.3.1994)
Mr. Du Due Thin, deputy general director;
Mr. Nguyen Van Thanh, manager of economic and planning department;
Mr. Ta Anh Khoi, vice-director of Business centre
TG2: Doximex (17.9.1992; 29.1.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Due Minh, general director assistant for training;
Mr. Nguyen Nhu Bao, manager of technical and production department
TG3: Hanosimex (14.9.1992; 9.11.1993)
Mr. Trinh Minh Hoc, chief of general director's office.
TG10: Chigamex (15.10.1993; 22.10.1993; 30.11.1993)
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Oanh, director and
Mrs. Doi Thi Thu Thuy, chief accountant
TG12: Textile company 'May 19' (3.12.1993; 11.12.1993)
Mr. Quang, Head of technical division
TG13: Thanglong knitwear company (1.12.1993; 10.12.1993)
Mr. Nguyen Xuan Long, Assistant director
Electronics:
El: Viettronics Dong Da (27.8.1992; 10.9.1992; 21.1.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Tich Tung, manager of technical department
E2: Hanel (27.7.1992; 9.10.1992; 14.12.1993; 5.4.1994)
Mr. Hoang Van Nghien, director
Mr. Dao Due Thanh, manager of technical control department
E3: 3C (26.8.1991; 31.1.1992; 28.7.1992; 19.9.1992; 23.10.1993)
Mr. Nguyen Quang A, chairman of governing board;
Mr. Nguyen Minh Song, deputy general director;
Mr. Bui Huy Hung, general director
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E7: VESCO (20.10.93; 24.12.1993; 20.1.1994; 29.1.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Viet Dung, technical department
Mr. Le Binh Son, director
E8: Nam Mon private Co. Ltd. (20.10.93; 25.12.1993; 7.4.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Thang, owner-director
E9: Vietnam Informatic Company (VIF) (15.1.1994; 6.5.1994)
Mr. Do Hung Chien, chairmen, president.
B. South:
Textile/garment:
TG4: Thanh Cong textile company (23.9.92; 16.11.1993; 1.3.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Due Hung, manager of R&D department
TG5: Legamex (1.11.1992; 10.11.1993)
Mr. Chau, deputy-director
TG6: Nhatexco (NTC) (5.5.1987; 6.10.1992; 28.9.1993; 9.3.1994)
Mr. Duong Van Khang, Director
Mrs. Nguyen Ngoc Lien, Head of financial department
Mr. Nguyen Thanh Binh, Head of workshop
TG7: Coats Tootal Phong Phu joint venture (6.11.1992; 8.3.1994)
Not recorded
TG8: Hong Ngoc garment Co. Ltd. (1.3.1994; 10.3.1994)
Mr. Huynh Thanh Chung, manager
TG9: Huy Hoang garment Co. Ltd. (14.11.1992; 7.3.1994)
Mr. Dao Due Hanh, deputy director;
Miss. To Thi Anh Dao, import-export department.
TG14: Viet Tien garment export-import company (9.3.1994; 11.3.1994)
Mr. Le Viet Toa, managing director
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Minh, manager of production department.
TG15: Giditex Co (25.2.1994)
Mr. Dang Van Lau, vice-director;




E4: SCITEC (24.9.1992; 2.3.1994)
Mr. Tran Ha Nam, Director general;
Mr. Tran Lac Hong, assistant director general;
E5: Gen Pacific joint venture (7.9.1992; 3.3.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Quang A, Head of Hanoi branch office
Mr. Le Ngoc Son, deputy general director;
Mrs. Hoang Kim Quy, assistant general manager, marketing director, chief of
foreign affairs.
E10: Viettronics Thu Due (5.3.1994; 7.3.1994)
Mr. Vo Dang Thuan, director.
Ell: Viettronics Tan Binh (3.1994; 8.3.1994)
Mr. Vu Duong Ngoc Duy, Manager of technical department.
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Appendix 4.6 Questions used in interviews with companies.
A. Company's profile and basic data.
- Name
- Date of establishment
- Ownership
- Location
- Creation of the firm: background
- Historical and educational background of respondents (managers, engineers, etc.)
- Employment
- Main products/services
- Forms of foreign/domestic technology sources
- Productivity
- Turnover
- Quality of main products (increase/decrease in specific features, change of design
and diversification of product assortment)
- Export performance.
+ share of export as percentage of total production
+ main products exported
+ main markets, change of markets, products, types of cooperation with
foreign partners.
B. Accumulation of technological capabilities and learning.
1. Does the company have a plan or strategy (in terms of consciousness of its managers, for
example) for acquisition of investment capability as abilities to acquire information, skills
and knowledge, competence in activities such as follows?
- Pre-investment activities:
+ pre-feasibility and feasibility studies,
+ site election, scheduling of investment to the search for sources of
technology
+ negotiation of contracts and bargaining for suitable transfer conditions
- Project execution activities to establish or expand facilities:
+ civil engineering and associated services
+ selection and procurement of equipment
+ detailed engineering
+ training and recruitment of the workforce, start-up operations.
More specifically, what did they do in these activities, what they can do now which they
could not do before, when did they start to do these?
2. The same question for production capability which includes:
- Production management:
+ organisation and control of the production process and its interaction with
upstream, downstream activities
- Production engineering:
+ raw material control, production scheduling
+ quality control
+ trouble-shooting
- Repair and maintenance activities
3. Minor technical change capability:
- Adaptive engineering: minor adjustment and incremental improvements in
production process




- Acquisition of market knowledge and intelligence
- Ability to set up marketing divisions locally and overseas, penetration of new
markets, changes of market shares
5. Linkage capability.
- Ability to transfer of technology within a firm to manage interactions and
information-sharing among different divisions and business functions such as
R&D, design, procurement, engineering, production, marketing, sales and
customer service
- Inter-firms linkages: procurement of materials, parts and components and servies,
exchange of information with suppliers, sharing of marketing and distribution
activities, sharing of other knowledge and joint development activities
- Linkages with the country S&T infrastructure:
+ to attract, absorb and upgrade the availale pool of human resources
+ to screen and scan new technology development
+ to establish close interactions with applied and basic science
6. Major technical change capability.
- R&D activities at different levels.
7. Could they get mentioned skills, knowledge, competence of investment activities by
simple participating in these investment activities? And how firms get knowledge,
information?
- what exactly new knowledge or skills firm can get which they did not know
before?
8. Could they accumulate these skills, knowledge in production activities by operating
production facilities? How it can be described?
9. The same question to be asked for minor change capability.
10., 11., and 12. for other capabilities.
13. Could firms get these skills, knowledge, competence in investment activities by formal
activities inside the firms and by interacting more actively with actors and organisations
outside firm? And how?
- by what mechanisms such as various kinds of training, hiring local and foreign
experts, signing contracts, participating in cooperation contacts, subcontracting,
joint venture, technology transfer agreements, etc?
- who taught staff of the firms? for how long? when?
- who gave the firms documentation, learning material, brochure, if any?
- are there any guidances from anybody?
More specifically, each of mechanism will be divided into more detailed activities.
For instance, training activities can have various modes and duration: off-the-job (domestic
and overseas), on-the-job overseas, on-the-job with or without foreign assistance, few
months (one to 4-5 months), one year programmes, more than a year, etc. The same can be
applied for hiring and other forms of interacting.
14., 15., 16., 17. and 18. will be asked similarly for other capabilities. However,
depending on each capability, more details will be put in the question. For example, for
minor change capability, question will include elements of conscious and formal changes at
the firms to pursue this accumulation as:
- organisation of improvement activities
- setting up of technical divisions for this purpose
- sending people for training courses
- signing contracts with consultants and R&D institutions, universities, etc.
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C. Differences in firms and sectors characteristics and learning.
1. What differences the company has in comparison with other companies in the same
sector in terms of ownership (state, private, cooperative, joint venture) and size (large,
small, medium) and other features, etc. How these factors affect the learning activities of
the firms (as mentioned in questions 7 to 12 and 13 to 18) and why?
- easier or more difficult to invest in R&D or training?
- sequence of learning for certain capabilities?
- ability to respond flexibly to external factors?
2. What differences the company has in comparison with other companies in another sector
in terms of type of activities and other specific features, if any? How these factors affect the
learning efforts (as mentioned in questions 7 to 12 and 13 to 18) by firms positively and
negatively and why?
- any sector-specific features to make firms more difficult (or easier) in their learning
- are sequences of accumulation of technological capabilities different for two
sectors? and why?
D. Learning and macro-environment factors.
1. Which factors are favourable or constraints/barriers/obstacles for company in doing the
activities mentioned in questions 7 to 18 in terms of government related policy dynamics,
such as:
- orientation of development and investment policies
- trade policies
- investment priorities
- financial and monetary policies
- other policy changes
How these factors influenced the learning activities of firms and why?
2. Which factors are favourable or constraints/obstacles for company in doing the activities




3. The same questions will be asked at firms for other macro-environmental factors with
more details for each of group of factors such as market factors: existence and activities of
capital and labour market, structure and size of market, etc.
4. R&D and education infrastructure systems:
- availability of R&D skills, training programmes, educational facilities
- activities and development of consultancy, standardisation and other organisations
of industrial supporting systems
5. Other social, cultural and historical specific factors:
- tradition of industrial development
- tradition of study and willingness to learn
- existence or lack of disciplines, social order, mentality
6. More concretely, how do these factors influence (positively or negatively)? And why?
- can firms get support from this system? in what ways?
- which organisations (ministries, universities, R&D units, etc.) prevented or
contributed to the firms' learning process, and how?
- how the existence or lack of certain external supporting organisations contributed
or hindered learning afforts of firms?
- how one or another policy prevented firms from doing certain learning? or forced
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firms to do so?
- how various mechanisms and regulations, law, policies created favourable (or
unfavourable) atmosphere for firms to carry out learning efforts?
- what attitudes or tendencies in firms' behaviour did these factors shape?
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Appendix 4.7 List of interviews of external organisations: names of
interviewed persons and dates of interviews.
A. North:
Ministry ofScience, Technology and Environment (MOSTE)
1. Mitec Inc. & Institute of microelectronic technology (IMET) (22.2.1994)
Mr. Chu Hao, director




1. S&T Department (23.2.1992; 3.2.1994)
Mr. Dinh Ngoc Lien, director
Mr. Nguyen Van Phu, expert in charge for electronics industry
2. VEIC (18.10.1993)
Mr. Le Quoc Chinh, deputy director of R&D dept.
3. VIELIN (Vietnam institute of electronics and informations)(19.1.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Dac Loc, vice director
Ministry ofLight Industry (MOLI)
1. Textimex (14.10.1993)
Mr. Nguyen Xuan Ha, deputy general director, director of development-investment
center (CENPITEX)
Mrs. Hoang Kim Dung, director of foreign relation department
Mr. Nguyen Son, expert
2. Confectimex (15.2.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Cao Binh, general manager of planning and investment division
3. Research centre for garment industry (RCGI) (15.2.1994)
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Minh, deputy general director of Confectimex and director
4. Research institute of Textile Industry (RITI) (20.1.1994)
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Bau, Director
5. Information Centre (many times during 1992-1994)
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Mr. Pham Viet Muon, vice director
Others
1. Vietnam Association for Information Processing (VAIP)(15.7.1992)
Mr. Nguyen Quy Son, general secretary
B. South:
1. Polytechnic University of HCMC (4.3.1994)
Mr. Lam Quoc Dung, Vice-director
Mr. Dao Van Luong, Head of research management and international relation office
Mr. Nguyen Van Thuong. Dean of the Faculty of Computer Science, Director of the
Computer Centre
Mr. Phan Anh Vu, vice-dean of the faculty of mechanical engineering
Mr. Nguyen Tuan Kiet, Dean of mechanical engineering faculty.
2. Swiss-AIT management program in Vietnam (25.2.1994)
Mr. Dominique J. Rohner, Director
Mr. Pham Phu
Mr. Truong Quang
3. People's committee of HCMC. Department of Industry (24.2.1994)
Mr. Ton That Tinh, assistant director
Mr. Phan Xuan Truong, chief manager
4. Economic and Industrial consultants company ECO Ltd., Management Training Center MTC
(26.2.1994)
Mr. Vo Sang Nghiep, Director
Mr. Lam Dieu Huy, project mnager
5. The technical professional school HCMC (24.2.1994)
Mr. Duong Quoc Dat, director
6. United Association of Industrialists HCMC (26.2.1994)
Mr. Do Huu Ngu, secretary general
Mr. Le Cong Tam,
7. Chamber of Commerce and Industry HCMC (26.2.1994)
Mr. Nguyen Duy Le, director of international relations department
8. Institute for Economic Research (IER) (24.2.1994)
Mr. Ton Si Kinh, vice director
9. Department for S&T of HCMC (23.2.1994)
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Mr. Hoang Anh Tuan, director.
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Appendixe 4.8 Questions used for interviews with external
organisations
1. General data on development and activities of the organisations:
- staff
- main activities, functions
- orientation
- historical background, etc.
2. Do they have any conscious plan, strategy to develop technological competence of the
sector concerned?
- plans of action
- research programmes
- training programmes
- development of S&T information and documentation units
- development of other industrial supporting units such as consultancy,
standardisation, quality control, technical services, etc.
- brief historical background of these plans, programmes and activities
3. Do they have relations, linkages with companies and how these relations take place in
practice?
- any services they provide for firms?
- any coopration programmes like trouble-shooting, technical assistance,
guidance?
- any training and education courses provided?
- how many and for how long these programmes have been undertaken? for how
many persons? for what kind of staff of the firms? for what type of firms?
- other supporting activities?
4. For what type of learning activity/mechanism firms tend to rely most on external
organisations? in what stage of capabilities accumulation? and why?
- training
-R&D
- technical assitance services
- others
5. What are the main obstacles to improve relations with the firms:
- lack of financial sources of firms to pay for services? surplus or shortage of
other resources?
- unfavourable general environment of doing business?
- lack of necessary policies of the government?
- poor infrastructure?
- lack of willingness and initiatives from the firms themselves to learn?
- others?
6. Is there any difference among firms of different sectors in their efforts to get relations
with external organisations for learning purposes? and why so?
- more active/passive attitude and behaviour
- more availability of financial sources
- existing rate of skills of firms' staff
- specific features of sector: some regulations which another sector does not have
7. Any other comments or reasons why one or another firm can not have good
cooperative relations with interviewed organisations?
324
Appendix
Appendix 5.1 Specifications of textile/garment industry
Activity Equipment Capacity (per year)
























all kinds of fabrics




Source: Textimex, Confectimex. 1994
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Year Total Cooperative Private Small & handycraft
units
1990 - 1,224 17 35,107
1991 36,348 739 16 45,324
1992 46,082 474 83 45,088
1993 - 298 83 57,067
1994 _ 165 99 57,067
Garment
1990 - 296 26 38,976
1991 39,298 287 28 39,895
1992 40,210 262 114 38,554
1993 - 89 147 36,324
1994 41,000 77 383 32,539
Source: Statisical yearbook. Hanoi. 1992.Textimex.Confectimex.1993-1994
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Appendix 5.3 Employment in textile and clothing industries
(in thousand persons)
Textile Garment





1980 n.a. 80 n.a n.a. 25.8 n.a
1985 476.9 103.2 374.6 112.8 30.4 82.4
1986 446.1 104.7 341.4 128.0 35.5 92.5
1987 493.9 110.4 383.5 131.6 38.1 93.5
1988 481.0 115.5 365.5 184.4 47.9 136.5
1989 370.1 103.8 266.3 167.7 49.2 124.8
1990 306.5 104.2 202.3 136.4 54.9 81.5
1991 300.7 98.4 202.3 145.4 63.9 81.5
1992 370.0 103.8 266.0 164.0 75.7 88.2
1994 400.0 n.a n.a 165.5 75.5 90.0
Source: Stastistic yearbook. Hanoi. 1980-1992.Confectimex. Textimex. 1993-1994
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Appendix 5.4 Textile and garment production in Vietnam
Years Fibres Fabrics Garment
('000 tonnes) (mln.metters) (mln.pieces)
1957 n.a. 67.0 n.a.
1960 10.4 89.7 4.4
1965 12.7 100.3 7.9
1968 n.a. 83 n.a.
1970 n.a. 89 n.a.
1972 n.a. 73 n.a.
1974 11.5 95.8 17.2
1975 13.0 164.6 19.1
1976 35.5 218.0 n.a.
1978 38.0 320. n.a.
1980 29.3 175.3 69.2
1981 31.0 179.2 52.7
1982 36.0 238.0 55.3
1983 44.8 307.0 74.1
1984 53.0 367.1 70.7
1985 51.3 374.3 73.6
1986 53.0 357.0 102.3
1987 57.0 361.0 n.a.
1988 62.0 384.0 109.9
1989 56.4 337.3 114.6
1990 58.3 318.0 125.3
1991 40.0 280.4 106.1
1992 44.0 272.0 104.0
1993 38.0 215.0 91.0
1994 44.4 228.1 121.0
Source: Statisic Yearbook. Hanoi. 1992.Textimex.Confectimex.1994
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Appendix 5.5 Export of textile and clothing in millions roubles and
USD (1991 and 1992 in USD only)
Year Total value Clothing Cotton and peco
yarns (in tonnes)
1980 52 44 5,300
1981 47 39 2,961
1982 62 52 4,887
1983 76 66 5,028
1984 85 74 6,800
1985 93 81 6,300
1986 93 74 4,900
1987 91 60 6,200
1988 132 99 7,300
1989 193 140.4 7,300
1990 210 178.1 n.a.
1991 132 93 n.a.
1992 145 119.2 n.a.
Source: Statistical yearbook. Hanoi. 1992.
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Appendix 5.6 Export structure of textile and garment industry




























Source: Ministry of Trade. Hanoi. 1993.
Appendix 5.7 Destination of garment export in 1986-1990
and 1991-1992 (in %)




1986-1990 100 95 5
1991 100 60.3 30.7
1992 100 42.4 57.6
Source: Ministry of Trade. Hanoi. 1993.
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Apendix 5.8 Number of enterprises (for both electronics and
electrical industries)
Year State sector Non-state sector
Cooperatives Private Small & handier.
units
1985 79 n.a n.a n.a
1988 75 n.a n.a n.a
1989 76 n.a n.a n.a
1990 61 109 14 5,186
1991 60 89 13 5,462
1992 67 49 10 1,244
1993 62 43 36 1,244
1994 59 14 42 2,209
Source. Statistical yearbook. Hanoi. 1992.
Appendix 5.9 Employment in electronics and electrical industries
(in thousand persons)
Year Total State sector Non-state
1985 28.0 19.1 8.9
1988 31.9 21.0 10.9
1989 29.5 18.9 10.6
1990 30.5 18.0 12.5
Source: Statistical yearbook.Hanoi. 1992.
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Appendix 5.10 Export of electronics industry (in USD)
Products 1991 1992
Office machines 1,111,350 266,218
& parts
of which PCs 805,805 139,407
Telecom & audio- 3,076,419 1,327,348
visual products
of which:
colour TV 134,100 923,453
radiocassetes 782,840 42,000
black/wh. TV n.a 219,360
Parts & comp. 1,008,067 249,314
for audiovisual
equipment
other parts & comp. 2,952,704 15,570
Source: Ministry of Trade. Hanoi.1993.
333
Appendix
Appendix 5.11 Vietnamese industrial development: historical milestones
Data provided in this Appendix comes from published sources of statistics and interviews
taken with external organisations (see also Appendix 4.6).
1 Colonial impact before 1945
The first industrial activities in Vietnam occurred in the period of French colonialism. Among
the different industrial facilities set up by the French, textiles were one of the most important.
For example, a textile factory set up in Namdinh province had already in 1920 2,000 workers
with a profit of about 52 millions francs (Buttinger, 1982: 65). The areas around the North
delta of Vietnam was the centre for the spinning of imported raw cotton and silk into yarns and
fabrics (Beresford, 1989: 19). The French contributed somewhat to the education and training
system in Vietnam, but these activities contributed little to the general development of the
colony. Serious learning was not encouraged by the authorities.
2 Two Indochina wars and Vietnam divided: 1946-1975
In September 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was born and began to build
up its industries. In 1947, expansion of industries occurred and by 1949-1950, there were
about 40 national factories, four of which were textile mills set up in areas held by the DRV
(Fforde & Paine, 1987: 87-88). Immediately after the establishment of the DRV, President Ho
Chi Minh declared a nation-wide campaign to eliminate illiteracy. By the end of 1958, 93.4%
of the lowland population aged 12-50 could read and write (Marr, 1981: 186-187). In the
regions controlled by the DRV, university level education and the first S&T research were
undertaken as well as other manufacturing activities (APCTT, 1988: 10). Also, after the
recognition of the DRV by China and then by the Soviet Union, foreign experts from these
countries came to assist with industrial management. At the same time, in the urban area, some
light industrial facilities (including textile plants) existed to serve the limited needs of the
population and French army.
Following the Geneva Peace Agreement of 1954, Vietnam became divided. In the North, the
DRV started its socialist construction the first period of which was a three-year plan (1958-
1960) devoted to the rehabilitation of certain industrial activities and prepare for the first five-
year plan (FYP) to begin in 1961. Foreign trade and other foreign economic relations also
started to develop, mostly with the Soviet Union, China and socialist countries in East Europe.
With the help of these countries, Vietnam began to build up its first large scale industrial
facilities.
A new education system was introduced with free, compulsory education for children aged
from 6 to 15. Teaching was undertaken in Vietnamese, while that literacy campaign which had
started even before 1954 continued quite successfully. More informal training for technical
skills and industrial competence was also organised. Because only a few thousands workers
could receive training in some special schools, the rest were being taught in schools attached to
enterprises or directly in these enterprises under supervision of more senior workers. For
example, by the end of 1960, 79% of workers in heavy industry were in spare-time classes. In
1961, the Office of the Prime Minister issued an instruction on the organisation of "on-duty"
studies to raise the technological qualification of workers.
Industrial development in the North also experienced some setbacks. Due to the division of the
country, there was a massive migration of North Vietnamese to the South, especially of
businessmen, bourgeoisie and intelligentsia with the knowledge and skills necessary for
business and industrial development. Those who stayed in the North faced a socialist reform
campaign. After 1954, the new government encouraged private enterprises to form joint
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private-state enterprises. By the beginning of 1961, capitalists no longer existed as a stratum in
society. During 1961, there were further attempts to re-educate capitalists and small
bourgeoisie such as the movement to turn them into state employees or members of co¬
operative organisations (Post, 1989: 39). These activities contributed to the destruction of the
emergent group of industrialists and business people including many private textile producers
with rather good entrepreneurial spirit and technological management skills. In spite of
training campaigns and programmes, the acquisition of technological competence still
remained a big problem due to the passive work habit of newly recruited workers (most of
whom were peasants, military personnel, poor urban population).
Among several limitations, one was the lack of an explicit national policy for technological
development. Economic development in the North had been interrupted in 1965 by the start of
air-raids by the US airforce. This situation continued up to the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973
and the start of the second FYP.
Development in the South, after 1954, had taken another direction. The Saigon government
started the capitalist development of the South on the basis of a relatively good industrial
infrastructure facilities left by the French. One of the main features in the development of
South Vietnam was large aid received from the US. During the war, annual aid increased from
230 M USD in 1964 to 800 M USD in 1966 (Dacy, 1986). In contrast to development in the
North, the private sector played a significant role which had investment rate of 88% in total in
1968, 86% and 71% in 1969 and 1971 (Nguyen Truong, 1974: 16). Almost all manufacturing,
commerce and financial activities were in the hands of private sector.
With the period of "Vietnamisation of the war" commencing in 1968, a massive influx of
foreign technicians as well as technical advisors for civilian purposes came to support
economic development and reconstruction. Thousands of foreign experts came under USAID
programmes together with substantial investment to build up manufacturing industries.
However, managerial and labour skills were never abundant to industry, due to the fact that
most qualified people were in the armed forces. Technical and professional education was not
fully integrated into the system of higher education. The economy was totally dependent on
US assistance since the late 1960s (Duiker, 1983: 101). The withdrawal of the US involvement
from 1972 brought recession. Only 200,000 persons were employed in industry and, by the
end of the war, in 1975, the economy was in a state of collapse (Dacy, 1986: 73).
South Vietnamese industrial companies had more advantages for their technological
development such as access to much better physical infrastructure (roads, harbours, airports,
storage facilities) thanks to large investment by American army. The industrial workforce had
acquainted itself with the management style of a market economy and access to a more
advanced technological equipment in manufacturing.
3 Vietnam unified and the economic crisis: 1976-1986
In 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was created by the unification of the two
regions and the second FYP (1976-1980) started for the whole country. The SRV continued
the process of socialist transformation in the South. During this period, the financial system,
the state budget, the currency and the banking system were unified and the state launched a
second battle against the bourgeoisie which led to even further destruction of Southern
capitalist entrepreneurship and loss of production management skills.
The first foreign investment code introduced in 1977 failed to attract foreign investors.
Industrial output fell during the years 1979-1980 due to poor management, hastened socialist
transformation, lack of capital and a shortage of energy, raw material and spare parts for
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enterprises. As a result of these economic difficulties, the government recognised the
seriousness of the situation and the need for some reforms.
Exports for this period were tied solely to the markets of CMEA countries (Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance - the economic organisation of socialist countries in the Soviet block).
Trade relations between these countries were regulated by long-term goods exchange
agreements signed by governments. Due to a general shortage of commodities, the export-
import quotas among the member countries of CMEA were not designed to protect the
importer's market, but to guarantee the importer country that the goods agreed in the
agreement will be supplied sooner or later. In this context, product quality was not a main
concern of export.
In 1981, the third FYP (1981-1985) started. Many state enterprises still received subsidies
from the state to operate regardless of their efficiency and no enterprise was allowed to
become bankrupt (Beresford, 1989: 205). At the same time, the rate of inflation increased
again. The currency reform in 1985 was a big failure resulting both in a drastic increase in the
shortage of goods in urban markets and in an inflationary surge in prices (Beresford, 1989:
211). The inflation rate rose from 50% per annum to 700% and then to about 1,000% in 1987-
1988 (Beresford, 1989: 211; Tornquist, 1991). The results of this reform were disastrous. By
1985-1986, Vietnam was in a state of almost total economic crisis.
In addition, for almost two decades (1960-1980), Vietnam had had a more inward than
outward looking development. The self-reliance idea of development of big countries such as
the Soviet Union, China or India was applied in Vietnam for rather a long time and had a
significant impact on its economic structure. Officially, the economy of Vietnam (and society
as well) was not closed to the outside world. But, in fact, for some decades it related itself only
to one economic and political block of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and due
to some well known reasons, it had no normal links with the Western world as most other
Southeast Asian developing countries had.
The unification of North and South affected the technological development of the country. On
the one hand, it led to the combination of strengths of two regions in terms of natural resources
and technical labour forces. On the other hand, the effort to adopt mechanically the
development model of the North in the South has not worked. During 1985-1986, many
managers of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in order to keep their companies alive, did not
follow official regulations on production activities such as input supply, sale of products, use
of labour force and material incentives, etc. They merely broke these rules (or 'broke the
fences') by adopting their own new rules. These fence-breakers are the first group of reformists
among managers of SOEs, and created strong pressure for the government to take further
reform steps when the fourth FYP (1986-1990) started in 1986. Concerning the legal
framework of industrial development, one of main characteristics is that the Vietnamese legal
system is not appropriate to foster the private sector, laws are still influenced by ideology to
maintain an inherent bias in favour of the state sector and collective ownership (Pham Van
Thuyet, 1995). This situation caused an extra problem for private ownership in addition to
those anti-private attitudes exercised by the state during the 1960s and the 1970s.
4 Radical reforms and industrial rehabilitation: after 1986
Facing more serious crises by 1985-1986, the leadership of the country sought measures for
more radical reforms. In 1986 the renovation policy (doi-moi) was announced, major features
of which included:
Structural change of investment priorities.
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A shift from heavy industry to three more specific orientation: food production, consumer
goods and export. The role of private sector has been recognised.
Decentralisation ofeconomic management ofstate-owned, enterprises (SOEs).
The move away from a strict planning system to giving state enterprises more autonomy in
their decision making for production, management and other activities.
Radical change and development offinancial and banking system.
The introduction of the new tax system. Structure of revenues and expenditures had also been
changed to reduce budget deficit. The banking system was commercialised in 1990 with a two-
tier banking system: the state bank and other commercial banks.
Diversification and liberalisation ofexternal economic relations.
CMEA was dissolved in 1991, Vietnam receives no more aid from these countries. All trade
had been converted into hard currency settlement. Facing difficulties, the government tried to
react quickly to the situation in two directions. With the CMEA markets, Vietnam tries to
maintain relations and continue trade and relations are based more on bilateral contracts at
company-company level.
The orientation of export to convertible currencies area of Asia-Pacific and EU countries was a
big shift. Domestically, many enterprises now got the right for doing business directly with
foreign partners. In 1987, the new Foreign Investment Law was promulgated. In addition,
different laws on technology transfer from abroad to Vietnam as well as those concerning
industrial property rights, patenting, etc. have also been introduced.
Technologically speaking, sole trading relations with CMEA countries had been a big
disadvantage because the country has to rely on only one source of technological competence
which may not be the best in the world. There have recently been possibilities of opening up
the country to the "other side" of the world which would clearly bring more conducive
conditions to develop a technological base for the economy.
337
Appendix
Appendix 5.12 The system of research and development (R&D)
The system of R&D institutions in the country is divided into 3 parts, until recently:
• laboratories and other R&D institutions operated by the various sectoral ministries.
• research departments and specialised R&D institutes at universities and other units of higher
education (in fact, they are laboratories to serve mostly teaching purposes).
• specialised R&D organisations at the national level, including the National Centre for
Scientific Research of Vietnam (NCSR), the National Institute of Technology and others.
There are smaller R&D units functioning as the subordinate departments within large enterprises
in various industries. Similar to other communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (see
Balazs et al, 1995) this system ofR&D institutions had specific features:
• science and technology (S&T) activities were treated as state monopoly. Private activities in
S&T did not exist and were not allowed. All S&T activities were planned and directed from
the higher level such as ministries. Universities have mostly teaching functions, not R&D.
• R&D activities were not formulated by market requirements but by subjective plans.
Enterprises themselves did not have a need for technological innovation due to lack of market
pressure. One striking fact is that in the structure for profit calculation of enterprises by the
state, profit was added automatically as a certain percentage upon the cost of production,
hence, the higher cost of production the higher profit they will get from the state. This
specific phenomenon of a centrally planned economy is one of the main obstacles for
enterprises in building up their technological capability.
• weak linkages between academic research and higher education, between engineering
research and industry. The direct horizontal contacts between R&D units and industrial
enterprises were not allowed. In order to do some services for industry, R&D institutions
have to go up vertically to their leaders through very cumbersome procedures.
During the 1980s various reforms were introduced to open up the S&T system to the use of
economic activities the major measures of which were:
• recognition and implementation of the right of R&D institutions to make direct contracts with
the industry.
• diversification of activities of R&D institutions. Now they can participate in a wide range of
activities such as research, development and technology transfer, S&T services, which
include experimental and pilot manufacturing, other kinds of small scale production, etc.
• diversification of financial resources for R&D: next to the state budget sources, now budget
for R&D activities can come from contracts and bank credit.
• privatisation of R&D activities and protection of intellectual property rights. It goes together
with the privatisation tendency of the economy. Private initiatives and involvement in R&D
activities are now recognised. The intellectual property rights (including industrial) which
were considered as socialist state properties for a long time, are now recognised and
protected by laws (Vu Cao Dam, 1992: 5-10).
These reforms had been crucial to free the potential of R&D institutions to serve the needs of
industrial firms in their technological capabilities accumulation. It is thanks to these changes that
many companies now have access to information, consultancy and training sources provided by
scientists. In addition, it enables many scientists to work closer with industries, or even to move
out to create their own firms.
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Appendix 5.13 Training and education organisations
The training and education system has some main features. The relatively high literacy rate of
Vietnamese population gives an important advantage (88% for 1990). Good primary and
secondary education systems (some are compulsory) prepared quite good basic education for the
Vietnamese work force, including industrial workers.
Higher education and training system has been developed by the state since the 1960s. In total,
there are currently 103 state colleges and universities in the country of which 13 engineering
institutes and colleges and 6 economic institutions offering training and education necessary for
industries. Although these organisations have contributed significantly to the education of
graduates who had been recruited to tindustries during the three decades of the 1960s-1980s,
they still have serious problems in their capacities to support the learning process of the
students.1 A gap was recognised between the technological sophistication of the equipment in
these institutions and of other organisations in industry. Similarly, libraries and information
centres as sources of learning were also poorly developed and of little use (Nguyen Thi Tri et al,
1995: 185-187).
The numbers of students for the 1989-1990 academic year are: 17,312 with bachelor degrees
(14,916 for 1980-1981 year), 2,689 postgraduate degrees (1,409) and 680 in professional
secondary education (1,267). The number of the last category has radically decreased over the
last ten years which has created a big problem in providing industries with middle level
professionals (managers, masters of workshops, technicians, etc.). Throughout the 1960s and
the 1970s, the higher education and training system produced a rather good stock of graduate
and R&D labour force, comparable to similar developing countries (Dang Ba Lam et al,
1995:141).
After the move to the market economy, many new hurdles arrived with less subsidies of the
state. The inability or unwillingness of the government to increase significantly the rate of
expenditure on higher education among other social welfare commitments is one cause (Le Thac
Can & Sloper, 1995: 18). The massive training of Vietnamese students abroad for
undergraduates and postgraduate degrees (mostly in the Soviet Union and East European
countries) had ended by the end of the 1980s. The move to a market economy also created more
difficulties for higher education institutes in organising their technical experimental activities that
are crucial for students' technological learning. Research and experiment facilities were obsolete
(established 20-30 years ago), poorly equipped, inadequate and satisfied only 30% of hours
required in the curriculum. In many cases, facilities of higher education institutions were more
obsolete and less developed than that of industries. It became more difficult to send students to
practise their knowledge at production enterprises since most enterprises did not want to accept
students. All these factors contributed to the lack of practical knowledge and experiences by
students to work for industries.
At the same time, vocational training has also had some problems. Most of the facilities were
supplied to the public sector and very few to co-operative and private sectors. Also, the training
of foreman or middlemen have been neglected as training for specific category of industrial
labour forces. The same weakness, either quantitatively or qualitatively can be said for training
' One survey shows not only that only 13 institutes and colleges have laboratories for their training activities, but
also that the laboratories are poorly equipped and in backward conditions with machines and instruments from the
1960s (Nguyen Thi Tri et al, 1995).
339
Appendix
of maintenance staff and managers of enterprises.2 Also, as the measures to fight
unemployment, some training programmes are being undertaken to enhance workers' skills.
Still, these have rather short-term orientation (ILO, 1994).
In spite of these shortcomings, in general, the rather high rate of literacy in Vietnam and a large
core of academically trained people are the main advantages of the industries for learning.
Although the quality of education does not match Western standards, this is a positive factor for
formation of a technological labour force in the country.
2By the end of the 1980s, a number of efforts were made by provinces, local governments, big companies and
social groups to change this situation to provide vocational training for those who will work later in co-operative
and private sectors, and a number of'complex training centres' were organised (Vu Cao Dam et al., 1991: 20).
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Appendix 9.1 Case study of garment company TGI (TLG)
This company was interviewed about 7-8 times during the period of 1992-1994. The three main
interviewees were: Mr. Du Due Thin, vice director responsible for technological innovation; Mr.
Nguyen Van Thanh, manager of planning and financial division; Mr. Ta Anh Khoi, head of
Business Centre. In addition, I had access to some of the company's internal reports. Also,
many observation were made and informal talks held with workers and technicians in various
workshops.
1. Company profile
The company was set up on May 8, 1958 as an export garment company. Established as the first
Vietnamese company specialising in the export of garments, it produces different products for
export: shirts, jackets, jeans, trousers, baby clothes, blouses, etc. Shirts were and remain the
main product. Among 2,500 employees, 68 are engineers and persons with higher education
degrees having graduated from local and foreign institutions. For the last 8 years, its
employment numbers were:
1985: 3,000; 1986: 3,000; 1987: 3,000; 1988: 3,000; 1989: 2,968
1990: 2,750; 1991: 2,183; 1992: 2,300; 1993: 2,500
Currently, TLG's sewing machines are brand new having been recently purchased (around
1990-1991). Besides, the company increased its facilities from 200 square metres up to 13,000
square metres of office space and stores in Hanoi and some other facilities in Haiphong city on
the east coast. Since the beginning of its establishment and up to the end of the 1980s, the
company exported products mostly to the former Soviet Union and East European countries.
Today, it exports to the EU, Japan, South Korea, etc.
2. Building technological capabilities
Created as a garment company specialising in exports, TLG started its production in a rather
simple way: it received cut pieces from Soviet contractors, sewed them together and sent them
back. All jobs were carried out in the framework of Vietnam's trade agreements with Soviet
buyers at governmental level which planned everything: prices, sales conditions, production
volumes, etc. The company had neither the incentive nor the possibility to develop its
capabilities, except for simple subcontracting production. Its main product was shirts and
working uniforms. In addition to equipment, the company received some experts assigned as
managers by the MOLI. These managers were mostly inexperienced with little knowledge of
business. Moreover, their knowledge was mostly about doing business in a strictly planned
economy.
By the 1970s and 1980s, the company produced simple garments to serve both limited export
and local markets under plans. In the middle of the 1980s, MOLI began a subcontracting
programme with East European countries and the former Soviet Union. TLG also participated in
the programme and so was able to upgrade its technological facilities. Although the company
exported through this programme, its products were still limited in quality and range. There was
no possibility to enter new markets.
1989 saw a turning point in the company's activities. With the industrial rehabilitation
programme supported by SIDA (Swedish International Development and Co-operation
Authority), TLG received aid in the form of new sewing machines and modern equipment for
garment production. At the same time, it also received some support from the state in terms of
new personnel: line managers and heads of workshops or divisions. Most of them began as
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junior assistants to other earlier appointed managers, then began to climb up to higher positions.
These were young, energetic people with degrees from universities or polytechnic institutes.
More importantly, they were more pragmatic and business oriented than existing managers. One
of these is Mr. Du Due Thin, Vice-Director of TLG who was educated in Hanoi Polytechnic
Institute in textile engineering, and now is in charge of technological innovation activities.
After being technologically upgraded by the Swedish aid, the company considered expanding its
export activities. With the opening up of the Vietnamese economy, many foreign customers were
introduced to the company. Following a 'trial and error' process of negotiating and establishing
business contacts, they started to do business with TLG more seriously. In 1989, GunYoung
Trading Co. Ltd of South Korea began business with TLG. It provided all material, design for
production of high quality jackets (three layers) and blouses. In order to implement this contract,
TLG set up a separate workshop for GunYoung, with its own staff of foreman and workers.
The physical infrastructure of this workshop was the best in the company. Many from other
workshops called this workshop "Korean house" with some envy: it became one of the first
modern facilities in the whole garment industry of Vietnam with the comprehensive involvement
of foreign partners. Not all companies in the clothing industry were able to enjoy this advantage.
The workshop used mostly TLG sewing machines but GunYoung also provided some machines
that TLG did not have (stitching and patterning machines, dotting and zipper equipment, etc.). It
also sent experts to supervise the organisation of production lines, and quality control, and took
part in discussion of production plans with TLG. All products of this workshop were bought by
GunYoung for export to Japan, and accounts for about 80% of TLG's exports.
Between 1989-1991, many other foreign companies developed co-operative relations with TLG.
For example, Shilton (Japan), Quell (Germany) and Hennes&Maurice (Sweden) provided their
sample designs and TLG implemented the production of these models using its own machines,
material and other inputs. These companies then bought the products for export to different
countries. Currently, the main export market of TLG is Japan (80%) and EU countries (like
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden account for the remaining 20%).
More recently, TLG started to introduce its own design by modifying foreign designs (old
collection taken from the previous season or from a catalogue). Also, in some cases it discussed
with customers the possibility of minor design changes to their models (counter-sample). After
three years of doing business with new customers, the share of simple subcontracting is
decreasing and the share of more active participation by TLG (e.g through OEM or ODM
agreements) is increasing as follows:





Although more and more products carry the label of TLG, it does not as yet manufacture any
branded products (OBM type of manufacturing). The growth of TLG depends on a range of
capabilities which are presented below.
Investment capability
For the period before the rehabilitation programme in 1989, TLG did not have the capability to
change or invest in any new expansion of production. The "May 19" programme created
opportunities for the firm to gain first hand knowledge of new investment. However, at this
stage pre-investment activities (like preparation of technical-economic feasibility studies, or
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choosing the partners who will take care of all pre-investment studies), were carried out by
personnel of MOLI in co-operation with foreign experts. TLG personnel were passive in the
next phase over the choice of machinery and equipment, designing the production processes and
sourcing activities. All sewing machines and input sources were provided by the contractors
from East European countries and the Soviet Union, the company simply accepted these plans
given to them from MOLI.
With SIDA support, feasibility studies for TLG's rehabilitation programme were carried out by
experts from HIFAB International AB, a Stockholm-based consulting firm in project
management and construction. Vietnamese personnel from TLG only participated in those parts
of the programme which required specific Vietnamese skills or experiences. For example,
TLG's personnel clarify and suggest appropriate arrangement for ventilation and lightning for
dealing with hot and humid working conditions of tropical weather. Preparation and
implementation of feasibility studies and project management were assigned to HIFAB.
Although in the construction of new houses for workshops, the Vietnamese side had the main
responsibility, due to lack of information on technology sources, TLG depended on HIFAB for
technology purchase, or on the list of suppliers given by the consultants. Some technical re¬
arrangements of sewing machines were carried out jointly as were machinery installation and
start-up activities.
Since the completion of the SIDA-supported project, TLG has not taken much part in new
investment activities. Although recently, TLG was more active in the co-operation with
GunYoung, it still relies rather heavily on the initiatives of foreign partners. So far, there is no
evidence of the existence of investment capability in the firm.
Production capability
Until now, the production activities of TLG have gone through 3 main phases: (i) simple
subcontracting for export to East Europe during the 1970s and up to the mid 1980s; (ii)
production upgraded technologically with SIDA assistance, to the end of the 1980s; (iii) since
the beginning of the 1990s, direct foreign investment with Korean and other involvement. After
each of these, the company personnel became more confident in running sewing workshops. In
the first phase, the firm's managers were dealing mostly with ensuring smooth production
without the necessity of changing the arrangement of production lines or workshops which were
fixed by plans. With the coming of new partners, TLG's personnel learned how to operate more
sophisticated and specialised equipment, including computer-added embroidery machinery. They
also became more able to re-arrange the production organisation. In short, TLG now has
production management skills such as how to operate a range of equipment and organise
production lines.
In the area of production engineering skills, TLG has become quite knowledgeable about dealing
with raw material control or trouble-shooting in very unstable conditions of production (poor
physical infrastructure, low supply and lack of long-term perspective in business contracts,
etc.), and to adjust production lines to tropical conditions. Repair and maintenance is now totally
handled by TLG after it received guidelines from foreign personnel. Issues of quality control are
more difficult to handle. In order to ensure quality of export products, foreign partners first sent
their sample design to TLG for trial production, and provided their technical support. After four
to six months, the foreigners responsible for quality control left, and the buyers signed more
contracts with TLG to produce these models, with all production issues taken care of by TLG
staff. Now, based on one model or part of it, TLG can implement and develop the rest of the
contract (all cutting, grading and stitching operations).
After about one year of working with Western companies (during 1989 - 1990), TLG improved
the quality of its products significantly. According to the company, this is why foreign partners
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are now ready to give TLG a more active role in their contracts. In terms of production
efficiency, all workshops have a longer time lag than the joint workshop with GunYoung, from
the order to delivery of products. Based on the upgrading of skills and general production
performance figures, it is clear that the company has a strongly developed production capability.
Minor technical change capability
In TLG, there were few changes in product specifications until the mid 1980s. The company
tried to fulfil the contract exactly in terms of quality, product range and design, as agreed upon
with the contractors; a non-change attitude towards the product range had remained from the
planned economy period. However, the company had organised different campaigns to
encourage its employees to be more active and to take the initiative in introducing minor technical
improvements. One example is of changes made to the production arrangement of a big long hall
in a workshop, in which workers had to carry cut pieces a very long distance between
operations. This was inconvenient and time consuming. Workers also felt tired and isolated from
each other. They have suggested replacing the linear line of operation with a round line to have
shorter distances between operations. This change has improved both productivity and the
working environment. However, under conditions with few incentives, the firm's employees
were not very active in proposing change like the one mentioned here.
A more positive attitude toward change emerged towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning
of the 1990s when the company introduced some changes in production technology. For a long
time, TLG's ironing equipment was too heavy for many workers to use causing the burning of
some fabrics. To solve this problem, workers in the workshops, together with technical
personnel, adapted these irons to allow more air-blowing to come in. The new ironing
equipment is lighter, uses less energy, is safer for workers to use, and has greatly reduced the
incidence of fabrics being burnt.
After two years of passively implementing orders of foreign buyers, by 1992 TLG was able to
introduce some changes to product specifications.
• minor adjustment to existing foreign designs, or models taken from catalogues;
• development of new designs based on one sample of foreign buyer;
• introducing some totally new designs by combining knowledge.
By making such minor changes, TLG could offer new models or collections of clothes to new
buyers. Some of these new products (shirts, pullovers, jackets) have been accepted by foreign
buyers. In this way, TLG can create designs with its own label for sale trial in other markets. All
these tasks are carried out by a technical unit of the company which has existed since the 1970s.
But in the pre-reform period, it was passive and its functions were mainly maintenance and
repairs activities to support production plans. Its relations with other production units in the
company were formal, but lacking close co-operation to achieve highest production
performances. Recently, the unit has been expanded, it now has about 60 people, of which half
are engineers or those with higher education degrees from universities. The unit's functions are:
• to study samples given by foreign buyers and develop them further;
• to design new models;
• to implement these new models in sewing workshops, by preparing concrete standard
specifications for each stage of production.
Now, this unit also sends its staff to different workshops of the firm to take part more actively in
production activities to help maintain the quality of products. Judging by these activities and the





This activity is the weakest at TLG. Almost all of the firm's marketing and sales has depended
on the foreign buyers. When the company relied on East European markets, TLG participated in
some trips organised by MOLI to trade fairs and exhibitions (Leipzig in East Germany or Varna
in Bulgaria) but these trips did not have any real commercial orientation. Although TLG is now
exporting more, it still depends on the sales channels and distribution of the foreign buyers.
Hence, TLG's marketing capability can be considered as non existent, and without involvement
in international sales and market research.
Linkage capability
The linkage among the company's different workshops and production units is developed in
TLG but inter-firm linkages with other Vietnamese companies are less developed. TLG's
technical personnel, who gained skills and experiences through contacts with foreign companies,
are considered more experienced in garment production than staff in other companies. Indeed
they are regularly invited by other local firms to give training courses or guidance in garment
production.
The linkages with R&D and training organisations is least developed. The company makes very
little use of government research institutions, universities or other local firms. Only in some
specific technical areas like energy system, has it received assistance from some specialist units
of MOLI. Without the most important form of linkage with S&T and training system, TLG
cannot be considered as having linkage capability.
Major technical change capability
All technical change activities at TLG are on a very minor scale without any new development or
design of technology. Those new products designed by the firm have been only modifications of
existing products, requiring no new technological equipment. Therefore, major technical change
capability is absent at the firm. The prospects for TLG developing more major technical change
activity on the basis of its minor improvements remains unclear. Among senior managers, only
the vice-director has enthusiasm for undertaking more radical technical improvements. Besides,




Formal training provided the firm with basic knowledge on industrial production in general and
textile/garment technological issues in particular. Engineers and graduates with higher education
received degrees from different universities and polytechnics in Vietnam (Hanoi Polytechnic,
Hanoi University) and abroad (Russia, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia).
With the need in the recent years to increase knowledge of production and doing business, TLG
has recruited personnel to join the first intake of managers. The number of engineers was
increased from 47 to 68 (2.8% of total employees) when the firm got SIDA support. The
proportion of technical workers (who can perform simple jobs and more skilful operations) and
technicians with vocational education are 83.9% (2,062) and 0.9% (24) respectively. From their
formal training, engineers learned both concrete operational techniques and more general
knowledge about production organisation.
The training of garment workers in sewing techniques and industrial garment production was
provided in a special vocational school located in a small town north of Hanoi. This school had a
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formal contract to provide TLG with certain numbers of workers every year (regulated by
plans). Before training, most workers gained knowledge from home based family activities.1 In
the vocational school, they learned to use electric industrial sewing machines, and simple
techniques like cutting, stitching and grading patterns. More importantly, they also learned about
industrial work organisation, standardisation and quality control.
This preparation of the work force by formal training and education prior to coming to work at
the firm is significant. It prepared staff in the basic principles of production, and of operating
textile/garment equipment. Thanks to this prior accumulation, production skills were acquired
rather smoothly and quickly when people joined the firm.
Prior accumulation makes an important contribution to minor change as well as production
activities. Technical knowledge accumulated in the universities and polytechnic institutes permit
engineers to know not only what is going on in textile/garment production in general, but also
why certain technologies work. This knowledge is crucial for employees when they need to
change or adapt technology, especially in engineering. Knowledge of physics and mechanics,
for example, has helped technical staff to deal with changing some mechanical parts of sewing
machines like rolling mechanisms. Similarly, thanks to chemical knowledge, people are more
confident in dealing with colouring, mixing designs, and patterns of clothes. However, this
contribution of prior accumulation to minor technical improvements is limited to those from
higher education institutions. Workers' training has been too simple for them to leam knowledge
necessary for change.
Not only formal training, but working experiences accumulated somewhere else before joining
the firm can also be useful, although to a lesser extent. Managers brought with them knowledge
and experience of how to organise production in general which has been helpful in the planned
economy period of simple assembly. In addition, social connections of the personnel could be
used for the firm to develop its linkages with colleagues or classmates.
In spite of this usefulness, the prior accumulation mechanism did not help much for acquiring
other TC like investment or marketing. The reason for this is quite simple. In the universities and
schools, the employees of TLG did not get training in the relevant knowledge like investment
studies, economic analysis, and marketing principles or business administration. This kind of
knowledge was rarely, until recently offered by training organisations .
On-the-job training
TLG has organised various formal and informal courses and guidance programmes for its
employees. For example, the company holds short term courses annually (ranging from 3-5
days to 2 weeks), with teachers invited from outside: local universities, research institutes,
consultants from Confectimex or other companies. At these courses, TLG's staff have gained
knowledge and experiences ranging from garment skills to electrical, mechanical engineering,
mostly for daily routine production operations or technical improvement.
Training is not always formal. Sometimes, consultants are contracted to solve a specific
problem, in the course of which they share knowledge and experiences with TLG staff assigned
to work with them. For example, when TLG changed the material for shirt production, it had
1 These workers are mostly young women of 18-22 years old, coming from families which were involved in
various kinds of small scale sewing and cloth-making for self-use or sale at local markets. In this setting, it was
old type manual sewing machines (not electrical) that gave these women the first idea of sewing technique.
Although this small scale activity is quite popular in cities and small towns, the production is fragmented, not co¬
ordinated and people are not familiar with industrial standards.
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difficulties in maintaining the same quality of products using the different types of fabrics. The
firm signed a contract with experts from a southern company who had dealt with these fabrics
before. These experts visited TLG for some weeks, discussing the problem with the firm's staff
and guiding them on how to deal with changes of material by adjusting the ways of cutting,
ironing and sewing. After that TLG's staff were able to use these experiences to handle quality
control problem of shirt production.
TLG has also used its own staff for on-the-job training. One example is the production of
fashionable Western vests for export in 1993. Before this, the production of such items with
high enough quality for export was not possible for Vietnamese garment firms. The most
difficult thing was to upgrade the pattern and then stitch them accordingly. To learn this kind of
specific production knowledge, TLG has invited old tailor men who used to sew Western vests
during the French time (before 1960s) to teach young technicians and workers about the
technique. But this was not enough since current Western fashions are quite different to the old
days. TLG combined this learning from old men with the use of more modern cutting and
patterning techniques (automatic specialised equipment for cutting sophisticated patterns like
pockets or pressing machines for chest and shoulders pads, etc.). The technical unit of the firm
was responsible for combining these old experiences with the use of modern technology
imported from Japan. In September 1993, TLG was able to begin this new export to France. As
the case shows, on-the-job training was mostly related to technical and engineering knowledge.
So far, few training courses are organised at the firm, nor the sharing of experiences by local
consultants on other non-technical issues. Therefore, this way of knowledge learning is mainly
geared to production or minor technical change activities.
Off-the-job training
This way of training has been quite popular up to the mid 1980s. Technicians graduating from
vocational schools, or workers who passed entry exams, could be sent to study part-time at the
Hanoi University or polytechnic for degrees in textile, mechanical or electrical engineering. For
more simple garment assembly skills, workers were sent from time to time to the training centre
for garment workers of MOLI. Similarly, TLG has sent its technical staff to short courses on
new issues like environmental regulations in production.
More useful off-the-job training came recently (during the last 3-4 years) with the pressing need
for managers at divisional level with knowledge on market economies and business
administration. They began to take courses in marketing or foreign trade management. For more
specific knowledge such as quality control, TLG sent its people to courses or seminars
organised by the General Department ofMetrology-Standardisation-Quality control (belonging to
Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment) on the new standard system of ISO 9000.
Off-the-job training has been helpful mainly for production and minor change rather than for
other capabilities, since most off-the-job courses are concerned with engineering issues. Non¬
technical subjects were not available until recently.
Foreign connections
This mechanism is the most used by TLG to learn recent knowledge of business practice and
more modern production technology. This learning through foreign connections can be divided
into waves. The first wave of foreign contacts came before the end of the 1980s, most foreign
experts, technical assistance, and sewing machinery came from the Soviet Union and East
European countries, especially during the "May 19" programme. Soviet experts came and stayed
at the firm to look after the implementation of production plans, quality control and export
business. By discussing relevant matters with foreign buyers during this period, managers of the
firm could, for the first time, learn about the organisation of production plans for export on a
large industrial scale. Technologically, TLG learned more about the use and specifications of
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industrial garment machinery, not only sewing but also finishing operations such as zipping and
putting buttons, pockets, etc. Still, due to the subcontracting nature of these connections and the
passive Vietnamese attitude of doing business (as discussed in 5.2.3), the technological
sophistication of the learning was not high. Also, TLG was only able to learn knowledge
appropriate for doing business in a centrally planned economy.
The second wave of foreign connections occurred at the end of the 1980s with the SIDA
programme. During this programme, TLG received assistance from consultants (HIFAB
International), mostly in pre-investment and investment studies. But, again, due to the passive
position of TLG in this programme, it did not learn much, except for simple knowledge of how
to choose new technology, and to deal with equipment purchasing which they could use later for
new local investment efforts. The passivity of TLG was only one reason for it not learning
much. Another reason was that the SIDA programme was the first time that TLG heard about
Western style analyses like feasibility studies. They did not have any experiences of doing this
kind of analysis before. Without prior basic knowledge, the absorption of new knowledge
remained limited. The discussed absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levithan, 1990) of TLG was
absent in this case. Thanks to SIDA assistance, TLG learnt how to use new Japanese sewing
machines and how to organise production workshops.
The most significant learning that TLG gained through foreign connections came with the third
wave of foreign involvement when it gained opportunities to cooperate with new buyers from
the EU and East Asian countries. The Korean company GunYoung has been among the most
important sources of learning for TLG. By providing TLG with the whole workshop, "Korean
house", GunYoung gave the TLG managers a living on-site example of a modern workshop for
garment production, which enabled TLG to have a full picture of what standards are needed for
export business. Korean experts visited 4-5 months each year during two years, and took part in
almost every activity of the workshop: supervision of production lines, quality control,
organisation of work division. In addition to ordinary sewing machines owned by TLG,
GunYoung provided the firm with some specific equipment like buttoning, pressure ironing to
produce high quality products to be exported to Japan (like three layer jackets and coats).
Technical assistance was also attached to equipment provision. GunYoung organised special
training courses for workers and technicians working in the workshop and regularly provided
them with guidance or shared experiences. First, the Korean experts taught a special group of
workers on how to use semi-automatic ironing and buttoning machines. Then other workers
received general guidance on how to use sewing machines to produce jackets. These workers
learnt many techniques from the Koreans: how to put fabrics in, how to link different cut
patterns and stitching them together, how to deal with finishing problems like cutting threads or
sticking decoration outlay.
At a higher level of management in this workshop, the heads of production lines or groups
learned from the Koreans how to deal with quality control checking, supplying and circulating
semi-finished products within the workshop, and organising workers on routine daily checking.
Thanks to these intensive learning activities (by working with GunYoung for about 2 years),
employees of this workshop became the most competent in the firm compared to those working
in other workshops, in producing highly sophisticated garments for export.
The assistance of GunYoung was not restricted only to this workshop. TLG invited GunYoung
experts to take part in general discussion about planning, organisation, and improvement of
performance of the whole company's activities. Although the final decision was always left to
the TLG director, GunYoung experts played quite an active role in providing business advising
to TLG. According to TLG's staff, the reasons for GunYoung being more involved with TLG's
business was to foster goodwill and mutual confidence. GunYuong might then, consider
expanding its business relations with other workshops of TLG. Both interviews with TLG
employees and the performance of the Korean workshop show that this learning has improved
production and technical change capabilities.
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TLG had also quite active and close connections with other foreign companies like Quell
(Germany), Shinton (Japan), Hennes&Maurice (Sweden), which are based on an OEM or ODM
agreement. Foreign companies provided TLG mostly with specific equipment or design, and the
firm had to develop the product prototype. The most intensive way of learning from these new
buyers was through discussion (on how to start a new design, how to change and improve each
specification, and about the fashion trends of each season), and co-design of new collections.
By working with many different buyers from different markets at the same time, TLG managers
learned the different techniques (or business know-how as called by Mr. Du Due Thin, vice
director) used by different buyers. German and Swedish buyers provided knowledge with
fashion trends and market orientation, while Korean or Japanese buyers gave more experiences
on production issues: how to economise on material, how to rationalise labour division; and how
to deal with the labour force and system of incentives.
Clearly TLG appreciated this way of combining knowledge. Furthermore, its diffusion of some
experiences to other parts of the company is clear evidence that they learned a lot by this
mechanism for TC building. For instance, after the staff of the Korean workshop became more
confident in handling all production operations, TLG decided they should circulate their
experiences to other parts of the firm. Every month, an internal meeting of director, heads of
other workshops and personnel from the Korean workshop was held where they discussed
experiences learned in the Korean house and how these experiences can be applied to other
workshops. From time to time, TLG also negotiated with Korean partners to second some
Korean-trained staff to work for a short period at other workshops. By doing this, the whole
firm can be in touch with changes and learning at the Korean workshop.
However, while TLG worked with various foreign partners, most of the knowledge they learned
was concerned with production and minor change activities. Experiences of investment or
marketing activities were shared more reluctantly by foreigners and at the same time absorbed
more passively by TLG itself. Indeed TLG was passive not only in the first and second waves
of foreign contacts, but also in the third. This passiveness of TLG is explained partly by the lack
of absorptive capacity (knowledge and experienced staff who can work alongside and leam from
GunYuong). In addition, GunYuong assisted TLG mostly with production techniques and
organisation. Investment preparation for setting up the workshop was done by GunYuong
without much involvement from TLG. As for marketing, TLG relied on foreign partners for sale
of its products, and involved no active learning.
An exception is GunYuong's contribution to TLG's linkage activity. Within one workshop,
Korean advisors have arranged close exchange of tasks and information among different
operative groups (supply, patterning, cutting, sewing, stitching and finishing). This helped TLG
to have a better idea of what are the internal linkages within the firm. Also, this internal linkage
was developed between the technical unit and other production units within TLG, partly thanks
to advice from GunYuong's experts.
Information
TLG made little use of this mechanism. Information comes mainly through technical
specifications and standards given by outside consultants or buyers. This information is used by
the company mainly to improve its production performance. TLG has more difficulties in
obtaining marketing or technology information from international trade fairs, exhibition,
seminars and workshops.
Learning-by-doing
Learning-by-doing first occurred in production and minor technical improvement. Through the
long period of doing various kinds of production tasks since the beginning of the firm, TLG's
349
Appendix
managers have been able to learn through many experiences, especially in changing and
upgrading types of technology to be used (from Soviet-made to a more sophisticated Japanese
sewing machines, and German specialised equipment). These experiences can also be related to
products to be produced (from simple products for Eastern European markets to higher quality
clothes for Japanese and EU customers) and relations with foreign partners (gradual shift from
subcontracting to OEM and ODM). After each of these changes, TLG's staff became more
familiar with new ways of doing business, new products and markets. One of the managers,
Mr. Nguyen Van Thanh in the planning division, said:
Before, we knew nothing about market economy. We simply are not able to have
any business with Western countries. Now we know how to produce products
good enough for these markets. Perhaps, it is the most important intellectual
development for us in the last five years.
TLG gathers the same learning-by-doing experiences through initiating technical improvements
at the firm. Over time, difficulties, problems and mistakes of this by-doing and by-trying to
solve problems are useful experiences. One example is the attempt of TLG to make its industrial
gas supply system more powerful and flexible. Initially, TLG intended to make this change
using its own staff, who are capable of mechanical engineering adjustment. After several months
of trying, the managers found that it was impossible to change the system without physical
knowledge of air flow pressure. Eventually, TLG had to invite people from the MOLI Centre for
boiler equipment to help, and at the same time, learned new knowledge of boiling system and
acquired many skills through working together with these people. In addition, they got very
good experience about the need for more specific knowledge to deal with small technical
problems.
More recently, learning-by-doing began to occur in investment and marketing. For the first time,
without any assistance from external personnel, TLG commenced to expand its production
facility and invest in a new subsidiary plant in Haiphong - a town on the east coast 100 km from
Hanoi. It took the firm almost two years (1991-1993) to complete investment and start-up
activities in this new venture. By making several mistakes and solving difficulties (how to deal
with poor physical infrastructure, how to negotiate with local authority, how to recruit and train
new workers coming from a harbour area and having less skills in garment, etc.), the firm
gained many experiences. Similarly, some new marketing attempts were made by TLG through
opening a new business centre and showrooms in Hanoi and some provinces. In the first year,
the business centre has lost money. Mr. Ta Anh Khoi, director of the centre admitted:
We did not make much profits after a year. Our staff have little knowledge and
experiences to advertise our products and market them to buyers. They just sit
here, watching people passing by. But we learn something from this mistake.
Probably from now on they should be more active for marketing and go out to
buyers.
These learning-by-doing activities in investment and marketing, therefore, are just the beginning
of TLG's learning process and so far, is not enough for them to acquire these TC. Without
backing up these efforts with other learning forms such as training or foreign contacts, this
simple accumulation just by doing cannot lead to the strong development of investment or
marketing capabilities.
4. Macro external factors, micro behaviours and learning
The influences of macro EF on TLG can be for both general business and technological
innovation and learning. In this section, only influences on learning efforts are provided. First,
TLG has to face problems of macro-economic policies practised by the government. Strict
regulations about financial and taxation issues made it very difficult to get extra resources for
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expanding new business, and for investing in learning activities in particular. The tax rate is very
high (40% levied on production and 50% levied on imported material) for the firm to have more
accumulation. To borrow this money for technological innovation activities, TLG has to pay
quite high rate of interest during the first six years of a loan. A shortage of funding particularly
influences off-the-job training, since fees for courses run by other firms, training organisations
are increasing.
Regulations of the state on relations between local firms and their foreign partners are still
cumbersome and TLG has difficulty in maintaining flexible relations with its foreign buyers and
technology suppliers. Although learning through foreigners is one of the most active learning
mechanisms at TLG, it still believes this connection can be improved with easier regulations and
open policies. For example, when the firm needs to send staff to attend an exhibition, trade fair
or workshop abroad, it is difficult to arrange for them exit/re-entry procedures such as visa,
passport, etc.2 Because of the rigid regulation, TLG simply did not bother to send its people
abroad, especially if the trip is for only 2-3 days. As they said, "it is not worth the effort". The
same can be said for entry/exit visas that TLG has to arrange for its foreign partners to come to
Vietnam. This situation sometimes can be frustrating, preventing the firm from pursuing its
limited learning opportunities for getting knowledge, information, and experiences through
contacts with foreigners.
Until the end of the 1980s, the most distinct feature of market factors for TLG has been the
homogenous export market of CMEA. This limited relation of the company with markets of the
Soviet Union and East European countries prevented it from having diversified and
comprehensive sources of technology and information. Learning by gathering information and
documentation, in this case, is limited only to one source of information. The company did not
have clear idea about doing business in a more diversified and open market economies. TLG got
technical documentation and information only from trade fairs and exhibitions in Eastern Europe,
without looking at high fashion development of garment in much more competitive markets.
Similarly, TLG's foreign connections during this period were mostly buyers from the former
Soviet Union, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. By using this connection, certainly, the firm could
learn only to do simple business and mostly about the payment procedures and financial
transaction in terms of rubbles, but not other convertible currency. Moreover, these activities
were usually planned from above, and the firm really has little interest in changing the situation.
Thus, during the pre-reform period, the firm's information sources and foreign connections for
learning were strongly affected by this limited market access.
After the reform, the situation has changed for the better and TLG has gained new market
opportunities. Through new foreign contacts, knowledge and sources of information on
production, technical change were brought in. But, this situation has brought some new
problems, too. Losing the market of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, TLG has
quite a difficult time adjusting to new markets which require quota for export and those non¬
quota markets, like Japan, that demand very high quality products. Fierce competition in the
domestic market without co-ordination by the state has led to a weak bargaining position of the
firms, including TLG, in having contracts with foreigners. Sometimes, TLG has to accept very
low subcontracting prices, like in contracts with Sanshin and Heunes&Maurice, just to have
access to their market information and technical documentation about fashion.
2 Vietnamese did not have right to carry their passport and in order to go abroad, they have to apply for both
passport and exit-entry visa and this process may take some weeks. These ridiculous procedures existed until very
recently with few changes.
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Although using foreign connection and information mechanisms in this period are more
diversified than before, TLG still has some problems without supportive market policies of the
state in a number of issues, such as quota.
The learning efforts of TLG through various training courses and information searches, are
influenced strongly by infrastructure factors like education, training, and R&D. During the
1970s and 1980s, TLG relied rather actively on the R&D, education and training system of the
country. The firm has benefited from free and continuous supply of personnel with higher
education, technicians as well as workers, for the use of prior accumulation and off-the-job
training activities. At the same time, poor curricula of training programmes and weaknesses in
the R&D system caused some problems for TLG's learning. A technical bias, and slow and
ineffective information flow have been the main obstacles to the firm learning capabilities other
than production and minor technical change.
The free supply of trained workers by the state had ended by the end of the 1980s. TLG now
has to take responsibility for the provision of its skilled garment workers. Although it still has
good relations with the training school, in order to receive training it has to sign a contract with
the school and pay significant amounts of money for training services. But even when the firm
can afford to pay, the existing training curricula is less suitable in the context of recent changes.
Previously acquired skills and techniques of workers on garment operations are no longer
suitable compared to those required for new garment equipment or production organisation
(higher speed, more precise operations, automated and computerised cutting, etc). This difficulty
has a serious impact on TLG's efforts to gain more knowledge for its workers through prior
training courses.
Many other sources of competence (like universities, R&D and consultancy organisations that
can help the company in its learning through off-the-job training and collection of information)
are not very useful. Technical schools, universities and polytechnic institutes mostly produce
engineers with degrees in textile engineering, but not for garment industry. TLG has to adapt its
technical educated personnel to garment activities through working experience and subsequent
training. Due to lack of the necessary investment in people and facilities, the Research Centre for
Garment Industry is weak and does not provide TLG with training or information. Due to
weaknesses of the domestic sources in expertise and information for garment business, TLG has
tended to rely more on assistance from its foreign partners, than on gathering information and
documentation from domestic consulting and associate organisations.
As for off-the-job training, although TLG argued that it cannot rely on activities of local
institutions, judging by its actual learning process, the firm did use some off-the-job training
offered by domestic training and R&D institutions. However, these activities occurred very
recently and still faced severe problems of a weak R&D and supportive system in terms of
expertise and information supply.
In relation to social and cultural aspects, the tradition of learning, a positive attitude toward
learning the garment business, especially on the family level, has been severely jeopardised
during the planned economy. The whole mechanism of welfare distribution and uncompetitive
environment (highly subsidised society and lack of personal responsibilities) made TLG's
employees passive and short of initiative or desire to innovate technologically. Managers and
workers did not want to learn extra knowledge (like higher or second degree) since they have no
incentive to do so: no chance of promotion, no bonus, etc. This attitude is very negative for
improving knowledge and experience of employees by training, especially in terms of self-
learning efforts and their mentality while accumulating knowledge through learning by-doing.




These mentioned factors have affected TLG's learning efforts in different ways. Off-the-job
training, use of foreign connection and gathering information, are those mechanisms that
received most pressures from external factors. In this context, TLG's responses have helped it to
sustain its business in general and learning efforts in particular.
TLG's first reaction (started by the end of the 1980s) was to diversify its product range by
producing more sophisticated products. TLG bought new sewing equipment from Japan, began
entering new markets, and also began to look seriously at domestic market. This diversification
helped the firm to secure more financial resources for its learning and innovation activities.
In the same vein, TLG is trying to find new non-traditional ways of acquiring knowledge and
information. Since 1991, TLG has been demanding certain technical qualifications from potential
employees. New workers can no longer rely on prior training campaigns of the firm, but have to
take care of skill shortage by themselves before joinging the firm. In addition, TLG is making
more intensive use of the informal network of consultants working in other organisations in
order to obtain necessary experiences and information. In addition, TLG has significantly
upgraded the activities of its showroom and sales centre (located in the central area of Hanoi) to
gather market intelligence.
To improve training (on-the-job and off-the-job), TLG has designed more incentives for those
employees who are willing to learn more actively. For example, those who get higher
qualifications gets a much higher salary. Managers and engineers also get a chance of going
abroad, as well as quicker promotion if they have a second degree. In addition, there are
bonuses (help with housing, tourism trip to resort areas, etc.) for those who can suggest more
initiatives and show a more active learning attitude. With new incentives, employees have begun
to regain their desire to learn more and deeper knowledge. Managers like Mr. Nguyen Van
Thanh and Mr. Ta Anh Khoi are now studying for degrees in management with Hanoi
Economics University. Interestingly, it is these incentives that have helped to reverse the hesitant
and passive attitude of TLG's employees which existed during the planned economy.
Diversifying through binding connections with foreign companies to get access to new
information, and to gain new experience is quite an active reaction of TLG. The firm diversified
its connections with both Western European and East Asian partners (e.g Germany, Sweden,
Japan, Korea). Moreover, the firm started to think more consciously about upgrading its
relations with foreign firms from simple subcontracting to a more active role as OEM and ODM.
Indeed, by diversifying its involvement with foreigners, the firm's managers has learned
different kinds of knowledge, piece by piece, from different sources. For example, TLG's vice-
director noted the sort of things that he learned from various partners: shape and colours of high
fashion products from German partner, technique of producing jeans and coats from the
Swedish; the way of organising a production workshop, planning and running quality control
from the Japanese and Korean; and techniques and skills of sewing jackets from the Korean
buyer. "We have to listen to them", he said, "and be patient. Then we can learn something
different from each of them".
These efforts of TLG, however, did not solve all problems. There are still hindrances to its
learning posed by the state macro policies and which the firm has to accept. Mr. Du Due Thin,
vice-director, has confessed that until the question of ownership is solved, there will still lack
confidence in firm's future. He said:
This company is not mine, so why should I try very hard. The firm is owned by
the state or almost everyone, collective ownership as you called it. The next one
who is going to be new director, who knows, perhaps might do things in reverse
to what we are doing now.
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The response of TLG to EF's pressure is mostly diversification of business activities, markets,
and products. There is little evidence of other responses. To acquire a richer knowledge about
new business opportunities, it seems that TLG has succeeded in knowing how to combine the
different learning sources of foreign partners. However, the case material also shows that the
differentiation of learning sources by TLG is limited, and it depends on the availability of
technical knowledge necessary for production and minor change. A more conscious and co¬
ordinated strategy for developing other TCs has not been pursued.
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Appendix 9.2 Case study of spinning company TG6 (NTC)
This account is based on interviews and observations made during various visits to the firm in
1987 and 1992-1993. Interviews were made with Mr. Duong Van Khang, Director; Mrs.
Nguyen Thi Ngoc Lien, former head of the technical division and now responsible for
technological innovation activities, and Mr. Nguyen Thanh Binh, head of one spinning
workshop.
1. Company profile
This company is located outside Nhatrang city of Khanh Hoa province in the central part of
Vietnam (about 500 km north of HoChiMinh City). In order to meet Vietnam's need for yarns
for weaving plants after the war, MOLI contacted Itochu Co. of Japan in 1972 to sign a
contract worth 50 millions USD for a turn-key spinning plant of 100,000 spindles, included
supervision of installation and training of Vietnamese personnel. The technology is a kind of
"combing and carding independently" which technologically is a semi-modern line in
comparison with "combing and carding together" and is similar in sophistication to European
plants (Italian, Swiss and German) of the 1970s. The mill also has a line with Open-End
technology which uses rotors instead of looms to make best use of poor quality cotton. The
planned operating time of the plant is 22.5 hours per day with three shifts a day and 306 days
per year .
In 1992, the company was reorganised as a corporation consisting of three plants: spinning
(1,291 employees), weaving-dyeing-garment (700) ,and a services workshop (100). This
reflects a downstream shift for the company from producing only textiles to include knitwear
and garments.
NTC's employment changed slightly from year to year as follows:
1987: 2,000 persons; 1989: 1,785; 1990: 1,750;
1991: 1,750; 1992: 2,136; 1993: 2,150; 1994: 2,000.
The structure of the workforce is as follows: in addition to the production staff, 45 people are
working in indirect supporting activities such as directorship, financial and accounting tasks.
About 20 people are working in three groups specialised in technical (3-4), planning (4) and
sales-supply (3) issues. Sixty five people (59 in 1987) have higher education degrees
(university graduates, engineers), 120 graduated from vocational technical training colleges
and 200 are technicians. The rest are workers who have been recruited during the construction
phase of the project and subsequently trained by the Vietnamese and Japanese instructors to
run spinning workshops.
Production facilities of the company includes:
• spinning: 100,000 spindles with a designed capacity of 5,100 (expected to be 6,000) tons
of yarn per year; Open-End (OE): 1,200 rotors with a designed capacity of 600 to 1,000
tons per year.
• garment, weaving and knitting: designed capacity of equipment is 1,000 tons of knitted
fabrics and 2 million pieces of garment per year.
• other equipment for carding and combing, for test and experimental laboratories.
Turnover (in USD):
1989: 6,862,630; 1990: 7,157,420; 1991: 7,427,430
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1992: 9,000,000 ; 1993: 14,000,000
The company began export of yarns in 1983 to the former Soviet Union on the basis of a
government trade agreement. During this period, the volume of export was small and quality
of yarns was not very high. In 1989 and 1990, due to changes in this market and the start of
textile joint venture operations in Vietnam which need yarns for their production, NTC began
to sell yarns to these companies with payment made in USD (42% of the firm's total yarn
production). More recently yarn product is being exported to other Asian markets like Taiwan
and Singapore.
Since September 1992 NTC commenced exporting new products, like knitted fabrics and
garment, to Japan and other countries. In 1993, NTC exported 1 millions pieces of garment
with a value of 2,200,000 USD to Japan, rising in 1994 to 2 millions pieces (about 4 millions
USD). Japanese long term partner of NTC - Itochu - has contracted to buy back these products
after they helped the firm to invest in knitting and garment production activities. In addition,
NTC also begins export of 60 new models of garment to France and Italy. This trial effort
seems successful in European markets as well.
2. Building technological capabilities
Investment capability
Establishment phase
Since the start, all pre-investment and investment studies were carried out by specialists of
both sides. Japanese companies included Itochu Co Ltd, Shin-Etsu Trading Co Ltd and
Toyobo Engineering Co Ltd. - experts in engineering, construction and technical services for
industrial plants, especially in textiles. Implementation of the project was also undertaken by
Japanese experts responsible for choice of technology suppliers, designs of the plant,
supervision for construction and installation works, starting up activity, etc. Vietnamese staff
participated in some simple activities like construction and installation, but did not play a
decisive role.
Mr. Duong Van Khang, director of another large textile plant in Hanoi was recruited as
manager of the project (now Director of NTC). However, since the participation of the
company's staff in the first phase of investment activities was limited, they got little from the
experience, except for some vague idea about new venture investment.
Expansion phase
In 1991, Itochu helped NTC to set up a workshop for production of T-shirts, pullovers and
children knitwear for export to Japan and South Korea. In 1992 it exported 1,500,000 pieces of
garment (its buyers carry out all marketing and distribution). New products were not only for
export but also for sale on the domestic market. Having the largest production capacity for
spinning and the most modern technology facilities, NTC could sell its products to all other
Vietnamese textile companies, and these products are much in demand. NTC staff are now
more active and confident in drawing new investment studies, negotiating with technology
suppliers, and looking for other technical assistance such as guidance and support in
management issues from local as well as foreign partners. For example, alongside co-operating
with Itochu in knitwear production, the company has also co-operated with ThanhCong textile
company in HoChiMinh City for technical assistance on how to start and run newly set up
knitwear and garment workshop.
The move of NTC from spinning activity to downstream business, like knitting and garment
assembly, is a big shift in its orientation. Also, this successful expansion (regardless of initial
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difficulties) is evidence of the ability of the firm in carrying out investment activity. The
company continued to invest in its spinning plant to expand and upgrade the existing
production facility. During the past five year, the company has imported two production lines
of combing and rotor spinning machines (2 more Open-End machines per year), improved the
carding system, added auto splices hand fitting and testing instruments. In 1991, the company
imported new equipment for dyeing, knitting and sewing from Japan, Korea and Taiwan
(about 2,100,000 USD). Before this, (since 1989) the company had already invested 1,750,000
USD. Although in this period, the company still had to ask partners from outside (both
Japanese and local) to assist in certain activities like starting up garment production, clearly its
investment skills, experiences, and confidence now are more developed than in the previous
phase.
Production capability
NTC staff can handle all production activities including management, maintenance and repair
of equipment. The firm's performance has improved steadily in turnover, total volume of
products and export. Since the start in 1982, the quality of products has also steadily increased:
fineness of yarn was Na 29.5, now its quality has improved to Na 40 to Na 60.
In the initial period, the company relied on Polytechnic institute of HoChiMinh City and on
technical companies for repair and maintenance of equipment (electrical, mechanical, etc.).
Now, the company is more confident in running all production lines and dealing with repair
activities by itself.
While observing the operations of NTC, I saw that all levels of management (directorship,
head masters of workshops, heads of divisions and operation groups) know how to run and
organise workers at their respective levels. There was no outside permanent consultant to assist
with production tasks (neither Japanese nor Vietnamese). When technical problems arose, the
firm had a strict rule to follow, relying on local staff competence: workers and heads of units
(workshops) have to look into the problem first, then report to technical experts if necessary.
Usually, staff of each workshop is able to deal with these problems without help.
But maintenance has remained an issue for reasons other than capability. First, infrastructure
facilities are poor. Supplied by the local electricity network, the company suffered power cuts
during the 1980s for about 5 hours per day, sometimes for 15-20 days consecutively. It had to
work 2.5 shifts instead of 3 which seriously prevented the company from reaching its designed
capacity. Due to power cuts, some special equipment (such as filter that converts sea water into
fresh water) needed for Nhatrang location was damaged. Second, poor supply of cotton
material (or of poor quality cotton) caused problems for the operation of the plant. Recently,
these problems have receeded through the provision of better infrastructure conditions locally
and by the company itself. Third, maintenance problems remain due to shortage of foreign
exchange for purchasing spare parts. According to estimates of experts from MOLI, in general,
10 USD per spindle is needed annually to maintain and repair (buy part, etc.). That means
NTC would need 1 million USD per year. In practice, it received only 100,000 USD from
MOLI. Up to 1990, due to lack of foreign exchange for purchasing parts, the rate of
deterioration of equipment, such as the rotor of OE machines, is quite high. Some parts have to
be used much longer than intended (e.g. leather belts of spindles have been used for 3 years
instead of 6 months).
Except for the maintenance problem, NTC's personnel have no major problems in operating
the production facility. After Japanese experts left in 1982, all production and related activities
needed to maintain the project were run entirely by the staff of the company. Moreover, when
the newbusiness opened up (garment and knitting) in 1991, after about a year relying on
guidance of external consultants (mostly Vietnamese), NTC can now master all these new
production processes in knitting and sewing operation.
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Minor technical change capability
Since the start of operations, NTC has been able to introduce some minor changes aiming at
rehabilitation of old equipment, and improvement of existing production facilities and
products. The company has undertaken various small scale projects like manufacturing 41 sets
of dust filter, making 1,200 sets of paraffin carding, 11 sets of ball-bearing drying equipment,
improving dust-collecting system, etc. All these activities are done by the staff of the company
itself without significant help from outside consultants.
Initially in the structure of NTC there was a special technical unit responsible for all technical
improvement jobs. After 1989, the firm dissolved this unit and organised technical change
activity on an ad-hoc basis. Whenever NTC needs to do some technical adjustment or
adaptation, the director set up a group of experts from different divisions and workshops to
deal with the problem. The kind of technical change undertaken sometimes involves adjusting
elements of imported technology that are not suitable for Vietnamese conditions. An example
is the dust-collecting system of spinning workshops. When the Japanese design of this system
was brought to Vietnam it turned out not to be hermetic enough to deal with higher air
temperatures. Dust was still penetrating into the workshop causing low quality of yarns. In
addition, some pipes in this system were not functioning properly. The company had to work
out what pipe changes were necessary and devise a method of sealing to help the system
become more hermetic. From time to time, in order to save foreign currency, the staff also
suggested some local made alternative of equipment like dotting machine to replace imported
ones. They handled these minor technical changes with considerable confidence.
Marketing capability
This capability of NTC is nearly non-existent. Since the beginning of operations, types and
ranges of products were decided by MOLI in agreement with Japanese supplier, and mostly to
meet local market needs. Products of high enough quality were bought back by the Japanese
supplier or by some Soviet buyers. Thanks to high local demand for these products, the
company has been able to sell its yarn products easily, thereby, easing the need for export
marketing activities, at least up until recently. As for export markets, some trial exporting was
being undertaken by the company, but mostly it relied on the foreign buyers and Vietnamese
trading companies of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Thus, the company did not need to
acquire any marketing skills.
This situation is starting to change with the move to new garment products. NTC now exports
through a co-operative agreement (which is a mix between subcontracting and OEM) due to
limited marketing capability. Itochu Co. is the main buyer of these garment products (80 to 85
% of NTC's total garment production is exported). NTC is able to supply input material from
its own yarns, as well as its own management and technical expertise (with the support of
ThanhCong weaving company in HoChiMinh City). The buyer provides design, colour, ranges
of products and some special equipment which are not available locally. At present, the
marketing function belongs to the division of planning, market and export-import. Also, the
company has a show-room in joint venture with a district of HoChiMinh City to introduce its
products and gather market intelligence from customers, mostly local. Still, this is only the
firm's very first step in building up its marketing competence.
Linkage capability
NTC has weak linkage capability. One type is developed mostly with domestic institutions and
universities to help the company in its problem solving in both technical and managerial
issues. NTC has close co-operation with HoChiMinh City polytechnic institute for training of
its staff and other technical assistance services. Because it is considered by many managers in
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the sector as one of the most modern spinning plants of Vietnam, NTC is even used as the site
where technical people came on various study excursions. The RITI and Textile Engineering
Factor No.2 of MOLI have visited in order to make a survey together with NTC staff, on the
different designs of equipment at the mill. The aim was to design, produce or improve similar
equipment.1
The second type of linkage is with other weaving companies who buy NTC yarns, such as
Thanhcong or Phongphu weaving plants in HoChiMinh City. In return for this, they support
NTC with technical guidance and some problem-solving, especially in a new activity like
garment and knitting production. This linkage has an important role in keeping NTC in touch
with the latest developments in HoChiMinh City - the hub of textile industry in Vietnam - at
the same time as ensuring it access to this dynamic Southern market.
Internal linkages within the company have been developed closely among its divisions and
workshops. After the technical unit was dissolved, staff of the unit became seconded to
production and sale units in a more flexible framework. Every year, the firm sent its staff from
different divisions to work in its shop and show-room in HoChiMinh City; in this way, the
circulation of information between sales and production activities is promoted.
Despite these linkages, NTC still lacks some linkages and information exchange mechanisms
with other spinning firms working in Hanoi (like TG3 in this study). One of the reasons is
difficulties in communication, due to isolated location of the firm.
Major technical change capability
There was no evidence of capability in major change and design work at NTC. In spite of
active minor technical change activities, it is difficult to see how NTC can develop them into a
more major change capability, due to many problems, one of which is the weakness of the
overall supporting R&D and industrial infrastructure.
3. Learning mechanisms
Prior accumulation
As a new turn-key project, staff of the company were prepared by MOLI and Textimex rather
intensively in order to be able to receive transferred technology. Many managers of the firm
come through being transferred (to the newly created project) from other textile plants in order
to get to know the technology from the beginning. The most distinguished example is Mr.
Duong Van Khang. He was the director of "March 8" textile plant - one of the largest textile
complexes in the North - before being assigned by MOLI as NTC director. He brought with
^For example, a study on manufacturing Open-End technology had been undertaken. This specific technology
was produced by Japanese manufacturers on the basis of Czech patents. The advantage of the technology is its
specification to use poor quality cotton for spinning. The research group studied in details the design of this
equipment, unpacked the machine and looked at how it worked, and from which parts it was made. They then
tried to produce similar parts with the aim of assembling the same sort of machine. If successful, this could be a
great solution for textile plants because they could use poor quality cotton, and save foreign exchange (no need to
import these machines). Unfortunately, when the group wanted to make some important parts of the machine
(mostly rotating and whirling parts requiring very precise mechanical engineering operations), none of the
existing Vietnamese mechanical engineering facilities could meet their requirements in terms of precision and
technical standards, and they had to drop this idea of imitation. This was a first attempt at reverse engineering in
textiles. But, due to weaknesses of mechanical engineering capability in the country, this attempt failed. This
experience shows that without the development of related industries such as mechanical engineering, attempts by
the textile industry to upgrade and learn technologically have been easily frustrated.
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him about ten engineers and managers from his old plant as well as other staff. This group of
people constituted the first generation of the company's employees working throughout the
investment and start-up phases. On the basis of their former experiences, they knew how to run
textile production, how to do investment studies and implement investment plans. Although
this expertise was geared to older and more simple technology than that of NTC, its staff
already had some elements of investment and production capabilities from the start. This prior
knowledge was especially helpful for them later, in upgrading investment and production
competence during the project's implementation.
The second generation of NTC staff was recruited during the implementation period from
different Vietnamese and foreign universities and polytechnic institutes. Mr. Nguyen Thanh
Binh, for example, graduated in textile engineering from Lodz University (Poland) and went
back to Vietnam in 1978 where he obtained his Vietnamese experience at Hanoi Polytechnic
Institute in textile engineering faculty. In 1982 he moved to NTC together with a group of
newly graduated engineers of this faculty who became managers of NTC working in different
work places. Mr. Nguyen has been promoted to head master of one spinning workshop. In
general, they are young, more knowledgeable and educated. Many of them can speak foreign
languages (Russian and East European languages such as Polish and German, and more
recently English). Compared to their predecessors, they have been much better prepared in
modern textile engineering. For example, the first generation like the director is more familiar
with Chinese loom technology of the "March 8" plant. The second generation learned more
from the Soviet and quite modern spinning technology of East Germany (combing and
carding), and they have a general idea about Open-End technology (non-loom technology
based on rotors). Thanks to their formal training, this second generation of managers have
contributed significantly to the firm's accumulation of technological expertise. Whenever a
need for some minor technical change has arisen, they felt confident to deal with it. However,
the lower level technical workforce like technicians and workers, benefited little from prior
accumulation mechanism.
As was presented above, this prior learning process for accumulating knowledge and
experiences is crucial for investment, production and minor change activities. Also, existing
contacts of NTC's staff with their class mates and former colleagues who are working in
research institutes, universities and other organisations help them a lot to develop linkage
capability. At the same time, there was no marketing knowledge to be accumulated before the
start of NTC. Its staff also did not have any experience of major technical change before
working.
Foreign connections
Japanese technology suppliers and product buyers are the most active source of learning for
workers and technicians. The assistance of the Japanese Itochu Co. can be divided into two
main periods. The first period was the setting up of the turn-key spinning plant during 1978-
1982. In the framework of this contract, the Japanese supplierd technical assistance for 10
months before and 6 months after mechanical completion of the last unit of the project. To
implement the project, about 46 Japanese experts were sent in over 28 months (or 322 person-
months) to undertake the following tasks:
Numbers of persons:
general management (1 person)
construction activity (7)
climatic and air conditioning (14)
electricity (independent source of power











A group of Vietnamese personnel were assigned to support the Japanese experts. They worked
together and shared (although informal) experiences. By working side by side with the
Japanese, the Vietnamese got first hand experience of how the project was implemented. For
example, NTC's staff gained some experience of international purchase and supply of
equipment, eventhough they did not take part directly in this activity; by discussing with the
Japanese experts, reading blueprint and contract documents, much new knowledge such as this
became familiar to them. Thus, by associating with the Japanese since the early days of the
project, NTC's personnel had a very good opportunity to learn investment skills. At the top
level of management, the director of the plant and others worked together with the Japanese,
discussing the implementation plans and time table, solving difficulties in dealing with local
conditions. At the lower level, technicians and engineers such as Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Lien
were assigned to accompany and assist Japanese experts in technical issues such as installation
of equipment, utility and electricity erection. They got a chance to watch what the Japanese
personnel did in reality, to ask them questions regarding how to solve certain difficulties and
so on.
More formally, training and technical guidance were also provided by Itochu. Technical
assistance for Vietnamese staff was undertaken in two areas. The first batch of knowledge was
transferred through technical documentation which consisted of:
specifications of machines;
operation and maintenance manual;




In production, Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) and other Japanese practical manufacturing
standards were applied. In order to train the Vietnamese staff in spinning production, another
group of Japanese experts were sent as technical instructors:
Numbers of persons: Time budget:
general management (1 person) 6 person-months
utility: mechanical engineer (1) 10 person-months
electricity: electrical engineer (1) 10 person-months
spinning activity: engineer (2) 24 person-months
Total: 5 persons 50 person-months.
The working language was English so easing the process of communication, since the
Vietnamese staff had some specific Vietnamese-English interpreters working for them, and
there were some young personnel who could speak English themselves. There was also a
Japanese-Vietnamese interpreter to help get contacts going more smoothly.
In addition to receiving experts, a group of 6 Vietnamese staff were sent to Japan for training
one of whom was the director. They spent about 7 months learning how technological
processes similar to that of NTC work and how to manage that kind of project. Since Itochu is
a trading company, it arranged for this group to spend time in various plants with similar
technology provided by Toyoda Co. and Murata Co. At these plants, Vietnamese managers
became acquainted not only with production technology but also with other aspects of running
the project. For example, they saw the ways Japanese firms organised production management,
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the ways they organised workers, dealing with discipline and other techniques of human
resources management, and incentive system. During these 7 months, they also had a chance to
associate with Japanese workers in various social activities and learned about Japanese life and
working style, and observe labour relations processes. This trip turned out to be a very
important experience for them. As the director said:
Our Vietnamese proverb - one time of seeing is much better than a hundred
times of hearing - is true in this case. I was there, I saw how Japanese did all
these things and it's much easier to understand and remember.
Specifically, the reliance on foreign connection in this first period brought more knowledge
and experience of production engineering, management skills, and repairs and maintenance.
These important elements of production capability were obtained by NTC's staff almost at the
start of operations.
Additional investment knowledge arrived with the second period of foreign assistance. In
1991, Itochu Co., at request of NTC, agreed to supply new equipment for knitting and garment
production and technical assistance but much less than in the spinning phase. NTC's staff had
to be more active in all investment activities through working with suppliers and learning from
discussion with them. During this new investment phase, NTC's managers learnt more about
starting a new venture.
So far, there is no evidences that other expertise like marketing or technical change has been
accumulated by these foreign connections.
On-the-job training
This mechanism has contributed importantly to the accumulation of investment, production
and minor change knowledge within NTC. Annually, NTC organises competitions and exams
to increase qualification levels of its technical personnel and workers. In order to upgrade their
skills, workers have to prepare themselves in theoretical questions and practical training before
taking the exams. NTC sometimes held short term training courses (from 10 days to 2 weeks)
to prepare workers for the exams, mostly in technical expertise (quality control, trouble¬
shooting activity). The importance of these courses is to keep workers aware of the need to
upgrade their skills on a regular basis. Through this training, knowledge and skills about
production management and engineering were provided. For managers and supervisors of
workshops, another kind of on-the-job training is provided. Consultants and instructors are
invited from MOLI to work, teach or solve specific problems on a contract basis. These
people, working in a managerial organisation like MOLI, have more knowledge and
experience in issues like setting up investment plans, applying for credit from financial
institutions and banks, or dealing with administrative procedures. Therefore, sometimes they
came to solve not only specific technical, but also non-technical problems. There, right on the
site of the firm, they taught NTC staff in a semi-informal way. At the same time, others have
assisted NTC in technical matters of production engineering and change. When the firm started
its new knitting and garment venture, the company invited personnel of Thanhcong textile
company from HoChiMinh City to help for a couple of months with start-up operations.
From time to time, researchers from Southern filial of the RITI, HoChiMinh City Polytechnic
and Textile Mechanical Factory No.2 have visited NTC and contributed to the consulting and
teaching courses. Working together with them in different assigned groups (similar to working
with foreigners), NTC's staff learned about production know-how that is not written in any
textbook or manual. One example was the manufacturing of 1,200 sets of paraffin carding.
While undertaking this task, NTC had difficulties in knowing the exact components of these
sets. They contacted researchers from RITI for consultancy. These people together with NTC
provided some experimental tests and consequently came up with the most optimal solution.
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After that, NTC staff knew how to do these tests and similar experiments for other relevant
activities next time.
Off-the-job training
More recently, NTC has been exercising this mechanism to a certain extent. The company
sends managers for short courses on economic and management issues mostly to HoChiMinh
City. These courses are run by HoChiMinh City Economics University and other
consulting/training organisations (such as Technology Development Co. belonging to the
City's Science and Technology Department) and range from 2-3 days to 2 weeks. They give
participants a quick update and introduction to basic ideas on business administration, foreign
trade, systems of international payment, project appraisal, etc. More recently, this training has
tried to cover marketing issue as well. However, as confessed by both Mr. Nguyen Thanh Binh
and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Lien, these courses are too theoretical and lack practical
usefulness, especially for local Vietnamese conditions.
Information search
This mechanism is not very much used by NTC. The most significant pool of documentation
was that collected by the company in the implementation of the spinning project and therefore,
it was useful for spinning only. For the next phase, there was little documentation available for
NTC on knitting and garment production, from any source.
Vietnamese sources of information are very difficult for NTC access because of the long
distance between Nhatrang and HoChiMinh City where most technical information and
documentation are held. In short, NTC acquires information on a very ad-hoc basis, lacking
regular access and screening.
Learning-by-doing
Again, it is quite difficult to assess learning-by-doing effort. The fieldwork revealed that this
way of learning occurres widely in NTC. In all investment, production, minor change and
linkage areas, the firm has been involved in many activities, made some mistakes, repeated
again and learned how to avoid these mistakes in the future; each time, the staff learnt
something more. Only in marketing and major technical change did NTC not attempt anything
significant. One example is how they learned investment capability just by engaging in a new
investment project (an expansion). Having been involved and taught by Japanese experts quite
actively in the first phase investment for spinning production, NTC managers seem to have
known how to do feasibility studies, how to choose equipment and deal with the transaction,
installation and start-up. This factor, in addition to shortage of funding for involving more
foreigners in the second phase of new knitting and garment business, led them to decide to do
this expansion mostly by themselves. The director described their attitudes as:
We thought that we can do it this time. We learned from Japanese a lot from
first time, so it should be easier for us.
He was overly optimistic. When they wanted to choose technology, this was more complicated
than it seemed. The types of knitting technology and sewing machines that are suitable for
knitted material are many, and range widely in terms of quality, sources of input quality and
prices. These issues are more diverse than in the spinning phase and were new to NTC.
Although Itochu Co. was asked to help with technology supply and some simple technical
assistance was brought in, it was not enough. The scale of Japanese involvement was much
less than before and NTC simply did not know what to do next. They tried to install equipment
and start production. It did not work properly, there was a high rate of defects. NTC technical
staff had to struggle with re-arranging, re-installing, re-test, and even asked for help from
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Thanhcong textile company in HoChiMinh City who are more experienced in knitting and
garment. It took them almost a year to put the new operation in order. From this, they learnt
about the need for better preparation in starting any kind of new business. Although now NTC
staff is more confident in knitting and garment, they know how difficult it is, if they go further
to garment production based on more sophisticated fabrics such as microfiber. If they do
expand again, they know from where to start, how to deal with potential problems in a shorter
period. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Lien said:
We were over confident. Next time, we have to be better prepared.
4. Macro external factors, micro behaviours and learning
In NTC's study, data have been provided for influences of EF on both general business
acitivity, including learning efforts. In many aspects, these influences are the same but this
section deals directly with those EF as seen as having important influences on learning
activities of the firm.
Factors of macro-economic policies are the most influential for learning efforts of NTC. The
first policy is the planning and allocation of productive forces in the textile industry. It was due
to this unique view (to evenly divide industrial capacity throughout the country), that NTC was
located in such an isolated place. This policy (related to the investment policy of the industry),
caused a lot of problems for the company: poor availability of training; poor sources of
information; and inhibiting opportunities to expand its foreign connection to new partners. It
seems difficult for all these learning mechanisms to operate, being far from HoChiMinh City
where most learning sources are concentrated. Regulations of foreign currency management
are strict and NTC cannot keep its foreign exchange to satisfy the need of technical change,
repair and maintenance activities. It prevented the firm from being active and self-learning or
from having more financial resources for on-the-job training.
A weak labour market factor is another cause of difficulties for NTC in its recruitment efforts
and training programmes for newly recruited work force. As a small town, Nhatrang cannot
supply a large project like NTC with enough skilled and professional labour as in HoChiMinh
City area.
The domestic market offers a profitable business opportunity for NTC, but the smuggling of
yarn from China, (encouraged by an inefficient trade and customs policy), has done some
damage to this business.
Again, as a result of isolated location, other supporting institutions function poorly. The
physical infrastructure was badly provided: a lack of electricity; and poor communication and
transportation facilities caused many problems for NTC in getting information and attracting
more foreign connections. During the 1980s, the supply of cotton imported from the former
Soviet Union was of poor quality. Because of this, some attempts by NTC to experiment with
production of finer yarns were unsuccessful and eventually discouraged the firm from
learning-by-doing through 'trial and error'.
The long distance of NTC from HoChiMinh City made it difficult for the firm to get easy
access to learning sources for its training activities. Experts from other companies, R&D
institutes or HoChiMinh City polytechnic were usually hesitant to visit the firm, due to the fact
that transport to Nhatrang is slow and inconvenient (a bus takes 12 hours to cover this 500 km
distance, for example).
Cultural factors have also had some impact on the learning attitude of the work force at NTC.
The long period under planned economy and subsidised incentive system made staff of the
company quantity rather than quality-oriented. They care more about volume of production
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and plan implementation than quality and diversification of product range.2 Some workers do
not understand the necessity of quality and don't even bother to think about it. This attitude
undermines both on-the-job training and learning-by-doing efforts of workers, in spite of
initiatives taken in some areas. In this regard, the attitudes of MOLI and other authorities
concerned are also a problem. For them, NTC, with its modern technology from outside
sources is doing well enough. Accordingly, in their plans, it does not require further assistance
from the authorities which should concentrate on weaker enterprises. This mentality of
'equality' reduced potential help which NTC still needs to receive from these administrative
organisations for its learning, in terms of provision of information, investment sources or
training opportunities, etc.
As a result, NTC has to face most pressures coming from external factors for its on-the-job,
off-the-job training, collection of information and getting foreign contacts. NTC managers
have responded to these factors in various ways. The company has diversified its production
by moving to downstream knitting and garment products. By doing so, NTC utilises its own
yarn products for more value added products like ready-to-wear clothes aimed directly at end
users. This enables the firm to generate more income and accumulate reserves for new
investment projects. The firm is also able to benefit from this for its technological innovation
and learning activities such as hiring experts, inviting teachers and instructors, sending people
to courses, etc. In this way, the fimr's response to problems for business and for learning
efforts are almost the same.
As for the problems caused by the poor supporting system, some additional measures were
taken. To secure a better source of supply, market channels, and assistance that NTC cannot
rely on of the state, the firm continues to upgrade its long term relations with Itochu Co.
Having worked with this Japanese trading company for almost two decades, NTC established
very close and effective relations that have been helpful in both the starting phase of spinning
and the expansion phase of garment assembly. According to NTC's managers, the aim of the
firm is to become a more equal partner with Itochu, not only in the textile business but maybe
in other types of business in the near future. This may also relieve NTC from depending on the
unstable needs of the domestic market, especially in yam products.
However, there are problems to which NTC cannot find any solution. Its location continues to
cause problems for the firm, although to a less extent than before. A weak labour market still
poses difficulties. If NTC intends to expand production and recruit new workers, without the
backing of the state training and research environment in HoChiMinh City, then the firm will
have to spend a lot of resources on training and technical consulting.
2In another study to evaluate technology transfer projects, of which NTC was one, I had a chance to know of this
problem from both Japanese and local experts working in MOLI. Some instructors from Itochu, for example (in
interview as with technology suppliers) metioned difficulties when they have to discuss with workers on-site
about upgrading product quality.
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Appendix 9.3 Case study of consumer electronic company E2 (HAL)
This company was studied on the basis of interviews made with several people during 1992-
1994: Dr. Hoang Van Nghien, director of the firm, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ky, expert of financial and
planning division and Mr. Binh, expert of sales and international transaction division.
1. Company profile
At the start in 1984, the company aimed at producing consumer electronics and measurement and
control equipment for the domestic market. Production was based on a technology transfer
agreement with foreign companies. In 1985, with the help of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, HAL chose JVC (Japan Victor Co.) to cooperate with in production. Initially, JVC
supplied complete equipment for assembly lines to produce colour TVs, radio cassettes and
some hi-fi equipment, as well as instruments for test, measurement and quality control. After
four years, HAL expanded its foreign relations to other Japanese and Korean companies, also on
the basis of business contracts to transfer complete equipment for production lines.
The labour force has a good level of general education. Almost all workers have had 12 years of
secondary education. However, there are still problems with low labour discipline and managers
lack basic knowledge of market economy and business administration.
Initially, HAL produced black-and-white TV sets, simple radio cassettes and some audio
equipment. Currently, the range of consumer electronics has expanded to include audio-visual
products for entertainment, like karaoke equipment. Currently the firm has two lines to produce
consumer electronics products from CKD and SKD components, with one line of SKD
production to be completed. In co-operation with JVC, it intends to further develop its IKD
production capability. The two CKD and SKD lines have capacity for 60,000 machines per year.
In agreement with both Japanese and Korean companies, production is split: 85% for consumer
electronics; 15% for industrial electronics. HAL's turnover (in USD) has dramatically in only
three years: 1992: 8 millions; 1993: 13.8 millions; 1994: 27.3 millions.
During the first five years of operation, the company sold only to the domestic market. In 1989,
HAL started to produce some industrial electronics for export to serve robotic lines of NISSAN
car plants. Production is carried out on the basis of subcontracting and OEM agreements: design
and technical specifications are provided by the Japanese company, HAL has to organise
production arrangements and the supply of almost all inputs. However, these products are
simple, involving mostly metal-working, while some components are still provided by the
Japanese partner.1 Up to 1992, the company produced approximately 50 sets of equipment per
year, amounting to more than 100,000 USD. The Japanese partner took care of all marketing
and distribution activities and it was the first time HAL could be involved in export. HAL also
tried the Soviet and East European markets with its consumer electronics products such as colour
TV sets and radio cassettes but without success. It was able to export only very small amount of
products from time to time. Recently, HAL has tried to export these products to remote locations
in South China provinces where Chinese made products have lower quality.
'The name of this new Japanese partner was not disclosed during our interview by HAL for competitive reasons.
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2. Building technological capabilities
Investment capability
In the early years, the managers of HAL were not very confident in dealing with investment
issues. When the company started, it relied on local experts for financial and economics matters.
HAL is one of the first electronics company created by Hanoi city. People working in financial
and legal departments of the city assisted the starting process in setting up the firm, dealing with
financial accounting and payment, banking and credit system, etc. Also, experts of some
research and training institutions like Hanoi polytechnic were invited to take part in investment
issues, starting up production lines and dealing with technical problems.
The second phase of expansion in late 1980s and early 1990s brought more new investment
practices when the firm began its relation with other firms, like Daewoo. In contracts to import
technologies from Japan or South Korea, the company also involved some foreign experts in
investment studies. Now, the company is able to make decision by itself concerning investment
plans and implementation of these plans. In some activities, like construction or civil engineering
design of its new facilities, it may invite some people from local construction companies to take
part.
Although the company still has not fully acquired the competence in sourcing new technologies,
it has become more capable of dealing with general investment issues than before. Mr. Hoang
Van Nghien, director of the firm said:
When working for the first contract with JVC, we need one year to complete
feasibility study and investment plan. Now, when we work and develop new
activities with Daewoo, we know how to do things and it takes us about one
month. We have to be faster and I think we can be so.
The ambition and capability of HAL in investment activities can be seen in its rather aggressive
approach to ventures of the latest expansion in co-operating with foreign companies in 1993-
1994. It has signed contracts with Daewoo to assemble tubes for colour TV sets for export. The
project is for 170 millions USD to set up a plant to produce about 1.6 millions tubes per year,
80% of which are for export. The company has a plan to go further in co-operation with
Daewoo, to set up a plant to assemble colour TV sets in Vietnam for export (with 70% of
components to be made locally). Besides, HAL has also approached and held negotiation with
other large firms like Thomson CSF (France), American Digital Equipment Co. (DEC), and
AT&T for future expansion into computer business.
Production capability
When HAL began operation, the company needed the support of other local companies, research
institutes, universities such as Hanoi Polytechnic and the National Centre for Scientific Research
(NCSR). In addition to providing equipment for assembly, foreign technology suppliers assisted
the company to accumulate its first knowledge and experience in the management and operation
of production facilities. Under the supervision of JVC quality control is carried out strictly in
accordance with procedures using appropriate measurement equipment, etc.), as well as other
maintenance and repair activities. After two years, HAL has become confident in handling all its
production lines, maintenance and repair activities, without regular help from foreign experts.
Presently, the company has a special unit to take care of quality control. This unit introduces
quality standards to different production units of the company and oversees implementation of
these standards. Thanks to these measures, the quality of consumer electronics, such as TV sets
or audio equipment, is equal to that of South Korean or other Southeast Asian products. In
industrial electronics, HAL's quality is regarded by the Japanese contractor as acceptable.
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Although having a production capability did not lead to the export of consumer electronics, its
accumulation did play an important role later when the company shifted to production of
industrial electronics for export. The production of new products requires almost the same skills
and techniques: welding operations, placing components, testing and organising component
supply, and the same technical standards of precision and miniaturisation. Therefore, the skill
and knowledge acquired by HAL's staff in assembling TVs and hi-fi products has accelerated
the firm's ability to assemble industrial electronics parts in this new venture.
Minor technical change capability
Minor change capability developed along with the accumulation of production capability. In
assembling consumer electronics, HAL has introduced some minor changes to upgrade products
or improve production processes: it changed aspects of assembling radio cassettes and TV sets
(procedures, schemes), replacing components in order to multiply utilities or make them more
suitable for use in Vietnamese conditions (poor infrastructure: electricity, transport, housing,
stores facilities, less stable power supply).
With video tapes coming from different countries using various transmission standards (NTSC
for Japan and the US, PAL for Europe and ASEAN countries, and SECAM for France and
Soviet block countries), Vietnamese consumers prefer to have a multi-system TV and VCR set
that is compatible with all of these. In order to sell modified TVs and VCRs, HAL replaces parts
of the original design with new components and parts.
HAL has also changed the rate of labour use to suit the capacity of Vietnamese workers. For
example, while the length of a shift for Japanese workers is 8 hours, because lower productivity
(due to poorer health and lower wages) the shift length for Vietnamese workers has been
adjusted to only 6 hours (a similar adjustment exists in Thailand, where there is a 7 hour shift
using the same assembly technology).
Since the production design of the foreign suppliers did not deliver the expected productivity,
production lines were rearranged after which productivity almost doubled.
Starting from small changes, HAL now began new and more changes of product design and
production. After some years of passively importing semi-complete technologies, it commenced
to design its own production lines. The firm purchased new equipment and parts from various
foreign sources and put them together into new assembling facilities; technology suppliers, both
local and foreign, were now less involved than before. Going further toward technological
innovation and change activity, HAL now participates in one of the projects of the state research
programme on developing IKD component production in Vietnam.
Marketing capability
This capability is still very weak. The firm is oriented only to the local market where it has been
opening 11 shops or show-rooms in big cities and provinces to introduce its products and take
care of maintenance and repair services. As for foreign markets, due to still limited export
activities, marketing activity has only recently been instigated. The company has also explored
marketing its industrial electronics products through its partner in Japan. By participating in
subcontracting for a company in Japan, HAL used this contact to enter the Japanese market
indirectly. It then set up a joint-venture office, Yokohanel (with Yokohama city), in the
beginning of 1992. With this office, HAL tries to develop not only its marketing activities for
existing products but also keeping an eye out for potential partners and markets for new




HAL has close relations with sources of research and technological intelligence, like Hanoi
Polytechnic or NCSR. Forms of co-operation range from signing contracts to solve
technological problems of the company to long-term consultancy agreements. For example, the
company has had to import tin for its welding equipment for sometime and this caused the
dependency on foreign sources (Japanese or Korean). To solve this problem, HAL, in co¬
operation with a research institute, tried to produce welding tin locally. After a successful
experiment, the company can now supply itself with this material. In general, the services of
these research institutes and technical companies could serve the needs ofHAL well, but they are
not regular and systematic. HAL also has relations with some other local firms, but these links
still lack any long-term commitments to co-operate. Linkage among different divisions of HAL
(e.g technical division is co-operating with production and sales divisions) is organised under
the supervision of the director. Linkage of the company with foreign suppliers and buyers is also
quite well developed. HAL's relations with JVC were fruitful in creating the initial capabilities. It
then developed further linkages with other Japanese and Korean companies, such as NEC,
Daewoo, Samsung and Lucky Goldstar (LG Group).
Major technical change capability
According to HAL's assessment, it has taken some first steps towards acquiring this capability.
It has a specialised unit for R&D (15 persons) reporting directly to the director, and is
responsible for the introduction of new changes and improvements. Despite its name, the R&D
unit has been doing more technical improvement than research, although recently HAL has
started to engage in research effort.2 These minor technical changes contributed considerably to
the firm's earnings. In the long run, these activities could help the firm prepare for further and
more radical research activity, and which might lead to significant innovation. However, these
change activities are still more minor than really radical, in terms of the taxonomy of major
technical change (ie the ability of the firm to introduce new in principle products and process
technology). So far this capability does not exist in the firm.
3. Learning mechanisms
Foreign connections
This is the most frequently used learning mechanism at HAL. In the start up period, JVC was
the main supplier of technology including training for HAL's assembling activities; JVC
engineers and technicians went to Vietnam to give instruction and supervise production lines.
Later on, they visited the firm on a regular basis (periodically 2-3 experts visited for a couple of
weeks to a month). This direct assistance occurred during the first two years of co-operation.
Within the framework of this contract, different groups of Vietnamese engineers and technicians
also went to Japan for training. These trips were repeated (with 4-5 persons per trip) with a
duration ranging from some weeks to one month. JVC had also arranged for Vietnamese trainees
to visit various manufacturing facilities. As a result, these persons learned how to run assembly
lines with similar production technology. More importantly, they learnt the whole business
culture of JVC like organising work places, dealing with training of workers, linking one
workshop with others in information flows.
These trips to Japan continued up until recently, becoming more of an experience exchange
(exhibition, study tours, etc.), with the topics expanding from merely technological issues to
international transaction and marketing. This first wave of foreign assistance helped HAL a lot in
its initial accumulation of knowledge and experience. By 1987, after 2 years working together
with JVC, HAL acquired some competence in production activities. To a lesser extent, JVC
2One example is a project to research the possibility of produce IKD components in Vietnam. This project is a
stimulus for the firm to develop further from lower level of CKD and SKD production to higher level.
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personnel were also involved in preparation of some investment studies, shared working
experiences with HAL through informal discussion, and sometimes gave advice to HAL's
managers.
Since 1988, HAL has developed relations with new foreign partners. When the company began
relations with Korean firms, in particular with Daewoo, this learning by co-operating with
foreigners got a new stimulus. Currently, Daewoo is working very closely with HAL in three
new joint ventures, Daewoo has a 75% stake in each case. The first project is for Daewoo-Hanel
Co. to start a 233 millions USD plant to produce TV sets, refrigerators and other appliances for
export. Korean experts also came for several months to assist HAL with preparation of
feasibility studies and other construction, erection, start up activities. The second joint venture is
the construction and operation of the Dae-Ha Business Centre on the outskirt of Hanoi; building
a hotel, two high-rise appartment building and shopping complex, amounting to 250 millions
USD. Although this joint venture is far from electronics business, HAL managers can learn a
great deal in investment and expansion skills, especially on how to deal with procurement,
international shipment of goods and other issues of large scale project management.
The third joint venture (with Orion Electronics Co., a subsidiary of Daewoo) contributes the
most to learning in electronics for HAL. The two sides set up a 170 millions USD plant Orion-
Hanel, to produce TV picture tubes, part of which would enable HAL to produce TVs for itself.
This plant started production by the end of 1994 intending to produce 1.6 millions tubes per year
of which 1 million is for colour TVs, 600,000 for black and white TVs, and computer making.
80% of products are for export and the rest for local use.
In the joint venture agreement, Orion Co. Ltd transfers technology and supply equipment for
HAL, of which the most important ingredient for learning is a training programme, to be divided
into two phases. In the first phase, 72 engineers and technicians went to Korea to learn about the
production of tubes, technology handling and other production management issues. This group
of personnel learned rather more technical knowledge and at a higher level of qualification
compared to the group of Vietnamese personnel trained in Korea in the second phase. For the
first time many HAL managers got a chance to learn experiences directly, at a large and
comprehensive foreign production plant. Thanks to this training, HAL's staff got an overall
technological landscape for working with Daewoo, providing a very crucial background to
starting the plant. In addition, they also learned basic Korean and something about Korean
culture.
In the second phase, about 20 Korean engineers came to Vietnam for equipment erection works
and provided instruction and general guidance. At the same time, workers of the joint venture
were sent to Korea for training in running production facilities: assembling tubes and dealing
with other operations. These workers were divided into four groups and sent at different times to
Korea, each time spending three months there. To comment on this training provided by the
Korean partner, Mr. Binh said:
Before this training, we knew more or less about electronics technology.
Through working with JVC, we already learned many technological skills. But
the knowledge of running production plant on such a large scale we never had.
This massive training giving us a fresh idea in a complete programme is unique.
Moreover, some knowledge in management is quite new for us.
All these efforts have produced a complete working team for the joint venture, ensuring that all
people involved in the production have a general idea of tube making and can handle their
relevant working positions properly. Moreover, HAL learned from its foreign partners how to
link different workshops of the same plant to produce the final product.
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In the interaction with foreign partners, HAL even invited foreign engineers (Japanese and later
Korean) to give them advice on making technical improvements. Although officially, foreign
experts were not assigned to help HAL with technological change, informal discussion and talk
sometimes helped managers by giving them a clearer idea of technical issues, such as the whole
concept of Japanese quality management.
As shown here, foreign connections play a crucial role in HAL's learning for investment,
production, minor change and linkage capabilities. To a lesser extent, the company has also tried
to acquire marketing knowledge through intensity of foreigners' visits. Every day, the firm
meets no less than 2-3 delegations of businessmen from different companies and countries. The
director set up a secretary group, who have to write down all questions that visitors ask during
the discussion, their proposal, suggestions, conclusion, etc. These transcripts are later analysed
by the firm as it tries to identify what foreign businessmen want and what they expect from HAL
and Vietnamese producers, as well as what the market wants. As Mr. Hoang Van Nghien
mentioned:
We learned a lot by doing this analysis, especially for finding new production
tendencies or information about market perspective, potential niche product, etc.
that sometimes they (foreigners) told us during our meeting.
Moreover, he would compare and cross-check information given by different groups of
businessmen, and try to combine them in terms of reaching some conclusions.
At the same time, HAL approached Yokohama City to create Yokohanel Business office in
Yokohama. The aim of this initiative is for HAL to have an on-the-spot point for gathering
marketing intelligence and business opportunities. Through establishing this office, the firm got
a good picture about the development of industrial electronic companies and the market
perspective in Japan. More recently, the opening of a similar office in Hanoi (aimed at serving
Japanese businessmen) is being considered. However, these efforts are just beginning so that
the firm cannot be said to have acquired a fully developed marketing competence.
Looking at the development of HAL's relations with foreign partners, the dynamics of learning
activities can be seen as follows. First, the company expanded its links with foreign partners,
from having only JVC to having a more diversified source of learning. While Daewoo has
become the most important partner, HAL still continues its relations with other Japanese and
Korean firms (Samsung, NEC, etc.). Second, the format of relations has changed from being
simple and passive subcontracting, to a more equal partnership. The range of products has also
moved from simple black and white TVs to colour TVs and other audio equipment, and on to
complicated industrial electronics. As for technological learning, the firm began from having
simple technical assembling knowledge and has moved on to non-technical experiences in
investment and management issues.
Prior accumulation
Initially, the firm was started by a group of 5 scientists and their 13 employees, who moved
from the department of radio-electronics engineering of Hanoi Polytechnic to set up a new
production unit at the request of Hanoi city committee. Mr. Hoang Van Nghien, the director of
HAL, was the Dean of this department. The other staff were researchers and lecturers working
in this department or other institutes and universities before Mr. Nghien invited them to work at
HAL. They had already accumulated deep academic knowledge on electronics technology before
moving to the firm. Although this technical knowledge and experience are more academic, they
still provide many advantages when working on problems of production and minor technical
change. Also, HAL recruited many engineering graduates polytechnics and universities in
Vietnam and abroad (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany). Thanks to this, HAL staff have
developed very strong links (formal and informal) with classmates working in Hanoi
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Polytechnic, University, and other R&D institutes. Relations with Hanoi polytechnic even
helped in the forming of an agreement where the two organisations train more practical engineers
(from 3 to 5 years of education) than usual, using HAL as a practical experiment base. In this
way, the firm is able to train and get access to newly graduated engineers in accordance with its
needs.
This prior accumulation helped HAL to gain many aspects of production, minor change and
linkage capabilities. As for investment activity, some cadres of the brought with them knowledge
when they moved from financial or planning departments of the City council. This way of
recruitment also helped to ease the firm's efforts in dealing with investment problems. So far,
none of HAL's staff have brought with them any prior accumulated capabilities in marketing or
more radical technical change.
The changing dynamics of learning is also seen in modes of prior accumulation. In the first 4-5
years, prior accumulation mostly relied on massive recruitment of young engineers and
graduates from universities and polytechnics. More recently, the firm has adapted its recruitment
and pursuit of prior accumulated skills by applying specifically designed programme that are
more selective in gathering practical knowledge and skills.
Off-the-job training
Training of engineers and technical cadres has received special attention. To increase general
knowledge of manufacturing, or specific techniques in assembling, the firm regularly sends its
staff on various short courses. More systematically, it has a contract with Hanoi polytechnic for
long term co-operation in engineering education. This programme is for practical engineers and
is intended not only for new graduates, but also for those workers and technicians of HAL who
have ambitions to become engineers. The advantage of this training is that students can use the
firm's facilities to practice their skills with theoretical back up, and later, these skills will be used
directly for the firm's benefit. Similarly, HAL sometime sends its workers on training courses
offered by the vocational school of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, mostly for mechanical and
electrical engineering.
Concerning non-technical learning, HAL managers are eager to fill the gaps in their knowledge
of investment, business administration and other economic topics. The director spent one year
on a course on how to manage business of the firm. He said:
I was from an academic environment, surely I did not have enough knowledge of
doing business. Therefore, I had to spend the whole year to learn a new subject:
how to do business. Fortunately, my friends and colleagues from Hanoi
Economics University helped a lot.
Not only the director, but other managers ofHAL also took these courses following the plan set
up by the firm to re-educate all managers. The firm signed a contract with the Economic
Management School of Hanoi to teach all staff who hold positions of workshop supervisor and
above. These managers spent 6 months at school learning production management and business
management techniques, including human resource management and accounting. They also
studied investment issues such as how to do an investment survey; feasibility studies, how to
calculate cost/benefit analysis, and how to deal with international transactions. After exams, the
firm divided them into those suitable and unsuitable for promotion in the future. In using this
incentive, the firm tried to make its managers take part seriously and actively in the courses.
Although off-the-job training has been useful for developing the capabilities of managers and
workers across many topics (investment, production and minor change), little was gained
through these courses for acquiring other capabilities, like marketing or linkage. It is
understandable since off-the-job training courses usually have a more short term perspective,
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aimed at solving more urgent and day-to-day problems of the firm's activities. In recent years
one change that can be seen in off-the-job training programmes is the shift in content from
technical to more non-technical subjects.
On-the-job training
There was surprisingly little of this in HAL. So far, the only courses organised were for
technical workers, given by instructors invited from Hanoi polytechnic. These courses are very
short, lasting only 2-3 days if held formally, or they can be small sessions where people give
instruction and discussion of relevant problems directly related to daily production operation, e.g
how to deal with material supply or replacement. Occasionally, even foreign language courses
such as English have been provided.
Information search
HAL's managers know very well the importance of these as a source of learning. Mr. Hoang
Van Nghien himself and other managers took part very actively in academic and non-academic
meetings, workshops, seminars, exhibitions, etc. The purposes of this activity is expressed
rather clearly by the company's director:
Electronics is high-tech industry and it is changing very fast, if not by days then
by months. You have to know about these changes. If you don't, you'll be out of
this business.
Existing friendships and relations between HAL's managers and external colleagues help to
maintain a flow of new information on recent changes occurring in production and research
environment elsewhere.
One of the ways to get access to information and enhance linkages with R&D institutions,
universities and other consulting organisations is to participate in research programmes funded
by external agencies. Conferences, seminars, workshops and discussion between HAL's
managers and researchers in these programmes give them a lot of information on trends in
technology development, difficult problems and the market perspective, locally and
internationally. This new source of intelligence is especially useful for the firm in its future
production plans and searching for co-operative links with potential partners, in and outside
Vietnam.
The assessment of the director (with which I agree) is that by involvement in these research
efforts, HAL can greatly upgrade its technological knowledge and experience, especially in
production and linkage activities, and to develop its relations with foreign sources of
information. This active involvement, is actually not very common among the majority of
consumer electronics firms, which have less opportunities to work side-by-side with R&D
institutes.
By being involved in doing various kinds of research activity recently, the possibility of
developing more radical and major technical change in HAL is quite high. The academic
background of its senior management staff, and active by-doing and other approaches means that
this firm is most likely to have major technical change capability in future.
Learning-by-doing
This mechanism has supported the development of all capabilities, except for major technical
change, where HAL has just begun to undertake the first activity. In initial investment activities,
it had to go through many trials and errors. After the early years of learning from JVC, HAL
attempted to launch their own investment by choosing technology from Japanese and German
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suppliers, and putting them together as its own design of production lines. By the end of the
1980s, the firm was trying to replace its passive purchase of turn-key project by a more active
involvement using local personnel capable of contributing to the development of technical
blueprints and schemes.
In the 1990s, active learning through doing various practical efforts by HAL occurred as well.
As the local partner in joint ventures with Korean partners, the firm had to be responsible for all
activities relating to the Vietnamese side: dealing with authorities, asking for land using right,
clearing up all procedures for construction, transporting equipment, purchasing local inputs and
material, etc. By doing all these tasks in combination with some consultation from its foreign
partners, HAL acquired a better idea of what should be done, how to do it, what could go wrong
and why, and how to avoid mistakes next time.
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ky from the planning and financial department said that in order to obtain an
investment licence for HAL's joint venture with Korean companies, they had to revise
investment documents and application papers more than ten times. This long and hard work was
exhausting, but really useful for their own learning. This active learning-by-doing and by-trying
in combination with a foreign connection, turned out quite helpful for the company. Thus, HAL
has experienced the necessity of combining different learning mechanisms with active by-doing.
Similarly, HAL engaged in various production and minor change activities and learned through
these efforts. The R&D unit of the firm, while adopting some technical improvements, found
that they were capable of changing some assembling operations as well as carrying out minor
technical replacements that improved products and productivity. From each foreign partner, the
company has learned something useful. By combining them, some of HAL's TV products now
have features and specifications that are better than some foreign made products. More
importantly, some of this technical upgrading was not passed on to foreign partners. The
director said:
These new things are our assets that we acquired through our very hard and long
way of trying.
HAL is also able to gain many new experiences through trying to upgrade its linkages with
external sources of research competence as well as its internal linkages.
The director has quite a clear appreciation that although learning-by-doing is necessary
(especially for simpler tasks), learning-by-interacting is even more important. For workers,
formal training should be short, concrete and geared directly to their daily skills. Overly wide
and general courses for workers should be avoided. On the other hand, technicians and
engineers should have at least some formal training programmes in both technical and non¬
technical knowledge.
4. Macro external factors, micro behaviours and learning
HAL's managers were strongly critical of macro policies that have influence on its learning
mechanisms among which taxation policy is the most notable. According to the company, tax
levied on the consumption of consumer electronics is inhibiting growth of production. Because
of a high tax, consumers buy less and so electronics companies' sales are affected by this. HAL
is in an unequal position compared with the tax rates and incentives offered to foreign investors,
making local firms less competitive. For example, while domestic companies have to pay rather
high tax without exemption, foreign investors are exempted from tax for four years after
profitable production starts. As HAL sees it, this problem made it less able to accumulate




As a SOE, HAL has to follow very strict regulations governing financial management. As a
consequence, this reduces speed and flexibility in using resources for technological innovation
activities. This caused serious problems for the firm in its spending on training activities and
purchasing, collecting information and documentation.
Lack of any long term policies to develop the whole electronics industry also hindered the efforts
of the firm in orienting itself to long-term on-the-job and off-the-job training programmes.
Furthermore, without long term domestic policies and strategies it is very hard for HAL to plan
its co-operation with foreign firms. In addition, prior training and accumulation of experiences
are being affected by labour policy inconsistencies and which has caused confusion for the firm
in its recruitment efforts.
However, as HAL's director emphasised, the most difficult problem of policy is its state
ownership status, which makes it difficult to encourage employees to make a long term
commitment to the development of the firm. He specified:
Our employees want to see more secure and long term benefit for them if they are
called to contribute more to the firm's growth.
In a SOE like HAL, salary is low and very rigid. Although some other material incentives exist,
like housing and social security benefits, after the reforms they became minimal. SOEs'
managers cannot use flexible and clear cut incentive system, as in a private company. Nor can
they exercise their own decisions in financial, recruitment or labour regulations. For instance, it
is much more difficult for them to sack ineffective personnel. These hurdles in management
practice prevent both HAL's managers and employees from devoting themselves to learning
efforts.
However, these policy hurdles aside, there are some positive factors for learning. Mr. Hoang
Van Nghien admitted that HAL's connections with Hanoi City is important. HAL was one of the
first firms set up by the City council, and got a great deal of support in terms of facilities
(assistance in use of land for construction, for instance), a labour force, and political
connections. Experts of various departments of the City council were, and continue to be,
helpful to the firm.
Market problems also erected hurdles to HAL's learning efforts. The weak development of the
domestic market for industrial electronics and computer business led to a low demand for high¬
tech product innovation. This situation made electronics firms like HAL less energetic in its
efforts to produce more sophisticated products. Even when the firm wanted to send its
employees for off-the-job training to learn about more sophisticated production, few
organisations could offer them the necessary courses.
HAL has little problems with supporting system. Already at the start, the company's managers,
as scientists themselves, know how to use this system in the most effective way. Throughout
the 1980s, the firm has enjoyed a good supply of technical staff from Hanoi polytechnic and
other institutions abroad. Similarly, the R&D institutes and other training organisations provided
information and off-the-job courses, in both technical and non-technical issues. However, low
technological level of industrial production in Vietnam, weaknesses in related industries
(chemical, mechanical engineering, etc.), and poor infrastructure cannot support electronics
production.
As for socio-cultural factors, there has been some positive impact. For HAL, the Vietnamese
tradition of learning is rather popular among its employees. Although workers are influenced
more by direct material incentives, the motivation for learning at managers' level was different.
For young graduates and engineers from polytechnic, working for a company like HAL is
prestigious and honourable. They, therefore, tend to learn hard in order to enhance their
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promotion prospects. Managers at a higher level carry ambitious hopes for HAL's future. The
director would like to see HAL becoming a strong player in electronics, if not internationally,
then at least regionally. All these ambitions plus the learning tradition encourages the majority of
HAL's employees to actively acquire more technological knowledge.
HAL's managers have reacted in various ways in facing problems caused by macro policy
factors. It continued to rely on its strong relations with the supporting system to solve the
problems of training and information gathering. The firm tries to use more non-fee training
activities, such as exchange programmes with other Vietnamese production units, companies,
and research institutes. This also applies to exchange of information and documentation. HAL
also tries to use existing strengths by combining its resources. For example, the older
generation's experiences and younger personnel's knowledge can be shared and exchanged by
working together.
Differentiation of relations with foreign partners remains one of HAL's priorities. Experience
has shown that by co-operating with various partners at the same time, the firm can gain varied
knowledge and experiences. Moreover, the aim of the firm is to become a more equal partner in
its relations with foreign companies, and consequently, an independent and strong player in
electronics business, both at home and in international markets. In pursuit of these aims, HAL
tries to expand beyond electronics to other types of business through its three joint ventures.
Using the resources of foreign partners initially, the firm hopes to accumulate more resources
that can then be invested back into its core electronics activity.
To deal with the market factor, HAL has a somewhat different approach. This is a kind of mix
between diversification of products and searching for 'niches' that the firm can enter. While
continuing to pursue with the production of conventional consumer electronics, the company
also looks for opportunities to do something quite new: assembling of electronics hands for
robots. This new product may help the firm to enter a niche via relations with the Japanese
producers, and to become part of a network of these producers world-wide. In addition, the firm
is currently searching for new business partnerships for other higher value added products. Its
current negotiation with AT&T and DEC are quite promising, offering an involvement in the
computer and telecom businesses. It is one way to avoid weak local demand for high-tech
products.
Although the state ownership problem is much more difficult to deal with, HAL has tried to give
employees more incentives to work with a long-term commitment to the firm. The sale of its
plastic factory subsidiary is an example. When the firm sold its share to employees, they were
very positive and bought a large part of the 55,000 shares of this polystyrene packaging factory
(at a price of about 10 USD each). This first experience of privatisation of an SOE may help the
firm (and other firms as well) to look forward to the long term.
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Appendix 9.4 Case study of computer company E3 (3C)
This case is made from interviews and observations of the firm's evolution during the period
1992-1994. Interviews were made with Mr. Nguyen Quang A, chairman of governing board,
Mr. Bui Huy Hung, director, Mr. Nguyen Minh Song, vice-director and Mr. Van Son, expert of
Software centre.
This company is quite unique in the Vietnamese context for it has been one of the very few
private companies working in producing computers for export market.
1. Company profile
At the start in 1988, the company had 17 shareholders: scientists and engineers educated in the
former Soviet Union or East European countries. By contributing their own money or
borrowing from relatives and friends, the founding shareholders had raised an initial capital of
about 25,000 USD. The company had identified a huge computers market in the Soviet Union,
where buyers did not require high quality products, but poorly organised and relations between
customers and producers were not close. Imported computers were not "Russianised", the use
of Latin script on keyboard was difficult for Russians and a system of maintenance and repair
was not available. This was a good opportunity to do business and 3C designed model 3C-286
specifically for sale in the Soviet market. Production of these computers was planned in
Vietnam, but it turned out to be too expensive (200,000 to 300,000 USD was needed to install
the production line). 3C decided to hire a Singapore company to assemble this model using
Singaporean hardware: the company designed a new model including main board, keyboard,
and Russian software package. This solution was granted a patent by the Vietnam National
Office of Industrial Property.
3C's staff learned about potential Singaporean partners in 1988, and in 1989 started co-operation
(right after the start of the firm) for various reasons: good technological facilities, reasonable cost
of manufacturing, no need to establish manufacturing facility in Vietnam with its higher cost,
and rather good personal relations were developed between the two sides. After the collapse of
the Soviet market, 3C maintains its relations with this group of partners, serving the domestic
market by selling PCs and providing computer services.
Thus, from the beginning, 3C was created with a very specific orientation: one product for one
market. The initial phase of the firm was to exploit the unique opportunity of the huge former
Soviet Union market. This way of starting business, therefore, depended on some pre-existing
assets that the firm had, and decided very much how it would accumulate TC later on.
After exports were reduced to a more modest level in 1991 (following the collapse of Soviet
market), 3C had to turn more to the domestic market. At this stage, the activities of 3C shifted to
more non-computer business. During the three years 1989-1992, the company was involved in
various new companies and business ventures.
The first attempt to expand into non-computer activities was aimed at the electronics business.
3C now produces specialised equipment, like electronics balance and electronic data transferring
blocks to be used in industrial projects. 3C was involved in other electronic businesses, ranging
from providing maintenance services for medical equipment, (such as electrocardiograph - ECG)
to the application of video text in telecommunication for remote provinces (helping and designing
software for broadcasting stations at district level to use text in television transmission over
satellites). The company is also active in non-electronics businesses, such as bio-chemistry,
construction, and even garment production. Mr. Nguyen Minh Song - vice-director -
emphasised strongly the use of non-electronic business for accumulation of financial strengths
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and investment skills which in the long run can help the company to return to the computer
business. He said:
We don't quit computing, not at all. But we have to make money in other
businesses, just to feed, so to say, people working in computing.
3C continues to maintain its computer business, both in software and hardware, and other
industrial electronic services. Starting as an export only company in electronics business, 3C
shifted its focus to work in both local and export markets, not only in electronics but other
businesses as well.
In 1990-1991, the turnover of the company was 4 millions USD. By the beginning of 1992, the
difficulties of the Soviet market means that exports have been reduced radically and now the
company has only a small export activity. Recently, there have been some attempts to export
products to other markets, like Cambodia, Southern China, and East European countries. But
there has been no success to date and the amount of export remains negligible.
2. Building technological capabilities
Investment capability
At the beginning of its computer production, the company got some support from outside
consultants in preparing its investment plans. Managers of the firm, especially Mr. Bui Huy
Hung - director - had very close contacts with people working in the State Planning Committee,
State Commission for Pricing, and Hanoi City Council. He asked them to assist in the first
phase of setting up the company, and to provide the initial business contacts. Investment
feasibility studies were being undertaken mostly by the staff of the company, with some
assistance from these external consultants. 3C negotiated with its Singaporean partner on choice
of components, parts, and other suppliers and also took part in some production management
activities.
Investment experiences of 3C have been further developed through other local electronics
businesses. One example is the production of electronics balances which were tried by some
research organisations and industrial enterprises. Unfortunately, during 8 years, these research
activities did not bring any practical results. The Union of enterprises for new product and new
technology (LICOSA - one of the organisations involved in this programme) has suffered severe
financial difficulties. LICOSA owned the design of the new product but could not commercialise
it. Managers of LICOSA sought help from 3C which by this time had accumulated good
financial reserves from sale of computers to the former Soviet Union. 3C helped LICOSA to
repay its debts and finance product development, and in the launching of a new electronic
balance product. The product was also patented in Vietnam and 3C got the commercial rights to
the product. Since then, this product has been sold widely to many customers in the provinces.
3C has also invested in other electronics products like ECG or telecom activities, although on a
smaller scale. In these cases, 3C provided not only technical assistance but also financial
resources as seed money or advanced investment. This way of doing business is quite a new
phenomena in Vietnam. By offering large sums of money and technical assistance with a focus
on commercialisation of existing technology or know-how, 3C became a source of not only
capita], but also expertise on how to commercialise and market new products. Thus, 3C is
among the first Vietnamese companies to be involved in venture capital activities.
This new and embryonic form of venture capital for technological innovation can also be seen in
3C's activities in non-electronics business. 3C owns 60% of a joint venture BCE (Bio-Chemical
Enterprise) to produce products based on bio-chemistry technologies developed by the National
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Centre for Scientific Research (NCSR). These technologies are varied: using domestic
ingredients such as herbs to stimulate growth of household animals like pigs, and the production
of a supplementary substance for concrete material used in construction industry. 3C has 71 % of
Hong Bang (HB) company, which specialises in architecture, design, construction and property
development. The firm also holds 10% ofMTT (fashion garment) and 67% of a tourist company
to develop a lake resort complex. Although these new investments are non-electronic, 3C has
practised its investment skills, learnt lessons along the ways to becoming more capable of
dealing with new investment issues.
Initially, 3C had little general investment knowledge in computing, except in relation to specific
product for specific market. Step by step, it acquired a lot of general knowledge and experiences
of starting a new venture, dealing with investment and sourcing activities which in turn, helped
the firm in its new electronic business. As a result, 3C is now confident enough to invest in
venture capital activities, in both electronics and non-electronics areas.
Production capability
By relying on the Singaporean sub-contractor producer, 3C has no need to set up production
facilities and develop production expertise, and therefore has no capability in producing
computers; the management of production; quality control and packaging were carried out by the
Singaporean contractors. All computer products were shipped (by air freight) directly from
Singapore to Moscow. The 3C office in Moscow took care of after sale maintenance and repair
services for these products. Its office in Singapore only supervised the last stage of quality
control.
Recently, 3C became involved in other local production activities, but still its production skills
are limited.
Minor technical change capability
Initially, 3C's production rested on minor technical change activity. By studying the existing
model of Singaporean machines, 3C re-designed and adapted it to suit Russian customers. The
company changed the structure of the old model, adding some components (random access
memory, or RAMs), and redesigned and created a new keyboard with Russian alphabet. 3C also
had to design a Russian version of software to be used with this new "Russian" machine, which
was called 3C-286. To maintain this minor change activity, 3C invested in two divisions, one
specialised in hardware and the other in software development.
In software, 3C created 3C-SOFT Centre with 30 engineers and other experts in computer
science, specialising in the development of software packages. This centre has good technical
facilities: 386 and 486 IBM compatible PCs, other automated office equipment such as laser
printers, scanners, colour photocopiers, etc. The cost of this centre is about 300,000 USD,
working conditions are quite good and people receive a good salary (about 250 - 300 USD per
month) compared to average level of 150-200 USD in other industrial companies. In addition,
about 20% of sales of any software go to staff who are directly involved in producing this
software product.
After producing the Russian software for 3C-286, the Centre has continued working on other
software aimed at both domestic and export markets. One of the products - TINCO (Tutor for
Intelligent Computing) - is a software for engineering calculation and mathematics tasks which
can be applied in many industrial projects as a computing "toolbox". Initially in 1991, this
software was made in MS-DOS 3.0 version, but with the introduction of the Windows
programme, TINCO became more difficult to sell. 3C-SOFT had to change and adapt this
software to a new version that could be used in Windows. In 1992, 3C-SOFT introduced
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Personnel Image Database System, which is a multimedia management system for companies to
store both full-colour images and text in an electronic database.
The Centre also has designed some specific software for using as cognitive tools in using
Vietnamese fonts for computer desktop works such as 3C-SCRIPT. In 1993, 3C-SOFT
designed a Vietnamese version of Windows 3.1 called VietWind, and has sold this product
widely in Vietnam. Moreover, against a background of severe piracy of computing software, 3C
added a 'hard lock' to prevent hacking of this software.
3C introduced VNij in 1995 which is a software designed by Cadpro - an associated group of
3C - for word processing in Vietnamese. This is the first programme that allows easy
communication between computers using different Vietnamese fonts. Its also has a spelling
check facility. Among other things, one important feature is that VNij can operate in various
Windows application including Microsoft Word, CorelDraw, etc. On average every two years
3C has introduced a new software product for sale in the domestic market. Some products, such
as TINCO, were also sold on a trial basis in France and Germany.
3C also has a hardware centre of 8 persons co-operating through a network with many others
working in different institutions. Besides research activities, this group also takes part in
maintenance and repair work in Moscow on a regular basis. More recently, this hardware centre
started to work in other electronics activities, such as providing maintenance and repair services
for cardiological equipment, or control equipment for electrical kilns in the production of brick
and construction material, etc.
The activities of these two centres has relied mainly on graduates recruited from the computer
science and electronics departments of Hanoi's polytechnic and other foreign institutions. Under
the guidance and lead of the firm's managers, who are themselves experienced scientists, young
employees have a chance to learn new knowledge and experiences. More importantly, in the
environment of a private company they have a free hand to develop their ideas into
commercialisable products, can expect to be remunerated in accordance with their performance.
Judging by its hardware and some software products, 3C can be considered as one among a few
(4-5) leading computer companies in the whole country. Unlike other firms assembling products
through joint ventures with foreign producers (as E5 in the study), often without any change to
the foreign model, the most distinguished feature of 3C is that the firm produced its 3C-286
model for the Russian market by changing, improving, and adapting an old model. So far, not
many companies in Vietnam can do this.
Marketing capability
Similar to minor change capability, 3C has been obtaining its marketing knowledge and
experience since the beginning of the firm, using this experience to capitalise on computer sale.
The company organised its marketing activity through both its official and personal contacts. Its
office in Moscow, in co-operation with Vietnamese trade representatives, played quite an
important role during the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s in the regular gathering of
marketing intelligence. This office gathered information about defects of products, trends, and
customer requirements to guide changes in computer design. To serve this need, 3C had stores
of parts and even complete PC sets in Moscow to supply or replace defected machines for
customers.
Among marketing activities, one noteworthy feature is 3C's ability to deal with hard currency
payment procedures. By the end of 1980s, Soviet buyers had little or no hard currency to pay
3C for its computer products. Instead, they agreed to pay 3C in goods and commodities such as
steel, construction material, cotton and iron, other consumer goods, etc. The firm sold these
goods to Vietnamese wholesalers for local currency, then exchanged it for hard currency coming
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from Vietnamese import-export companies that had a surplus of US dollars. This mechanism has
helped 3C to secure dollar reserves to do business with the Singaporean partners. But, in order
to pursue this mechanism, they needed some specific knowledge and practical experiences of the
Soviet business situation, Vietnamese connections, and international market, including shipping
and freighting issues. By the end of the 1980s, only a few companies had this "business know-
how" to deal with Soviet buyers. 3C was also able to gain advantage by entering the computer
business earlier than its competitors.
This unique marketing know-how, however, seems no longer valid following the radical
changes in the Soviet market. Almost all interviewees at 3C agree that the unique experience they
have gained from the Soviet market may not be so relevant in other international markets.
Nevertheless, experiences and knowledge on how to deal with marketing and international
payment problems are valuable for the company. The company has some marketing capability,
although this marketing activity is unique and the company has been experiencing more
problems in recent times.
Linkage capability
This capability is strong in all three aspects of linkage. The overall picture shows that 3C has
obtained close links with the whole industrial and R&D system, the most important ingredient of
linkage competence. The company has close relations with a wide network of collaborators
working at many local research institutions and universities such as the Institute ofMathematics,
Institute of Information Technology (IOIT), Hanoi Polytechnic, etc. At the same time, 3C
assisted IOIT in its sales effort. This institute designed a software called Ador, a programme that
enables an optical scanner to recognise text and translate it into computer data as a file. In 1992-
1993, this Ador programme went on sale (together with some 3C's products, like TINCO or
3C-SOFT) in France and Germany.
3C also collaborates with local companies such as FPT (computer), and LICOSA (electronics for
printing and other services). This form of involvement allows 3C's staff to maintain an operative
relationship with the business community in Vietnam to share jobs or to do joint development.
Internally, 3C has very strict regulations about circulating job positions and information flows.
Every 6 months, for example, personnel of the hardware centre have to replace their colleagues
who are stationed in the Moscow and Singapore offices to keep them closer to production or
market activities. Similarly, personnel of the software and other units have to exchange
information, suggestions and planning, at an internal roundtable organised by the director. By
doing so, 3C tries to ensure that all new information or related market trends are quickly
circulated among its staff.
Major technical change capability
Although 3C pursued a lot of research-related activities and did introduce some new products,
these products were largely adaptations and modifications of existing foreign made models. 3C-
286, for example, is a version of a Singaporean machine adaptated to satisfy Russian customers.
Other software products were designed by 3C staff, but most of them, except for TINCO, are
"Vietnamisation" of existing Microsoft products.
Economically, the production of 3C-286 is significant for the firm's business, but,
technologically, the firm did little to change the computer's design, approrpiate to the minor
technical change category. Similarly, 3C's software products were simple adaptations. Although
TINCO is a new product, it used the same principle of software design (as Mr. Van Son, expert
of Software centre admitted) adapted for a new purpose. Thus, it is reasonable to consider 3C's





This seems to be 3C's most important learning mechanism. Starting as a group of scientists and
private entrepreneurs, the company has relied entirely on its staffs existing knowledge and
expertise, at least initially. Fortunately, before setting up their company, most of 3C's managers
had worked in various government and private companies and organisations, accumulating a
very good knowledge base and pool of experience. The director of 3C worked many years as a
senior expert in the foreign economic relations department of the State Planning Commission,
and at the State Committee for Pricing. He also worked as secretary for some ministers,
including the minister of foreign trade, after being educated in financial and economic issues in
the former Soviet Union. He speaks Russian fluently, knows the Soviet market very well, has
strong connections with Soviet business, and was one of the very first persons to conceive of
selling computers to Soviet market.
Mr. Nguyen Quang A, chairman of the governing board and Nguyen Minh Song, vice director,
were educated in Hungary in computer sciences. Mr. Quang A obtained his Doctorate and
Professorship, worked in Hungary for some years and was chosen as a member of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. After coming back to Vietnam in the mid 1970s, both of them
worked for the Military Technological Research Institute (Ministry of Defence). During this
period, although the institute was one of the top priorities of the government, by the end of
1980s working conditions had worsened through necessary financial cuts. Mr. Quang A was
invited to work in Hungary as a visiting scholar but he decided to stay on, quitting the military
institute, and went to work for the General Department of Electronics Industry. In this capacity,
he was assigned as Director of GenPacific, the first joint venture between Vietnam's electronics
industry and Bull.S.A of France, to produce computers in Vietnam. This was a very good
preparation for him to create his own company, which he did in 3C. 3C's vice-director also
followed a similar path, but instead of working for a Vietnamese non-military institution, he
went straight to work for GenPacific, then moved together with others to 3C. By the time they
came back from Eastern Europe, these scientists had accumulated a very good and deep
knowledge of electronics theories. This knowledge and information took on a more practical
orientation when they worked for the Military Technological Institute, where they tried to deal
with the sample production of electronics products like transistors and components, etc.
While the head of the governing board and vice-director had more technical expertise that was
necessary for minor change capability, the director had more business knowledge and marketing
experience. This period can be considered as the first phase of knowledge accumulation by these
people in minor change and marketing activities (with a focus on the Soviet market). To a lesser
extent, they acquired some investment, production, and linkage knowledge as well.
The second phase of prior accumulation occurred when all of them moved to work for
GenPacific (E5 in this study). As a joint venture, this company specialises in computer products
and services, both for export to the Soviet Union and for the domestic market. In the
directorship of GenPacific, and working alongside French partners, were Mr. Nguyen Quang A
as general director, Mr. Nguyen Minh Song as director of Hanoi office and Mr. Bui Huy Hung
as assistant to general director in charge of dealing with the Soviet market. This was a valuable
learning period (1988-1989) enabling them to upgrade their knowledge and experience. In
investment activity, they learned from their French partners about how to start a joint venture,
prepare investment studies, and conduct the implementation phase. Moreover, because one
member of the governing board of the joint venture was a French lawyer, they learned a lot
about the international and legal dimension of investment activities in the Western environment.
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Since GenPacific was producing computers in Vietnam, these persons had a very rare
opportunity to see and learn how production is run, what were the difficulties of operating this
business, especially in Vietnam, and how a French multinational like Bull dealt with these
problems. They were involved in production operations such as assembling, quality control test,
organisation of production lines, dealing with supply, maintenance and repair activities, and
packaging. When products were shipped out of the workshop, they had to look after delivery
and sale activities, mostly for export to Soviet market, and had got an opportunity to experience
various kinds of problems in marketing.
They furthered their own existing knowledge on electronics during this period, learning more
about the technology of PC assembly, particularly of Bull's machines, and also about how to
link business internationally, and information circulating with foreign partner's headquarter -
Bull.S.A in France.
By working for GenPacific, all of these persons, in fact, were trained in the practical problems
of doing business. Their minor change capability was upgraded from theoretical to more applied
electronics knowledge and geared directly to PC assembly. Investment knowledge was upgraded
almost from nothing to doing business internationally and starting a joint venture project.
Marketing experience expanded to include Western techniques while still using their unique
know-how on doing business in the Soviet market. In linkage knowledge, they learned about
internal and international relations of a joint venture company. Experience in all these activities
gave them confidence as they moved out from GenPacific to set up 3C. This can be seen through
their own assessment as Mr. Nguyen Quang A said:
We learned a lot from the French. In our governing board there were two
Frenchmen (one of them was Mr. Pascal, Bull's regional director for Asia
Pacific), who were experts in international business. When we worked for the
benefit of the same company, they did not hide anything from us. In many cases,
they opened our eyes to the outside world.
One contributing factor is that GenPacific invested a lot in training its staff. This joint venture
sent its personnel to training courses in France for different periods with total training expenses
amounting to about 200,000 USD in 2 years. At the same time, Bull sent some French experts to
assist the joint venture with operating the assembly line. Sometime, they stayed for about 6
months. All these activities at GenPacific certainly gave these persons a great opportunity to
learn about the computing business before they became managers of 3C.
With accumulated knowledge and experience, the founders of 3C could be called the 'first-tier'
learners who benefited from training and working before the start of the firm. To continue this
tradition, 3C tries to recruit and rely on young and talented individuals, newly graduated from
Hanoi University and polytechnic or institutions abroad (Hungary, former Soviet Union). These
persons are the 'second-tier' of learning-by-accumulating knowledge prior to working for 3C.
Every year, 3C offers 9 scholarships for the best students in universities and polytechnic
institutes who are involved in research activity. By doing so, 3C tried to engage selected
students in its research even before graduation, after which the firm can recruit them and sign a
preliminary contract for three months. If everything goes well, these students may get a
permanent job with 3C. In this way, the company is creating for itself a fresh and ready-to-use
source of young, dynamic and talented graduates who continuously feed its knowledge
accumulation.
The prior accumulation mode of learning has changed from period to period and brought to 3C
knowledge in minor change, marketing and then investment and linkage experience. First, it
happened in the academic environment of higher education abroad and research activity in
Vietnam. Then, it was continued through working experiences in a joint venture company. The
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content of learning also developed from those aspects suitable for minor change and marketing
capabilities (that helped it to seize the unique chance of business) to the practicalities around the
investment competences needed in the expansion phase.
Foreign connections
The connection with Bull.S.A continued even after the 3C managers left GenPacific, but since
they are no longer members of the joint venture, their contacts with the French members of
GenPacific have become less co-operative. However, 3C did not limit itself to Bull. After
starting up, 3C's managers began to build new contacts with Singaporean companies, with
whom they made contact through trade fairs, workshops, and exhibitions since 1988. Through
the assembly operation that the Singaporean firm performed for 3C (3C-286), the company
learnt knowledge which was different from the Bull joint venture experience: for example, how
to produce rather cheap Southeast Asian computers (cost cutting through saving raw material,
input and component sourcing).
Similar to investment activity, 3C's managers could no longer learn market competence from the
French after quitting GenPacific. 3C has recently made new connections with some American
companies newly arrived in Vietnam like Digital Equipment Co. (DEC), IBM, and Apple in the
beginning of the 1990s. Of these, 3C is to be DEC's sale representative in Vietnam, responsible
for machine sales, provision of equipment and software package, and maintenance, repair, and
guarantee services related to DEC's activities in Vietnam. This contact has brought 3C a very
good chance to keep up-to-date with the computer business. 3C's vice-director said in the latest
interview in 1994:
Computer business is changing very fast. With Bull, we learned technology of
1980s, with the Singaporean, we learned about low-cost and cheap models of
Southeast Asian standards. But to learn more world class business, not to say
about technology of 1990s and beyond, you have to be with American.
Fortunately, we are with them now.
Learning through working together with foreign partners at 3C was used both as prior
accumulation and as an on-going activity. Although foreign connection mechanism contributed
to all investment, marketing and production activities, the firm only acquired investment and
marketing capabilities. It can not acquire production capability just by having contacts with
foreigners, without any other learning mechanisms being used. The case shows that the
changing pattern of using foreign connections (moving from French to American) can help the
firm to upgrade its technological expertise from knowledge of the 1980s to that of the 1990s.
Information search
This is also one of the active learning mechanisms at 3C. As mentioned above, one of the
strengths of 3C is its wide range of connections with people working in many R&D institutes,
universities, etc. developed even before the start of the firm. This network is a lively source of
information, documentation and many informal consulting opportunities for 3C to draw on. The
overall impression from talking with various managers is that 3C makes intensive use of its
informal relations with researchers and staff of other organisations. One example is that half of
those working in 3C-Soft are not 3C's staff but come from the IOIT, Hanoi polytechnic, or
other competitors computing companies. They may stay for a few hours to some days, just to
use 3C's facilities. Mr. Van Son at 3C-SOFT Centre explained this situation:
They came here just to use our Centre which is among the best equipped, for
free. Most of the time, they used for their own things: something urgently to do,
or just playing games. But sometimes, we asked them a few things, or suggested
to do something together. And they did this also for free.
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In fact, this "barter' approach of informal relationship with its informal club atmosphere has
attracted many people to 3C: scientists who have talent, knowledge, expertise but lack facilities
and a conducive working environment. In many cases, they moved from just 'hanging around',
to working for 3C in many projects.
This mechanism not only helped 3C to learn knowledge of minor technical change (in some
instances, rather advanced expertise can be helpful for even major technical change capability)
and linkage, but marketing capability as well. 3C's managers are members of different
associations or clubs: club of company' directors, club of private entrepreneurs, Vietnam
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations,
Vietnam Informatics Association. These connections help them to take part in different
exhibitions, fairs, meeting, workshops. Still, more important are 3C managers' personal
contacts and friendships with people working in Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and
Investment, Ministry of Trade. Through these connections, 3C upgraded its existing expertise in
marketing. It can be said that this network of personal contacts and relations was, and remains,
3C's main conduit of information collection.
On-the-job and off-the-job training
Surprisingly, learning through methods like sending people on training courses did not exist at
3C. During the three years (1992-1993) that this study lasted, there were no training courses
organised by 3C for its staff. Also, none of its personnel (almost all of them have university
degrees) have been sent on courses to increase their qualifications. The reasons for this could be
twofold. One is that the training resources of the firm are limited (it is a small private firm).
Second, and because of that, the firm's managers maybe deliberately exploiting the existing
academic strength of its staff, rather than developing it further.
Learning-by-doing
Almost all activities were undertaken quite actively by its staff, except for the production of
computers. In investment, 3C was heavily involved in all kinds of pre-investment and
investment studies, preparation of feasibility studies, and dealing with starting up activities of the
firm. Although knowledge and experiences which 3C's managers had previously accumulated
were very valuable for them, it was not enough. When they started the firm, many problems
arose and they have to learn how to deal with these, through their own trial and error. One
problem was the establishment of a private company. At the time when they tried to create 3C,
there were not many private companies in existence. The legal framework was poor. In 1988,
they submitted documents to Hanoi City's authority for the establishment of a private firm. It
was refused. It took them almost a year of hard study to find a way forward. They found that
they had to use Vietnam Informatics Association as a sponsor to create their firm. Thre were
other problems. As a private firm, they had many difficulties dealing with foreign economic
issues, including the hiring of a Singaporean manufacturer to produce computers. Again, they
had to try hard to find appropriate partner, and mode of operation. To describe this step-by-step
trying, the firm's director said:
With all experiences we had from GenPacific and other organisations, we were
confident. When we began our own business, something turned out new and
quite different from the things we knew. No one taught us how to run a private
firm. So many pressures, so many new problems... But we had to accept this
and carry on. It took time, but we learned a lot. Now, we know how to expand
to garment or construction business, how to take and give shares in the new
share holding companies. And if we decide to go into East European market for
computing, we know more or less how to start a plant in Czechoslovakia.
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This learning-by-doing or it could be called "leaning-by-struggling to get things done" also
occurred in marketing activities. Prior accumulated experiences and knowledge of the Russian
market helped 3C a lot in selling its computers to the former Soviet market. When it produced
software, things became very different. 3C tried hard to sell these products to some
neighbouring countries by showing them at computer fairs and software exhibitions (in
Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore). It even tried to market these products (TINCO) to Western
countries like Germany and France. Despite these efforts, its success was limited. Numbers of
sold copies were insignificant. After a couple of years ofmarketing software, the lesson they got
is not surprising, but important as the vice-director mentioned:
Software is very unique product. It's tough for us to sell. You can design
something, but sell it is 10 time more difficult. You cannot compete with big
players like Microsoft. They are Kings in this business. In order to sell, you need
a network of advertisement, sale, after-sale and standardisation services. We do
not have anything like that. But we can try to become part of this big players'
network. Find a niche, and try to get a piece of this. That is the only way.
It seems that 3C learned this lesson quite well. They have dropped the idea of exporting its own
software by itself. Instead, it has moved to working with an international network of firms
specialising in the sale of software. Vietnamisation of software to serve the domestic market is
one of the niches they have found, and software subcontracting is being discussed with
Microsoft and Oracle.
Although 3C's learning-by-doing in minor technical change and linkage activities are not as
clearly seen as in investment and marketing, this mechanism was also used. The modification of
computer hardware to suite Russian customers brought 3C many practical experiences in
adaptation technique. In designing software, the first test of 3C's capability was adaptation of
the English version for the Russian market. They have obtained some small "know-how" in this
adapting process, and this success led the firm to its next venture with more confidence and less
time consumption. To modify Windows to Vietnamese version, 3C needed about 4-6 months
(compared to about a year to prepare Russian software) thanks to the use of this know-how. 3C
also started its first effort in learning major technical change, through producing an industrial
software package for the domestic market, and doing some research on mainframe computing.
But this effort is still very new and its impact on learning is yet quite limited.
4. Macro external factors, micro behaviours and learning
For the last 2-3 years, 3C has faced some difficulties. First is the unequal position of private
companies competing with SOEs in many aspects: higher tax rates levied on its sale, stricter
regime of financial control, and monitoring by government organisations. 3C, along with many
other private companies, argue that in doing their business they have to face much more
difficulties compared to SOEs. Second difficulty is related to market activity. The firm finds
exporting extremely hard and although the domestic market is expanding, it is still rather small
and disorganised.
As for difficulties in learning activities, 3C's managers reported the weakness of the supporting
system as the most serious problem. The domestic network of R&D institutes and universities
are not capable enough in supporting the firm in its innovation and learning activities. These
problems are varied: lack of modern facilities for providing training and experiments, and the
curricular of training and education programmes is unsuitable for the needs of the computer
business. The way research programmes and co-operative relations are organised and structured
does not encourage scientists to cooperate with 3C in formal contracts. One possible reason is
that computer scientists graduated from different schools and countries and worked in different
organisations; the tendency toward competition is obvious. At the same time, given the funding
shortage and bureaucratic funding application, relations between different groups of scientists
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sometimes can be rather negative and intense. Many education courses have not provided
practical training. All these have prevented 3C from using more formal learning mechanisms
such as sending its staff for different kinds of training beyond university degrees. This also
explains why 3C did not use any formal training mechanism. Information sources necessary for
upgrading its knowledge in high-tech areas such as computing are also limited.
3C sees the infrastructure, both physical and legal as a big problem for its training. One example
is the production of the VietWind software. When 3C began to sell this product to Vietnamese
buyers at a cost of about 100 USD per copy, in very short time the company found that its
product was being copied by computer users. As noted earlier, the firm had to put an extra hard-
lock on this software. Nevertheless, some expert users are able to break this lock after using the
product for a while. Although this product was registered with the National Office of Industrial
Property, there are no effective measures to protect 3C from piracy. This situation is
widespread, affecting many other products as well (most of which are foreign made). This
explains the reluctance of foreign firms (American firms, for instance) to co-operate with 3C in
long-term software development. Without this co-operation, it is difficult for 3C to learn the
skills of minor technical adaptation and improvements from foreign sources.
It would be unfair to say that 3C faces only negative factors from the supporting system. In fact,
even as a firm set-up privately, it has enjoyed many positive factors of the system. The founders
of 3C got training abroad and worked in these R&D institutions for many years. They acquired
much knowledge during the 1970s and 1980s thanks to this system. Also, the continuous
recruitment and accumulation of knowledge and experiences at a later stage of 3C's development
was helped mainly by the resources of the supporting system.
Policy factors are criticised by 3C's managers as being not favourable for a private company in
its learning efforts. The well-known discrimination towards private entrepreneurship makes it
more difficult to accumulate financial reserves for learning. At the same time, public sources of
training and expertise are very limited. As 3C's managers mentioned, these difficulties prevented
them from using off-the-job training mechanism: no funding, and no available free courses from
the state. Moreover, 3C's unequal position as a private company, and the unstable future
prospects of the private sector, may lead to the reluctance of foreign companies to cooperate
more closely with the firm.
Market factors have a significant impact on the learning activities of 3C. In a market open to
competition, searching, establishing and using foreign contacts for learning have all become
more costly and difficult. Domestically, the company has problems in developing its co¬
operative efforts with other companies; undermining the scope for its off-the-job training. Also,
its own learning-by-doing efforts are affected by a weak domestic electronics market. At the
same time, market changes have also given 3C something positive. Opening up the Vietnamese
and international markets to each other, and the integration of Vietnamese companies with
regional and international networks, has led to more open and transparent information flows. As
a company working mainly with information storage and processing, these conditions are
certainly important advantages that 3C can now enjoy.
One cultural factor has had a strong impact on learning in 3C. When researchers from many
institutes work together, there is always a psychological problem: their uncooperative attitudes to
working for the same software product. Because of this, 3C has had problems when it tried to
rely on these scientists for off-the-job training and collecting information.
3C argued a lot about the factors affecting its foreign connection mechanism: a mechanism that is
crucial to the firm. A possible explanation is that the foreign connection mechanism was used by
3C long before the firm started (as part of prior accumulation). More recently, the company has
had difficulty in maintaining these connections and developing new partnerships. Because of this
difficulty (as a result of a poorly developed legal system and unequal policy), 3C has only used
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foreign connections for learning marketing, investment, and production mostly in the initial
phase, but not for other capabilities like technical change or linkage.
3C has adopted various strategies in response to these problems. It has diversifies beyond
computing, trying to accumulate financial reserves from non-computer business to help with
new investment and expenses. Such activities also help with learning and innovation, especially
in the development of software products. The firm uses this diversification not only for
developing new markets and products, but also for maintaining its old market. After the collapse
of the Soviet market, the firm had to suspend its business temporarily. One new approach that
3C is exploring is a much more flexible mode of conducting business. Instead of being just a
seller of computers, the company now tries to be an intermediate arranging business deals. It
first looks for some potential customers, then finds the money to finance the deal, and also
arranges payment for those organisations which do not have experience and capabilities. Also,
instead of transferring goods back to Vietnam, the company can involve other partners from
third or fourth countries to arrange payment in goods. Thus, by playing an arranging role in this
kind of three-partite international contract, 3C continues it activities in Russia.1 The
diversification used by 3C helps the firm to secure new learning resources and expertise.
In addition, finding and using niches is another strategic behaviour as 3C did with software
production. However, this attempt of 3C was less successful. It does not yet have the marketing
knowledge required for international sales of software products. Its early marketing expertise
was suitable only for the Soviet market, and is no longer relevant. In general, many problems
will remain without solutions if there is no change in government attitude and policies.
^ne possibility that 3C is considering now is opening a production facility in Czechoslovakia, where imports of
SKD components is tax free. From this assembling facility, the firm would serve its market in the former Soviet
Union and other countries as well. According to the firm, this strategy has some advantages. Compared to Russia,
setting up business (sale office, shops, service centres or assembling facility) in Eastern Europe is easier, and
reasonable in terms of cost. The business environment is also more stable and safe. Another reason for expansion
is to utilise the existing academic strengths of Eastern European organisations. Meanwhile, the business now in
Russia becomes more and more non-computer. In 1992, 3C signed a deal of more than 3 millions USD for the
sale of garment products. Also, it is involved in a financial business: arranging and dealing with money exchange
and transfer for Vietnamese organisations and persons working in Russia. The firm can gain about 20% of total
amount of transaction from this business.
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